273 Mass. 19 | Mass. | 1930
This is an action of tort for the conversion of a player piano and piano bench. The plaintiff named in the writ, when originally issued, was the Conway Financing Company. The defendant filed a demurrer and a motion to dismiss. The grounds alleged in the demurrer were (1) that the court had no jurisdiction of the plaintiff; (2) that the plaintiff was not entitled to and has no power to bring suit; (3) that it does not appear that the plaintiff has a residence, domicil or place of business anywhere; (4) that the declaration did not set forth a cause of action; and (5) that the various counts were repetitions of each other. The grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss were the same as the first three grounds of demurrer above stated. The plaintiff filed a motion to substitute as parties
The right of the defendant to maintain a petition of interpleader is governed by G. L. c. 231, § 40. “The statute, authorizing this summary proceeding in actions at law, does not alter the settled doctrines applicable to bills of interpleader . . . Interpleader lies only when the party is exposed to several actions for the same demand, while he is ready and willing to satisfy that demand in favor of the claimant who establishes his right thereto, and he himself claims no personal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Between the claimants, he should stand indifferent. If he denies and contests the right of one of them to share in the money due, or if he has incurred a personal liability to either of them, independent of the question between the claimants themselves, he is not entitled to relief by way of interpleader.” Gonia v. O’Brion, 223 Mass. 177, 178, 179.
It is plain that the defendant is not within the law above stated. He does not stand indifferent between the parties. The action is brought against him for the conversion of personal property. To the declaration he answers denying every material allegation in the plaintiffs’ writ and
The judge had power to reverse what he deemed to be a,n error on his part in granting the petition for interpleader at any time before the case had gone to judgment. The record shows that the order of the court reversing its former order was entered before an answer had been filed, and before there was any hearing on the merits. It is obvious that the case was not ripe for judgment when the petition for interpleader was dismissed. If, as the judge stated, he was satisfied that his former action in allowing the inter-pleader was erroneous, it was within his power, before judgment, to correct the error without further hearing or notice to the parties. The language of this court in Waucantuck Mills v. Magee Carpet Co. 225 Mass. 31, at page 33, is pertinent in this connection. It was there said that “The power of a court is ample to correct its records so as to make them conform to the facts and to express the decision really intended to be made . . . But even if there was no mistake and the final conclusion of the judge was reached simply through more mature reflection and more careful consideration, there is no error of law. The court has power to reconsider its decision on the same facts, although this is a power rarely exercised.”
In the cases relied on by the defendant where it was held that the court had no power to reverse its decision, it appeared that there had been an entry of final judgment. See Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205; Shawmut Commercial Paper Co. v. Cram, 212 Mass. 108; Wright v. Macomber, 239 Mass. 98; Burgess v. Burgess, 256 Mass. 99.
Order dismissing report affirmed.
