142 U.S. 671 | SCOTUS | 1892
CONVERS
v.
ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FÉ RAILROAD COMPANY.
Supreme Court of United States.
*672 Mr. Charles M. Sturges for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Charles S. Holt (with whom was Mr. Norman Williams on the brief) for defendant in error.
*673 MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question in this case is, whether the verdict and judgment responded to the issues tendered by the pleadings. A bill of exceptions was prepared, showing that the testimony presented to the jury was simply as to the damages resulting from the appropriation of the proposed right of way by the railroad company; and that no testimony was offered by Convers as to the extent and nature of his title, and none by the railroad company in any manner challenging it. By the *674 express language of the verdict the amount found by the jury was the total amount of compensation due for the appropriation of this right of way through the particular tracts claimed by Convers. As that matter was properly determined, there is no necessity for a new trial, or further inquiry as to the amount of damages. But upon the pleadings we think a judgment ought to have been entered in terms in favor of Convers for such damages, or at least one directing their appropriation to him personally, and that the question as to who was entitled thereto ought not to have been, by the form of the judgment, left open to further inqury.
The bill of rights of the constitution of Illinois (Constitution 1870, art. 2, sec. 13) declares: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation when not made by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law."
The eminent domain act, passed under this constitutional provision, (Revised Statutes, Illinois, 1874, chapter 47, p. 475,) directs in terms that just compensation for private property taken "shall be ascertained by a jury as hereinafter prescribed." (Sec. 1.) The procedure thereafter provided was a petition by the party authorized to take the property to a judge of the circuit or county court, describing the property and naming the owners appearing of record, if known, or if not known, stating that fact, and praying that the compensation be assessed. (Sec. 2.) In the one petition any number of parcels of property might be included, and the compensation for each assessed separately by the same or different juries. (Sec. 5.) Process was to be served, as in cases in chancery, (sec. 4,) a trial had, and the verdict, or report of the jury as it is called, was "to clearly set forth and show the compensation ascertained to each person thereto entitled." (Sec. 9.) The oath to be taken by the jury contemplated also the same separate ascertainment. (Sec. 8.) "Sec. 10. The judge or court shall upon such a report, proceed to adjudge and make such order as to right and justice shall pertain, ordering that petitioner enter upon such property and the use of the same, upon payment of full compensation, as ascertained as aforesaid." Section 11 *675 adds that "any person not made a party may become such by filing his cross-petition," and that his rights "shall thereupon be fully considered and determined." Sec. 14 is as follows: "Payment of compensation adjudged may, in all cases, be made to the county treasurer, who shall, on demand, pay the same to the party thereto entitled, taking receipt therefor, or payment may be made to the party entitled, his, her or their conservator or guardian."
These sections make it clear that under the pleadings the judgment entered upon this report or verdict should either have directed payment to the plaintiff, or that the deposit with the county treasurer was for his benefit. In other words, Convers's right to this money should have been settled by the judgment, and not left open to further inquiry.
It is unnecessary to consider what rule obtains when the railroad company puts in issue the fact or extent of the claimant's title or interest. It is enough to dispose of the case here presented.
While the precise question does not appear to have been determined by the Supreme Court of the State, its rulings are in this direction. Bowman v. Railway Company, 102 Illinois, 459; Johnson v. Railway Company, 116 Illinois, 521; Suver v. Railway Company, 123 Illinois, 293. In the first of these cases it was held that the provision in the statute, that several tracts of lands belonging to different persons might be included in one petition, and the compensation for each separately assessed by the same or different juries, extended to cases where different persons had distinct interests in the same tract, and that in such cases the damage to each might be separately ascertained. In the second, the court decided that each owner might have his damages assessed before a separate jury, and was entitled to his single appeal from the judgment; and, also, that, if a cross-petition set forth only evidence of claimant's title, and was uncertain in the description of his interest in the property, such defect was ground for demurrer, but did not justify a dismissal on motion. And, in the third, the petition of the railroad company, averring that four persons named had or claimed an interest in a tract described, and there being *676 no other averment in the petition or cross-petition of separate interests in such parties, a finding of the gross amount to be paid to them was sustained. In that case, also, it was held that certain defects alleged to exist in the petition must, to be taken advantage of, be challenged by demurrer. These cases all indicate that proceedings under the eminent domain act may be divided into distinct controversies between the railroad company and each party owning or having a separate interest in any tract; and that a controversy, thus separated, is to proceed according to the ordinary rules concerning trials, with a certainty in verdict and a finality in judgment. They sustain the conclusion we have heretofore expressed in this case.
The judgment will be
Reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to enter a judgment in terms securing to Convers the amount of the damages found by the jury.
The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case.