Continental Clay & Mining Co. v. BrysonContinental Clay & Mining Co. v. Bryson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Monks
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver without notice. The complaint was filed and summons issued September 8, 1906. On the same day the judge of the court below, at chambers, without notice to or appearance of appellant, appointed a receiver of all its property rights, credits and effects.
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The only evidence given at the ex parte hearing for the appointment of the receiver was the verified complaint, which reads as follows: “John G. Bryson complains of the Continental Olay & Mining Co., and says that said defendant is a corporation, carrying on a general clay and coal mining business, in pursuance of the laws of the State of Indiana, and having an office and agency for. the transaction of such business in the county of Olay; that he, the plaintiff herein, is a stockholder in said corporation; that the business of said corporation has been conducted in such a loose, careless and reckless manner as that there now exists an outstanding indebtedness against said corporation of more than $50,000, as plaintiff is informed and believes; that the receipts accumulated by said corporation are all *488paid out-in salaries and in the carrying on of the business of said corporation, without any corresponding benefits or profits to the stockholders, including plaintiff herein; that the business of said corporation is now, and for a long time past has been, a losing business, and there is no prospect that it will or can be conducted in the future, under the present management, on a paying basis; that said corporation is now unable and without funds to meet its indebtedness and is insolvent, or at least in imminent danger of becoming- insolvent. Plaintiff now further shows that the board of directors of said corporation have authorized one Legnard, its president, to dispose of the assets of said corporation; that said Legnard is a nonresident of the State of Indiana, and if he is permitted to turn the assets of said corporation into cash or available securities he will, in all probability, take the same outside the jurisdiction of this court; that said Legnard is the principal stockholder in said corporation, and plaintiff believes that he would not dispose of the assets of the corporation to the best advantage of the minority stockholders; that said corporation is now threatening to sell the property of the corporation, over the protests and objections of this plaintiff. Wherefore, plaintiff prays for an accounting to him by said corporation and that the court, upon proper and sufficient hearing and proof, order that the affiairs of said corporation he wound up and dissolved, that the proceeds be applied to the extinguishment of its debts, and that the surplus, if any, be divided among the stockholders. And plaintiff further prays the court that to that end a receiver be appointed, without notice, to take charge of the property, business, assets and avails of said corporation for the purpose of winding up the affairs thereof, and plaintiff also prays for all other relief in the premises.”
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It was said in the case last cited: “When such notice can be given it should be given, unless there is imminent danger of loss, or great damage, or irrevocable injury, or the greatest emergency, or when by the giving of notice the very purpose of the appointment of a receiver would be rendered nugatory; and such instances are of rare occurrence in the federal courts, because of their power, when an injunction is asked for, to grant a temporary restraining order (Rev. St. U. S. § 718), which may be served at the same time that the notice is served, to prevent action by the defendant or his agent, and to preserve the existing conditions until the application for an injunction *490and for a receiver can be heard. North American Land, etc., Co. v. Watkins [1901], 109 Fed. 101, 48 C. C. A. 254.”
Tbe belief of appellee that Legnard would not dispose of tbe assets of tbe corporation to tbe best advantage of tbe minority stockholders, and tbe probability that said Legnard would, if tbe assets of tbe corporation were turned into cash, take tbe same out of tbe State, was not a sufficient showing to authorize tbe appointment of a receiver. This was a mere statement of tbe opinion of appellee. Tbe facts upon which such opinion was founded should have been set forth in the verified complaint that tbe court might judge of its correctness. Wabash R. Co. v. Dyke-man, supra, at page 65.
*491It is evident from what has been said and the authorities cited that the facts stated in the verified complaint were not sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver without notice.
The interlocutory order appointing a receiver is reversed.