169 Pa. 305 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion by
This case comes to us in an unsatisfactory shape, as there is no finding of facts, and regularly we should send it back for the purpose of having them definitely ascertained, but as the evidence is in small compass we have examined it for ourselves. The fair result is that the farms in controversy were bought and are used for hospital purposes, as a part of the hospital plant, an open air sanitarium and roaming ground for manageable and convalescent patients, very much as a play-ground might be used as an aid in the cure of sick children. And this present employment in this way is the first step in the ultimate devotion of the whole property to the same use. The testimony to the curative value of the farms in this respect is positive and uncontradicted. Dr. Chapin, the superintendent and physician in chief, says, “If we had accommodations we would have two hundred or two hundred and thirty patients there. Looking at it from a medical standpoint we would move all our patients there if we could.” The farms, in actual operation as such, with live stock, and the various crops, are part of the attraction and usefulness for curative purposes. That they are also farmed for profit to reduce expenses does not vary their position as part of the plant. If there were any fair doubt of the good faith of such use, the case would be different.
On the general question of what part of the property of a charity is exempted from taxation a plain distinction is to be observed in all our cases. Property which is not used directly for the purposes and in the operation of the charity, but for profit, is not exempt, and the devotion of the profit to the support of the charity will not alter this result. Of this class of cases Am. Sunday School Union v. Phila., 161 Pa. 307, is the exemplar and authority. But property which is used directly for the purposes and in the operation of the charity is exempt, though it may also be used in a manner to yield some return and thereby reduce the expenses: Donohugh’s App., 86 Pa. 306; Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 154 Pa. 9; House of Refuge v. Smith, 140 Pa. 387.
The first objection that the farms are worked for profit is sufficiently answered by the evidence that they were bought and are used as part of the hospital plant, and the farming is incidental, to reduce expenes.
The second objection that the farms are separated from the main building and not used with it, is ruled by House of Refuge v. Smith, 140 Pa. 387. What is there said by our brother Williams needs only the change of name to apply exactly to the present case: “ Viewed with reference to its property and the question of taxation, the buildings, and grounds legitimately used in its work are the House of Refuge. Originally this institution was confined to an inclosure in the city of Philadelphia which had become too narrow and confined. . . . This land was purchased for the use of the male department. The female department remains for the present, as now located, in Philadelphia. The two departments though separated by a county line and some miles of distance will nevertheless constitute one whole. . . . Together they will constitute the actual plant used in the reformatory work for which the house of refuge was organized; and looked at from the property point of view they are the House of Refuge.”
This case therefore belongs to the second class above mentioned, where the property is used directly for the purposes and in the operation of the charity, though it is managed at the same time so as to secure some return and thus keep down the expenses. It may be that the acreage is larger than is necessary or really useful for the number of patients which the other facilities of the hospital enable it at present to treat there, but as the fact is not found by the learned court below, and is not clear on the evidence we do not assume it as true.