The petitioner, Continental Air Lines, Inc. (Continental), appeals from the court of appeals’ unpublished opinion, Keenan v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., No. 83CA1104 (Oct. 18, 1984), which held that *710 an employer’s distribution to employees of handbooks or policy manuals which contain specific procedures for termination of employment, when relied upon by an employee and supported by the consideration of continued service, may result in the employer becoming contractually bound to comply with those procedures. The court of appeals concluded that there were material questions of fact; therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. We granted certiorari review, and we reverse in part and remand with directions.
I.
The respondent, Maynard W. Keenan, Jr., was employed by Continental from May 1974 to September 1981, when he was discharged. Keenan then filed this suit alleging wrongful discharge based on the failure of Continental to follow procedures set forth in its policy manual or handbook. Keenan alleged in his complaint that he was given “certain job security assurances” contained in Continental’s handbook. At his deposition, Keenan stated that he had not relied on any policies contained in the manual at the time he became employed and stated that he did not receive a copy of that manual until after his employment had started. Subsequently, however, Keenan contradicted his deposition testimony in an affidavit and stated that he was given a copy of the handbook when he was hired.
Continental published the handbook before Keenan was hired. Periоdically, the handbook was subject to revision by Continental. The pertinent portion of the handbook concerns a corporate hearing procedure for management personnel who wish to challenge a discipline, discharge, or other job action taken by the company. The hearing procedure was revised by Continental on February 1, 1979, prior to the time Keenan assumed a management position. There is no evidence that Keenan participated in the revision or negotiated fоr the terms of the handbook either prior to accepting his initial position or prior to accepting the management position. After Keenan was discharged, he made a request for a hearirig pursuant to the applicable portion of thе handbook. Keenan was denied this hearing.
The trial court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment. Keenan appealed, and the court of appeals reversed anq remanded the cause.
II.
We granted certiorari to determine wh 3ther an emplоyee may sue an employer for breach of contract on the theory that an employee manual, unilaterally published by the employer, may serve as a basis for altering the terms of an employment otherwise terminable at will. Courts have taken vаried and sometimes contradictory approaches to this question. Several courts have concluded that employee manuals setting forth termination procedures are not contractually binding on the employer.
E.g., Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc.,
There is similar uncertainty in Colorado concerning the formulation of the appropriate standard in such cases.
See Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co.,
The parties and the amici curiae to this prоceeding have recognized that resolution of the question of the propriety of the trial court’s decision requires the articulation of some definitive standards to guide trial courts in resolving an employee’s legal or equitable claims based on an еmployer’s failure to follow the termination procedures set out in an employee manual unilaterally published by the employer and not expressly made a part of the original employment agreement.
III.
An employee who is hired in Colorado for an indefinite period of time is an “at will employee,” whose employment may be terminated by either party without cause and without notice, and whose termination does not give rise to a cause of action.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co.,
An employee originally hired under a contract terminable at will may be able to enforce the termination procedures in an employee manual under one of the following alternative theories. The employee may be entitled to relief under ordinary contract principles if he can demonstrate, first, that in promulgating the termination procedures the employer was making an offer to the employee — that is, the employer manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the employee’s assent would conclude the bargain, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981) — and second, that his initial or continued employment constituted acceptance of and consideration for those procedures.
1
See, e.g., Dahl,
Alternatively, even if the requisites for formation of a contract are not found, the employee would be entitled to enforce the termination рrocedures under a theory of promissory estoppel if he can demonstrate that the employer should reasonably have expected the employee to consider the employee manual as a commitment from the employеr to follow the termination procedures, that the employee reasonably relied on the termination procedures to his detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the termination procedures.
See, e.g., Cleary,
IV.
Under C.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper only when the рleadings, affidavits, depositions, or admissions establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
E.g. Huydts v. Dixon,
Whenever summary judgment is sought, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for his motion and identifying those portions of the record and of the affidavits, if any, which he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477
U.S. at —,
*713
Once the moving party has met this initial burden оf production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that there is a triable issue of fact. If the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on his claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. —,
In a case such as this, when an employer seeks summary judgment on an employee’s claim that the employer was bound to follow termination procedures set forth in a manual unilaterally promulgated by the employer, the employer would have the initial burden of showing that there was nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the employee was terminable at will. If the employer makes such a showing, the burden would then shift to the employee to show that there is a triable factual issue on whеther the termination procedures constituted a unilateral offer for which the employee’s initial or continued employment constituted an acceptance and provided the requisite consideration, or that the termination procedurеs constituted a promise on which the employee reasonably and detrimentally relied. If the employee shows there is a triable issue of fact in regard to these matters, he has made enough of a showing to withstand a summary judgment motion. If he does not, summary judgment for the employer is appropriate.
Summary judgment for Continental was improperly granted because the trial court incorrectly assumed that termination procedures in a company manual could not under any circumstances be binding on the employer in a case where the employee was originally terminable at will. The trial court erred in this respect and should have considered Continental’s motion under the two alternative theories of liability previously discussed. The court of appeals alsо erred when it simply reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for trial. The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded to the court of appeals with directions that it be returned to the trial court for reconsideration of Cоntinental’s motion under the standards set forth herein.
Notes
. In such a situation the termination procedures may be construed as an offer of a unilateral contract. The operation of such contracts has been explained as follows:
*712 In a unilateral or оne-sided contract only one party promises a performance as the exchange for an act other than a promise bargained for and performed by the promisee. The promise conditioned upon performance of the act is not legally binding until that event occurs. If A says to B “I will pay you $100 if you will plow this field,” B’s act of plowing the field is both performance of the condition to A’s promise, or the acceptance of A's offer, and also it is the giving by B of the price or consideration for A’s promise.
L. Simpson, Handbook of the Law of Contracts § 6, p. 9 (1954).
. In his dissent in Celotex, Justice Brennan discussed the mechanics for discharging the initial burden of production when the moving party is seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party — who will bear the burden of persuasion at trial — has no evidence:
Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party has no evidence is insufficient. Such a ‘burden” of production is no burden at all and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool for harassment. Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. This may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party’s witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence. If there is literally nо evidence in the record, *713 the moving party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court the admissions, interrogatories and other exchanges between the parties that are in the record. Either way, however, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrates that there is no evidence in the record to support a judgment for the nonmov-ing party.
477 U.S. at-,