*1 TRAILWAYS, INC., CONTINENTAL INCORPORATED UNDER THE DELAWARE, THE LAWS OF STATE OF PLAINTIFF-RESPON- DENT, DIRECTOR, VEHICLES, OF DIVISION DE- MOTOR FENDANT-APPELLANT. Argued November May 1985 Decided 1986. *2 General, argued Deputy Wheelwright, L. Attorney Martin Kimmelman, Attorney Gener (Irwin I. appellant for the cause Ciancia, Attor Assistant J. attorney; James Jersey, al of counsel). General, of ney respondent. cause argued the
Joseph T. Wilkins delivered the Court opinion GARIBALDI, J. primary issue in this case is whether the autobus excise imposed under N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 discriminates inter- state commerce violation of the commerce clause of the Const, 1, 8, cl. 3. If the Constitution, art. § States
United unconstitutional, as to secondary issue arises a tax is excise Trailways, Inc. Continental plaintiff-respondent, whether the Tax Court and refund. Both right to a (Continental), has tax was unconstitu- that the excise Division held Appellate case involves Because this a refund. and ordered tional of the Unit- arising under the Constitution question substantial Director, Division States, defendant-appellant, ed right matter of to this (Director), appealed as a Motor Vehicles Court. *3 I provision, 48:4-20,
The autobus excise tax origi- N.J.S.A. 1934, 1934, nally enacted in L. c. 68. Its forerunner was enacted (L.1927, 184), in accompanied by c. following the statement purpose: of highways This bill an excise on the use of imposes State motor by carrying passengers vehicles used for or for hire in interstate com property just merce. The is to such vehicles to their bear share of purpose compel nothing At taxation. the time such vehicles to the State of New present pay registration the Jersey, fees for under the Motor Vehicle except Act, provided operating subject while other vehicles within the State are to taxation. wholly right engaged such a tax on such vehicles in impose interstate commerce courts, has been in Inc. the Federal [quoted Trails, recently upheld Safeway by (1964),
v. Furman, N.J. dismissed, 379 85 appeal (1964).] 13 L.Ed.2d purpose require of the statute therefore was to inter- pay privilege using highways, state buses to for the of state in compensate effect to the State for their share of the cost of constructing maintaining highways the and of administer- ing Trails, Furman, Safeway the motor vehicle laws. Inc. 41 N.J. issue, by
The version of N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 at as amended L. 1972, 211, 2, 31, 1972, c. effective retains December essential- § ly purpose. the same It reads: operating owning or an autobus which is over operated Every person carrying passengers highway state for the of a point in this purpose from the or outside state, to another outside point outside the state point from state within the to a the within state to a state, point point shall to the outside the state Director of Division of Motor point pay highway, an excise for of such cent for Vehicles, as the use ½ each mile or highways fraction been thereof such autobus shall have over operated mileage this no excise shall be traversed in state, payable except for regular passenger operating under route service conferred provided authority added.) (Emphasis 48:4-3. E.S. pursuant Thus, 48:4-20 still exacts an excise tax for each mile N.J.S.A. (bus) operations highways Jersey of New in of autobus1 tax, transport passengers. connection with the interstate No however, mileage payable regular- for intrastate traversed ly-scheduled passenger provided authority under the service (P.U.C.).2 the Public Utilities Commission undisputed. major The facts are Continental is a common- providing by carrier bus both interstate intrastate service route) (regular operations means of regular-route-passenger through operations wholly-owned and charter subsidiaries. During issue, period November to June provided were under operations Continental’s author- ity (I.C.C.) by conferred the Interstate Commerce Commission operations provided authority and its under intrastate were approval P.U.C. conferred the P.U.C. Continental also held with provided conjunction for intrastate service it I.C.C.- approved interstate routes. filed month- Continental prior June years
For several payment Director with returns ly business-excise-tax re- In those 48:4-20. N.J.S.A. imposed under the excise *4 of the total on the basis computed its Continental ports, 48:4-3, is defined in used in both N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 N.J.S.A. 1 "Autobus," as highways or over as motorbus public public places N.J.S.A. 48:4-1 operated passengers business, for hire in intrastate this State for the of in transportation notwithstanding interstate commerce. such also be used in bus engaged or partially wholly that no bus 2 N.J.S.A. operation 48:4-3 provides securing without run in New Jersey or shall intrastate commerce operated (P.U.C.). The Board of Commissioners the Board Public Utility of approval under Public Utilities the Board of became Public Commissioners of Utility 11, 1977. 5.1, c. effective L.1977, 146, § 52:27F-6, July NJ.S.A. Jersey. of exempt number miles traversed New It did not Jersey regular from its calculation New miles traversed in authority route service under the P.U.C. November 1979, when Continental realized that it had not excluded this exempt mileage, a claim it filed for refund. The Division of (D.M.V.) Vehicles Motor advised Continental that no refund was permitted, overpayment but that its could be used to offset following future taxes in the three months the end of the applicable tax month. Continental then filed a complaint with 9, 1980, seeking $55,392.64. the Tax Court on June refund of During period made, for which the refund claim was Trails, Safeway Inc., plaintiffs wholly-owned one subsidiar- ies, into, operated through, seven interstate routes and out of Jersey. Trails, New For Safeway each the routes Inc. held operating authority I.C.C. for the interstate service well as approval Hence, P.U.C. for the intrastate service. Continental held necessary authority provided P.U.C. whenever it bus passenger strictly points Jersey. service between within New However, whenever passenger the bus service related transport passengers only points between outside this State points Jersey, within only points or between outside this State and no Jersey points, included service to New Conti- approval. nental held I.C.C.
Continental concedes its charter miles3 are taxable. The Director concedes that scheduled intrastate miles for which authority (i) point-to-point there is P.U.C. either Jersey in New exclusively as an trip, (ii) intrastate point-to-point in New part Jersey as trip an interstate are not taxable. conflict between parties specifically concerns the tax to be 3 The Tax defined charter to constitute service operations groups of lease charter or buses and drivers for patrons transportation designated group certain locations for a fixed Continen price per trip. tal v. Motor Div. Vehicles N.J.Tax at Trailways Director, *5 imposed under miles, N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 on interstate for which (1) there authority is I.C.C. point either from a in Jersey New point versa, Jersey (ii) outside New point or vice from one Jersey outside New point to another Jersey, outside New with mileage Jersey by traversed going through the state. alleges D.M.V. mileage that such is taxable. Continental con- taxing tends that mileage such is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.4 Tax Court held that the imposed by excise tax N.J.S.A. miles,
48:4-20 on interstate “complementa- the absence of a ry” miles, tax on intrastate unconstitutionally discriminated against commerce violation of the commerce clause, and was therefore void. It also ordered the D.M.V. to repay “all paid bus excise taxes from November 1977 to June 1979, except ... taxes on Appellate charter bus miles.” The Division affirmed the Tax Court’s determination that the stat- unconstitutionally commerce, ute burdened interstate but vacat- ed the order to refund the taxes with Retaining interest. jurisdiction, it remanded the case to the Tax Court so that the parties agree could on the method and terms of a credit for the overpaid parties taxes. When the advised the Tax that a Court impractical, credit was pay the Tax Court ordered D.M.V. to refund, together Appellate with interest. The Division af- order, judgment firmed the N.J.Super. affirm the 257. We Appellate Division insofar as it holds that N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 unconstitutionally discriminates interstate com- merce, but reverse insofar as it orders a refund. argued trial, 4 At Continental also the tax was a denial of the equal clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Tax held that protection "[I]n view of the determination reached on the nature of the tax in discriminatory Clause,
violation of the Commerce it is not to deal with necessary plaintiff’s argument.” Continental did protection not raise the equal equal protection argument in the briefs that it submitted to the Division or to this Appellate Instead, Court. it chose to on the lower court that focused rely opinions on the commerce clause.
II
In
we held the earlier version of the excise tax5 on
interstate bus service to be constitutional because there was a
complementary tax
Trails,
on intrastate service. Safeway
Inc.
Furman,
v.
In Safeway, plaintiff-bus company also argued that excise tax mileage by traveled unlawfully buses However, burdened interstate commerce. part of the then- statutory existent scheme intrastate carriers were also taxed for the use of the highways. Legislature had enacted 48:4-14, imposed N.J.S.A. a gross receipts of “3% ... monthly franchise tax for revenues for upon the use of streets” operators. intrastate In proof the absence of the inter- state excise tax resulted in a heavier financial burden than the tax, intrastate excise we held the latter tax did not discriminate interstate commerce.6 The Court concluded that a tax decided, Safeway 5 When virtually was N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 was identical to its present version. It read as follows: Every person owning operating operated or an autobus which is over highway purpose carrying passengers point this State for the of from a State, point outside the State to point another outside the or from a outside State, point point State to a within the or from a within the State to a point pay outside the State shall to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, highway, as an excise for the use of such cent for each mile lA operated fraction thereof highways such autobus shall have been over the State, except of payable this that no mileage excise shall be traversed for any municipality operator paid to which such monthly owner or has provisions the use its streets under the section 48:4—14 franchise of of this Title. language represents Legislature’s The italicized changes above in N.J.S.A. Safeway 48:4-20 from the time when was decided and to the version of the statute at issue in this case. Supreme previously 6 The recognized importance comple mentary Corp. Blodgett, taxes. In Interstate Buses 273 U.S. 48 S.Ct. (1928), imposed L.Ed. 551 a Connecticut statute a tax of one cent for each highway mile of traversed a motor vehicle used in interstate commerce. challenged by The tax company engaged Connecticut bus in interstate England commerce between Connecticut and other New states. Connecticut imposed companies engaged also a tax on all transportation in intrastate bus levied on interstate commerce is not discriminatory, merely form, because the tax differs in or adopts a different measure assessment, imposed from that on intrastate carriers. Id. 489. 1972, however, the complementary gross receipts tax
imposed on intrastate carriers under N.J.S.A. 48:4-14 was re- pealed, 31, 1972, L.1972, effective December c. 6. As § part legislation, N.J.S.A. 48:4-14 was amended to its present exempt “mileage form to regular traversed in route passenger provided operating service under authority conferred pursuant to R.S. 48:4-3” and to delete gross reference to the *7 L.1972, receipts tax. c. 2. The entire legislative pack- § age was introduced in Senate Bill No. purpose 1151. The of the legislation, as set in forth the Statement to Senate Bill was as follows: purpose companies provide regular
The
of this bill is to assist bus
route
Jersey
bus service to New
residents.
[M]any
companies
of these
past
have suffered serious financial losses in the
years.
potential
companies
apply
few
The
for loss has forced these
for rate
present
increases and curtailment of
services.
Mindful
only
that increased rates and curtailment of service will
worsen the
picture
regular
companies
financial
for
route bus
because it will force bus
patrons
transportation,
repeals parts
to seek other
this bill revises and
statutory
companies pay,
law to reduce the taxes and other fees which these
thereby relieving part
public transportation
of the financial burden of these
companies.
oriented
bill,
Through
Legislature
this
complementa-
removed the
ry
commerce,
tax on
thereby providing
intrastate
an indirect
carriers,
subsidy to intrastate
attempt
in an
to ameliorate their
plight
serious financial
in
complementary
1972.7 No
tax has
percent
gross receipts,
three
of their
less certain limited deductions. The
Supreme
upholding
comple-
Court in
the statute held that the two taxes "are
mentary
only
in the sense that ... one affects
interstate and the other
intrastate commerce.”
535 III per se invalid it burdens because A state tax is not Transit, Brady, Inc. v. Complete Auto commerce. interstate (1977). 51 L.Ed.2d 1076, A state 279, U.S. S.Ct. 326 274, 430 97 that use carriers upon interstate may impose a reasonable tax against does not discriminate highways long its as that tax so Brice, 339 Lines v. Capital Greyhound interstate commerce. Trails, (1950); Safeway 94 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. 806, 1053 Furman, (1964). Inc. v. N.J. Transit, Inc., Supreme Complete Auto United States
In validity of a tax measure the four-part forth a test to Court set concluded The Court challenge. against a commerce clause per unconstitutionally se burden does not that a state nexus with (1) a sufficient commerce if: there is interstate activities to local state; (2) fairly apportioned taxing the tax is placed on the being multiple burdens and does not result (3) taxpayer; not discriminate the tax does and to the services commerce; (4) fairly related and the tax is taxpayer. taxing state to provided by benefits four, two, one, requirements The excise tax meets number case is in this they primary are not at issue.9 The issue By history. legislative exemption is set forth in No reason for the "regular service from exempting commuter bus route from the bus-excise tax State, point a outside point point or from outside the within the State to a State,” exacerbates point the amendment within the State to regular providing discriminatory carriers interstate bus effect of the Act on subject tax. operations, to the excise route which remain taxed when the Supreme nexus exists that an obvious 9 The Court has noted Department v. Association activity Revenue within the state. is conducted 734, 750, Cos., 55 L.Ed.2d Washington Stevedoring U.S. imposed miles traversed at issue is The excise tax addition, apportionment Jersey highways. solely Jersey in New over New apportionment of an mileage among [bases] is the "reasonable based on highways.” Capital Grey upon use the interstate carriers which excise tax Brice, 70 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed. 1053. There is Lines hound activity. multiple same allegation taxation of the no here that the tax results fairly highways the services Finally, related to an excise tax to maintain *9 536 taxing against
three: scheme discriminates whether Conti- companies nental and similar interstate bus violation of the commerce clause.10 clause, force, protects
The commerce
of its own
free
Hardesty,
638,
the states. Armco Inc. v.
U.S.
among
trade
467
—,
2620, 2622,
540,
81 L.Ed.2d
(1984);
S.Ct.
Boston
104
545
Comm’n,
318, 328,
Stock Exch. v.
Tax
429 U.S.
State
S.Ct.
97
Hewit,
599,
514,
606,
(1977);
50 L.Ed.2d
Freeman v.
523
329
249,
274, 276,
265,
U.S.
91 L.Ed.
252,
S.Ct.
271-72
aspect
protection
“may
One
of this
is that a state
not discrimi
nate
between transactions
on the basis
some interstate
Exch.,
Stock
12,
at
element.” Boston
332 n.
S.Ct. at 608 n.
50 L.Ed.2d at
12,
n. 12. A
tax does not
if
discriminate
interstate
commerce
it does not favor
disadvantage
local interests to the
of interstate business.11 See
benefits,
roadways,
provides
use of the
that the State
this case
Capital
Brice,
Greyhound
544, 70
bus carriers.
Lines v.
atU.S.
807,
1055;
Trails,
at
Safeway
Furman,
94 L.Ed. at
Inc. v.
141N.J. at 486-87.
argument
discriminatory,
10 Weaddress D.M.V.’s
that even
tax is
if the
it is
per
se unconstitutional. See
at 543.
infra
1886,
Supreme
spoken
11 TheU.S.
has
issue. As far back as
often on this
Supreme
Court stated:
discriminating
imposed by
disadvantage
A
operating
a State
to the
products
of other States when
into the first
introduced
mentioned
State, is,
effect,
States,
regulation
among
in restraint of commerce
usurpation
power
by
and as such is a
conferred
the Constitution
upon
Congress
[Walling Michigan,
of the United States.
116 U.S.
446, 455,
454, 457,
691,
(1886).]
6 S.Ct.
29 L.Ed.
Walling
Court feared that discrimination
interfere
would
with interstate
id.,
preventing "uniformity
regulation,”
interfering
commerce
with
power granted Congress.
459,
Id. at
The Court noted even the of required provide precise a determination of extent discrimination, reason to declare it was an insufficient to wait unequal the not know how the tax unconstitutional. “We need unconstitutionally it concluding that discrimi- tax before 760, 2136, 68 at 604. nates.” Id. at 101 at L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Comm’n, Similarly, in v. Tax Boston Stock Exch. State 599, (1977), 318, 514 97 50 L.Ed.2d Court 429 U.S. S.Ct. higher tax imposed a that a found New York stock transfer tax York on transfers when the sale occurred outside New stock involving a the State State than on stock transfers sale within Court noted: to be unconstitutional. The discriminato- Clause out-of-state businesses from protects any [Commerce] tax is now on their commerce activities. Even if the not burden ry residents’ refusal to trade on out-of-state ex- the sole cause of York exchange changes, at choice of an in-state least it reinforces their very selling inhibiting an is an force to inhibition is unconstitution- out-of-state; flow al barrier the free of commerce. at S.Ct. at 609 at 334 n. 97 n. L.Ed.2d 527 n. [Id. 13, 13.] 50 13, Moreover, that it did not “hold that a State the Court stated may compete with states for a share of interstate other commerce____” pro- It hold continued: “We prod- discriminatorily no competition cess State
539 ucts manufactured or the operations performed business 337, other State.”12 Id. at at S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 529. case, In Imports, Dias, the most recent Bacchus Ltd. v. (1984), Supreme L.Ed.2d held that liquor Hawaii tax unconstitutionally dis- against criminated interstate commerce. The tax was enacted defray in 1939 to police the increased costs of and other resulting consumption services from the increased liquor. —, Id. S.Ct. at 82 L.Ed.2d at originally 205. As drafted, imposed liquor the tax was on all sold in In Hawaii. attempt encourage in an liquor the local industry, Legislature granted Hawaii exemption Okolehao, a tax brandy indigenuous plants. distilled from granted it exemption similar for fruit wine. Id. key question for the Court was how much effect on
competition must a tax have
before
violates the commerce
language
Westinghouse
12 This
was restated in
Corp. Tally,
Elec.
where the
Supreme
Court held that the credit
the New York franchise tax for
gross receipts
exports shipped
received
regular place
from a
of business
discriminatory
within New York was
because the credit benefitted local com
disadvantage
competing exports
merce to the
shipped
from other states. In
State,
Westinghouse
D.M.V.,
like
contended that even if the tax was
discriminatory
placed
the burden that it
on interstate commerce was not of
*12
significance.
argued
constitutional
It
that the credit was not intended to divert
York,
activity
prevent
new
into New
but to
activity
the loss of economic
in the
sought
classify
State. The State
subsidy."
tax credit "as an indirect
12,
12,
U.S. at 1856 n.
found
not
exempted liquors did
fact
that
beverages nor the
liquors
to other
deter-
“competitive threat”
present
a
constitute
locally-produced
existed between
competition
mined whether
Instead,
found
beverages.
the Court
and out-of-state
competition.
such
Id.
only to the extent of
factors went
those
at 208. The Court
—,
82 L.Ed.2d
at
at
S.Ct.
competition between
long as there is some
concluded that “as
non-exempt products
exempt products
locally-produced
discriminatory
Id. at
State,
effect.”
there is a
outside the
added).
(emphasis
at 209
—,
82 L.Ed.2d
that the Court
three other reasons
contended for
Hawaii also
approach to its case.
and flexible
practical
a more
should take
objec-
legitimate state
First,
liquor tax advanced
because
Second,
patently
discriminate
the tax did
because
tives.
third,
the effect of
And
because
against interstate commerce.
conclud-
incidental. Hawaii
commerce was
the tax on interstate
by simple economic
is motivated
legislation
ed that
when
invalidity.
strict rule of
there be a
protectionism should
arguments and found
rejected these
Supreme
protection-
“economic
did in fact constitute
liquor excise tax
discriminatory purpose and
ism,”
it had
both
because
Legis-
from the
it discerned
The former
discriminatory effect.
*13
industry.
to
the Hawaiian
lature’s stated intent
aid
fruit-wine
that
tax
liquor
exemp
The latter it inferred from the fact
applied only
locally-produced beverages. Consequently,
tion
any competition
locally-produced
if there
were
between
exempt products
expensive
products,
and the
nonexempt
more
—,
then
a discriminatory
there was
effect.
Id. at
104 S.
atCt.
3056, 82
at 209. The
concluded
even if
L.Ed.2d
that
legislature’s original
promote
ailing
intent
an
local
industry
than to
rather
discriminate
interstate com
merce,
would
constituting imper
this still
not save a
—,
protectionism.
Id. at
missible economic
at
S. Ct.
These
cases
recent
establish
the commerce clause
prohibits
discriminatory
tax that has the
of giving
effect
industry
advantage
local
a commercial
over its out-of-state
impermissible
competition.
advantage
could
in the
form
through
of lower
a tax exemption,
Imports,
costs
as in Bacchus
in the form of increased
business,
taxes on interstate
as in
Exchange,
Boston Stock
an incentive to invest in intrastate
rather than
enterprises,
interstate
inas Maryland
Louisiana,
v.
or in the form of an
subsidy
indirect
through a credit as in
Westinghouse
Corp.
Elec.
v. Tully, 466
atU.S.
104S.Ct.at
1866,80
at 401.
L.Ed.2d
There is no need to
unequal
“know how
the Tax is
concluding
before
unconstitutionally discrimi
nates.” Maryland
Louisiana,
U.S. at
IY case, that the Applying principles these this we hold imposes bus excise tax an unconstitutional burden on D.M.V., the bus recognized by commerce. As whether operation imposed on out-of-state, the excise tax is is local Jersey mileage Jersey highways the use of the New when *14 trip. It is strictly interstate with a conjunction in is traversed the tax activity occasions character the interstate taxpayer is a Likewise, whether the intrastate incidents. Jersey carrier, New use of an out-of-state or local business transportation of a tax when result in highways not does point Jersey to another point in New one passengers is from Jersey. New against interstate
Thus, discriminates on its face the tax tax does Nevertheless, that the contends D.M.Y. commerce. by asking this conclusion not so reaches discriminate. D.M.V. actually or effect “whether or has the the tax was intended to, creating interstate potentially a barrier handicapping, if not In answer- competing commerce in favor of local businesses.” ing history of question, legislative this D.M.V. that the states receipts tax does amendment to excise tax and the reflect competition intent to interstate bus restrict or promote carriers inter- protectionism economic for local In support position, ests. this argues D.M.V. first that tax effect, excise does not discriminatory have a for both domestic foreign companies equally. are treated Since the exemption applies to regularly-scheduled service bus be- points in Jersey, tween provided by whether it is a New Jersey company foreign corporation, or a D.M.V. claims there is no local favoritism. find contention to question
We D.M.V.’s be meritless. The is discriminatory whether there is a effect on interstate com- If merce. a tax otherwise discriminates interstate commerce, engage entities that it is irrelevant whether business interstate commerce are domestic or out-of-state. however, here, argument, is that unlike major
D.M.V.’s decisions, is Supreme there and the other recent Bacchus and interstate bus competition in fact no between intrastate regular-route passenger ser- argues that local service. D.M.V. vice, operators or interstate provided by intrastate whether exclusively operators, significantly different argument For a transportation services. This is unrealistic. riding rider an interstate bus confronted with the choice (as run City part carrier and Atlantic of its between Newark taking an City), between New York and Atlantic intrastate City, and Atlantic bus that travels between Newark companies engaged are in the interstate and intrastate bus As public transportation. same the same provide business choice, competition long as the rider has that there is between *15 and pineapple interstate service. Like and intrastate bus wine scotch, competes with intrastate inevitably interstate bus travel overlap. bus service of their routes whenever discriminatory, Lastly, D.M.Y. contends that even if the is inter per is not the burden on se unconstitutional because outweighed by promot state commerce is the state interest position ing passenger local its bus service. It bolsters regu citation to number of where a statute cases hold public inter evenhandedly legitimate lates local to effectuate incidental, it only its is est and effect on interstate commerce is upheld imposed on commerce will be burden such unless the Pike clearly putative local benefits. excessive relation to the 137, 142, 25 Church, Inc., v. 90 Bruce 397 S.Ct. U.S. v. (1970); Commerce L.Ed. 2d 178 Chamber U.S.A. of County State, (1985); v. Gloucester 162 Glassboro N.J. Freeholders, 100 N.J. Bd. Chosen of as follows: approach Brennan Justice summarized determining inter- general the burden imposed whether Under rule [of (1) challenged whether must state commerce is we permissible] inquire regulates interstate effects on “incidental” statute with evenhandedly or in against either on its face commerce or discriminates interstate commerce, legitimate (2) and, local serves a purpose; whether statute effect; practical well (3) this local purpose means could so, promote if whether alternative discriminating to show against The burden interstate commerce. without but challenging the statute, rests the validity discrimination on the party falls the burden demonstrated, commerce ... discrimination “[w]hen flowing justify local benefits on the State to it both terms alternatives non-discriminatory adequate and the statute unavailability the local interests at stake.” preserve [Hughes Oklahoma, L.Ed.2d 322, 336, 1727, 1736, (citations (1979) omitted).] essence, D.M.V. submits that even if the bus excise tax burden, subsidy constitutes a the indirect provided by the exemption outweighs for intrastate service far the inconven- expense ience and added to interstate carriers such as Continen- paying tal of their fair share of the maintaining state’s cost of improving roadways. Legislature’s While the intent to support intrastate bus service laudatory, the result is that the maintaining highways burden of administering laws, motor vehicle providing as well as an subsidy indirect companies, intrastate bus disproportionately now falls on intra- state commerce.
We addressed a similar issue in Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Director,
Taxation,
(1967),
Div.
Moreover, the State has not demonstrated the lack of nondis- criminatory alternatives. For example, subsidy a direct to intrastate carriers from supplied by state funds all citizens might accomplish the same result an subsidy indirect fi- solely by nanced the imposition of the bus-excise tax on inter- state commerce. tax, 48:4—
Accordingly, we hold that the bus-excise N.J.S.A. in violation of the against interstate commerce discriminates also clause. We need not decide whether it violates commerce equal protection clause. the
V however, must, determine whether Continental is We pursuant for the excise entitled a refund to N.J.S.A. 48:4-20 paid from November 1977 to June 1979.13 it had not Continental realized that November when exempt tra- monthly reports mileage from its the excluded a regular-route Jersey, filed refund versed service New $55,392.64. This miles in amount covered claim those filed period 1977 to June 1979. Continental November pursuant to the State its the Division of Taxation claim with Law, to -5. Tax Uniform Procedure N.J.S.A. 54:48-1 D.M.V., refund to of Taxation forwarded claim for Division con- tax did not that bus-excise advised Continental However, D.M.V. authorizing a refund. provision tain 13:18-7.7, pursuant to N.J.A.C. further advised Continental future taxes in an be used offset overpayment of taxes applicable tax month. following the end of the three months -55, Act, 48:4-1 to does not contain The Autobuses N.J.S.A. 48:4- refunds. And neither N.J.S.A. provision dealing with tax (L. 136), (L. (the c. predecessors nor its 198) (L. 1962, versions) the word 68) c. contains c. granting the Director any language expressly “refund” or refunds or credits. regulation regarding power promulgate it is entitled to contended that trial for the first time 13 Continental its brief 48:4-14, under N.J.S.A. all since January a refund for taxes paid tax) (the was repealed, effective date NJ.S.A. 48:4-14 complementary refund, its complaint, miles. In its claim for for taxes on charter paid except *17 to taxes limited paid claim was order, however, Continental’s and the pretrial November 1977 to June 1979. provisions Continental contends the Tax State Law, :52-4, Uniform Procedure to apply N.J.S.A. 54:48-1 to its Specifically, refund claim.14 Continental relies on N.J.S.A. 54:49-14, provides: which Any taxpayer, any years payment any original time within two after the of him, by or additional tax assessed unless shorter limit is fixed the law tax, imposing may refund, the the file with a claim commissioner under oath for may prescribe, stating grounds therefor, such form as the commissioner required permitted respect
but no claim for refund shall be or to filed with to paid, protest proceed- a tax after has been filed with or commissioner after ings appeal provided subtitle, on have been commenced as in this until such protest finally appeal has been determined. Law, however, The State Tax Procedure defines tax” “State “any payable by as tax which is to or collectible tax state commissioner, and tax any ‘state law’ means which tax levies or imposes a state tax as herein defined.” N.J.S.A. 54:48-2. Therefore, correctly D.M.V. contends that the State Tax Uni- form applicable Procedure Act to Continental’s claim because the “payable bus-excise tax is not by to or collectible the state tax payable commissioner” but to Director of D.M.V., pursuant to 48:4-21.15 N.J.S.A. purpose
14 The of the State Tax Uniform Procedure Act is provide procedure by far as feasible a uniform to be followed taxpayers any in relation state taxes and to afford uniform remedies procedures which be resorted to the state in the collection of of its [N.J.S.A. taxes. 54:48-3.] provides: 15 N.J.S.A.48:4-21 Monthly report mileage; payment of of Every operator such owner or shall file with the Director Division twenty-fifth day report, Motor Vehicleson or before the of each month a oath, prescribe, report under such form as the shall director shall operated disclose the number of miles such autobus shall been have so month, highways during preceding over the of this State calendar together registration with number such vehicle and such other may require. information as the director Every person pay upon filing report such shall the director such person report. the amount of tax due from such as disclosed in the [Emphasis added.] *18 provision Instead, applicable refund that the D.M.V. asserts 13:18-7.7, is which states: N.J.A.C. tax; liability.
Overpayment of credit future upon upon taxpayer’s report his examination of records If of the or examination due, may paid excess that in excess of that such it is tax was determined following applicable applied against tax in the three months the end due tax month. provision pur- was promulgated that this credit D.M.V. claims 48:4-24, general gives the Director suant N.J.S.A. may regulations “rules and as he deem power promulgate necessary.” statutory his Tax Court held that Director exceeded granted authority promulgating N.J.A. 13:18-7.7. It Conti- C. years nental a refund limited to two based on Continental’s pre-1977 in the com- failure to claim reimbursement for taxes legislative expressed plaint pretrial and order and intent Act, 54:48-1. The State Tax Uniform Procedure N.J.S.A. Division, Appellate point, af- without discussion on opinion entitled to firmed the Tax Court's that Continental was a refund. specific statutory authority requiring no a refund of
There is
tax
under
There
bus-excise
due
N.J.S.A. 48:4-20.17
provides:
16 N.J.S.A. 48:4-24
payment
enforce the
The Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles shall
hereby imposed
purpose
and enforce such
excise
and for such
make
necessary.
may require
regulations
a bond
and
as he
deem
He
rules
penalties imposed by
surety
payment
of excise and
other
for
payable pursuant
this Title and for
48:4-20 to 48:4-34 of
to sections
regula-
compliance
provisions
the rules
with the
of said sections and
by
pursuant
him
hereto.
tions made
provides
specifically
refunds
motor fuels-use
for
17 N.J.S.A. 54:39A-19
Legislature
indicating
intended to
if the
administered
D.M.V.
48:4-20,
have done
provide
paid
it could
under N.J.S.A.
for excise taxes
refunds
so.
regulation
Legislature
13:17-7.7.18 The
N.J.A.C.
could have
provided
governed by
refunds of excise tax be
the State
reason,
Uniform
Act.
Procedure
For whatever
it has failed
appears
do so. While
reasonable that the State Uniform
govern
tax,
Procedure Act should
refunds of the excise
we
Legislature.
leave that determination to the
*19
policy discourages suits
Public
for the refund of taxes
erroneously paid
illegally
or
collected. Governments are enti
presume
are
tled to
that statutes
constitutional. Government
budgets
prepared on
are
an annual cash basis. Lavin v.
Educ.,
(1982). Therefore,
Hackensack Bd.
90 N.J.
of
in
statutory
the absence of a
limitation
time in
on the
which a
taxpayer
unconstitutional,
file
may
govern
suit to declare tax
subject
ments
to
would be
substantial liabilities from refunds of
Accordingly,
those
the
unconstitutional taxes.
in
absence of
statutory authority,
voluntarily,
taxes
although erroneously,
paid
an
even under
unconstitutional statute cannot be refunded.
Berry Daigle,
(Me.1974);
v.
322 A. 2d
326-27
72 Am.Jur. 2d
¶ 1074,
State and Local Taxation
long
general
It
been
has
the
that
common-law rule
where a
fact,
duress,
party,
fraud,
extortion,
without mistake of
voluntarily pays money on a demand that
is not enforcible
him,
he
not recover it. In re Fees
State Bd.
of
of
(1980);
Dentistry, 84 N.J.
Koewing
Orange,
v. West
(E. A.1916);
Green,
N.J.L. 539 &
Camden
54 N.J.L.
(E. A.1892);
&
Restatement
Restitution
comment f
§
of
(1937).19
most recently
We
addressed this issue in In re
party
Accordingly,
18 Neither
contends that N.J.A.C. 13:17-7.7 is invalid.
we
holding
need not and
do
address the
Court’s
the Director
Tax
that
authority
promulgating
regulation.
D.M.V.
his
exceeded
the
Green,
(E.
19 In
A.1892),
Camden v.
54 N.J.L.
593 &
Court held that a
the
party
paid
liquor
shortly
County
who
for a
$500
license
after the
Board of
paid
voluntarily
License
$300
Commissioners had lowered the fee to
fee
the
knowledge
change.
apparently paid
because he had full
of the fee
He also
the
protest.
fee without
con-
That case
Dentistry,
Bd.
established “the decision, assumption law raises an judicial aside ‘the set ” honestly retained.’ money longer can no refund omitted). primary (citations recognized We Id. principle as the aforementioned “volunteer exception to this *20 pay the in that did not We found that the dentists ease rule.” no “The have had voluntarily under duress. dentists fee but they registration the fee if were continue pay but choice addition, the legally.” profession Id. 589. practice their of the the after the enactment promptly challenged fee dentists fee schedule. this in case Continental there is no evidence
We conclude in by its act protest, evidenced duress or paid the tax under due, as well that was tax under the statute paying both the Here, we unconstitutional. today declare the tax that we law.20 under a mistake of paying a tax typical taxpayer a have is later a statute that that a tax under in his dissent states paid 20 Justice Stein of law. Voluntary mistake is not under unconstitutional paid declared imposing valid, it even law was in the belief that the tax made payment mistake is under a unconstitutional, to be tax later declared paid the where repeal the complementary Since of the statute in Conti- reports nental filed monthly with in it the D.M.V. which includ- mileage ed all the Jersey. it accumulated in New As states complaint, its “[u]pon discovery mileage report- mistaken overpayment tax, claim, ed and Plaintiff filed a refund etc.” erroneously law, monthly reports, Continental mistook the filed regularly paid prescribed by the taxes as 48:4-21. N.J.S.A. questioned It payments never tax until 1979. It November certainly pay did not them protest. under
We conclude that Continental is not entitled to refund. Legislature provide did not erroneously for a refund of mistakenly-paid taxes; voluntarily bus-excise and Continental paid years the contested amounts for seven under a mistake of law. modified,
As judgment Appellate Division af- firmed.
STEIN, J., dissenting part.
I in full agreement am majority’s with the conclusion that the tax, 48:4-20, autobus excise N.J.S.A. in- discriminates terstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. I cannot, however, agree majority’s with the conclusion that Continental is not entitled to a refund.
Preliminarily, majority distinguish paid fails to the taxes by transport Continental connection with the interstate passengers, today unconstitutional, holds to be mistakenly paid by the taxes Continental for intrastate mileage regularly passenger traversed in scheduled service provided authority According under the the of the PUC. to the majority, paid Continental was a volunteer that its tax “under a However, paid mistake of law.” at 549. Ante Continental under a mistake of law was tax on intrastate *21 law, thereby recovery paid. precluding Berry Daigle, of of the amount v. 322 A. (Me.1974); Taxation, 2d 72 AmJur.2d State and Local 1087. ¶ by As mileage approved over the PUC. R.S. 48:4-3. routes noted, Continental’s taxes were Tax Court the balance of by they rather were mandated paid mistakenly not but because (1983). Had failed to Continental the statute. N.J. Tax mileage, today, it the tax on which we invalidate pay registration its to subject have been to revocation of would As Jersey. in New N.J.S.A. 48:4-30. we operate autobuses Dentistry, in re 84 N.J. noted Fees State Bd. of of (1980), payment a tax that the of is well-established 589-90 “[i]t * * * right payor’s to continue in order to avoid the loss involuntary and removes it payment renders business majority’s applica the ambit the volunteer rule.” of to tax on interstate rule” the excise tion of “volunteer misplaced.1 obviously is transportation passengers of acknowledges, noted Board Dentist- majority As the we of already “that a tax collected principle the established when ry decision, to judicial assumption raises an aside ‘the law is set longer honestly can no retained.’ money refund the which right money taxing particle ‘not a entity has ‘according principles taxpayer to the question,’ which is due ” omitted). (citations That honesty.’ of common Id. today holds plainly applies to the tax which the Court doctrine to be unconstitutional. rule,”
However, majority “volunteer on which even the refund, ques- is of deny entire claim for relies to Continental’s mistakenly by paid application to the excise taxes tionable Procedure to the Tax Uniform Pursuant State Continental. 52-4, Law, provide as a statute enacted “to N.J.S.A. 54:48-1 by taxpayers followed procedure to be far as feasible a uniform support majority for its is able to muster conclusion 1 The showing Maine, protest provides without law of that "[m]ere common property preserve person does purpose to avoid arrest of seizure (Me.1974) Berry Daigle, right paid.” A.2d to recover taxes omitted). Jersey (citations See with New law. decision is not consistent This Dentistry; State 84 N.J. 589-90 In re Fees Bd. *22 taxes,” any 54:48-3, relation to state N.J.S.A. the volunteer appears superseded. rule to provides N.J.S.A. 54:49-16 follows: Where no of fact or law are involved and it questions from the appears records of the illegally Commissioner that monies have been any or erroneously or have collected from or other been any taxpayer paid by any person or other under a mistake taxpayer person the law, Commissioner of fact at time, within two unless a shorter limit years payment, is fixed by imposing making writing
the law tax, record upon his reasons therefor, to the certify is entitled to such comptroller taxpayer refund shall authorize the thereupon thereof comptroller payment for such appropriation purpose. [Emphasis added.] statutory provision This legislative makes clear that intent was to authorize the paid by refund of taxes taxpayers even under a mistake of fact or law.
The State Tax Uniform Procedure appear Law would to settle the matter of Continental’s claim for a respect refund with both the tax mistakenly paid and the tax on passen- ger transport which the Court holds to be unconstitutional. However, majority points out that the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law only applies to payable a tax “which is to or commissioner,” collectible the state 54:48-2, N.J.S.A. whose subsequently duties were transferred to the Director of the Division of Taxation. N.J.S.A. majority 52:27B-48. The concludes that question since the taxes in payable are to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles rather than to the Taxation, Director of the Division of the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law and its provisions refund inapplicable. are
I find interpretation this of the statute to be too restrictive. As the Tax Court appropriately pointed out, “[tjhere is no distinguish reason to among paid taxes to the State of New Jersey on the basis of which government division of state is the payee.” 6 N.J. Tax 59. Such a construction of the statute is unreasonable, and we legislative should not distort the intent by so a reading. literal The Tax Court also observed that the State Tax Uniform imposes Procedure two-year Law limita tion on paid refunds of taxes Division of Taxation and concluded that the same apply limitation should to refunds of I paid Motor Vehicles. Id. find the Division of taxes unassailable. Tax on this issue to be reasoning of the portion from that Accordingly, respectfully I dissent for a claim refund. majority opinion denies Continental’s joins opinion. Justice CLIFFORD this *23 O’HERN, J., dissenting. tax today Jersey’s
The excise on bus strikes down 48:4-20, concluding that the tax unconstitu- operations, N.J.S.A. tionally against cer- interstate commerce because discriminates they granted exemption tain an from the if carriers are Jersey’s to New commuters and provide an instate service intercity I that bus service and travelers. Because believe substantially equivalent are taxable commuter service not events, is no out-of-state and there direct discrimination business, I operators engage in same believe the who by majori- compel the result reached Constitution does ty- Congress simply provides Commerce Clause “[t]he * * * * * * among regulate shall have Power Commerce [t]o * * I, 8, Const, art. sec. cl. 3.
the several States U.S. Congress, the clause Although grant power as a to stated of in on states even imposing has been read as some limitations See, by City Philadel Congress. e.g., of action absence of 2531, 2535, 617, 623, 57 Jersey, v. 437 98 S.Ct. phia New U.S. regulation (1978) potential (subjects 2d of federal L.Ed. 481 congressional open to control escaped attention “are have imposed long restraints they so as act within the States itself”). by the Clause Commerce power Congress to implications grant of negative ” “ ‘silent,’ ‘negative,’ ‘dormant.’ to have been referred Rest, Eule, 91 Yale Laying the Dormant Clause Commerce (1982). interprets this dormant n. 1 When a court L.J. 425 will, occasion, Clause, invalidate aspect of it the Commerce commerce; should not into a court unwarranted state intrusion so, public in the however, merely it to be do because believes 554 policy Congress
interest to determine where has not. The of transportation policy establishment or tax for state is government. Airlines, the other branches of Northwest Cf. Minnesota, 292, 302, 950, 955, v. Inc. 64 88 L.Ed. (1944) (Black, J., (“The concurring) Constitution gives [Congress] the power regulate among commerce states, and until it I think acts we should enter the with field caution”). extreme Our constitutional traditions have been “ similar. ‘To declare a statute judicial unconstitutional is a ” power delicately to be exercised.’ Harvey v. Board Cho sen Freeholders County, (1959) Essex 30 N.J. (quoting Hendrickson, (Ch. v. Wilentz 133 N.J.Eq. 1943), (E. aff'd, N.J.Eq. A.1944)). 244 & legislative A act should not be void declared its repugnancy “unless beyond constitution is clear reasonable Gangemi doubt.” Berry, I dispel N.J. cannot that reasonable doubt this case and therefore must dissent. opinion
The majority
prevalent
reflects a formalism once
analysis of state
taxation
interstate commerce.
But
*24
Complete
Transit,
274,
Auto
Brady,
Inc. v.
430
97
U.S.
S.Ct.
1076,
(1977),
51
326
Supreme
L.Ed.2d
the United States
Court
“
altogether
abandoned
magic
‘the use of
words
labels’ [that]
”
could ‘disable an
levy’
otherwise constitutional
and recognized
they
longer
that
284-89,
no
an analytic
served
function. Id. at
1081-1084,
555
com
against interstate
fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
merce,
provided
fairly related to the services
and is
1082-84,
285-89,
It was to the that New York had created a tax granting a advantage direct commercial to local businesses. Id. However, at 50 at 525. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d when the different, may transactions are a different tax imposed. See, 204-05, Maid, e.g., Alaska v. Arctic U.S. S. Ct. 929, 932, (no (1961) 6 L.Ed. 2d discrimination tax where operation ships greater of freezer is than tax on local fish processors since the competitive). businesses are not beyond appearance try
We must upon then look to focus the commercial event that involved here. I am certain that standing the commuter at a roadside Plains Scotch would Trailways fail to see through that bus that roars the commu nity on its route Miami engaged between and Boston is not the same company provides public business as a bus transportation point from that point to another within the really question commuter shed. There should be no in the minds majority intercity entirely of the bus service is an commodity distinct from commuter bus service. See Salorio Glaser, 447, 459, denied, 93 N.J. cert. (1983) within, (comparing journeys L.Ed.2d 682 to work
from, modes). essence, and to New all Jersey, In the Court now holds that the commodity, State cannot tax this a discrete aspect commerce, of interstate unless it taxes a different com modity, intrastate or commuter bus service. While case might discrimination particular be made in circumstances when transportation products analyzed, primary are facial effect is not discriminatory rationally because it distinguishes products. between
In analysis, the last the issue given is whether the state has something something ask for return. service, case of commuter bus the benefits to the are state eased, transportation self-evident. Not is a crisis but air-pollution problems energy-consumption problems are delivery addressed of the local bus service. same holds true for intrastate bus services essential to the New *26 Hence, public important purposes, which Jersey job market. intercity transportation, are served not related to bus are intracity or commuter service. provision of under the Commerce Clause The of discrimination essence Tax Exchange in Boston Stock State expressed thus Comm’n, supra: structuring their does not States today prevent Our decision encourage growth commerce and of intrastate development
systems with other States for Nor we hold that a State may do compete industry. of a such lies at the heart free trade of interstate commerce; competition share in of no State diserimi- may hold the process competition We only policy. in business manufactured or the operations performed tax the natorily products other State. 50 L.Ed.2d at 97 S.Ct. at U.S. 528-29.] at 336-37, [429 in domain state and national relationship intricate between The v. San Antonio was outlined Garcia the field of mass transit —, Auth., 469 105 S.Ct. Metropolitan Transit There, supporting the federal interest L.Ed.2d considering important factor was an mass transit urban —, 105 Id. at regulate wages in that area. Congress’ power to however, issue, 1019-1020, at 1036-37. at L.Ed.2d S.Ct. here, not, power, and sweep Congress’ was the —, 105 Id. at the Commerce Clause. negative restraints of the essential- 1020-1021, Given at 1037-38. L.Ed.2d function, nega- sovereign transportation to a state’s ity of directly is not Clause aspect or dormant Commerce tive regulates the commercial It the state is when relevant. that it private citizens advantage of its for the market bal- against economic policy to offend the constitutional found kanization. lead analysis could sum, only formalistic I believe discriminatory. unconstitutionally conclusion that this tax Jersey private interest since no New excise tax furthers same nonresident deliverers
treats resident both important public an rationally related to equally and is service purpose. The Constitution require does not the invalidation this tax. *27 For —Chief Justice WILENTZ, and affirmance modified POLLOCK,
Justices HANDLER and GARIBALDI-4. For CLIFFORD and STEIN-2. affirmance —Justices For reversal—Justice CLIFFORD-1.
