243 Conn. 677 | Conn. | 1998
Opinion
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an employee who is injured in the course of his employment while occupying a motor vehicle owned by his employer is entitled under General Statutes § 38a-336 (f)
The following facts are not disputed. The plaintiff, John Conzo, while operating a police vehicle during the course of his employment as a police officer for the defendant city of West Haven (West Haven), sustained personal injuries in a collision with an underinsured vehicle. The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits from West Haven for the injuries he sustained in the collision. He also received the $20,000 limit of the third party tortfeasor’s automobile insurance policy. The plaintiff sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits from West Haven, which is self-insured pursuant to
Both West Haven and Aetna denied coverage of the plaintiffs claim for uninsured motorist benefits, each claiming the coverage of the other was applicable. The plaintiff then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment to determine whether one or both of the defendants must provide uninsured motorist benefits for his loss, and whose coverage would be primary. Aetna moved for summary judgment claiming that West Haven has a duty to provide uninsured motorist benefits, and that those benefits are primary. West Haven also moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284 (a),
The trial court determined that both West Haven and Aetna are required to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the plaintiff, but that West Haven’s coverage was primary and Aetna’s coverage was secondary.
We do not write on a clean slate with respect to the right of an employee to receive uninsured motorists benefits as a result of injuries sustained while operating an employer’s motor vehicle during the course of employment. In 1992, in Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 755, 610 A.2d 1245 (1992), a majority of this court held that § 31-284 (a) prevented an employee from collecting uninsured motorist benefits from the employer. Id., 755-56. The court pointed out “that workers’ compensation is an employee’s only remedy for injuries that arise during the course of his employment,” and that the exclusivity provision of § 31-284 (a) applies whether the employee’s claim is predicated on common-law tort,
In 1996, in Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 238 Conn. 285, 291, 679 A.2d 925 (1996), we held, with respect to an employer who was insured by a commercial insurance policy for uninsured motorist coverage, that § 38a-336 (f) clearly was intended to reverse the majority holding in Colman and, in doing so, “was intended to be clarifying legislation and, as such, must be accepted as a declaration of the legislature’s original intent pertaining to the interplay between the uninsured motorist provisions of . . . § 38a-336 and the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision of § 31-284.” Consequently, we applied § 38a-336 (f) retroactively. In Reliance Ins. Co., we also noted, however, that we were leaving open the question of the effect of § 38a-336 (f) on cases such as Bouley in which the employer is “self-insured.” Id., 289 n.4.
West Haven argues that § 38a-336 (f) cannot be interpreted to apply to self-insured employers because it does not expressly create an exception to the bar set forth in § 31-284 (a). In response, Aetna argues that § 38a-336 (f) reverses the decision in Bouley as well as in Colman because the legislature intended to guarantee that the benefits of uninsured motorist coverage
Our resolution of this issue is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. “[0]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 379, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
In its argument, West Haven focuses on the language of § 38a-336 (f), which excepts from the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act “an employee of a named insured” that shall be covered by “such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.” West Haven points out that because it is self-insured, it does not come within the purview of the phrase “named insured” in § 38a-336 (f), which is defined as “the person specifically designated in the policy as the one protected and, commonly, it is the person with whom the contract of insurance has been made.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). We disagree for several reasons.
First, West Haven, as a self-insurer, comes within the definition of insured. West Haven, pursuant to § 38a-371 (c),
Second, the legislative history of § 38a-336 (f) persuades this court that the legislature intended to mandate uninsured motorist benefits for employee victims of accidents involving inadequately insured vehicles irrespective of the status of the victim’s employer as a self-insurer or as a purchaser of a commercial policy of insurance. “The legislature is presumed to know the judicial interpretation placed upon a statute. ... It is further presumed that when the legislature subsequently acts with respect to a statute, it does so with full awareness of relevant judicial interpretations.” (Citations omitted.) Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255, 262-63, 701 A.2d 650 (1997); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 107 S. Ct. 1391, 94 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987). The decisions in Bouley and Colman, the relevant judicial interpretations of the uninsured motorist statute, § 38a-336, rendered less than one year
When enacting § 38a-336 (f), the debaters confirmed that the legislature focused solely on its original intent with respect to the interplay between § 38a-336 and § 31-284 (a), without regard to whether the employer was self-insured or insured by a commercial carrier. Representative Richard Tulisano stated that the legislature, “in drafting [§ 38a-336 (f)] . . . intended [it] to be a recital [of] [w]hat [the legislature] believe[s] current law was and has been .... [T]here is a recent Supreme Court case
Third, the legislature could not have intended such an untenable result as denying uninsured motorist benefits to employees who work for self-insured employers, while providing uninsured motorist benefits to employees who work for employers that purchase commercial insurance. “It is ... a rule of statutory construction that those who promulgate statutes or rules do not intend to promulgate statutes or rules that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.” State v. Siano, 216 Conn. 273, 278, 579 A.2d 79 (1990). Section 38a-336
We conclude, therefore, that an employee who is injured in the course of his employment while occupying a motor vehicle owned by his employer is entitled under § 38a-336 (f) to uninsured motorist benefits from his or her self-insured employer.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) provides: “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.”
The term “uninsured” will be used throughout the opinion to refer to both uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits.
General Statutes § 38a-371 (c) provides: “Subject to approval of the Insurance Commissioner the security required by this section, may be provided by self-insurance by filing with the commissioner in satisfactory form: (1) A continuing undertaking by the owner or other appropriate person to perform all obligations imposed by this section; (2) evidence that appropriate provision exists for the prompt and efficient administration of all claims, benefits, and obligations provided by this section; and (3) evidence that reliable financial arrangements, deposits or commitments exist providing assurance for payment of all obligations imposed by this section substantially equivalent to those afforded by a policy of insurance that would comply with this section. A person who provides security under this subsection is a self-insurer. A municipality may provide the security required under this section by filing with the commissioner a notice that it is a self-insurer.”
Aetna’s policy with the plaintiff provided uninsured motorist benefits in the amount of $300,000.
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides: “An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other
The parties do not dispute that if West Haven is liable for uninsured motorist coverage, then it’s coverage would be primary. General Statutes § 38a-336 (d) provides in relevant part: “If a person insured for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of a nonowned vehicle covered by a policy also providing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, the coverage of the occupied vehicle shall be primary and any coverage for which such person is a named insured shall be secondary. All other applicable policies shall be excess. . . .”
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
General Statutes § 38a.-363 (b) provides: “ ‘Insurer’ includes a self-insurer and a person having the rights and obligations of an insurer under sections 38a-19 and 38a-363 to 38a-388, inclusive, as provided by section 38a-371.”
This court expressly acknowledged in Bouley that a self-insured municipality is required by § 38a-336 to provide uninsured motorist coverage on its vehicles. Bouley v. Norwich, supra, 222 Conn. 747 n.6.
Although Representative Tulisano referred to only one case, it was in Bouley v. Norwich, supra, 222 Conn. 751-61, a case involving a self-insured employer, that a majority of this court undertook its analysis of the interplay between the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision found in § 31-284 (a) and § 38a-336, and in CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, supra, 222 Conn. 773, a case involving a commercially insured employer, that the majority of this court summarily affirmed the same principle.
General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (1) provides: “Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and under-insured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. Each insurer licensed to write automobile liability insurance in this state shall provide uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage with limits requested by any named insured upon payment of the appropriate premium, provided each such insurer shall offer such coverage with limits that are twice the limits of the bodily injury coverage of the policy issued to the named insured. The insured’s selection of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by any named insured. No insurer shall be required to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to (A) a named insured or relatives residing in his household when occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or a motorcycle