CONTROL TECHNIQUES, INC., a/k/a Warner Control Company and/or Warner Control Techniques v. John W. JOHNSON and Linda Johnson
No. 45S03-0202-CV-97
Supreme Court of Indiana
Feb. 5, 2002
762 N.E.2d 104
Viewing child support arrearages as an asset held in trust for the children is supported by larger policy concerns as well. Insuring protection and support for the children of Indiana is an important state policy. The Indiana Child Support Guidelines have been enacted to “establish as state рolicy an appropriate standard of support for children, subject to the ability of parents to financially contribute to that support.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 1. The Income Share Model was adopted in Indiana because it “was perceived as the fairest approach for children because it is based on the premise that children should receive the same proportion of parental income after a dissolution that they would have received if the family had remained intact.” Id. at cmt. If child support arrearages are property of the custodial parent, subject to the parent‘s creditors, this important goal will not be met. Moreover, it is frequently the case that custodial parents are simply unable to replace the missing child support. If so, the child goes without until the delinquent parent pаys. If creditors of the parent take precedence as to these funds, the children will never be fully compensated.
In sum, “[t]he bankruptcy court‘s jurisdiction over [debtor‘s] property extends only as far as [the debtor‘s] particular interest in the property.” Marrs-Winn Co., Inc. v. Giberson Elec., Inc. (In re Marrs-Winn Co., Inc.), 103 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1996). Child support arrearages are held by the custodial parents for the benefit of the children. As such, child support arrearages are not property of the custodial parent, and a trustee in bankruptcy has no interest in them. Accordingly, Warsco has no right to intervene in the proceeding.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
Cornelius J. Harrington, Highland, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Nick Katich, Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
BOEHM, Justice.
This case deals with the relationship between the Comparative Fault Act and the common law tort doctrine of superseding or intervening cause. The requirement of causation аs an element of liability for a negligent act includes the requirement that the consequences be foreseeable. A superseding cause that forecloses liability of the original actor is, by definition, not reasonably foreseeable by a person standing in the shoes of that actor. Accordingly, the doctrine of superseding cause is simply an application of the larger concept of causatiоn. Because an instruction on superseding cause would only further clarify proximate cause, the trial court‘s failure to give a separate jury instruction on superseding cause was not reversible error.
Factual and Procedural Background
John Johnson sustained serious burns to his arms and face in December of 1991 while measuring the voltage of a circuit breaker at the LTV Steel Plant in East Chicago, Indiana. A jury awarded him $2,000,000 and allocated eighty percent liability to Meade Electric Co., Inc., which installed the breaker, fifteen percent to Johnson, and five percent to Control Techniques, Inc. (Control), which designed and built the circuit breaker. Control was thus ordered to pay $100,000, representing its five percent of the total.
We grant transfer to discuss one of the four issues Control raised on appeal: whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing Control‘s tendered jury instructiоn on the doctrine of su-
Superseding or Intervening Causation
The doctrine of superseding or intervening causation has long been part of Indiana common law. It provides that when a negligent act or omission is followed by a subsequent negligent act or omission so remote in time that it breaks the chain of causatiоn, the original wrongdoer is relieved of liability.1 Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 981 (Ind.1999). A subsequent act is “superseding” when the harm resulting from the original negligent act “could not have reasonably been foreseen by the original negligent actor.” Id. (quoting Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind.1994)). Whether the resulting harm is “foreseeable” such that liability may be imposed on the original wrongdoer is a question of fact for a jury.
The plaintiffs argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the doctrine has been incorporated into Indiana‘s Comparative Fault Act, which allocates damages among the parties according to their respective negligence. They argue that the need for the doctrine is obliterated because a defendant is liable only for the amount of damages traceable to his or her conduct and that a simple jury instruction on proximate cause is sufficient. Control rеsponds that cases subsequent to the passage of the Act have discussed the doctrine favorably. It argues that there was evidence in the record to support an instruction on superseding causation and, therefore, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give the instruction.
The Comparative Fault Act was adopted in Indiana in 1983 and went into effect in 1985.
For the reasons expressed below, we agrеe with the Court of Appeals that no separate instruction is required. In capsule form, we conclude that the doctrines of causation and foreseeability impose the same limitations on liability as the “superseding cause” doctrine. Causation limits a negligent actor‘s liability to foreseeable consequences. A superseding cause is, by definition, one that is not reasonably foreseeable. As a result, the doctrine in today‘s world adds nothing to the requirement of foreseeability that is not already inherent in the requirement of causation.
Under Indiana law, a negligent defendant may be liable for a plaintiff‘s injury if his or her action is deemed to be a proximate cause of that injury. Whether or not proximate cause exists is primarily a question of foreseeability. As this Court recently stated, the issue is whether the injury “is a natural and probable сonsequence, which in the light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind.2000). As a result, liability may not be imposed on an original negligent actor who sets into motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury was not reasonably foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. Havert v. Caldwell, 452 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind.1983); see also 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 596 (1989) (“[T]he question of [superseding] cause is simply а question of whether the original act of negligence or an independent intervening cause is the proximate cause of an injury.“). Section 442 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) also lists factors to be considered in determining whether the intervening force may be deemed a superseding one:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor‘s negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by the actor‘s negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) thе fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person‘s act or his failure to act....2
The sum of all this is that, in order to be liable for a plaintiff‘s injury, the harm must have been reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, in this case the original negligent actor. This is the case if there is only one negligent act or omission and it is equally true in the case of a negligent act or omission followed by a “supersеding” act or omission. These propositions were valid both before and after the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act. See Torres, 987 P.2d at 392 (“[T]he doctrine [of su-
The Comparative Fault Act addressed two major concerns. Before adoption of the Act, a defendant whose negligence contributed only slightly to the plaintiff‘s loss could be required to pay for all of the plaintiff‘s damages and the plaintiff could proceed against and collect from the defendant of choice. See Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ind.Ct.App.1979). Because there was generally no right of contribution, a defendant only slightly responsible could be liable for the entire amount of damages. Similarly, comparative fault abolished the harsh common law rule that a plaintiff contributorily negligent to any degree was barred from all recovery. See Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 504; L.K.I. Holdings, Inc., 658 N.E.2d at 119; see also Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 246 Mont. 37, 803 P.2d 629, 634 (1990). In short, the Act did not change the standard for imposing liability. Rather, it changed the apportionment of the damages flowing from that liability. Enactment of comparative fault preserved the requirement of proximate cause as a requirement of liability.
Under the Comparative Fault Aсt, liability is to be apportioned among persons whose fault caused or contributed to causing the loss in proportion to their percentages of “fault” as found by the jury.
Here, the trial court refused Control‘s jury instruction on intervening cause, which is drawn verbatim from Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil 5.41 (2d ed.2000):
An intervening cause is an action by a third party or agency that breaks the causal connection between the defеndant‘s alleged negligence and the plaintiff‘s injury. This intervening cause then becomes the direct cause of the injury.
If you decide that the injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred without the action of the third party or agency, then the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant.3
However, if you find that the defendant acted negligently and could have reasonably foreseen the actions of the third party or agency, then the defendant can still be liable for the defendant‘s injuries.
In reviewing a trial court‘s decision to give or to refuse tendered instructions, this Court considers: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ind.2001).
Trial courts may properly elect to give an instruction on this doctrine if they conclude it would aid the jury in determining liability. However, this call is better left to the discretion of the trial courts, as they are in the best position to determine whether an instruction on superseding cause is useful. It was not error to instruct only on causation.
Conclusion
We conclude that the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act did not affect the doctrine of superseding cause, but on the facts presented here the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine. On all other issues, the Court of Appeals is summarily affirmed. Former Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B) (now App. R. 58(A)(2)). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., dissents with separate opinion.
DICKSON, Justice, dissenting.
I agree that the adoption of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act did not affect thе doctrine of superseding cause, and that the evidence in the record in this case supports giving an instruction on superseding cause. I dissent, however, as to whether the defendant‘s issue of superseding cause was adequately covered by other instructions, and as to whether the Comparative Fault Act abrogated the common law principle of joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors.
I.
I believe that the majority mistakenly concludes that the trial court‘s instruction defining proximate cause was adequate to cover the substance of the defendant‘s tendered but rejected instruction on superseding cause. As acknowledged by the majority, under the facts presented by the record, the defendant was entitled to have the jury informed that an unforeseeable action by a third party or agency that breaks the causal сonnection between the defendant‘s alleged negligence and the plaintiff‘s injury then becomes the direct cause of the injury. This principle of law was not adequately covered by the trial court‘s instruction providing the definition of proximate cause, notwithstanding inclusion of the requirement that the cause “must lead in a natural and continuous sequence to the resulting injury.” Record at 112. I therefore conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant‘s tendered superseding cause standard pattern jury instruction.
II.
I also dissent from the majority‘s unnecessary excursion into the issue of apportionment of liability under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, and I specifically quarrel with its belief that the Act altered the common law rule of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors.
The majority asserts that the Comparative Fault Act аddressed two major con-
Furthermore, the nature of and procedures established by the Indiana Comparative Fault Act reveal that its primary function is to modify the common law rule of contributory negligence under which a plaintiff only slightly negligent was precluded from recovery оf any damages, even as against a relatively highly culpable tortfeasor. In abrogating this harsh rule, the Act allows recovery but reduces such recovery in proportion to any fault of the plaintiff which contributed to the damages.... In furtherance of these objectives, the Act establishes a mechanism by which the factfinder is required to specifically determine the relative degree of the plaintiff‘s fault with respeсt to others. This proportional allocation of fault is the means by which the Act‘s objectives are reached, not the ends to which it aspires.
Id. at 1190 (emphasis added). We did not find the allocation of limited liability among multiple tortfeasors to be a purpose or function of the Act. Significantly, in footnote 1, we stated: “[T]he Indiana Comparative Fault Act does not expressly prescribe whether the common law principle of joint and several liability is abrogated in cases to which the Act is applicable. This is an unresolved issue which has not yet been addressed by amendatory legislation or by this Court.” Id. at n. 1.4
Our rejection of liability allocation as a purpose of the Comparative Fault Act is further demonstrated in Indianapolis P & L v. Snodgrass, in which we quoted with approval the above passage from Bowles and held that the Court of Appeals “[e]rroniously impart[ed] to the Act the goal of full and complete proportional allocation of fault.” Snodgrass, 578 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ind.1991). Likewise, in Mendenhall v. Skinner and Broadbent Co., we repeated, “The primary objective of the Act was to modify the common law rule of contributory negligence under which a plaintiff was barred from recovery where he was only slightly negligent.” 728 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind.2000).
The majority states that, under the Act, liability is to be apportioned among tortfeasors in proportion to their percentages of fault as found by the jury. I strongly disagree. As noted in Bowles, the fault determination is necessary to enable the jury to determine a plaintiff‘s recovery as reflecting the relative degree of plaintiff‘s fault. But the Act does not require that the resulting fault percentages also be used to limit a joint tortfeasor‘s liability.
The Comparative Fault Act, adopted in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. Snodgrass, 578 N.E.2d at 673. “It is well settled that the legislature does not intend by a statute to make any change in the common law beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication.” Id. at 673; see also Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int‘l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 767 (Ind.2001); S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Widawski, 622 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.1993); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Citizens Action Coalition of Ind., Inc., 548 N.E.2d 153, 159 (Ind.1989); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Structo Div., King Seeley Thermos Co., 540 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Ind.1989).
Under common law, joint tortfeasors are subject to both joint and several liability,
The Indiana Comparative Fault Act did not by express terms or unmistakable implication abrogate the common law principle of joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors.5 Furthermore, despite our decisions beginning in 1989 noting this omission, the legislature has not since chosen to enact such abrogation. For these reasons, I dissent to the majority‘s assertion that the Act requires liability to be apportioned among joint tortfeasors in proportion to their fault.