delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Continental Resources of Illinois, Inc. (Continental), brought an action against defendants, Illinois Methane, LLC (Illinois Methane), and DeMier Oil Company (DeMier), alleging that, pursuant to certain oil and gas leases, it has the exclusive right to explore, drill, and produce the coalbed methane gas that is being produced by defendants. Continental further alleged that it also has a legal right to share in the proceeds of Illinois Methane’s coalbed methane production from certain coal mine voids because Continental owns the coal rights in nearby lands which were a part of the same coal mine. Royal Talon Company (Royal Talon) intervened, alleging that its rights might be affected by Continental’s complaint. The circuit court of Franklin County dismissed Continental’s complaint for a failure to state a cause of action because Continental did not have any right to produce - coal-bed methane under the conventional oil and gas leases it controlled. The court further found that, under the mineral-production principle known as the rule of capture, the complaint did not state a cause of action for the drainage of gas. Continental appeals the dismissal of its complaint. The United Mine Workers of America, its District 12 (Illinois), and the Illinois Coal Association were given leave to file amicus curiae briefs with this court. We affirm.
Old Ben Coal Company (Old Ben) originally controlled the coal, oil, and gas underlying various lands in Franklin County, Illinois. In the early 1980s, Old Ben executed oil and gas leases granting the right to produce from those lands oil, all gases, liquid hydrocarbons, and their constituent products. Continental obtained three of these oil and gas leases by assignment in 2001. Continental also acquired in 2001 all oil, gas, and mineral rights to some 300 acres known as the “Williams Acreage.” According to Continental, Illinois Methane and De-Mier allegedly were producing coalbed methane gas from mine voids underlying the lands leased or controlled by Continental. Continental sought a declaratory judgment that it had the exclusive right to explore, drill, and produce gas, including coalbed methane gas, on these properties. Continental also sought relief
Continental argues on appeal that the court erred in dismissing its complaint. Continental asserts that it was error to find that the language “all gases” in its leases did not include coalbed methane gas. Continental further contends the court erred in holding that gas existing in mine voids is subject to the rule of capture.
While the ownership of and the right to develop coalbed methane gas are questions of first impression in Illinois, courts in other jurisdictions have struggled with these issues for more than a decade. A review of these cases reveals a split of authority. Many of the cases have resolved the issues by resorting to interpreting or looking to the intent of the original leases and/or grants. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.,
The process by which organic material becomes coal is known as coalification. The coalification process generates gases, one of which is coalbed methane. There are three states of coalbed methane gas: (1) free gas within the cleats and matrixes of the coal, (2) gas dissolved in water in the coal pores, and (3) gas adsorbed onto the solid surface of the coal. When the pressure on the coal is reduced, the forces that hold the coalbed methane to the coal are reduced and coalbed methane is released from the coal. Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. Ratliff,
Historically, coalbed methane gas was considered a “dangerous waste product of coal mining.” Amoco Production Co.,
In Illinois, mineral rights may be severed from surface rights and conveyed separately. Miller v. Ridgley,
Continental first alleges that oil and gas leases granting the right to produce all gases include the right to produce coalbed methane gas as well. As shown, coalbed methane gas is distinct, and the answer is not that simple. Each side has presented cogent arguments why coal-bed gas should be declared the property of that particular side. Notable arguments include the fact that coalbed gas has practically the same chemical composition as natural gas with only very small percentages of other ingredients. On the other side, coalbed gas is a by-product of coal and has a natural and unique affinity for coal. The coal owner cannot mine the coal without removing the coalbed gas because it poses the perils of explosion and asphyxiation. In addition, coal owners need to control the production of coalbed gas in order to maintain the safety of the mines and the value of the coal seams.
Given the status of this case and the leases and land interests involved, we need not determine to whom the coalbed methane gas belongs in the absolute. We first note that the leases at issue here deny Continental the right to produce coalbed methane from a coal seam or void. The leases specifically require the lessee to
Continental argues that the coalbed methane found in mine voids, however, should not be treated the same as that found in coal seams or active mines. It is true that natural gas produced and reduced to possession is personal property. And gas injected into underground, defined, and controlled reservoirs belongs to whoever produced or bought the gas and transported it to those reservoirs. See, e.g., White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp.,
We therefore conclude that coalbed methane gas found in coal seams and/or in mine voids is controlled by the coal estate. Under the rule of capture, coalbed methane gas cannot be owned until it is reduced to possession. Consequently, Continental does not and cannot own the coalbed methane gas at issue here. We further conclude that defendants’ production of coalbed methane gas from wells located outside Continental’s lands is not a violation of Continental’s rights. For these reasons, even after viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Continental, we agree with the trial court that Continental failed to state a cause of action. Clearly, there is no set of facts that can be proved under these pleadings entitling Continental to the relief it seeks. See 735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 2000); Pochopien v. Marshall, O’Toole, Gerstein, Murray & Borun,
Affirmed.
WELCH and McGLYNN, JJ., concur.
