delivered the opinion of the Court.
Richard B. Horton (claimant) was injured in an industrial accident on Mаy 28, 1975. His injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Initially, the Insurance Company paid claimant his proper disability rate and certain medical expenses. During approximately the next 18 months thе claimant sought additional medical assistance for his injury and underwent two operations. By June, 1977, the Insuranсe Company was refusing to pay certain medical expenses incurred by claimant. They also rеfused to pay claimant’s full disability rate. As a result, claimant filed a petition for an emergency heаring before the Workers’ Compensation Court. That Court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in claimant’s favor.
The judgment awarded attorney fees and costs to claimant pursuant to sectiоn 92-616. R.C.M. 1947 [now section 39-71-611, MCA], Claimant’s attorney submitted a statement to the Workers’ Compensation Court claiming attorney fees and costs incurred in the case totaling $3,355.19. Subsequently, the Insurance Company filed a petitiоn requesting a hearing on the question of attorney fees.
A hearing was held before the Workers’ Compensation Court for the limited purpose of hearing arguments on whether a hearing on attorney fees, shоuld be granted. The Workers’ Compensation Court entered an order granting Horton’s motion for leave tо verify his previously filed statement for attorney fees and costs, and denied the Insurance Company’s motion fоr an evidentiary hearing prior to an award of attorney fees and costs. This appeal followed.
The sole issue, as framed by appellant Insurance Company, is whether the 1979 amendment to section 39-71-611, MCA, providing that attorney fees shall be established by the Workers’ Compensation judge instead of the Divisiоn of Workers’ Compensation
In 1979, section 39-71-611, MCA, wаs amended. Prior to the amendment this statute read:
“In the event the insurer denies the claim for compеnsation or terminates compensation benefits, and the claim is later adjudged compensable, by the division or on appeal, the insurer shall pay reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees as established by the division . . .” (Emphasis added.)
After the amendment this statute read:
“In the event an insurer denies liability for a claim for compensation or terminatеs compensation benefits and the claim is later adjudged compensable by the workers’ comрensation judge or on appeal, the insurer shall pay reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees as established by the workers’ compensation judge.” (Emphasis added.)
For the purposes of this case, the only pertinent distinction between this statute as it existed prior to the amendment and after the amendment is the substitutiоn of “workers’ compensation judge” for “division.”
In 1978, prior to the amendment, this Court decided the case of Smith v. Pierce Packing Co. (1978), Mont.,
“Further, claimant argues that no evidence per se of attorney fees need be presented in a workers’ compensation case, as the procedure entails submission of a verfied petition to the division, set*344 ting forth the number of hours spent and services performed. The division administrator then reviews the petition and sets a ‘reasonable fee’. We concur.” Mont.,581 P.2d at 838 ,35 St.Rep. at 984 .
In other words, thе rules pertaining to attorney fees as enunciated in Crncevich do not apply in workers’ compensatiоn cases. In the present case, the appellant contends that the amendment to section 39-71-611, MCA, requires us to overrule Smith and apply the Crncevich rule to workers’ compensation cases. We decline to so hold.
The amendment, noted above, merely changes the party who sets the reasonable fee. The amendment to section 39-71-611, MCA, does not change the Smith decision. The statute both before and after the amendment does not require an evidentiary hearing to determine attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases. The method used to fix attorney fees is discretionary with the Workers’ Compensation judge, and the matter of allowing a hearing concerning attorney fees is alsо discretionary. The failure to allow such a hearing is not per se an abuse of discretion. In the prеsent case, the appellant’s only allegation of abuse of discretion is the failure to prоvide a hearing on attorney fees. Since we hold that such a hearing is not required for workers’ compensation cases, the Workers’ Compensation Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.