Lead Opinion
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
for the Court:
¶ 1. In July 2006, Pаul R. Cook’s workers’ compensation claim was dismissed for failure to file a properly completed pre-hearing statement. In December 2006, Cook’s “Motion for an Order Re-Instating Claim” was denied for failure to “attach a properly completed prehearing statement....” In August 2008, Cook’s “Amended Motion to Reinstate” was dismissed as barred under the one-year statute of limitations provided in Mississippi Code Section 71-3-53. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-53 (Rev. 2011) (“the cоmmission may, ... at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case, issue a new compensation order ..., or award compensation.”) (emphasis added). The full Commission affirmed the dismissal, as did the Circuit Court of Rankin County and a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals. See Cook v. The Home Depot,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. The Court of Appeals summarized the underlying facts and procedural history, as follows:
[o]n August 6, 2004, Cook filed his petition to cоntrovert with the Commission alleging a back injury he had sustained [on May 13, 2003] while moving cast-iron bathtubs at The Home Depot, his place of employment. The Home Depot filed a B-31 Final Notice form with the Commission on August 6, 2004, providing Cook disability payments in the amount of $7,153.72.
Cook filed a motion to review the cessation of his benefits and payment of his medical bills on April 29, 2005, alleging further medical treatment was necessary. The Home Depot disputed Cook’s nеed for further treatment in its response to Cook’s motion, and on June 30, 2005, the [Administrative Judge (“AJ”) ] ordered an independent medical examination with The Home Depot to pay the costs associated with the examination.
On July 27, 2006, the AJ dismissed Cook’s claim for failure to file a completed prehearing statement pursuant toCommission Procedural Rule 5.[ 2 ] Cook filed a petition to reinstate his claim and a prehearing statement [on October 30, 2006], which the AJ denied on December 6, 2006, due to an improperly completed prehearing statement^3 ] Cook filed an amended prehearing statement on December 13, 2006, and also on January 8, 2007. [4 ]
In June 2008, Cook’s attorney sent a letter to the Commission alleging that he had personally delivered a second amended petition to reinstate, which was attached to a prehearing statement, to them on July 21, 2007. Cook’s file with the Commission did not originally contain either оf these documents. His file was updated with these documents dated July 21, 2007, but they only bore the official stamp date of June 17, 2008, the day the Commission received them.
[On August 29, 2008,] [t]he AJ dismissed Cook’s claim because the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-53 (Rev. 2000) ran from December 26, 2006,[5 ] to December 26, 2007, and was not tolled by any action or filing.[6 ] Cook filed an appeal with the full Commission. The full Commission affirmed the AJ’s decision to dismiss Cook’s claim. The Rаnkin County Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal of Cook’s claim as barred by the statute of limitations.
Cook,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 3. This Court has stated that the:
review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, was beyond the scope or power of the agency to make, or violated one’s constitutional or statutory rights.[7 ] Short v. Wilson Meat House, LLC,36 So.3d 1247 , 1250 (Miss.2010) (quoting Public Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Dearman,846 So.2d 1014 , 1018 (Miss.2003))_ Because the Commission is the ultimate fact-finder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, this Court may not reweigh the evidence before the Commission. [Short, 36 So.3d at 1251 ] (quoting Barber Seafood, Inc. v. Smith,911 So.2d 454 , 461 (Miss.2005)). This Court affords de novo review to the Commission’s application of the law. Natchez Equip. Co., Inc. v. Gibbs,623 So.2d 270 , 273 (Miss.1993). “The legal effect of the evidence, and the ultimаte conclusions drawn by [the Commission] from the facts ... are questions of law, especially where the facts are undisputed or the overwhelming evidence reflects them.” Cent. Elec. Power Ass’n v. Hicks,236 Miss. 378 , 388-89,110 So.2d 351 , 356 (1959). “[W]hen the agency has misapprehended a controlling legal principle, no deference is due, and our review is de novo.” ABC Mfg. Corp. v. Doyle,749 So.2d 43 , 45 (Miss.1999).
Gregg v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass’n,
ANALYSIS
¶4. Mississippi Code Section 71-3-47 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this chapter, the details of practice and procedure in the settlement and adjudication of claims shall be determined by rules of the commission, the text of which shall be published and be readily available to interested parties.” Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-47 (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added). See also Miss. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Gen. R. 2, http:// www.mwcc. state.ms. us/LAW-CLMSH rules, asp (last viewed Feb. 8, 2012) (“These Rules shall be in effect and shall apply to all claims or matters pending before the Commission as of the effective date of the Rules [April 1, 2001], and to all matters or claims thereafter filed.”).
[i]n December 2005, the Commission approved changes to the prehearing statement form. The revised prehearing statemеnt form became effective January 2, 2006, and the revised form, as well as general instructions and a sample completed form, are available in the “Forms” section of the Commission’s official website....
Beginning February 21, 2006, the Commission will require the exclusive use of the revised prehearing statement form. On and after that date, any prehearing statement filed using the old form will be considered incomplete under Procedural Rule 5. Any party who files а prehearing statement using the old form will be required to resubmit a complete prehearing statement using the revised form.
(Emphasis added.) The Commission’s “General Instructions Regarding Prehear-
¶ 5. Based upon Cook’s failure to comply with Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission Procedural Rule 5, the AJ entered an “Order Dismissing Claim for Claimant’s Failure to File a Completed Prehearing Statement.” (Emphasis added.) That July 27, 2006, order added that Cook “must attach” a “prоperly completed prehearing statement” to any subsequently filed “Motion to Reinstate the Claim.” Yet Cook failed to correct the prehearing statement error in his “Motion for an Order Re-Instating Claim.” The AJ’s December 6, 2006, “Order Denying Motion to Reinstate Claim” expressly noted Cook’s failure to “attach a properly completed prehearing statement to” his “Motion for an Order Re-Instating Claim[,]” such that Cook’s claim would not be reinstated to the Commission’s “active docket....” The order became final twenty days later, on December 26, 2006, at which point Cook had no claim pending before the Commission. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-47 (Rev. 2011). Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations began to run at that time. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-53 (Rev. 2011). Throughout 2007, while Cook “submitted] several notices of depositions and amended prehear-ing statements,” he never “petition[ed] to have his claim reinstated.”
¶ 6. Under these circumstances, this Court is not presented with an “even question” or a “[d]oubtful case” which would be controlled by the “beneficial purposes” of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 7. Many putative suitors intend to file lawsuits; and many lawsuits evidencing an intent to pursue a remedy are dismissed for failure to follow the rules. Intent to proceed does not excuse Cook’s failure to follow established procedural rules and court orders providing repeated instruction on his need for, and the means to, cure. A suitor’s intent does not toll the statute of limitations. It is his action, or failure to act, that decides the issue. Cook did not file an “Amended Motion to Reinstate” with the proper prehearing statement attached until June 17, 2008, nearly six months after the statute of limitations had expired on December 26, 2007. Therefore, Cook’s claim was properly dismissed. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the Commission’s rules and rulings of their statutorily intended effect, since “[a] rule which is not enforced is no rule at all.” Allen v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
CONCLUSION
¶ 8. Cook’s claim is time-barred. Accordingly, the judgments of the Mississippi Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court of Rankin County, and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission are affirmed.
¶ 9. AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The bracketed portions of this quote, including bracketed footnotes, have been added by this Court.
. The "Order Dismissing Claim for Claimant's Failure to File a Completed Prehearing Statement” specifically stated that "if [Cook] desires to file a motiоn to reinstate the claim, he/she must attach to the motion a properly completed prehearing statement and a proposed order or the motion will be denied.” (Emphasis added.)
. The "Order Denying Motion to Reinstate Claim” provided that "because [Cook] did not attach a properly completed prehearing statement to the motion or did not notice the motion[,]” his claim would not be reinstated to the Commission's “active docket....” (Emphasis added.)
. These "Amended Pretrial Statements,” along with subsequent deposition notices, did not accompany a "Motion to Reinstate the Claim.”
. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-47 (Rev. 2011) (a "decision shall be final unless within twenty (20) days a request or petition for review by the full commission is filed.”).
. The "Order of Dismissal” stated that "[n]either the notices of ... deposition nor the Amended Prehearing Statements ... was effective to erase the one-year statute of limitations.”
. Cook has raised no constitutional оr statutory violation, and the procedural rule at issue comports with due process and equal protection.
. The effective date of these rales followed this Court's decisions in Harper v. North Mississippi Medical Center,
. The dissent additionally relies, erroneously, upon the "eventual taking of Dr. David Lee's deposition,” which occurred on December 28, 2007, after the statute of limitations had expired. (Waller Op. at ¶ 20).
. As grounds for reversing the Commission, the "beneficial purposes” of the Act should come into play only on close calls. Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie,
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring:
¶ 10. While I agree with the majority that workers’ compensation applicants must follow the law, I am surprised to read this Court’s doctrinaire view that the Commission’s rules — which, in terms of authority, hardly rise to the level of statutes — should be so strictly applied. Were all members of this Court to apply the same level of commitment to the strict application of statutes (say, for instance, the State’s statutory obligation to bring the accused to trial within 270 days),
. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev. 2007).
. McBride v. State,
Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶ 12. Because I would hold that Cook took sufficient action to toll the statute of limitations on his workers’ compensation сlaim, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and the Rankin County Circuit Court and remand to the Commission for further proceedings. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 18. Vardaman Dunn, in his oft-cited treatise on workers’ compensation law, said, “The humanitarian objectives of compensation laws should not be defeated by over-emphasis on technicalities or by putting form above substance.” Dunn, Vardaman S., Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation § 32 (3d ed. 1990). Long ago, this Court expounded on the benеficent purpose of workers’ compensation law:
[T]he worker’s compensation acts should, must, or will be accorded a broad or liberal construction or interpretation, on the various grounds that the acts are remedial in their nature, and that the acts are remedial in their purposes, objects, or operation, that they constitute commendable legislation, or humane, humanitarian, paternal, or social legislation, that they have a beneficent or beneficial purpose, that they are enacted for worthy, public, humane, or humanitarian purposes, that they are grounded in justice, and economically sound, affect the public welfare or interest, establish or are founded on a public policy, and are authorized by the police power.
... [T]he acts are not to be given a strict construction or application, nor are they to be given a narrow, strained, forced, harsh, rigid, unrealistic, fanciful, or technical construction or interpretation.
L.B. Priester & Son, Inc. v. Bynum’s Dependents,
¶ 14. In Harper v. North Mississippi Medical Center,
¶ 15. In Doyle, this Court again found that actions other than a formal petition to reopen were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on a claim. Doyle,
¶ 16. In today’s case, Cook filed two amended pretrial statements following the AJ’s December 6, 2006, order of dismissal. These statements noted that Cook’s disability status and the amount of benefits he was due were contested. Furthermore, the statements alleged that Cook and Home Depot did not agree on his date of maximum medical recovery. It is apparent that these statements were intended to show that Cook was continuing to seek disability benefits. Cook also filed several notices of deposition, and took the deposition of Dr. David Lee on December 28, 2007.
¶ 17. As with the claimants in Doyle and Harper, Cook’s actions subsequent to the AJ’s order constituted a “sufficient request for payment” to toll the statute of limitations. See Doyle,
¶ 18. The majority points out that Harper and Doyle predate the effective date of the current version of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission’s General and Procedural Rules. (Maj. Op. ¶ 4, n. 8). I fail to see how this is significant. First, in Doyle, the Court recognized that the claimant’s actions were not in compliance with the Commission’s Procedural Rules, as the Rules existed at that time. Doyle,
¶ 19. The majority also takes issue with my reliance on Cook taking Dr. Lee’s deposition as one of the actions sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The majority believes that because this took place on December 28, 2007, it occurred “after the statute of limitations had expired.” (Maj. Op. ¶ 5, n. 9). However, Cook had taken significant actions prior to this date, including filing multiple amended pretrial statements and several notices of deposition. Based on this, I would find that Cook had taken actions sufficient to toll the limitations period prior to the date of the deposition.
¶ 20. I agree with the majority that “[a] suitor’s intent does not toll the statute of limitations. It is his actions, or failure to act, that decides the issue.” (Maj. Op. ¶ 7). However, Cook did take action. Coоk’s amended pretrial statements, combined with Cook’s notices of deposition and eventual taking of Dr. Lee’s deposition, were more than sufficient to put Home Depot on notice that Cook continued to request and seek enforcement of payment. In barring Cook’s claim for his failure to file a formal petition to controvert with a proper prehearing statement attached, the majority incorrectly foсuses on “form above substance,” and ignores the beneficent purpose of the worker’s compensation acts. See Dunn, Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation § 32; Prentice v. Schindler Elevator Co.,
¶ 21. Based on this Court’s precedent, and considering the beneficent purpose of the worker’s compensation acts, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and hold that Cook took sufficient action to toll the statute of limitations on his claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ„ JOIN THIS OPINION.
. In keeping with the majority’s baseball analogy, based on this Court’s precedent, if Cook is "out by multiple steps," it is only because the majority has moved the bag back several feet. (See Maj. Op. ¶ 6, n. 10).
. The only difference between the prior version of this rule, with an effective date of September 1, 1993, and the version quoted by the majority is that the current version refers to a "prehearing statement” where the prior version labeled it a "pretrial statement.” Otherwise, the rule is unchanged.