83 Ind. 402 | Ind. | 1882
Indictment for obtaining a signature to a deed of conveyance by false pretences, under section 27 of the act of 1852, defining certain felonies. 2 R. S. 1876, p. 436. Motion to quash the indictment overruled. Verdict, of guilty, fixing the punishment at two years imprisonment in the State’s prison, and judgment on the verdict.
The indictment charged that James V. Cooke, the appellant,, on the 7th day of May, 1881, at the county of DeKalb and. State of Indiana, with intent to cheat and defraud one Hugh Watt, did feloniously, fraudulently, designedly and falsely represent and pretend to the said Hugh Watt that he, the said' James V. Cooke, was then and there the owner in fee, in his-own right, and had a good and perfect title, in law and equity,, to a certain described tract of land containing 160 acres, situate-. in the county of Osceola and State of Michigan; that said land was free and clear from all liens and encumbrances of every kind; that it was worth $10 per acre ;®that the soil was a rich, black loam, from eight to fourteen inches deep; that said land was well timbered with hard-wood timber; that there were no swamps or lakes on said land; that said land was situate not more than six miles from Evart, a railroad town and a good market; that it was also situate not more than nine
The first objection urged to the proceedings below is, that the court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion to quash the indictment.
It is insisted that the averments in the indictment did not, in any material sense, show that the false pretences alleged to have been made by the appellant, were the operative cause in inducing Watt to sign the deed of conveyance set out in the indictment.
In our opinion the indictment was, in the respect suggested, fatally defective.
It contained no averment of any contract or agreement between Watt and the appellant concerning the Michigan land; or of any interest, either present or prospective, which Watt may have had in the subject-matter of the pretences and representations charged to have been made as an inducement to him to sign the deed.
It is true the indictment averred that Watt relied upon these pretences and representations when he signed the deed, but why did he rely upon them ? what reason had he for doing so ? that is left to conjecture merely. It may have been that an exchange of lands was at the time in contemplation, but the indictment did not make any such an averment. Con
We are unable to see any natural connection between the two transactions.
We think that this case is analogous in principle to the case of Jones v. State, 50 Ind. 473, and that the conclusion we have reached is fully sustained by that case.
As the judgment will have to be reversed for want- of a sufficient indictment, we need not consider some questions discussed by counsel which arose at the trial.
The judgment is reversed, and'the cause remanded for further proceedings.