Case Information
*1 Before B AUER , E ASTERBROOK , and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges .
E ASTERBROOK ,
Circuit Judge
. This suit began as
Cоok Coun-
ty Republican Party and Chicago Republican Party v. Cook Coun-
ty Board of Election Commissioners
. The Party (as we call the
two partiеs collectively) contended that the Board must in-
clude on the ballot a candidate that the Party slated for the
House of Representatives in the November 2016 election. But
*2
the Board had never announced a plan to exclude the candi-
date. The district court entered an injunction compelling the
Board to keep this candidate on the ballot. The court did not
ask whether there ever had been a case or controversy be-
tween the Party and the Board.
The Party named two additional defendants: Frances Sapone and Sammy Tenuta. In March 2016 еach had been elected a ward committeeman, a position that includes a seat on the Party’s central committee. The Party, whiсh refused to seat them, sought a declaratory judgment that its action is valid under Illinois law. Its refusal to seat them is what led it to worry that the Board would not рut its candidate on the ballot. The Party feared that the Board would deem the se- lection invalid because the central committee wаs not properly constituted. That worry proved to be unfounded, but the Party’s dispute with Sapone and Tenuta remains live. It is not, however, itself a fedеral claim—the Party’s po- sition against Sapone and Tenuta rests on state law, and the litigants are not of diverse citizenship.
The state-law dispute is a serious one. Illinois law pro- vides for the election of ward committeemen. 10 ILCS 5/7- 8(b). Sapone and Tenuta won their elections and contend that they are entitled to be seated unless disqualified under 10 ILCS 5/7-8(k) (felony conviction) or 5/8-5 (death, resigna- tion, or moving outside the ward of election). Sapone and Tenuta describe these statutory conditions as the sole grounds of disqualification. But the Party has eligibility rules. One of these is that a person is ineligible to be a ward committeeman if he voted in any other party’s primary with- in eight years of standing for election as a ward cоmmittee- *3 man. (This rule was adopted less than two weeks before the election in which Sapone and Tenuta ran, but they do not make anything of this timing.) Sаpone had voted in every Democratic primary during the eight years preceding her election as Republican ward committeeman, seе 223 F. Supp. 3d 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 2016), and Tenuta had voted in at least one Democratic primary during those years. The Party con- tends that its eligibility rules are valid under Illinois law. Thе Party adds an anticipatory federal contention: if state law does not respect the Party’s eligibility rules, then Illinois violates the First Amendment. We call this anticipatory be- cause (a) neither the Cook County Board of Election Com- missioners nor any state official has suggested that the Par- ty’s eligibility rules are invalid, and (b) it is just a potential response to a potential contention by Sapone and Tenuta.
The district court ruled in the Party’s favor on its conten-
tion that its rules are valid under Illinois law and added that,
if local or state officials nonetheless were to contest thе Par-
ty’s rules, then the officials would be violating the Constitu-
tion. 207 F. Supp. 3d 841 (N.D. Ill. 2016). For the constitu-
tional part of its decision the district court relied on
Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee
, 489 U.S. 214
(1989), which holds that political parties have a right under
the First Amendment to choose their own leaders. The judge
did not consider the fact that public officials were not con-
testing the Party’s claims—recall that the Board did not ap-
peal and that the relief against it became incontestable when
the time for appeal expired. See
1000 Friends of Wisconsin Inc.
v. United States Deрartment of Transportation
,
That the Party’s claim against Sapone and Tenuta rests on state law and the Party’s own rules is the initial jurisdic- tional problem as the case reaches us. The Party’s claim against the Board deрended on federal law, which raises the possibility that its claim against Sapone and Tenuta could come under the supplemental jurisdiction. But 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) limits the supplemental jurisdiction to events “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdic- tion that they form part of the same case or controversy un- der Article III of the United States Constitution.” The Party’s claim against the Board demanded the inclusion on the bal- lot of a candidate for the House of Representatives in No- vember 2016. The Party’s claim against Sapone and Tenuta denies that all elected ward committeemen must be seated on the Party’s central committee. The validity of the Party’s rule potentially matters to both claims, but they are not rе- motely a single case or controversy under Article III.
This leaves the question whether the Party’s claim against Sapone and Tenuta arises under federal law and therefore can support original federal subject-matter juris- diction. There is a federal issue, but it is a defense; the Party submits thаt its rule is valid and that it need not seat Sapone and Tenuta. They, too, rely on state law, not on the Constitu- tion. The federal issue would matter in pоtential reply to an argument Sapone and Tenuta might make. That’s not enough to have a claim “arise under” federal law, which is required for original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331.
Declaratory-judgment suits under 28 U.S.C. §2201 can complicate the ascertainment of subject-matter jurisdiction by casting a natural defеndant as the plaintiff. That’s what happened here; the Party sued Sapone and Tenuta to defend *5 its decision to exclude them, rather than waiting for them to assert a right to be seated on the central committee. The Su- preme Court has told us that the best way to evaluate juris- diction in a declaratory-judgment suit is to determine whether the mirror-image suit by the other side would be within federal jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Board v. Con- struction Lаborers Vacation Trust , 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). So let us try that exercise.
If Sapone and Tenuta had sued the Party, demanding
membership on its central committee, their сlaim would
have arisen under Illinois law: they received the most votes
in elections as ward committeemen, who get seats on the
central committee. The Party would have defended by rely-
ing on its rule. Sapone and Tenuta would have rejoined that
the rule is invalid—that 10 ILCS 5/7-8(k) and 5/8-5 are the
sole exceptions to the seating of elected officials. Only then,
in the fourth round of pleadings, would the Party have con-
tended that, if Sapone аnd Tenuta are right about Illinois
law, the state violates the First Amendment by abridging a
political party’s right to choose its leaders. A claim does not
“arise under” a fourth-tier line of argument in a suit that is
fundamentally about state law and a private organization’s
bylaws; even a federal defense (thе second tier) does not
make a claim arise under federal law. See
Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co
., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950);
Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley
, 211 U.S. 149 (1908);
South Bend v.
South Bend Common Council
,
The district court should not have adjudicated the dis- pute among the Party, Sapone, and Tenuta. The declaratory judgment is vacated, and this aspect of the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter juris- diction.