41 N.J. Eq. 152 | New York Court of Chancery | 1886
The questions now before the court for decision arise on exceptions to a master’s report. When the bill in this case was filed, the complainant obtained an order requiring the defendant to show cause why an injunction should not issue against him. Subsequently, an injunction was granted conditionally, the condition being that the complainant should execute .a bond, with sureties, to the defendant, conditioned to pay him such damages as he should sustain by reason of the injunction, in case it should finally be decided that he was not equitably entitled to the in
The exceptions taken to the report are so comprehensive as to render a reconsideration of the case, in all its branches, necessary. While the exceptions on the part of the complainant challenge each allowance made to the defendant, the argument of his counsel, on the hearing, was mainly directed against two items: first, the allowance made to the defendant for his time and services in procuring a dissolution of the injunction, and for the mental strain and anxiety he suffered in consequence of the injunction. The master has allowed for counsel fees a little over $4,300. The complainant denies, the right of the defendant to recover counsel fees at all, but says that if they are recoverable in cases of this kind the amount allowed to the defendant is unreasonable and excessive.
Judicial opinion on the question whether or not counsel fees should be allowed as damages in such cases, is not uniform in this country. The supreme court of the United States holds
The course of decision, however, in many of the states is the other way. It is there held that- a reasonable amount of counsel fees, necessarily expended in getting rid of an injunction unfairly obtained, may be recovered under a bond or undertaking similar in its provisions to the terms of the bond on which this proceeding is founded. Such, it is said, is the course of decision in New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,. Alabama and California. 2 High on Injunc. § 1685 et seq.; 2 Suth. on Dam. 64 et seq. I have not examined any of the-cases except those decided by the courts of New York and Ohio. In both those states the rule as above stated is firmly established. Edwards v. Bodine, 4 Edw. Ch. 292; S. C. on appeal, 11 Paige 223; Aldrich v. Reynolds, 1 Barb. Ch. 613; Corcoran v. Judson, 24, N. Y. 106; Rose v. Post, 56 N. Y. 603.
The courts of this state- are, so far as I am aware, entirely uncommitted on this question, and they are therefore at- liberty to-
Where the act of a complainant makes it necessary for a defendant to expend his money to rid himself of an illegal or unjust restraint, the loss thus suffered is an actual damage which the defendant has sustained by reason of the restraint. There is
The master has allowed the defendant a little over $4,300 for counsel fees. This allowance is said to be unreasonable and excessive. The injunction was granted July 5th, 1877, the defendant filed his answer on the 13th of October following, and the injunction was dissolved and the complainant’s bill dismissed on the 20th of December following. The defendant was subject to the restraint of the injunction for a period of five and a half months. The injunction' was not dissolved on motion, after argument, but by the consent of the complainant. So far as appears, no effort was ever made to get rid of the injunction, and no step ever taken looking in that direction except filing the-answer. The case the defendant was required to answer was neither intricate nor difficult. The complainant, by his- bill,.
The foregoing statement presents the substance of the complainant’s case. It will be seen that the case the defendant was called upon to answer was a comparatively simple one. It involved nothing but his contract relations with the complainant. He must have known what these were the moment he received notice of the suit. The claims which were the subject of the contract were very large, the judgment recovered on them being nearly $300,000.
The amount allowed by the master for counsel fees is, in my judgment, excessive. I regret to differ with him. His judgment, in consequence of his learning and large experience both
The master allowed the defendant $2,500 as compensation for his time and services in procuring the dissolution of the injunction, and for the meutal strain and anxiety he suffered in consequence of the injunction. This allowance is contrary, I think, to both precedent and principle. An attempt was made, in Edwards v. Bodine, to induce the court to make a similar allowance. The claim made in that case was for compensation for time spent in going to counsel and consulting with him. Both the vice-chancellor and the chancellor rejected the claim, declaring that such loss was not a damage. 4 Edw. Ch. 292; 11 Paige 227. There is such a thing known to the law as damage without injury, and this occurs where- damage results from an act or omission which the law does not esteem an injury. Human tribunals administer justice imperfectly; even when they do their best, the results obtained, as a general rule, are only approximations to perfect justice. There are wrongs and misfortunes, arising from casualties and the imperfections of human institutions, against which no human law can give protection. “ The best cause,” says the chancellor, in New York and Long Branch R. R. Co. v. Dennis, 11 Vr. 340, 369," may be eventually lost by
I shall not discuss the other exceptions. All of them have been carefully considered, and such consideration has led me to the conclusion that none of them are well taken, and they must therefore be overruled.