Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. County of Fayette
929 A.2d 1150
Pa.
2007
Check Treatment

*1 Philаdelphia, Frazier v. City commenced. See (“[PJursuant (1999) terms of express 735 A.2d rules, until entered on the appealable an it is order is has notice appropriate notation required docket with correctly Court deter- Although Superior given”). been at the time appeal that it not consider Petitioner’s mined could filed, directed the trial court that court should have was Action No. 01- on the docket Civil the denial order enter 13665. VACATED, is Superior order of the Court

Accordingly, the to that court instructions the matter REMANDED with is to enter a the trial court jurisdiction direct retain 01-13665, Action thus No. denial order the docket Civil See, appeal. e.g., otherwise perfecting premature Petitioner’s Mullin, (Pa.Super.2001) n. 1 v. Sobien that, notice of prematurely appeal “if a files a (observing party order, once a interlocutory appeal perfected from entered.”). generally See Pa.R.A.P. order is appealable final 905(a).

929A.2d 1150 SUPPLY, INC., Appellant, COOLSPRING STONE

v. Township FAYETTE, OF North Union COUNTY District, Appellees. Highlands Laurel School Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Argued Sept. 2006. 20, Aug. Decided *2 J., concurred Saylor, opinion. and filed C.J., Eakin, J., Cappy, opinion dissented and filed joined. Walker, Lucas, P.C.,

James R. Esq., McDonough Manion & Pittsburgh, Coolspring for Stone Inc. Supply, McCue, Firm, Esq.,

Donald J. McCue & Husband Law Connellsville, for North Township. Union at Frankhouser, Attorneys & Davis Esq., Davis

Gary Jay District. Law, Uniontown, Highlands Laurel School for Uniontown, & County Fayette for Esq., Cupp, John S. of Assessment. Fayette Board P.C., Imblum, Kodak & Esq., Knupp, L. Knupp,

Robert of Penn- Association Commissioners Harrisburg, sylvania. NEWMAN, CASTILLE, CAPPY, C.J., and

Before: BALDWIN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, JJ. BAER and OPINION Justice CASTILLE. real estate taxes in this is whether

The issue case interests subsurface on leasehold imposed & Independent Oil Gas decision following County, Fayette Association v. Board of *3 (2002) (“IOGA ”), we held 240, 180 where Pa. 814 A.2d of ad the imposition not authorize law does Pennsylvania case interests.1 The instant oil and gas valorem taxes on chal Inc. (“appellant”), Supply, Stone began Coolspring when limestone interest subsurface the tax on its leasehold lenged Township, North Fayette, Union by levied (collectively “appellees”) District Highlands Laurel School Appeals of Assessment to the Board through filing appeal ap (“Board”), appellant’s assessment. On upheld which did ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍not Board, held that IOGA the trial court from peal limestone, is not on subsurface an assessment prohibit “land” pursuant and is taxable as gas, like oil and fugacious Law, 72 P.S. County Assessment 201 of the General 201”). af 5020-201(a) (“Section The Commonwealth Court sufficiently firmed, meaning of “limestone” finding that case 201 and that the term “land” by encompassed following For the on limestone. an assessment supports law reasons, affirm. we and, accordingly, scope our question law presents a

1. This case novo. Common of review is de plenary and our standard review is (2006). Jones, 816 n. 1 wealth v. 590

341 Appellant operates a limestone quarry in North Union on Township leased property. Appellant has been conducting mining operations there for approximately two decades and has mining oсcurred at the site since the 1940s.

appellees began assessing real estate taxes on subsurface oil, minerals including gas, and limestone. Appellant appealed to the Board challenging validity of the tax on limestone. Meanwhile, a of oil group producers filed a declarato- ry judgment action challenging the validity the taxes ap- plied gas. Appellant’s appeal was deferred pending the outcome of the oil and gas producers’ case in IOGA. Ultimately, this Court decided that Pennsylvania statutory law does not authorize imposition of ad valorem taxes on oil and gas interests. 814 A.2d at 180. Following a hearing before the Board regarding appellant’s assessment appeal, the upheld Board the validity of the assessment on limestone.2

Appellant appealed to the trial court and also filed a com- plaint for declaratory relief. The two matters were consoli- Appellant mining operations pursuant conducts permits grant- to two ed Department ("DEP”) and, of Environmental Protection such, the limestone designated assessments have per permit. been 3374SM58T, Regarding permit DEP appellаnt by the Board notified 31, 2003, letter dated December following it owed the taxes:

Year 2,560 $ 1998 2,560 $ 1999 2,560 $ 7,310 $ 7,310 $ $776,000 $776,000 Regarding permit DEP appellant the Board notified on the *4 same date following that it owed the taxes: Year Assessment 53,620 $ 1998 53,620 $ 1999 53,620 $ 2000 $153,200 2001 $153,200 2002 $395,000 $395,000 in the facts the material averred admitted Appellees

dated. a motion to file appellant complaint, prompting petition judgment pleadings. on the for appellant’s trial court denied the

On December decision IOGA.3 reviewing motion after bemay to coal and court that limestone is similar trial noted By as beneath it. surface of as well found contrаst, fugacious oil are not constitute gas and Moreover, of the court found the definition surface land. 201 of “lands” in the General of Section minerals beneath the sur- solid-state inorganic Law included bar did not The trial court therefore found IOGA face. subsurface limestone. of real estate taxes on the assessment Thereafter, pursuant filed a statement appellant R.A.P.1925(b) its challenging reasoning the trial court’s to ad- supplemental opinion The trial court filed a opinion. (1) the court challenges misapprehend- that: appellant’s dress 201; portion addressing ed the of IOGA decision (2) that limestone relying the court erred in on case law find lands; (3) court is included definition within to find nature of citing fugacious erred limestone. The trial court did not taxes on prohibit stated scope that the was limited and emphasized permitted real estate to be that none of the forms of gas. The trial court taxed under Section included furthermore, noted, construction rules- a included within the defini- that limestone is require finding to the prior passage tion of “lands” because case law includ- it clear that the definition “lands” made former-justice trial Russell Finally, the court cited ed stone. that oil and opinion in which stated Nigro’s concurring estate, real fundamentally support unlike is relevant court’s character proposition filed a Appellant case. then disposition to the instant opinion trial its rendered on this date as 3. The court classified replaced opinion filed in which Opinion,” as it an earlier "Corrected incorrectly grant- introductory paragraph stated that the court was judgment pleadings. ing appellant’s on the motion *5 341(c), of finality pursuant motion for certification to Pa.R.A.P. the trial court granted. which the appellant’s

On Court affirmed appeal, Commonwealth opinion. a unanimous Stone published Coolspring Supply, (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). v. County Inc. 879 A.2d 323 Fayette, Judge Pellegrini, writing Judge Dante on behalf of L. Bernard Jiuliante, McGinley Judge rejected and Jess appel- Senior S. lant’s contention that limestone does not within the defini- fall tion “lands” Section 201 of General County under “land,” comparing Law after the definitions “limestone,” mineral, and “rock.” Since limestone is solid noted, panel gas. panel is dissimilar also early this quoted Lillibridge Court’s decision v. Lackawan- Co., (1891), na Coal 22 A. citing even Fulton, (1858), eаrlier decision v. Caldwell for the proposition place minerals in are “[e]oal land.” omitted). Coolspring, 879 A.2d at 327 (emphasis Because case is clear coal, law should be treated same as opposed gas, as ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍to oil Court agreed Commonwealth the trial with court that limestone is taxable.

Upon review, discretionary grant appellant claims that the Commonwealth Court to interpret failed Sec- and, tion 201 as set forth accordingly, erred in holding that a tax assessment subsurface limestone inter- is permissible. ests Specifically, argues appellаnt (1) IOGA decision instructs that: no expressly statute author- (2) izes taxation of coal; subsurface minerals than other subsurface 201; minerals are not explicitly listed (3) subsurface minerals do not come a layperson’s within understanding of the term “lands” and thus do not fall within meaning “lands” used in 201. Appellant contends that prohibits taxation of all subsurface miner- coal, other als than is distinctly by statute, authorized and IOGA must be followed under the principle stare decisis.

Appellant also that the erred in argues relying lower courts on “ancient” cases to address nature of subsurface mineral interests because those cases that oil equally suggest and at 7. Appel- Brief Appellant’s taxation.

rights interpret do not Lillibridge lant states that Caldwell If minerals term as used in Section 201. subsurface “lands” lands, Legislature would have asserts appellant were taxation legislation no to enact authorize separate had need *6 201 and no other interprets coal. Since Section on IOGA limestone, appellant argues of statute authorizes taxation in this case. controlling must be deemed that nature of oil fugacious contends Appellant further provides distinguishing no for because gas and basis ground on” that and “expressly this Court disavowed reliance instead, gas rights on the fact that subsurface oil and relied rights improvements. not as surface or could be classified although at 8. asserts that lime- Appellant Brief Appellant’s land, may on the of so too may gas, stone exist surface may not be also notes Section Appellant taxed. fisheries, not taxing obviously which are solid 201 authorizes lands, lime- that the differences between indicating physical oil, stone, Finally, anticipation of gas and irrelevant. 419 that Section appellees’ arguments, appellant argues (“Sec- Law, 72 P.S. 5020-419 General 419”), to tax limestone inter- provide authority does not tion ests, may taxed but states that the interests be provide of Assessment Law provisions extent other authorization. question counter does not

Appellees that IOGA answer case, gas to oil and holding as its limited posed fit gas that oil and do not within Appellees argue interests. lands, while limestone does. conception of layperson’s stated, gas any that oil and unlike according appellees, were objects and the listed in 201 decision did note mention limestоne. also did not Appellees 419, taxed, stone and address Section which indicates and attendant provides for taxation mines Moreover, naturally ap- fixed and stays shelters. land, appear on but oil and do not on the surface pears evaporate If the surface. left the surface of would time into the escape atmosphere. Appel- over and would recognized lees assert that this Court these differ specifically oil, gas, appellees ences and stone in Lastly, between IOGA. Lillibridge contend that IOGA did not cite and related 19th century thеy cases because were not relevant to the issue decided in thus been having ably IOGA.4 matter briefed argued, ready it is for decision.

It in Pennsylvania is well-established power a municipal body to tax is must from originate enactment Constr. Assembly. General Northwood Moreland, v. Township 463, Co. Upper 579 Pa. 856 A.2d (2004); IOGA, 182; Appeal A.2d at H.Kof Co., (1966). Here, Porter appellees contend that the General County Assessment Law provides requisite for authority the taxation of subsurface limestone interests.5 Section in particular, states that: subjects shall, The following property hereinafter provided, assessed, be valued and taxation *7 town, all county, city, borough, township, poor school and purposes at the rate: annual

(a) estate, Houses, All real to wit: house trailers and mobi- lehomes[,] buildings or permanently attached to land con- water, facilities, nected gas, sewage with electric or build- lands, ings, rents, lots of ground and ground parks trailer lots, kinds, and parking mills and manufactories all furnaces, bloomeries, forges, distilleries, houses, sugar malt houses, breweries, fisheries, ferries, wharves, tan yards, and all kind, office type construction portion whatever that steel, lеad, a aluminum or like melting and continuous enclose, casting structures which provide protec- shelter or tion tools, from the for the elements various machinery, appliances, equipment, materials or products involved the 4. County Pennsylvania Commissioners Association of submitted echoing arguments by appellees amicus curiae brief the raised emphasizing broadly that improvements this Court has construed land suggesting conception be taxed under Section a broad lands in is in precedent. this case accordance with otherwise, Except explicitly whеre stated the General Assess applies ment Law to all counties within the Commonwealth. 814 A.2d at 182 n. 6. other

mill, mine, or industrial and all manufactory process, from taxation. by real estate not law exempt 5020-201(a) added). § (emphasis P.S. does not this Court determined that Section 201 814 A.2d at 183. gas taxation of oil and interests. provide for interests includ- rejected gas that oil were specifically We the overruling categories ed within listed two to “all statutory reference trial court’s determination interests, the encompassed real estate” as well that the reference separate Court’s conclusion Commonwealth Id. gas. Relying to “lands” covered generis6 doctrine of codified ejusdem construction 1903(b) 1903(b), Act, Statutory of the Construction Pa.C.S. term estate” forth reasoned that the “real set Court following provi- limited the terms in the Section 201 is 814 A.2d at 183-84. therefore determined sion. We subjects those listed only proper taxation were estate,” court’s following rejected the term “real trial contrary. Addressing basis reasoning typi- stated holding, this Court Commonwealth “lands” referred to layperson’s understanding cal the term any “permanently surface or rights physical improvement elaborated: ground. affixed” to We contrast, any are unlike gas rights, by quite Oil and Thus, objects other identified in Section 201. specifically dissimilarity the nature of oil and and those between fit to enumerate as Assembly items the General saw militates the conclu- proper against of taxation general within the encompassed sion that such terms term “lands” listed therein. *8 for support

Id. at 184. This Court found further its conclusion under any that oil taxable gas interests ejusdem generis as follows: IOGA further summarized doctrine of particular general classes of words follow the enumeration "[W]here things, applicable рersons general words will be construed as or things general persons or the same nature or class as those IOGA, (citing at 184 Steele v. Ins. enumerated.” Statesman Co., 190, (1992); Summit Condo. v. 530 Pa. A.2d House Commonwealth, (1987)). 514 Pa. 523 A.2d 333 authority by looking to Section 415 of the General County Law, 5020-415, § Assessment 72 P.S. and Sections 612 and Law, 616 of the Fourth to Eighth ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍Class Assessment County 5453.612,5453.616, §§ P.S. provide separate assess- IOGA, ments of coal and do not mention oil gas interests. 814 A.2d at 184-85.

Former Nigro Justice Russell authored a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas Saylor, agreeing IOGA there is no statutory authority permit taxation of oil and However, gas interests. Justice Nigro disagreed with the majority’s because, view, application ejusdem generis in his it rendered the “all phrase other real estate” in Section 201 Nigro ineffective. Justice would have held that oil and gas were not taxable under statutory authority since are of a they IOGA, “fundamentally different character than real estate.” J., 572 Pa. at 814 A.2d at 185 (Nigro, concurring). cannot accept appellant’s We contention that fugacious nature of oil was completely irrelevant to this Court’s reasoning Although IOGA. Court declined to a expressly address second issue upon granted which we review, namely whether the fugacious nature of oil and gas exempts those fossil fuels from being of real estate taxation, id. at 180 n. 1 it is evident that the physical charac teristics of the fuels was central to the Court’s ultimate holding that oil do not fall within the term “lands” listed in Section 201 of the General Law. The IOGA Court considered the physical nature of oil and gas pursuant 1903(b), to 1 Pa.C.S. which instructs that a stat ute’s “[gjeneral words shall be construed to take their mean ings and be words,” restricted preceding particular and this prior interpretation of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that general words of a statute enumerating particular class should “be applicable only construed as persons or things general of the same nature or class as those enumerated.” 814 A.2d at 184 (citing Steele v. States Co., man Ins. (1992); 530 Pa. 607 A.2d 742 Summit Commonwealth, House Condo. v. 523 A.2d 333 (1987)). Under and principles construction, of statutory *9 case, therefore, prop- instant Court the Commonwealth of “land” definitions the terms

erly dictionary examined the is its of whether limestone during and discussion “limestone” pursuant taxable to Section 201. alia, as, “the part solid

Land is defined inter of specific part and as “a by earth’s not covered water” surface Dictionary earth’s surface.” Webster’s NewWorld ed.1986). (2d mainly of consisting is “rock college Limestone carbonate, remains composed organic calcium often mollusks, corals, etc., building animals, and used as sea as lime, Rock, stone, a etc.” Id. at 820. source of portion a obviously comprises limestone a certain type, is surface, stony as it defined as a mass of may be earth’s contrast, neither nor is a By at 1231. material. Id. the physical solid on the earth’s surface. Given structure limestone, сlear, minimum, it is at a that surface properties taxed as under Section 201. may limestone be “lands” afford subsurface question remains whether a from limestone interests different status surface Caldwell, at tax In purposes. interests for real estate coal dispute a over subsurface property which involved interests, place stated and minerals in this Court that “[c]oal three land.” the same before that case was Court When earlier, years the Court noted no distinction between subsur face and mineral interests: surface name may incongruous

It somewhat thought apply be mineral underlying of land the surface and to both strata, title; it is more they where have been severed but a to treat as heredit- incongruous corporeal still the surface ament, right, granted large the mine in terms so when deposit, incorporeal. as to mineral as whole comprehend Lillibridge, at 480. summarized Caldwell Id. this Court other stating as that coal and corresponding precedent are land: subsurface minerals or other emphatically have decided that the coal

[W]e land, mineral attended with beneath the is surface ownership all the peculiar attributes and incidents corporeal, land. We have held the mineral to be hereditament; may that the surface be held incorporeal, one person, by fee and the mineral also fee another person; mineral taxation land,, to an independent taxation as surface *10 when a of the by person; possession owned different ejectment, may mineral be and title to it by recovered be acquired by possession adverse under statute limitations, though by not because it not prescription, is short, a incorporeal right. we have nearly half mineral, сentury judicially regarded ownership of where it has been severed properly surface, as from ownership to all intents and purposes. added). 22 A. at 1036 (emphasis these While cases did pertain tax challenges to and coal they primarily address interests, they illustrate that this Court has classi- historically fied subsurface and surface minerals as Since both land.7 there is apparent authority interests, to tax surface limestone we it incongruous, find that would be in consideration of both precedent logic, to a place higher tax value on land with surface limestone than on land with the same quantity completely limestone underlying the earth’s surface. Appellant’s objection to the taxation of limestone based on the fact explicit that there is authorization tax statutory to coal, 5453.612, 5020-415, §§ see P.S. 5453.616, but not limestone, is of no moment.8 The physical solid nature of coal limestone, is similar to that of distinct from the fugacious minerals addressed our IOGA. Given determina- tions that limestone falls within the term “lands” listed Section 201 and that limestone is like coal more than oil and gas, need limestone not be in a explicitly listed tax statute interests, specifically Few cases address limestone same but the 7. principles applicable mining of law rights contractual coal have been applied explicitly construing regarding mining a contract limestone Kerr, rights Pa.Super. (1940), v. per Burke aff'd opinion by, (1941). adopted curiam and 19 A.2d 382 Appellees also refer County to Section 419 of the General Law, 5020-419, § support 72 P.S. position for their that limestone is however, agree, taxable. We appellant provision with would equally support gas. of oil taxation construction, principles taxable under be deemed 1903; category of a only subset see 1'Pa.C.S. need listed, it is. conclude that already and we Furthermore, us interpret would have although appellant mineral rights, bar of all subsurface the taxation IOGA limestone, em- coal as from we recognizing different thereby to oil and interests. pertained phasize character of land additionally recognized physical terms in Section unlike the listed declaring here considered appropriately courts therefore lower Finally, in general. appel- and land the nature limestone our the 1933 ignore preceded lant us cases urges {i.е., Assessment Law Lilli- enactment of General however, Caldwell). so, to do for our bridge and We decline as encompass- of “lands” in Section 201 present interpretation and physical is informed both historical ing term, assume in- may safely which we conceptions In re Locust St. legislative enactment.9 See formed *11 741, (1935) 744 (Legislature 319 Pa. 179 A. Subway, change state its intention to ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍common expressly presumed statute). law new reasons, judgment affirm the foregoing

For the we limestone interests are Commonwealth Court subsurface real estate taxation. not participate Former Justice NEWMAN did decision of this case. (1910), County, & Warren 228 77 A.

9. F.H. Rockwell Co. v. Pa. 665 gas separately are beneath the surface also taxable as stated that land, contemplate any particular did whether but F.H. Rockwell interests, gas as we statutory provision permitted the taxation of oil and repeatedly of the General instructed that an enactment have since Co., Assembly necessary tax valid. See for a to be Northwood Constr. 796; 182; Co., IOGA, Appeal 219 at 814 A.2d at H.K. Porter Moreover, County Assess- A.2d at 654. enactment General and, there is Law followed F.H. Rockwell as determined ment prеsently supports authority that the real estate taxation of no gas interests. proposition by appellant that oil and cases cited Other Mellon, taxing do not See Marshall v. 179 minerals involve issue. Marshall, (1897); Blakley A. 201 v. 34 A. 564 (1896). Justice BAER and Justice join BALDWIN the opinion. Justice files a concurring SAYLOR opinion.

Chief Justice flies a dissenting CAPPY opinion which Justice EAKIN joins. SAYLOR,

Justice concurring. I join the I majority opinion. that, write note in the case, joined I concurrence, Mr. Justice Nigro’s relied on the special characteristics of oil to support the conclusion that such minerals beyond were the reach of Section 201 of the General I appreci- Law. ated that oil and gas have been termed “real estate” in various decisions, but applying a strict construction of the statute most favorable to the I taxpayers, found sufficient ambiguity in Section 201 regard minerals, with to these in light of their vagrant character, and fugacious support taxpayers’ position. However, regard with to solid minerals attached to earth, surface, on or beneath its there seems to me to be no room for similar any ambiguity-these are almost universal- ly understood to be rеal estate. See generally C.J.S. Mines (2007) (“Minerals § and Minerals in place are generally held to be a part of the real estate with all the attributes and peculiar incidents to the ownership of but after their removal from the they land become Thus, personalty.”). I conclude that was plainly intended to reach them. 5020-201(a) See 72 P.S. (providing for taxation of real “[a]ll estate” and “all other real estate not exempt by law from taxation”). CAPPY,

Chief Justice dissenting. *12 I respectfully dissent. When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, this Court must adhere to the rules promulgated by the Statutоry Construction Act in order to ascertain and effect the intent of the Legislature as conveyed the 1921(a). 1 statutory language. § case, Pa.C.S. In this we are asked to construe the words promulgated by 201 of the Law, General County specifically the the taxation. imposition in the context of

word “lands” 5020-201(a). this § this Court has done Respectfully, P.S. (2002), once In before. the used the word Legislature this Court held that when then rights.” “lands” in it meant “surface We case, to the facts of that to determine applied this construction as of “lands” category that oil did not fit under the case is Accordingly, Id. the task this rights. surface as this construed already previously Court partially complete, the of the “lands” in Section 201. What meaning word bar, to the at that construction issue only apply remains is or under which is whether not subsurface fits “lands,” i.e., rights.” “surface category limestone, or As is focused on subsurface inquiry our here surface,” unequiv- is limestone which “below the would seem the taxation “surface ocal that a statute that authorizes uppermost layer,” the “outermost or rights,” or which is impose could read a tax power not be to extend of the land. The Random minerals lie below thе surface Language Dictionary English (2nd ed.1987). I House thus hold 201 does authorize would that Section con- taxation of limestone based on subsurface struction of word “lands” IOGA. major- despite attempt distinguish

Notably, of the earth’s ity part does concede that land is defined as But it that limestone exists both on surface. observes Therefore, surface the earth as below the surface. as well incongruous expand claims that it be not to majority would merely include not the surface of definition lands to majority The has chosen but also which is below. than to of the statute rather expаnd previous our construction sense, our the statute in its did construe narrowest Court we inappropriate IOGA. I believe that this because when taxes, our must impose construe construction provisions 1928(b)(3). Breitinger City v. strict. Pa.C.S. (1950), 70 A.2d 640 this Court Philadelphia, rule that there are consid- long-established reiterated the two provision. a tax erations involved the construction of *13 tax, first consideration measures government’s power and the second mandates strict Id. at 642. construction. (Internal omitted). citations “It principle universally is a declared and admitted that municipal corpоrations levy can no taxes, inhabitants, or general special, upon or their property, power plainly unless the conferred.” Id. unmistakably Further, grant construed, of such rights is to be strictly and not by implication. extended Id. This is so principle doubt, important when there is the construction should be against the government. Therefore, Id. our rules of construction precedent compel us not expand definition of “lands” to include subsurface limestone by impli- cation, but rather to all resolve doubt in taxpayer. favor of the meanwhile, The Legislature, remains free to explicitly invoke the authority limestone, to tax subsurface itas has with coal.1 precedent

Our concerning the provisions construction of tax further makes clear that this case is not analogous our decision in Lillibridge, (1891), 22 A. which we held that subsurface minerals can be conveyed as land, because in Lillibridge we construed a contract between private two parties, which did not require strict level of construction that must employ we when we construe a statute that imposes a tax.

Therefore, 1 would hold that subsurface limestone does not fall within the meaning “lands” as used Legislаture thus, the Legislature yet has to plainly and unmistakably confer power to tax subsurface limestone. I Accordingly, would reverse the order of the Commonwealth

Court. IOGA, support this Court found proposition for the that the use of the word "lands” Section 201 gas by noting did not include oil and separate statutory provisions had been created for the taxation of 5020-415, §§ coal at 72 P.S. 5453.612 and 5453.616. suggests at Legislature 184. This necessary ‍‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‍believed that it was promulgate specific coal, authority imposing the taxation of because Section 201 did authority. not contain that If Section 201 does not coal, grant authority mineral, to tax a subsurface than it follows that grant the same section authority does not to tax subsurface lime- stone.