We granted the applications for discretionary appeal in this alcoholic beverage ordinance case brought by appellant, Consolidated Government of Columbus/City of Columbus, to determine whether the issues presented for review come within the ambit of the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 and to review the ruling by the superior court that thе ordinance is unconstitutional. We conclude that these cases are subject to the discretionary appeal process. In addition, finding no merit to the constitutional rulings, we revеrse the superior court.
In 1998 appellee Matt Barwick, d/b/a Red Riders Restaurant, qualified as a restaurant under City ordinance section 3-1 (f) 1 and acquired a conditional alcoholic beverage license. Appellee successfully renewed the license in 1999. However, in January 2000, the City rejected appellee’s application for another renewal of the alcoholic beverage license because appellee was situated within 600 feet of a location already holding a valid on-premises alcohol license, see city code section 3-5 (d), 2 and a city financial audit had demonstrated that appellee failed to meet the food/alcohol sales criteria set forth in section 3-1 (f). A show cause hearing was held before the Columbus City Council on February 8, 2000 at which time appellee, represented by counsel, appeared to oppose the denial of the renewal of the alcoholic beverage license. After hearing evidence presented by both *177 sides, the city council unanimously voted to deny the license basing its decision оn evidence that appellee did not meet the ordinance’s definition of a restaurant.
Claiming irreparable harm if not allowed to sell alcohol, in February 2000 appellee filed a petition for certiorari to the superior court challenging the city council’s decision and seeking a temporary and permanent injunction preventing the City from enforсing its decision not to reissue the alcoholic beverage license. At the same time, appel-lee filed a complaint seeking mandamus, a temporary restraining order and declaratory relief seeking reversal of the City’s decision and challenging on equal protection grounds the constitutionality of the distance requirement in the City’s ordinance becausе of the exemption granted to establishments in the Riverfront District of the City of Columbus (CRD). 3 The trial court conducted a consolidated hearing, and entered two orders, which although similar in content afford different forms of relief. In Case No. S01A0564 the trial court declared section 3-5 (d) unconstitutional because similarly situated businesses located in the CRD are exempt from the distance requirеment. In Case No. S01A0565 the court denied mandamus relief, but ruled section 3-1 (f) unconstitutional as applied and issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance fоr ninety (90) days. 4
1. In appealing to this Court from the superior court’s orders, the City filed both direct appeals and applications for discretionary appeal. We granted the applications to consider, inter alia, whether the issues presented for review come within the ambit of the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35. We find that because bоth the petition for certiorari and petition for mandamus filed by appellee in the superior court sought review of the City’s decision not to renew the alcoholic beveragе license and the superior court, in ruling on such petitions, reviewed the decision of a local administrative agency, an application for discretionary appeal wаs required in each appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1);
Sprayberry v. Dougherty County,
2. The City contends it had the authority to enact section 3-5 (d)
*178
requiring a distance of 600 feet between establishments that operate as bars. A city council in the exercise of its рolice power may formulate rules and regulations for the licensing of the liquor business, . even to the extent of prohibiting the licensed activity in a specified area. See
Powell v. Board of Commrs.,
3. The City further contends that the trial court erred in finding that the city ordinance which distinguished between licensed alcohol outlets located in the CRD and licensed alcohol outlets located elsewhere in the city violated equal protection in that it excepts establishments located in the CRD from its provisions. Since appellee is not a member of a suspeсt class and operating a business which sells alcoholic beverages is not a fundamental right, we apply the “rational basis test” to determine if the favored classification creаting the CRD exception violates equal protection. See
Love v. Whirlpool
Corp.,
Judgments reversed.
Notes
Tо meet the definition of a “restaurant,” section 3-1 (f) requires that at least fifty (50%) percent of an establishment’s sales be dedicated to food prepared and consumed on the premises.
Section 3-5 (d) provides in its entirety:
It shall be unlawful to issue an on-premises alcoholic beverage license within six hundred (600) feet of a location already holding or which has held within the last twelve (12) months a valid on-premises alcoholic beverage license; provided, however, that this prohibition shall not apply if the applicant for a new license meets the definition of a restaurant, a hotel, or a club as defined in section 3-1 of this chapter.
Section 3-5 (g) states that alcoholic beverage licensees located within the Central Riverfront Zoning District are not subject to section 3-5 (d).
The evidence presented before the superior court showed that the City had given other establishments ninety (90) days to comply with the provisions of the ordinance. However, the 90-day period has run without re-application by appellee for licensing as a restaurant. Accordingly, the parties agree that the issue whether appellee re-qualified as a restaurant under section 3-1 (f) is now moot.