The salient facts established by the findings
Plainly it could be found "that the accident occurred in the course of his employment. In going to the Boston office on this Thursday morning Cook was performing a duty for which he was expressly employed and paid. A failure on his part to so report would have been sufficient ground for his discharge from the company’s employment. This is not the case of an employee being injured after he has finished his day’s work and left the employer’s premises. See Bell’s Case,
The only doubtful question is whether the board were warranted in finding that the injury arose out of Cook’s employment. It is often stated as a general rule that an injury cannot be said to arise out of the employment of the injured workman where it
There is nothing in the language or purpose оf our workmen’s compensation act to indicate that the Legislature intended to exclude from its benefits the numerous body of men engaged in out of door employments. Among those generally recognized as coming within the compensation acts are teamsters, drivers and chauffeurs, injured upon the strеet; the following recent -cases being illustrations: Keaney’s Case,
It is not material whether such injured workman is using the street on foot, or in a public or private vehicle, provided he does not thereby subject himself to somе added and unauthorized peril. As was said by Lord Finlay, L. C., in Dennis v. A. J. White & Co. supra, “If a servant in the course of his master’s business has to pass along the public street, whether it be on foot or on a bicycle, or on an omnibus or car, and he sustains an accident by reason of the risks incidental to the streets, the accident arises out of as well as in the course of his employment.” It frequently happens that the employer furnishes transportation for the workmen to and from their work, as an incident of the employment; and an injury suffered by the employee while so travelling is generally held to arise out of the employment. Donovan’s Case,
In view of the foregoing principles and authorities, it seems to us that the Industrial Accident Board were warranted in finding that the injury suffered by Cook arose out of his employment. They would unquestionably be justified in so finding if Cook had been struck by an automobile while he was necessarily crossing a street, on his prescribed route in South Boston, in the performance of his duty of soliciting insurance. The same would be true if a similar accident happened while he was walking to the home office in Boston, in pursuance of the orders of his employer to do so, and while under its pay therefor. If, in order to save time which belonged to his employer, he took an electriс car to Boston, and was injured in a collision, the accident board would not be precluded as matter of law from finding that the injury arose out of his employment. The fact that in the case at bar the injury arose while Cook was alighting from the car does not render the relation between that injury and his emplоyment so remote as to preclude a legitimate inference that the risk from which he suffered was incidental to his employment, and arose out of it.
The facts bring this case within the authority of Moran’s Case, supra. Moran also was a solicitor and collector in the employ of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, and he was struck by an electric car which he was intending to board. On the other hand it is distinguishable from Hewitt’s Case,
In the opinion of a majority of the court, the decree of the Superior Court should be affirmed.
Ordered accordingly.
The Chief Justice and Justices Crosby and Carroll feel constrained to express their dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court. It is their firm conviction that the facts of the case at bar bring it directly within the authority of three of our decisions under the workmen’s compеnsation act. The facts here are that the claimant was an. insurance solicitor for the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. He walked about his district, which covered definite streets in South Boston, making collections of premiums from those insured. He also solicited new insurance. Once each week he had to take his collections to the home office and settle his accounts there. He selected the car, route and precise time of going to the home office. He might have used any other appropriate means of transportation as well as a streеt car. He was riding on a street car on his way to make one of these weekly visits when he received injury. It happened in this way: “When he was getting ready to get off the car, his heel slipped and caught on the step. He was dragged along. . . . Before the accident he had been riding on the front platform. . . . His hеel slipped and then he was dragged. He was not going to get off the car without it stopping; that he was getting ready to be on the lower step.”
The three decisions which we regard as completely concluding the case at bar in every essential particular are Hewitt’s Case,
The claimant in Hewitt’s Case was also an agent for the Jоhn Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. He was injured by the overturn of an automobile upon which he was riding for the purpose of inducing its driver to buy insurance and who just before the accident had agreed to take a policy. It was said in the opinion that in taking the ride Hewitt “plainly did not leave the field within whiсh he was authorized to work for his employer.” He was injured by one of the ordinary perils of modern travel.
In Moran’s Case,
The cases of Hewitt, Donahue and Braley were rightly decided. They all are recent cases, the earliest having been decided barely six years ago and the last less than two years ago. They stand as the adjudications of the court. They are not overruled. The attempt to distinguish them from the case at bar will introduce confusion in the administration of the workmen’s compensation act, which ought to be made as simple as possible.
The history of the workmen’s compensation аct shows that it was not intended to include within its scope the ordinary injury occurring in street cars. Chapter 120 of the Res. of 1910, whereby provision was made for the appointment of a commission to investigate the subject, recites that a change is required “in the present system of determining the compensatiоn of employees for injuries sustained in industrial accidents, and that the Commonwealth ought to provide different and more suitable relief.” The commission appointed pursuant to that resolve, in submitting the draft act subsequently enacted into the law with few changes, said: “The basic principle of the act is that the cost of injuries incidental to modern industry should be treated as a part of the cost of production.” Report of Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents (1912) 46. That the act was intended to be in a general sense a substitute for pre-existing law is apparent from provisions to the effect that subscribers under the act are relieved from the provisions of the employers’ liability act while all other employers of labor (with exceptions not here material) remain subject to that act. Certain defences were taken away from employers who chose not to become subscribеrs under the act. St. 1911, c. 751, Part I, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4. While the act is given a liberal interpretation, it seems to us unlikely that the Legislature intended to afford relief to an employee riding on a street car, when left freedom of choice as to particular car, time or route.