8 How. Pr. 514 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1852
The question involved in the first demurrer is whether the action, and judgment therein, by Barton, against the present defendant, operates- as an extinguishment of the plaintiff’s demand.
It was settled, that at law, separate actions could not he sustained for different parts or portions of an entire demand or cause of action. Miller agt. Covert, (1 Wend. R. 487, and cases there cited.) In those cases, and all I have met with on the subject, the same person was plaintiff in the different suits for parts of the same cause of action; and they were cases, wherein, from the nature of the demand, there was nothing to hinder the plaintiff in the first suit, from recovering the entire claim as well as any part,—as well the part not included in the judgment, as that which was included. In such a case it would be oppressive and vexatious to allow the plaintiff to split up a cause of action which was single and entire, and to harrass the defendant with several prosecutions, when one would subserve the same purpose. That was one of the reasons why it would not be permitted. - Another arose out of the incongruity of allowing a party, having an entire, indivisible
The defendant claims that the foregoing rule is applicable to the present case; that the liquidation of the amount of loss by the burning of the insured property, between Fletcher and the defendant, constituted one entire, undivisible demand or cause of action, which it was not competent for the former to separate, so as to make it the subject of several actions; and hat the action brought by Barton, and judgment therein, for the part of the liquidated amount subsequently assigned to him by Fletcher, had the effect to extinguish the whole claim.
I think it cannot be maintained that an entire demand cannot be assigned in parts to different persons, so that the rights of each assignee shall be protected and enforced; or that a part of such demand may not be assigned, and the residue or remainder retained by the assignor, and the assignee and assignor be both protected in respect to their respective interests.
In the case of a legal demand, the assignor and assignee, or the several assignees, in case the whole demand had been assigned, probably might have united in an action at law, before the Code, in the name of the assignor, to recover the whole demand. But no action at law could be sustained in such case, except in the name of the assignor, unless the debtor had agreed to pay the assignee who brought such action.
It does not appear what, if any, defence was set up in the action by Barton against the defendant. It was competent for them, in that action, to have alleged the nonjoinder of the
The second answer shows that Sheppard should have been made a party. As I have attempted to show, in discussing the validity of the first answer, the defendants have the right to have all the claims to this demand, growing out of the loss of the insured property, adjudicated and settled in one action. The complaint makes out a prima facie case against these defendants alone, and it does not appear from it, that there is any other person who ought to be made a party; but the answer under consideration sets up other facts, showing the propriety of making Sheppard a party. On being informed by the answer, of Sheppard’s interest or claim, the plaintiff should have made him a party, by way of amendment to the complaint, and have brought him into court by process, if necessary. (See Story’s Eq. Jur. § 1526; Van Santvoord’s Pleading, 103-4-5, &c.)
The plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment on the demurrer to the first answer, and the defendant to judgment on the demurrer to the second answer; with liberty to the plaintiff to amend his complaint by making Sheppard a party, with proper averments or allegations. No costs are allowed to either party as against the other, on either of the demurrers, or upon the amendment.