Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of ELSIE SMITH. STAN L. DIXON, as Public Guardian, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. ELSIE SMITH, Objector and Appellant.
No. A033206
First Dist., Div. Five
Dec. 8, 1986
187 Cal. App. 3d 903
Steven B. Solomon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Robert D. Curiel, County Counsel, and William J. Losh, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
LOW, P. J.— We hold that a proposed conservatee suffering from a mental disorder is not “gravely disabled” for the purposes of conservatorship and possible involuntary confinement, under
I
The case raises a familiar moral and legal problem that the Legislature has sought to resolve: When should the state intervene to care for the
On September 13, 1985, the public guardian appeared before the superior court requesting that it declare appellant Elsie Smith “gravely disabled” within the meaning of
Smith appealed from the judgment and order of conservatorship, contending (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court‘s finding that appellant was “gravely disabled“; (2) the statute (
Elsie Smith, 43 years old, is a resident of Humboldt County, California. Her current marital status is unknown, but she has two brothers and seven children. She has no fixed income and no home address.
At intermittent periods for the last five years, appellant has attended the Eureka Church of God in Eureka, California. In June 1985, appellant began an around-the-clock vigil outside the church. At the times she would enter the church, she would make a disturbance and interrupt services. The pastor of the church made several attempts to counsel her about receiving help, but his advice was ignored. The pastor also contacted the police on several occasions when appellant‘s behavior was particularly disruptive. On these occasions, the officers arrested appellant and took her to jail or to a nearby mental hospital.2
Pursuant to
Two other witnesses testified that food and money had been given to appellant over the past year, one time because of her “poor physical condition.” Another witness testified that he had talked to appellant to persuade her to return to her family and that she had ignored his requests. He also noted that “lots of people offered to help her.”
Appellant testified, stating that the Bible commanded her to “forsake all.” She elaborated that she rejected shelter and income “in order to suffer with Christ” and she would be “sanctified” by obeying the Gospel‘s teachings. In response to a question from the trial court, she stated that she did not want any income.
II
Sections
The LPS Act instituted fundamental changes in the confinement and treatment of nondangerous mentally ill persons. It was enacted in response to the report of the California Assembly Ways and Means Subcommittee
One of the primary objectives of the LPS Act is “[t]o end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons . . . and to eliminate legal disabilities.” (
The clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly and only for those truly necessary cases where a “gravely disabled” person is incapable of providing for his basic needs either alone or with help from others. (See Conservatorship of Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 253; Report at pp. 137-138.) Those persons considered “gravely disabled” were the ”exceptional emergency cases when the person is so disabled . . . that they are incapable of participating in planning for their own needs.” (Report at p. 137, italics added.) The Report proposed that for a person to be “gravely disabled,” he must be incapable of carrying on transactions necessary for survival and otherwise providing for such basic needs as food, clothing and shelter. (Report at p. 133.) The Report stated that this was a specific description of “an incapacitated person in need of immediate treatment.” (Report at p. 138.)3
This conclusion is consonant with O‘Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563 [45 L.Ed.2d 396, 95 S.Ct. 2486]. In Donaldson, petitioner had been confined in a mental institution for 15 years without treatment. The high court rejected the belief that the state may confine the mentally ill to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community. “[I]ncarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising [their] living standards.” (At p. 575 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 407].) The court held that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself.” (At p. 576 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 407], italics added.) The “more” required by the Supreme Court, we feel, encompasses the standard for “gravely disabled.” “[P]ublic intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person‘s physical liberty.” (At p. 575 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 407].) Bizarre or eccentric behavior, even if it interferes with a person‘s normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to fend for herself or destroys her ability to meet those basic needs for survival. Only then does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests.
III
The public guardian must prove the proposed conservatee was “gravely disabled” beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 225-226 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1].) The stricter criminal standard is used because the threat to the conservatee‘s individual liberty and personal reputation is no different than the burdens associated with criminal prosecutions. (Id., at p. 223.)
We conclude that there is insufficient evidence to prove appellant is “gravely disabled” beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite her admittedly bizarre behavior, appellant is not, nor has she been, incapacitated or unable to carry out the transactions necessary to her survival. No evidence was adduced to show that appellant, because of her mental condition, was suffering from malnutrition, overexposure, or any other sign of poor health or neglect. Her refusal to seek shelter is not life threatening. There was uncontradicted evidence that she accepts offers of food and money from friends and relatives. Appellant evinces a strong, sincere—if unorthodox—belief in God, her religion and her place in religion. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant is not “gravely disabled” to justify appointment of a conservator.5
We do not say, however, that from a more complete record appellant could not be adjudicated “gravely disabled.” However, the limited testimony adduced at trial compels our conclusion today. Our conclusion might have changed had more extensive testimony on the effect of appellant‘s behavior on her health and well-being been elicited, or a more thorough investigation properly introduced into evidence been presented. In this case, however, the investigation mandated by
Because of the resolution of this case, we need not address appellant‘s contention regarding religious beliefs and the conservatorship statute.
The judgment and order appealed from are reversed.
Haning, J., concurred.
KING, J.— I concur that the evidence in this case is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). However, this case is exemplary of the human tragedies that have resulted from LPS.
Every citizen in California will surely be horrified to learn that the only possible legal recourse where a nondangerous mentally ill person continuously engages in unlawful conduct, but can provide food, clothing and shelter for herself, is to repeatedly place that person in jail for disturbing the peace. More should be expected from a civilized society. It would seem we are now reaping the harvest from seeds planted in the 1960‘s by the Legislature‘s adoption of California‘s public policy toward the seriously disturbed, but nondangerous, mentally ill. A great many seriously disturbed men and women now inhabit the downtown areas of our major cities, too mentally ill to avoid running afoul of the law but not ill enough to be treated under an LPS conservatorship. If civil commitment with treatment provided to cope with mental illness is inappropriate for such persons, incarceration in county jail is certainly even less appropriate. Yet, as the facts in this case demonstrate, this is exactly what has resulted from the public policy provided by LPS.
Access to needed medical care is a basic human right, and is of particular importance to those whose very illnesses cause them to refuse care. Perhaps this is the proper time for the Legislature to reexamine public policy toward the mentally ill and ensure the provision of essential medical treatment to those who so desperately, both literally and figuratively, cry out for it.
Without some change in public policy, the phenomenon of dramatically increasing numbers of the mentally ill living on the streets and in the