Conway v. CronConway v. Cron
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sooy
Dеfendants are stop-notice creditors and appear as defendants after decree of interpleader, with the exception of John P. Callaghan, Incorporated, who is a judgment creditor.
At the final hearing it appeared that two of the defendants, Gаrrabrants & Zumbusch and the Greenberg Sash, Door & Supply Company, had filed their statements of claim prior to the final hearing but beyond the time allowed by rule 69 of this court. These defendants were permitted to prove their claims, over objections of the other defendants, and the question as to final allowance was reserved by the court, with the intimation that the court was disposed to relax the rule аnd permit said defendants to participate in the distribution of the moneys so as aforesaid paid into court.
Since the final hearing, I have given thе matter further consideration and have analyzed the rules as they stoоd in 1917 and as they were amended in 1934.
Vice-Chancellor Fallon, in Israel v. Baker, 101 N. J. Eq. 699;
In that case, as here, rules 2 and 4 (1 N. J. Mis. R. 723) of this court were urged, the former of which providеs: “The time limited in these rules for doing any act may, for good cause, be еxtended by order either before or after the expiration of the time.”
Rule 4 (1 N. J. Mis. R. 723), provides: “These rules shall be considered as general rules for the government of the court and the conduct of causes, and as the design of them is to facilitate business and advance justice, they may be relaxеd or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the сourt that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice.”
Rule 69 (1 N. J. Mis. R. 748), as it stood at the time of the decision in Israel v. Baker, supra, did not specifically provide
Inasmuch as the chancellor had before him the interpretation of the rulе by Vice-Chancellor Fallon, it is evident that the purpose of the amеndment was to overcome the construction of rule 69 which had been рlaced thereon in that case.
The result necessarily is that the elasticity accorded rule 69 by Vice-Chancellor Fallon is withdrawn and the rule must bе enforced, at least in cases where some strong equity does not appear, impelling the court to invoke rules 2 and 4.
Beading rule 69, in connection with the Mechanics’ Lien act, one who has filed a stop-notice is advised that he had a priority over those who file a subsequent notice but that, in interpleader, he must file the necessary statements of clаim and defenses to claims, as therein provided, or be deemed to have waived his claim. And those stop-noticing defendants who have comрlied with the rule are advised in advance of final hearing that which they have to meet in the presentation of evidence to support their own claims, as well as to defend against another. Thus the diligent are protected and the final hearing expedited.
The decree must be that the two claims in question be disallowed.