Constance Guice-Mills appeals from an adverse decision after a three-day bench trial before Judge Bernard Newman. * He held that she had not been the subject of handicap discrimination by the Veterans Administration Hospital at Montrose, New York. We agree with Judge Newman that Guice-Mills’ medical condition rendered her not “otherwise qualified” to satisfy the justified requirements for a head nurse position. Moreover, the hospital’s offer to reassign her to the position of staff nursе for a shift compatible with her medical condition and at no decrease in grade, salary or benefits constituted a “reasonable accommodation” within the meaning of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act оf 1973. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Guice-Mills began work at the Veterans Administration Franklin Delano Roosevelt Hospital, Montrose, New York, in February 1980. Approximately one month later, she assumed the position of head nurse, which she held until her retirement on a disability pension in April 1986. There was testimony at trial, credited by Judge Newman, that head nurses need to work an “administrative tour of duty” of either a 7:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m. shift or 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. shift. Head nurses are the only management— nonunion — employees in patient-care units. They must participate in major administrative activities concerning their unit, including meetings near the beginning of their shift. They must also review and modify the care and treatment of patients often after consultation with the night supervisor. Accordingly, the hospital’s standard requirement is that a head nurse be *796 present and fulfill the prescribed tasks during the designated administrative shift. It was also established that head nurses have worked different shifts from those above or covered more than one unit in the absence оf a head nurse. However, as a matter of ordinary practice, head nurses were expected to comply with the designated schedules.
During her term as head nurse, Guice-Mills suffered from a number of maladies, among them depression, sevеre anxiety, insomnia and migraine headaches. She attributed these to job-related stress. In 1984, she had a major depressive episode. At that time, her physician recommended a two-month leave of absence from her job. As part of her treatment, Guice-Mills also commenced antidepressant drug therapy and, upon the recommendation of a psychiatrist, began to take sedatives. After the leave of absence, appellant returned to her job, but her depression recurred.
Upon her physician’s recommendation, Guice-Mills took an extended leave of absence from February until September 1985. Returning, she again experienced depression-related symptoms, among them insomnia, extrеme fatigue, lassitude, physical deterioration, significant weight gain, difficulty in concentrating, loss of interest in ordinary activities, sleeping disturbances, inability to get out of bed in the morning, and other symptoms. At that time she came under the care of a Dr. Barnеs. Among other medications, Dr. Barnes prescribed Desyrel, a sedating antidepressant intended to relieve stress and induce sleep.
After beginning to take Desyrel, Guice-Mills found it nearly impossible to get out of bed in the morning and usually arrived for her 8:00 a.m. shift аfter 10:00 a.m. Her supervisors repeatedly instructed her to arrive by 8:00 a.m., but she regularly failed to do so.
On or about September 19, 1985, Guice-Mills asked that she be allowed to work a later block of hours, specifically 10:00 a.m-6:30 p.m. At that time she submitted a lettеr from Dr. Barnes stating that she was under care for extreme stress and needed to work a later shift, beginning at or after 10:00 a.m. The letter did not mention appellant’s depressive illness, her treatment or medication program, or her prognosis. Nor did it explain the significance of the 10:00 a.m. starting time.
On September 23, Dr. Richard Donn, Chief of Staff of the hospital, wrote to Dr. Barnes seeking information concerning appellant’s illness, treatment plan and prognosis. Guice-Mills refused to allow Dr. Barnes to release any information. On September 24, appellant’s request for a changed tour of duty was denied, and she was directed to work the 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. tour of duty. On October 8, 1985, appellant submitted an application to the hospital for disability retirement. This application was approved in April 1986.
On October 22, 1985, while her application for retirement was still pending, appellant filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that she had been denied the requested change because she was black and handicapped. Appellant continued to arrive late, often coming in after 11:00 a.m. On January 2, 1986, before any EEOC investigation and prior to the expiration of Title VII’s 180-day waiting period for commencing a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), appellant filed a pro se action charging race- and handicap-based discrimination.
On January 8, 1986, Dr. Barnes wrote a second letter seeking to have appellant’s work hours changed. In that letter, Dr. Barnes referred to appellant’s need for a later starting time because of her medication schedule. Replying to that letter, Dr. Donn indicated that a particular medication schedule alone was insufficient to justify a change and professed his willingness to keep an open mind and to explore alternаtives. There was no response, and on January 14, 1986, Dr. Donn reiterated his prior conclusion that, based on what he knew of the situation, he could not justify a change in appellant’s tour of duty. Meanwhile, Rosell Knight, R.N., the hospital's Chief of Nursing Service, indicаted a willingness to reassign appellant to the position of staff nurse in order to meet Guice- *797 Mills’ expressed need to work a 10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m. tour of duty. The position of staff nurse was consistent with appellant’s professional training and experiеnce, met her request for a permanent 10:00 a.m. starting time, and, so far as appears on this record (Guice-Mills having the burden of proof), maintained her compensation level. Appellant rejected the offered staff-nurse position, stating that the change would constitute a demotion and that she was not qualified for the position.
Appellant’s application for disability retirement was approved in April 1986, and she terminated her employment with the hospital on April 25, 1986. The EEOC mаde no final determination on her complaint. The EEOC file was turned over to the Veterans Administration Office of General Counsel for final agency determination. On October 30, 1987, the Office of General Counsel of the Veterans Administration published a final decision rejecting the substance of appellant’s EEOC complaint.
After a three-day bench trial, the district judge held against Guice-Mills. He found that she was a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., but that her inability tо work the administrative shift beginning at 8:00 a.m. rendered her not otherwise qualified for the position of head nurse. He also held that the requested accommodation would have been administratively unreasonable for the hospital and that appellant was not constructively discharged or subjected to handicap-based discrimination.
DISCUSSION
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, a complaining party is required to show that: (1) she is a handicaрped person under the Act; (2) she is “otherwise qualified” for the position; (3) she was excluded from that position solely because of her handicap; and (4) the program sponsoring the position received federal funding.
Joyner by Lowry v. Dumpson,
Title 29, §. 706(8)(B) defines a handiсapped individual as “any person who (i) has a physical or mental, impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). “[Mjental imрairment” includes “any ... emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b)(2). For a “mental impairment” to constitute a handicap, it must “substantially limit[ ] one or more of a person’s major life activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i). The pertinent regulations indicate that working and the pursuit of profеssional responsibilities are major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c). We agree with the district court that because appellant’s illness and medication regime interfered with her ability to arrive at work on time, she was a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against “qualified handicapped persons.”
Hall v. United States Postal Serv.,
With regard to undue hardship, the district court, concluding that “an administrative work week tour оf duty was a critical requirement for the position of Head
*798
Nurse at the Hospital,” held that the hospital had no duty to grant appellant the requested accommodation in starting time.
Guice-Mills v. Denvinski,
Moreover, with regard to an offer of reasonable accommodation, the hospital offered Guice-Mills a position as a staff nurse with the hours requested and with no reduction in remuneration. In addition to making changes in job requirements that do not create undue hardshiр for the employer, an employer may reassign the handicapped employee as a “reasonable accommodation.”
See Rhone v. United States Dept, of the Army,
The decision of the district court is therefore affirmed.
Notes
Senior Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.