115 P. 318 | Cal. | 1911
The defendant in this action is a California corporation having its principal place of business in the city and county of San Francisco. The action was commenced in the county of Santa Clara to recover damages for breach of warranty of the quality and fitness of certain galvanized sheet iron which it was alleged was sold and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff in said county of Santa Clara. The defendant demurred to the complaint and at the same time filed its demand, affidavits, and motion for an order changing the place of trial to said city and county of San Francisco, "where said defendant resides and has its principal place of business." This is an appeal from the order denying that motion, and involves a consideration of our constitutional and code provisions relating to the place of trial of those civil actions, in which our domestic corporations are defendants. By section
"Sec. 16. A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases."
And this has been held to mean, not merely that an action against a corporation may, at the option of the plaintiff, be commenced in one of the designated counties other than the one in which the defendant has its principal place of business, but that it may be prosecuted to final judgment where commenced unless the defendant can allege and show some sufficient *Page 697
ground for a change of the place of trial distinct from the fact that the residence of the corporation is in another county.(Terezevant v. Strong Co.,
It is true that the appellant urges the objection that the complaint does not show that the breach of contract alleged therein occurred in Santa Clara County, but we have no doubt that it does.
It is also contended by the respondent that the punctuation of section 16 of article XII of the constitution, requires a construction which would allow a corporation to move for a change of the place of trial only when the action has been commenced in the county of its principal place of business. We do not consider this the proper construction of the section, and do not see how such construction would affect the disposition of the present appeal. If the main feature of said section as construed in the cases above cited is violative of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution no construction of its final clause could save it, and if it is not violative of the fourteenth amendment, the construction contended for is of no consequence in this case. Aside from these minor questions, thus briefly considered, all that we have to decide in this case is, as above stated, whether section 16 of article XII of the constitution of California, as heretofore construed, is, in its application to transitory actions, such as this, violative of a right secured to our domestic corporations by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. To sustain its contention on this point the appellant relies principally upon the decision of this court in the case of Grocers' Union v. Kern County Land Co.,
The order of the superior court is affirmed.
Angellotti, J., Shaw, J., Sloss, J., Lorigan, J., Henshaw, J., and Melvin, J., concurred.