410 S.E.2d 315 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1991
This is the third appearance of this workers’ compensation case before this court. In the first appearance, Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41 (363 SE2d 271) (1987), we reversed the superior court, which had denied Georgia-based coverage, and directed that the case be remanded to the State Board of Workers’ Compensation to determine the principal locality of the employment relationship. After the case was remanded, the board, without hearing evidence, entered an order finding that the locality of claimant’s employment was in Georgia and that the board had jurisdiction of the appeal. The
The claimant/appellee was employed as a factory representative distributing products to retail and wholesale dealers in an area consisting of nine Tennessee counties and four Georgia counties. The claimant resided in Georgia and sustained a work-related injury while in Tennessee. The ALJ found that although appellant’s corporate office was in Tennessee, the claimant maintained an office in his personal home in Georgia because appellant required him to have a place to keep “merchandise, samples and damaged goods”; that in addition to storing samples and damaged goods in his home office, claimant conducted company business from his home office, including keeping records and preparing daily reports; that claimant deducted the cost of his home office and all expenses associated therewith on his federal income tax return; that appellant shipped goods to claimant’s home office; that claimant began and ended each work day from his home office; that claimant generally covered his entire 13 county area in a six-week period, spending approximately 14 to 15-% days in Tennessee stores and 13 to 14-V2 days in Georgia stores; and that although claimant’s assigned territory was geographically larger and consisted of more stores in Tennessee than in Georgia, the greater weight of the evidence showed that claimant’s principal locality of employment was in Georgia. The ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by the full board. “A finding of fact made by the full Board when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the superior court as well as this court. Neither we nor the superior court have any authority to set aside an award based on supported findings of fact merely because we might disagree with the conclusions reached therein. [Cits.]” Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Harbin Homes, 182 Ga. App. 316, 318 (355 SE2d 702) (1987). There was ample evidence presented by claimant through his own testimony to sup
Judgment affirmed.