180 Ga. 282 | Ga. | 1935
The Volunteer State Life Insurance Company filed a petition praying that a policy of life insurance issued on the life of J. Murray Cook be canceled. The defendant, tiie beneficiary named in the policy, in her answer prayed for a judgment against the plaintiff for the amount of the policy. The first trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the cross-action of the defendant. On motion of the plaintiff a new trial was granted, which resulted in a directed verdict in favor of the prayers of the plaintiff for a decree canceling the policy. The defendant excepted to the refusal of a new trial.
The petition alleged that the policy lapsed on August 11, 1932,
Upon the trial it appeared that the policy in question was issued on July 26, 1925, and was carried as a term policy until January 1, 1926, from which time its status was that of a twenty-pay life policy. The annual premiums due on January 1 were paid during the years 1926 to 1930, inclusive. The policy contained the usual provision in life-insurance policies that á grace period of thirty days was allowed in payment of premiums. During January, 1931, the insured borrowed $214 on the policy, .and out of the proceeds of this loan paid the premium due then. When the January, 1932, premium became payable the insured, Dr, Cook, wrote to the Augusta office of the company, stating he would like to give a note for the premium due. He was advised that “The full loan value has been withdrawn on this policy; however we can make you an extension on the following proposal: Premium on policy is $73.40, the loan interest is $12.24, making a total of $86.24. If you will remit us promptly $15.24 together with the executed extension note, we will carry the policy to May 1st, 1932;-and we will at that time, if you are unable to settle the note in full, grant a further extension of a part of it.” Dr. Cook executed the note and remitted the $15.24. When this note matured in May, the company agreed to accept a payment thereon of $15 and to extend the due date of the note to August 1, 1932, which was done. The note provided a grace period of ten days. The insured mailed to the Augusta office of the company a check for $56.30,- payable to the order of the company, which was received on August 16, 1932, and on that day deposited to the credit of the -company in a bank in Augusta, by Mrs. Harden, the company’s cashier at Augirsta. The indorsement on the check was “For deposit to credit of The Volunteer State Life Insurance Company of Chattanooga, Tennessee.” On August 20, 1932, Mrs. Harden wrote to the insured: “I have been holding your payment of $56.30 on extension note in suspense column, waiting for the balance of $1.77 interest due. Will appreciate it you will give the matter prompt attention, so we can close
1. The insurance company brought the petition, after the death of the insured, to cancel the insurance contract on the ground that the policy had lapsed, and in order to prevent collection by the beneficiary, who had asked for a blank upon which to make proofs of loss. The insured had paid the note representing the premium on the policy to a date subsequent to his death. In payment of a note given by the insured for the premium just referred to, the insured transmitted to a duly authorized agent of the insurer a check which was paid by the bank upon which it was drawn, and the money was deposited to the credit of the insurance company
2. A jury would have been authorized to find in favor of the beneficiary, and consequently it was error to direct a verdict in favor of the petitioner. An insurer can not arbitrarily accept money, and afterwards say he holds it for a different purpose than payment of the premium.
3. Moreover, if for no other reason, the court erred in directing the verdict, inasmuch as the suit was not one justiciable in equity. Enelow v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., U. S. (55 Sup. Ct. 310, 79 L. ed. 247).
4. In view of the rulings stated above, a ruling on the question of the reinstatement of the policy is not at this time necessary. The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.