65 So. 911 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1914
The indictment on which the defendant was tried charges murder in the first degree. On the trial a conviction was had of murder in the second degree.
The conduct of the witness Cora Coon, when on the stand, and her refusal, or failure, to answer proper questions after the court was forced to waste much time in long waits and delays, fully justified the remarks of the court in admonishing her to answer questions, and in fining her for contempt for her refusal or failure to do so. The fine is shown to have been subsequently remitted. A witness may be adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to give testimony in a case in which he has been duly and regularly subpoenaed (Ex parte Pearce, 111 Ala. 99, 20 South. 343), and may be imprisoned until he consents to testify. — Code, § 4028.
Under the evidence in this case it was for the jury to say, from all the circumstances, whether or not the defendant believed, or suspected, that the person in the room with his sister was Bert Miley, the person he was charged with killing, and who, to the defendant’s knowledge, had been accused of having improper relations with his sister and warned, to stay away from the girl and keep off the premises. It was, then, relevant and competent evidence, and proper for the state to sIioav that these relations existed between Miley and defendant’s sister, or were the subject of suspicion that caused Miley to be notified to keep away, and that these matters were known to the defendant at the time, for the purpose of showing a feeling of enmity or animus, against deceased that would furnish a motive actuating the defendant in the commission of the act. The' natural tendency of this evidence AVas to give charac
It was not necessary to authorize a conviction by the jury that the evidence should show the particular intent, or motive, that actuated the defendant in the commission of the offense, so long as the jury was satisfied from the evidence that the criminal act was committed with one of the intents comprehended in the charge.— Code, § 6874. The law presumes that every person intends to do what he does, and that the natural, necessary, and probable consequences of his acts Avere intended. — McElroy v. State, 75 Ala. 9; Stein v. State, 37 Ala. 123.
It is fundamental, and has long been the declared rule in this state, that the law will not justify taking the life of an intruder because of a mere trespass committed by him on the person or property of another; it is only when necessary to prevent the commission of a felony by the trespasser that the law justifies such a killing (Oliver v. State, 17 Ala 587), and not then when a person is only attempting a secret felony unaccompanied by force (Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329). The authorities concur that the deliberate killing of another to prevent a mere trespass, Avhether it could or could not be otherwise prevented, is murder. — Williams v.
In this case the facts without material conflict show that the trespass had been committed. The intruder was on the premises the defendant had the legal right to protect, hut this person was not, at the time he was' shot and fatally wounded by the defendant, engaged in the commission of a felony or seeking to do bodily harm to the defendant or any of the inmates of the house. The
Construing the refused charges requested by the defendant in connection with the evidence, it will be readily seen that they are not reconcilable with the conclusions of law here announced, and there is' no error in their refusal of which the defendant has any right to complain. The given charges, more than covered the correct propositions contained in portions of the refused charges, and were, in some instances, more favorable statements of the law applicable to the case than the defendant was entitled to.
No reversible error is shown by the record, and the judgment of conviction appealed from will be affirmed.
Affirmed.