51 So. 321 | Ala. | 1909
This is a sad and unfortunate case. It is a suit by a child against her father, and seeks to decree and enforce a resulting trust in and to certain lots, and the houses thereon, in the city of Gadsden, Ala. The hill charges that the father, under an agreement Avith the daughter, invested her money in the purchase of these lots and in erecting the houses thereon, and took the title thereto in his own name, and now refuses to,recognize the trust, or-to convey the property to her, and is attempting or is in the act of selling and conveying the same for his own benefit and
The father and children seem to have been people of small means, but were industrious and lived well. Neither father nor daughter had any estate of material consequence until the daughter acquired by the will of her uncle this estate of more than $14,000. The father was, of course, her natural guardian till her marriage, which occurred September 3, 1906, and was appointed her legal guardian upon the death of her uncle who left her the estate. As such legal guardian he received her legacy in June, 1906, and at once had instituted in the chancery court proceedings to have her disabilities of nonage removed, Avhich were accordingly so decreed; and on the 14th of July (a little more than a month after receiving her legacy as guardian) he made his
If this was an absolute, valid, and bona fide gift to the father, then the complainant is not entitled to relief, except to the extent admitted by the respondent in his answer; that is, to a half interest in the two lots, as to which funds were used in constructing the houses thereon under the alleged agreement to share equally in the lots after the improvement. The father’s theory of the case is corroborated by his and his daughter’s attorney, Mr. Strange, who conducted the settlement of the guardian, and also conducted the proceedings to have the daughter’s disabilities of nonage removed, to the effect that the daughter told him she was going to give her father something out of the legacy, but named no amount, and that the father told him she was to give him $4,000. He is also corroborated by one Baird, who seems to have represented a surety company, who made the father’s bond as guardian, and who seems to have supervised or assisted in the settlement of the guardianship. He says that when- the daughter delivered the check for $4,000 to her father, she said “that she was giving this to her father, and that she thought he deserved it.”
The wife of the father, stepmother of the daughter, and Sumner Spain and Tressie Spain, relatives of the stepmother, were at the father’s house at the time the
The daughter Avas married in September after the transactions in July. It seems that no trouble arose until in January, 1907, when the daughter and her husband demanded the deeds and papers, the father refusing to deliver them, and they say that for the first time they then learned that the titles to some of the lots Avere in the name of the father. The daughter says that her father at first promised to deliver the deeds to her, and made no objection or refusal to do so, but put her off for one reason and another, saying that the deeds were in the courthouse and Avere safer there, than they would be elsewhere; that her husband then demanded the deeds of her father; that they had some Avords about them, and the father said he did not know that she and her husband could get the deeds, and, as she says, for the first time claimed that the lots were his, and that she had given him the $4,000 absolutely. This, of course, was denied by the father, his wife, and Miss Spain; and they testified that the daughter had seen the deeds, and knew of their contents before, and had not objected, that at one time they Avere kept in her hat box, but the testimony of the clerk in the probate office tends to show that all the deeds remained in the probate office from the time they were filed till January, 1907, about the time the father declined to deliver them, and (as the daughter says, for the first time) claimed the lots as his oavu. It is impossible to reconcile this evidence as to the gift. Besides, the evidence referred to her Aras evidence of expressions of the
Thus is the case made a hard and difficult one. Because of the great conflict in the evidence, and because of the relations of the parties to the transaction, it is hard to find wherein the exact, the whole truth, lies. It is, however, made certain that in law and in equity this property is or ought to be the daughter’s, unless she did make an absolute gift, binding in law and equity, of the $4,000 evidenced by the check from her to her father on July 14, 1906, the date upon which he made the final settlement as her legal guardian. But for the evidence tending to show gift unquestionably the complainant would be entitled to relief. It is likewise beyond question that the daughter drew the check for $4,000 in favor of the father, but it is not certain that it was intended as an absolute gift. The use to which the father put it, as well as all his subsequent acts, shows that he applied it to the purpose for which the daughter says it was intended; the difference being that the father says it was for himself, and the daughter, that it was for her, and their respective witnesses, corroborating each, differ as widely, one set from the other, as tlie daughter and father. • The evidence being so in conflict, the law must be appealed to, to settle the respective rights of the parties in the matter.
It was said by the New York Court, long ago, in the case of Bergen v. Udall, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 (we quote head notes of opinion).: “Where a daughter, immedi-. ately upon her arrival at lawful age, makes a voluntary conveyance for the benefit of her father, the transaction will be examined by the court with the most jealous scrutiny and suspicion. The person relying upon the conveyance must show affirmatively, not only that the one who made it understood its nature and effect, and executed it voluntarily, but that such will and intention was not in any degree the result of misrepresentation or mistake, and was not induced by the exertion for selfish purposes, and for his own exclusive benefit, of the influence or control which the father possessed over his daughter. There is no law against a child bestowing upon a parent any property of which she may be the owner because she loves him, and desires to promote his interests. But there is an inflexible principle both of public policy and private justice which forbids a parent making use of his influence, or his child’s affection, to impose upon her mind a purpose of bounty to him.” In this same case the court quotes from Lord Langdale, M. R., as follows: “If there be a pecuniary transaction between a parent and child and just after the child attains the age of 21 years, and prior to what may be called a complete emancipation, without any benefit moving to the child, the presumption is that an undue influence has been exercised to procure that liability on the part of the child, and it is the business and duty of the party Avho endeavors to maintain such a transaction to show that that presumption is adequately rebutted, and that it may be adequately rebutted is perfectly clear. This court does not interfere to pre
The following rule of law and evidence is firmly settled in cases like the one in question, coming down to us, as it does, in an unbroken chain from Lord Elder’s decisions: Where a father takes a gift from his child he must assume, the burden of proving the transaction righteous, by showing, not only that the child comprehended the transaction, fully understood it, and that the act was the exact and correct intention of the donor, but how that intention was induced, what influence (if any) was exerted in procuring the gift, or that it was for the benefit of the donor and not of the donee. Courts watch such transactions: with great jealousy. The parent in such cases must observe the best of faith —“uberrima fides.” The weaker party must be put and kept upon an equal footing with the stronger, and the courts must do this. In the case of Davis v. Davis, 4 Giff. 417, it was held that where a daughter shortly after becoming of age gives to her- father, who acts as her guardian, a large part of her property, the gift should be set aside. In a. similar case — Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 Deg. M. & G. 133 — upon a state of facts very much the same as that in the case last cited and as that in the case at bar, the same rule was applied and made just after the donor had arrived at majority; and the
The averments of this bill are a sufficient basis for the award of the relief granted, and a separate bill was not necessary.
We are not prepared to say that the chancellor was in error in finding the transaction not to be a gift; and say what is uttered in the foregoing paragraphs merely in answer to appellant’s argument as to a variance. We do not think there was a variance, and hence do not
The decree of the chancellor is affirmed.
Affirmed.