19 Tex. 434 | Tex. | 1857
The petition, by Joseph T. Cook, charges that the defendants, as administrator and administratrix of James Cook, deceased, are indebted to him for moneys loaned the deceased on the 19th day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-one, and on the 19th day of February, eighteen hundred and fifty-two, amounting to six hundred and fourteen dollars 25-109, and alleges that, at the time of the loan, it was understood and agreed between the said James Cook, deceased, and the plaintiff, that the money was to be repaid to the plaintiff at any time when he should want or demand the same ; but that the said James died on the 19th Sept. 1853, without having paid any of the said sum of money; that the defendants took out administration on the 19th Oct. 1853; and by amended petition, he alleges that the account being presented to defendants on the 28th September, 1854, was rejected by them as not being a just claim against the estate. The plaintiff also alleges, in his amended petition, that the contract as to the payment was specific and certain; that the plaintiff expressly agreed to demand said money as condition for its payment, and the deceased expressly agreed to pay the same on demand; and in substance charges, that he did not demand his money during the lifetime of the deceased. The only evidence, introduced in support of the claim, was that of S. M. Cook, the administrator, who deposed that, in the year 1854, in (as witness believes,) the fall of that year, the plaintiff
The defendants relied, among other matters, on the Statute of Limitations of two years ; and the ruling of the Court was to the effect that the Statute did not commence to run, as against the plaintiff, until demand made for the money loaned. The jury found for the plaintiff the full amount of his claim.
The only question is, whether there was error in the proposition that the Statute did not commence to run against the claim, until there was demand for the restoration of the money. And it appears very clear, upon the authorities, that this was erroneous; that an account or note payable on demand, is payable immediately ; that there need be no special demand, and that the Statute of Limitations commences to run from the date of the note or account. (4 Humphrey, 321, 322 ; 13 Pick. 418 ; 13 Wendell, 267.)
A receipt for a sum of money, by which the person receiving it undertook to return it with interest, “ when called on ” so to do, created a cause of action from its date, and against it the Statute runs from that time. (Perry v. Griffith, 1 Har. & Gill, Md. R. 439, as cited in Angell, 98.)
In Norton v. Ellam, 2 Meeson & Welsby, Exchequer Rep. p. 461, the note was, “ I promise to pay £400 on demand, with
The agreement in this case, as appears from the evidence, was, that the money should be paid the plaintiff when he demanded it. In other words, it was a loan of money payable on request, and the debt which constitutes the cause of action arose instantly on the loan ; consequently, the Statute commenced to run immediately, and the demand as alleged, and even as proven, was clearly excluded by the bar of the Statute.
The evidence to sustain the demand was not very satisfactory. The witness knew nothing about it subsequent to the declarations of the deceased, which were long before his death, perhaps twelve or eighteen months. The transaction in relation to so large an amount of money, was extremely loose ;
Reversed and remanded.