Conservatorship of O.B.
of her person and appointing respondents T.B., her mother (mother), and C.B., her elder
A person with autism is not automatically a candidate for a limited conservatorship. Each case requires a fact-specific inquiry by the probate court. “Autism is known as a ‘spectrum’ disorder because there is wide variation in the type and severity of symptoms people experience.” (https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/autism-spectrum-disorders-asd/index.shtml.) Based on the facts here, we affirm the order establishing a limited conservatorship of appellant‘s person.
Factual and Procedural Background
The limited conservatorship was imposed after a contested evidentiary hearing (also referred to herein as “trial“). Our summary of the facts is based on evidence presented at the trial in the form of testimony and exhibits. We disregard respondents’ summary of the facts based upon reports and declarations that were neither offered nor received in evidence. During the parties’ closing argument, the probate court made clear that it would consider only evidence presented at the trial: “We have had lengthy proceedings outside of the evidentiary proceeding, so you need to limit your arguments to the record inside of the evidentiary proceeding.” (See also
appropriate orders” (italics added)].)2 Moreover, because the evidentiary hearing was contested, declarations were inadmissible pursuant to
In August 2017 respondents filed a verified petition requesting that they be appointed limited conservators of appellant‘s person. The petition alleged that appellant had been diagnosed with autism and “is unable to properly provide for . . . her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter.”
An expert witness, Dr. Kathy Khoie, testified on appellant‘s behalf. Khoie, a psychologist, opined that appellant “is not a candidate for conservatorship.” Khoie explained: “My opinion is based on her intellectual functioning level. I believe that [she] has at least average intelligence. She‘s high average in her nonverbal functioning.” “[S]he is verbal. She‘s able to talk about her likes and dislikes.” In her report, Khoie concluded that although appellant “has a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder,” she “has the potential to live independently with support. She does not require a high level of supervision and decision making by a conservator.”
In her report Khoie said she had reviewed the “Conservator Evaluation” report of the “Tri-Counties Regional Center.” The regional center report, which was neither offered nor received in evidence, was prepared by David Jacobs, Ph.D.
a contract. Recommended power for education and medical treatment were reiterated. Dr. Jacobs did not recommend conservatorship for decision regarding place of residence.” Since Dr. Khoie‘s report was received in evidence without objection, we may consider her report‘s reference to Dr. Jacobs’ recommendations even though Dr. Jacobs’ report was not received in evidence. (See Estate of Nicholas, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 1088.)
Appellant‘s other expert witness, Christopher Donati, is the probate investigator for the Santa Barbara County Public Guardian‘s Office. Pursuant to a “non-court ordered” referral, he met with appellant and evaluated her “to determine if conservatorship was appropriate.” Appellant said she “was opposed to the idea of a conservatorship.” She wanted to continue living with
Donati reviewed Dr. Jacobs’ regional center report as well as the “capacity declaration by Dr. [Cindy] Blifeld.” Her declaration was neither offered nor received in evidence, but Donati testified that Dr. Blifeld‘s declaration contained the required “medical component [for a limited conservatorship] where a medical professional is in support of a conservatorship and [declares] that they feel that the . . . potential conservatee
lacks capacity.” Dr. Blifeld “did feel that . . . [appellant] lacked capacity.” Donati continued: “There seemed to be conflicting reports where certain professionals felt . . . that she did lack capacity. And I believe Dr. Khoie was a professional that felt like she did have capacity and the conservatorship was not appropriate. So there seemed to be conflicting information.”
L.K. is appellant‘s 82-year-old great-grandmother. She testified that, since the conservatorship proceedings began, appellant has been “a nervous wreck.” L.K. opined that appellant does not need a conservatorship and can take care of herself “[a]s much as any teenager can.” She also opined that it was “a bad idea for [appellant] to live with her mom and her dad and her sisters” because “[s]he‘s afraid of them. She‘s afraid that she won‘t be able to come back and see me.” “Her mother yells and swears at her and takes her electronics . . . away from her.”
Mother testified: For the past 10 years, she has had “[n]early daily” contact with appellant. Mother lives with appellant‘s father and two sisters in a “large five bedroom home” in Orange County. She “filed the petition to basically protect [appellant] from the school [Cabrillo High School in Lompoc] and then long term just [to] protect her.” Appellant “has had . . . like 160 missed class periods, but she still manages to get passing grades, even high grades, in all of her academics.” Mother referred to the grades as “‘get this kid out of my class’ grades.” “[S]he‘s not in class to earn the grades. She‘s not producing work to earn the grades.” Sometimes the school placed appellant in detention for the entire day.
If the requested conservatorship were established, mother said appellant would attend El Modena High School in the Orange County School District. Mother asserted that this school
is “one of the highest rated schools in the
Mother further testified: Appellant needs guidance in making routine decisions and assistance in performing daily tasks. Appellant “really struggles with taking in information needed to make decisions.” Mother needs to ask her, “‘Are you going to wear a sweater today? Are you putting on clean underwear? Are you going to brush your hair? Did you brush your teeth? Did you take your pills? . . . Is it hot out? Do you need to wear shorts?‘” Appellant asks mother, “‘Can you lay my clothes out for me. . . . Can you turn the shower on.‘” Mother, appellant‘s father, or her great-grandmother “handles her medication.” Appellant cannot cook or do her laundry. Appellant has “behavioral outbursts” where she will “run off or scream and yell.” She “screams and yells and fights and gets her way no matter what she does, . . . and it stresses her out and makes her upset.”
Mother also testified that appellant is too trusting of other people. She will trust “people who are just nice to her . . . . She will go off with people she shouldn‘t and trust people she shouldn‘t. It‘s dangerous.” Two years ago, appellant “ran off” to see “Sponge Bob on Hollywood Boulevard.” She trusts Sponge Bob.5 She also trusts “all of her family and anyone at school,
anyone she‘s seen before, people at restaurants, restaurant staff.” If a person she trusts asks her to sign a document, “she‘ll just sign it no matter what.” If “you‘re explaining [the document], she doesn‘t really care.”
Tammi L. Faulks, appellant‘s guardian ad litem, filed an action against the Lompoc Unified School District claiming that appellant had not “received the education to which she was entitled.” Faulks sought to “get the school district to either set aside a compensatory education fund [for appellant] or allow [her] to continue to obtain high school services and all of the benefits that go with that until she‘s age 22.” Faulks told the court she was “very worried that [school employees] seem to . . . do whatever it takes to push [appellant] out of the school regardless of whether she gets a proper education.”
During closing argument, respondents’ counsel stated that appellant “has had 312 unexcused class absences this year, so far, and numerous suspensions.” No one objected to this statement. Appellant‘s guardian ad litem said, “[I]t‘s true that she‘s missed over 300 class periods . . . this school year.”
Limited Conservatorship
“A limited conservator of the person . . . may be appointed for a developmentally disabled adult. A limited conservatorship may be utilized only as necessary to promote and protect the well-being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual, and shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual‘s proven mental and adaptive limitations. The conservatee of the limited conservator shall not be presumed to be incompetent and shall retain all legal and civil rights except those which by court order have been designated as legal disabilities and have been specifically granted to the limited conservator.” (
Court‘s Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction to Modify Appellant‘s Educational Plan
Appellant argues: The probate court‘s “JURISDICTION WAS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL AND STATE EDUCATION STATUTES.” “[T]he [probate] court . . . lacked the ability to modify or alter the special education plan instituted by the local school district under requirements established under federal and state education statutes.” “As a result, . . . the [probate] court‘s order granting [respondents‘] petition, which prevented [appellant] from . . . graduating from Cabrillo High School, and resulted in the removal of [appellant] from both her
school and her home, exceeded the court‘s jurisdiction and was legally invalid.”
Appellant‘s argument lacks merit. The probate court did not modify her special education plan. As authorized by
Appellant has not cited authority prohibiting the establishment of a limited conservatorship solely because it may result in an adult student‘s transfer from a school that has failed to meet her educational needs. “‘It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that the judgment appealed from is presumed correct and “‘“all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.“’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. . . .‘” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.)
Substantial Evidence Supports the Establishment of a Limited Conservatorship of Appellant‘s Person
At the hearing on a petition for appointment of a limited conservator of the person, the court shall make the appointment “[i]f the court finds that the proposed limited conservatee lacks the capacity to perform some, but not all, of the tasks necessary to provide properly for his or her own personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter, or to manage his or her own financial resources.” (
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the required findings.
We review the probate court‘s findings to determine whether they are “supported by substantial evidence. In making that determination, we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the . . . findings. [Citations.] We must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the findings. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Ramirez (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 390, 401.)
The “clear and convincing” standard of proof applies to the appointment of a limited conservator. (
Mother‘s testimony constitutes substantial evidence in support of the required finding that “[appellant] lacks the capacity to perform some . . . of the tasks necessary to provide
properly for . . . her own personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter, or to manage . . . her own financial resources.” (
Dr. Khoie‘s and probate investigator Donati‘s opinions conflict with the regional center evaluation prepared by Dr. Jacobs, who recommended a limited conservatorship. Their opinions also conflict with Dr. Blifeld‘s evaluation of appellant. Donati testified that Dr. Blifeld had provided the required “medical component [for a limited conservatorship] where a medical professional is in support of a conservatorship and [declares] that they feel that the . . . potential conservatee lacks capacity.” The opinions of Drs. Jacobs and Blifeld add to the already substantial evidence in support of the probate court‘s findings.
In deciding to appoint a limited conservator of appellant‘s person, the probate court took into account its personal observations of appellant during the proceedings. The court stated: “I‘ve been involved in numerous hearings, and [appellant] has been at all of them or most of them. So in addition to some of the different witnesses[,] I am entitled to base my decision . . . in part on my own observation of [appellant] at the proceedings.”
We reject appellant‘s assertion that “[t]he fact that the trial court ‘observed’ [appellant] - who was sitting right in front of him - over a ten month period [citation], proves nothing.” The court‘s personal observations of appellant contribute to the substantial evidence in support of its findings. (See People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 234 [“when a competency hearing has already been held, [in determining whether to conduct a second competency hearing] ‘the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has
The Probate Court Did Not Violate Principles of Conservatorship Law
Appellant claims that the probate “COURT‘S ACTIONS AND ORDERS VIOLATED BASIC PRINCIPLES UNDER THE STATE CONSERVATORSHIP STATUTE.” “[O]f particular significance, the [probate] court‘s conservatorship order ignored or disregarded the wishes and desires of [appellant] herself, contrary to both the letter and the spirit of conservatorship statutes.”
The probate court considered appellant‘s personal preferences. Although appellant did not testify, the court
permitted her to explain at length in open court why she wanted to stay in Lompoc and attend Cabrillo High School. The court was not required to accede to her wishes.
Appellant argues that the probate court “FAILED TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR AVAILABILITY OF LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO A CONSERVATORSHIP.” “No conservatorship of the person . . . shall be granted by the court unless the court makes an express finding that the granting of the conservatorship is the least restrictive alternative needed for the protection of the conservatee.” (
Appellant contends, “[T]he statements and actions by the [probate] court demonstrate that it had already prejudged the case, and the purported need for a conservatorship.” In support of her contention, appellant refers to the court‘s remarks at a pretrial hearing concerning “[a] placement decision,” i.e., “whether or not [appellant] stays at Cabrillo [High School] or she
goes down to a high school in Orange County.” The court said appellant‘s counsel should “be prepared to show cause why I shouldn‘t impose a permanent conservatorship on the date of the [upcoming trial] because . . . . I believe that the mother has shown a prima facie case [at the pretrial hearing] of why a permanent conservatorship is probably appropriate.” A prima facie case is shown when a party produces “enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party‘s favor.” (Blacks Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1310, col.1.) The court continued, “So . . . you need to make sure that if you object to that, . . . you make it clear to both sides and to the Court on that day [the day of trial] that you don‘t want a conservatorship because when that day is over, I‘m going to probably impose one, unless you change my mind.” Appellant‘s counsel replied, “Understood, Your Honor.”
The probate court‘s statements do not demonstrate that it prejudged the limited conservatorship issue before hearing the evidence at trial. As a courtesy to appellant, the court informed her counsel that at the pretrial hearing mother had made a prima facie case that a limited conservatorship “is probably appropriate.” (Italics added.) Thus, the court warned counsel that at trial she should be prepared to present evidence showing that a limited conservatorship is not appropriate. The court made clear that it would not make up its mind until it had heard all of the evidence.
Disposition
The order establishing a limited conservatorship of appellant‘s person and appointing respondents as conservators is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
PERREN, J.
James Rigali, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Appellant.
Law Offices of Laura Hoffman King and Laura Hoffman King; Tardiff Law Offices and Neil S. Tardiff for Respondents.