A. MSA Claim
As noted, the Court embarks on its journey with Plaintiff's MSA claim. Getting a handle on this Act, however, is no mere
1. Threshold Issues
In order to set up the analytical framework that guides its inquiry, the Court first wades into the parties' disagreement about what restrictions the statute - or, more precisely, one provision of the statute - places on the Agency's actions in developing conservation measures. It next offers a few words about the nature of judicial review of an agency decision rendered subject to this standard.
a. Meaning of MSA's EFH Provision
As explained earlier, amendments to FMPs must comply with a plethora of statutory requirements. One such provision plays a starring role here. Unlike other requirements, which target the commercial and recreational catching of fish directly, this one aims at protecting the critical habitat of each managed species of fish.
Agreement evident in the parties' briefs sets the bounds of this dispute. They are notably on the same page that the "practicable" language permits, or perhaps even requires, the Council to weigh social and economic harms to fishers against any conservation value. See Pl. Mot. at 27; Def. Opp. & Mot. at 16; see also Pl. Opp. & Reply at 3 (" 'Praсticable' implicitly requires that NMFS not focus on the EFH ecological benefits exclusively but must also weigh them against socio-economic factors."). The parties also agree that the Council must harmonize the ten national standards in any action, which requires it to balance multiple objectives. See Pl. Mot. at 27; Pl. Opp. & Reply at 3; Def. Opp. & Mot. at 17. Where they disagree, however, is in the relative priority assigned to these goals.
CLF contends that, as a categorical matter, conservation objectives take priority over economic considerations. See Pl. Mot. at 28, 30. This interpretation, it says, follows from the "plain meaning" of the statute. Id. at 27. Only when two proposed actions have similar conservation goals can the Council turn to economic considerations. Id. at 28, 30. And even then, only an "extreme economic hardship" justifies diverging from a more conservation-friendly alternative. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 6, 8.
Not quite, retorts the Service. It sees the balancing as more flexible. Under its approach, the Council is entrusted with "conduct[ing] a thorough consideration of complex factors representing a broad array of interests with the goal of achieving the greatest benefit to the nation from each managed fishery." Def. Opp. & Mot. at 21. Unlike CLF, the Service does not think that the Council is required to "prioritize alternatives based solely on conservation value." Id. at 22. It goes so far as to say that "[n]othing ... require[s] the Council, where there were multiple alternatives for each sub-region that were potentially practicable, to choose the one with the highest conservation value." ECF
The Government's view advanced in its brief, however, is only a litigation position. Although the Service has promulgated a regulation that expands on the meaning of the statutory provision at issue, see
The Court nonetheless largely agrees with the Government that the statutory scheme does not impose the rigid prioritization urged by Plaintiff. Although it understands why reading the requirement to "minimize ... the adverse effects of fishing" in a vacuum would yield CLF's interpretation, resort to the full statute dispels this hierarchy. That is because, as the parties acknowledge, in any FMP or amendment to an FMP, this is not the only requirement with which a Council must comply. The ten national standards also compete for attention, many of which are similar in structure to the provision at issue here. Three, for instance, command the Council to "minimize" something. See
The upshot of this statutory structure is that Congress did not intend any of these specified goals - i.e. , the ones limited to actions that are "practicable" - to take priority over the others. That includes CLF's focus on the habitat-conservation goal. Rather, the legislature wrote the essential-fish-habitat provision "to allow for the application of agency expertise and discretion in determining how best to manage fishery resources." Conservation Law Found.,
As CLF points out, there is language in one D.C. Circuit opinion that appears to suggest otherwise. In NRDC, the circuit stated that "the Service must give priority to conservation measures" and that "[i]t is only when two different plans achieve similar conservation measures that the Service takes into consideration adverse economic impacts." NRDC, Inc. v. Daley,
A glance at the statute's language confirms the logic of that court's view in this context. National standard one is an unqualified directive: the Service "shall prevent overfishing while achieving ... optimum yield."
Unlike NRDC, the challenge in this case is not to the Service's prescribed catch limits that attempt to "maximize the harvest of a single class of fish over its entire life span" - i.e. , achieve optimum yield. See NRDC,
The Court declines the invitation to read such a hierarchy into the Act's essential-fish-habitat provision. Applying the logic underlying NRDC to statutory text here proves central to this conclusion. Unlike the directive to "prevent overfishing," the EFH provision is qualified by both its verb ("minimize") and the limitation to actions that are "practicable." The structure of this mandate is thus functionally identical to much of national standard eight, which is the precise provision that the court in NRDC held was subordinate to a more explicit directive. For many of the reasons already explained, the inclusion of the word "practicable" is "crucial." Conservation Law Found.,
To be sure, CLF appears to retreat from this position in its Reply brief. It contends that the Council need not adopt any restriction that imposes an "extreme economic hardship." Pl. Opp. & Reply at 6, 8, 14. But whence CLF finds this limit is unclear. The language does not exist in the statute or in any of the regulations governing EFH. And, absent a hook in the law, this Court sees no reason to adopt it in place of the more flexible balancing that flows from the statutory structure.
Finally, before moving on, the Court notes that its conclusion here also does away with another variant of CLF's challenge. Plaintiff asserts throughout its briefs that the Council and the Service both misunderstood the MSA's requirements. It contends that both the formal goals and objectives created by the Council to guide its action, as well as several statements sprinkled throughout the record, demonstrate this misunderstanding. See, e.g., Pl. Mot. at 30-32; Pl. Opp. & Reply at 5. Certainly, if that were true, it could be grounds to condemn the Sеrvice's Amendment: an agency's decision "based on an improper understanding of the law" can render it arbitrary or capricious. See Kazarian,
b. Nature of Judicial Review
The preceding section mapped the contours of the MSA's directive to protect essential habitat. With that task complete, the Court's exercise in statutory interpretation also concludes; what remains is governed by arbitrary-or-capricious review. See Judulang v. Holder,
However interesting this issue of administrative law, it ultimately matters little to the nuts аnd bolts of this Court's analysis. That is because, as this circuit has repeatedly pointed out, there is often much
Starting with the basics, it is the "actions of the NFMS in promulgating regulations to adopt a Fishery Management Plan [that] are subject to judicial review," rather than the actions of the Council directly. See NRDC,
Finally, in its Reply brief, CLF asserts that the Court should not grant any deference to the Council or "sanction NFMS' deference" to that body. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 14. Because Plaintiff's explanation of this contention is brief, the Court struggles to discern the precise argument it is trying to make. If CLF is attempting to argue that no Chevron deference is due to the Council following the Supreme Court's decision in Mead,
Alternatively, perhaps CLF means to argue that the Court should look only to the Record of Decision (ROD) and imрlementing regulatory language to locate the Service's rationale, instead of crediting anything in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). The rationale here might be that, while the ROD (and likely the text in the Federal Register) originates with the Service, the FEIS is "[p]repared by the ... Council." EFH 5780. This too founders. For one, the FEIS is not prepared by the Council alone, but "[i]n cooperation with the ... Service."
2. Gulf-of-Maine Protection Measures
CLF's discontent with the Service's approval of the Habitat Amendment in the Gulf of Maine is geographically comprehensive: it raises challenges to the level of habitat protection in all three sub-regions. The Court will sail through each in order, moving from east to west.
a. Eastern Gulf of Maine
Setting out, the Court first encounters Plaintiff's challenge to the Eastern Gulf of Maine measures. The Habitat Amendment establishes a single protected area within this region, which it closed to all mobile bottom-tending gear. See
Prior to this Amendment, no habitat in the Eastern Gulf of Maine garnered any protection at all from fishing. To draw up potential geographic areas for fishing restrictions, the Council employed its SASI model and other survey data. This process yielded four possible habitat-management areas, which are represented in Figure 1: Machias HMA, Large Eastern Maine HMA, Small Eastern Maine HMA, and the Toothaker Ridge HMA. See EFH 6207. Notably, Small Eastern Maine is contained wholly within Large Eastern Maine. For purpose of analysis, the Council then combined various permutations of these areas into three alternatives. Alternative 1 left things as they were at the time of the Amendment - i.e. , no habitat in the Eastern Gulf of Maine would receive any protection.
Figure 1: Eastern Gulf of Maine Alternatives
CLF takes issue with the Service's approval of this designation. Reduced to its core, Plaintiff's suggestion is that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to approve a plan that did not protect additional habitat. See Pl. Mot. at 32-33. The Court's earlier analysis interpreting the
What the record does reveal is consideration of the impacts of each proposed closure on the effected habitat and fishing communities. See, e.g., EFH 6207-21 (habitat impacts); EFH 6347-60 (human impacts). As all sides agree, these are factors the Council was permitted - and even obliged - to consider in determining whether a closure was practicable. See Am. Oceans Campaign,
Compared with the other closures considered, the Small Eastern Maine area comprises the habitat most vulnerable to bottom-trawling gear. See EFH 6212 (mapping relative vulnerability). In general, the magnitude of positive impact from a closure depends on the vulnerability of the management area to negative impact from fishing. See EFH 6201. This habitat, moreover, is especially important to the managed species. The Council's expert analysis concluded that this area had a significantly higher abundance of managed fish over the past decades compared to the other proposed closures. See EFH 6217 (map of relative weighted persistence showing concentration in Small Eastern Maine region); EFH 6199 (defining weighted persistence as measure of "the number of decades in which the species was present" and "the relative abundance of the species"); see also EFH 6221 ("In addition, the very far above average weighted persistence areas are included within th[e Small Eastern Maine] HMA, and do not overlap the Toothaker Ridge or Machias HMAs."). Combining these features, the Council concluded that, relative to the other areas, "the Small Eastern Maine HMA appears to potentially provide the most habitat protection." EFH 6221.
On the other side of the scale, the impact of the closure on fishing communities was especially minimal. Despite being larger than either the Toothaker Ridge or Machias HMAs, see EFH 6221, the area generates significantly less revenue from the types of fishing affected by a closure. Purse Seine - a midwater gear used in the herring fishery, see EFH 6209 - and lobster traps are the two principal drivers of revenue in the Small Eastern Maine HMA, neither of which is subject to a prohibition on mobile bottom-tending gear. See EFH 6347-49 (graph of fishing revenue); EFH 6350-51 (table of fishing revenue);
Turning to the other regions, it is understandable why the calculus that led the Council to conclude that the Small Eastern Maine HMA warranted protection yielded different conclusions for the other potential closures. Compared with Small Eastern Maine, those potential fishing closures would provide fewer benefits to habitat but have a higher adverse economic impact on fishers.
In Machias, for example, the Council concluded that the habitat is "somewhat less vulnerable to accumulating adverse effects of fishing due to more rapid recovery times associated" with the type of habitat. See EFH 6219; see also EFH 6212 (map of trawl vulnerability). The habitat also evinces a markedly lower prevalence of protected species than other areas in the Gulf of Maine. See EFH 6217. Further, this HMA's proximity to Canada could dampen the effectiveness of any fishing prohibition. Because "portions" of the Machias HMA are in the grey zone, an area that can be fished by both U.S. and Canadian vessels, these waters "could continue to be fished with mobile bottom-tending gears by Canadian" boats, even if the U.S. were to forbid such gear. See EFH 6220. This occurrence "would undermine the effectiveness of the mobilе bottom-tending gear closure and compromise habitat recovery." EFH 6219. A closure there, however, would have a larger impact on U.S. fishing communities than a closure in the Small Eastern Maine HMA. In particular, the clam and scallop fisheries have "the most potential revenue displacement," at levels that far exceed any fishery in Small Eastern Maine. Compare EFH 6355 (revenue displacement in Machias between 8% and 17% of average revenue per trip) with EFH 6358 (revenue displacement in Small Eastern Maine generally less than 1%).
Toothaker Ridge tells a similar story. Like Machias, the habitat type is "relatively less vulnerable and consists mainly of mud-dominated areas." EFH 6221; see also EFH 6212 (maps of trawl vulnerability and dominant substrate). On the economic side of the scale, the magnitude of bottom-trawl fishing in this area is greater than in Small Eastern Maine. See EFH 6359. The Council thus concluded that, in comparison to Small Eastern Maine, closing Toothaker Ridge would have a larger impact on these fishers.
The Service's decision in Large Eastern Maine, although ultimately sufficiently articulated and rational, is harder to understand. On the one hand, in support of the Service's decision, maps of the region do show minimal trawl vulnerability. See EFH 6212. But on the other, like Small Eastern Maine - which, as a reminder, is a wholly included subset of Large Eastern Maine - both show above-average abundance of managed fish. See EFH 6217. The larger area also holds benefits that the smaller, protected area does not: unlike the Small Eastern Maine HMA, "the Large Eastern Maine HMA is expected to
Two arguments in the record ultimately tip the scales in the Service's favor. First, the Council acknowledged the habitat value of the area, but justified its action out of a "concern[ ] that closing the area to mobile bottom-tending gears could affect the local scallop fishery." EFH 6758. Although the support for this proposition in the administrative record is a bit thin, it is present. See EFH 6347 (graph showing revenue from "other gear"); EFH 6355 (noting that "other gear" includes scallop dredges, which "cannot be detailed for privacy purposes"); EFH 6358 (similar). Second, the record reveals why the Council may have been particularly concerned with adverse economic impacts on the fishing community. It points out that these impacts of those closures would target "smaller coastal communities that have high levels of engagement and reliance on commercial fishing and have limited economic opportunities outside of fishing and relatively high social vulnerability indices." EFH 6357. At bottom, the Service's decision checks out.
This tour of the record demonstrates what the Service needs it to. It shows the Court that the "major issues of policy were ventilated" and permits it to see "why the agency reacted to them as it did." Republican Nat. Comm. v. FEC,
Plaintiff offers three retorts to this conclusion. First, it notes that the record is rife with concessions that the adverse economic impacts of closing additional areas are not particularly substantial. See, e.g., EFH 6356 (noting that closure in Machias and Large Eastern Maine "has a relatively small impact on the total revenues");
Second, Plaintiff points out that a draft Environmental Impact Statement concluded that both Alternatives 2 and 3 - which would have closed far more ocean habitat to fishing - could "likely be considered practicable." EFH 4177. This early finding gives the Court some pause. For although the Agency is imbued with significant discretion, that delegation largely lies within the statutory language to limit actions to those "practicable." An Agency's conclusion that an action is practicable seems to be the conclusion of a discretionary inquiry, rather than onе factor to be weighed in that process. It seems that the Agency would need to provide a compelling reason to discard an alternative that was both practicable and had a measurably positive
Ultimately, however, the document's draft status dissuades the Court from placing much weight on it. Absent this document, the Court would uphold the Service's action in this sub-region for the reasons already explained. The inclusion of the draft does not upset this decision. That the record shows some early reticence is of little significance. The Council, certainly, is not bound to the conclusions it reaches in the draft document, which was prepared well before the Council selected its preferred alternatives. The Final EIS, which like the draft was prepared by the Council in cooperation with the Service, supersedes the earlier document. It is thus the reasoning and conclusions in the final document that serve as the operative portion of the record in this regard.
As a final retort, CLF takes issue with the fact that there is no explicit practicability finding in any of the final documents justifying the Council's decision and the Service's approval of that decision. The Court's search for any law imposing this procedural requirement, however, comes up empty. The Service need only articulate a reason for its decision based on relevant factors and grounded in the facts found in the record. This it has done. Similarly, CLF's repeated assertions that it thinks the unchosen alternatives are practicable does not persuade the Court. It is the Service's judgment that matters in this respect, not Plaintiff's.
b. Central Gulf of Maine
Next up is the Central Gulf of Maine, represented in Figure 2. Unlike its eastern neighbor, parts of this area received habitat protection prior to this Amendment. With some exceptions, the Habitat Amendment kept in place the prior regime, but altered protection in a couple of areas and modified the boundaries in another. CLF's challenge to this region is twofold. In this Amendment, the Council maintained one region - Cashes Ledge - as a groundfish closure, a protective measure that diverges in some respects from the habitat closures that define the other areas. Not re-designating this area as a habitat closure, CLF says, was arbitrary and capricious. See Pl. Mot. at 34-35. Similar to the Eastern Gulf, it also believes that an additional area - here, Platts Bank - warranted closure. Id. at 35.
Figure 2: Central Gulf of Maine Alternatives
Some background may help to set the stage. Much of the debate turns on a series of closures surrounding Cashes Ledge, which lies almost due south of the Toothaker Ridge. In 2002, in response to a declining Atlantic cod population - a species within the groundfish fishery - the Service closed a large area surrounding Cashes Ledge to gear capable of catching groundfish. See EFH 7170. In this Amendment process, the Council considered doing away with this closure, which would have opened up much of these waters to such fishing. See EFH 6237. Although the Council ultimately opted against this tack, CLF says it should have gone a step further
Reduced to its bones, CLF suggests that the administrative record required the Council to have designated the entire Cashes Ledge as a habitat-management area, instead of mеrely maintaining it as a groundfish closure. The building blocks for this argument appear to be as follows. Plaintiff contends that the Council analyzed the area's habitat value but then, in discussing the manner to protect that habitat, pulled a fast one. See Pl. Mot. at 17, 34. The Council, it says, "assumed the whole area would be protected as a habitat-management area and closed indefinitely," when in fact the approved measure was merely a groundfish closure, which, unlike a habitat closure, is subject to reopening when the stock of the relevant fish population - here, Atlantic cod - sufficiently rebuilds. Id. at 34; see also id. at 19. Without further explanation, CLF does not think that the Council has provided a reasoned basis why the groundfish closure provides enough protection to the underlying habitat. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 6. Therefore, Plaintiff says, the Service's decision to maintain a groundfish closure is unsupported by the record. Id. at 7.
The Court reads the record differently. To begin with, to the degree CLF means to imply that the Council or the Service operated under a misconception about the effects of a groundfish closure, the record flatly contradicts this claim. In the federal-register discussion of the Council's deliberations, the Service explicitly delineated the differences between the two types of closures. See
The question then becomes whether the Council's decision to retain a groundfish closure finds support in the record. Some context helps here regarding the daylight between a habitat closure and a groundfish closure. In essence, these two measures are different sides of the same coin. By restricting fishing gears capable of сatching groundfish, a groundfish closure seeks to protect those species directly by limiting their exposure to fishers, thus boosting their productivity and ensuring a more sustainable population. See Conservation Law Found.,
The immediate purpose of a habitat closure, on the other hand, is the protection of vulnerable habitat. But the reason for this protection brings this analysis full circle. As the Council put it, the "underlying premise" is that "habitats [are] linked to higher survival and/or growth rates of juvenile fish." EFH 7808. Protecting such habitats thus can boost "stock productivity" of aquatic populations. See EFH 7864. This should sound familiar. Importantly, there is often significant - and sometimes complete - overlap between gears capable of catching groundfish and the mobile bottom-tending
The Court, consequently, finds no prohibition on employing a management tool originally developed for another purpose to support a habitat goal. CLF's abstract contention that the area should be protected "for its habitat value" - as opposed to, presumably, groundfish-rebuilding purposes - finds no success here absent some concrete difference between the two closures. And, as CLF concedes, both restrict "virtually the same fishing gears" in the short term. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 6. Nor does the Court see any other categorical reason that the Service cannot rely on the effect of a groundfish closure for its effect on habitat. See
Plaintiff does point to one key difference. It is temporal: the groundfish closure will be re-evaluated should cod populations improve and may be scrapped, while a habitat closure would not be subject to this process. For two reasons, the delta between this process and a hypothetical HMA designation is small. For one, habitat measures themselves are subject to periodic review - in this case, every ten years. See
If that is all true, Plaintiff retorts, and the existing groundfish closure provides sufficient ancillary habitat protection, then how can the Council's action regarding Fippennies Ledge be explained? See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 7, 10. Some brief explanation may help to place this question in context. The Habitat Amendment established a new habitat-management area - Fippenies Ledge HMA - which the Council closed to all mobile bottom-tending gear. See
But, Plaintiff rejoins, does this same theory not apply to the rest of the closure? See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 7, 10. Asked another way, if the Council thinks the whole area warrants protection now, would it not still warrant protection if the cod population rebuilds? This argument falters in its premise and logic. For one, it is not clear that the Council ever concluded that the level of protection offered by the closure was necessary for EFH minimization. The Service read the Council's decision as concluding that it needed to keep the closure for groundfish purposes, and the effect on EFH protection, although welcome, was mostly a bonus. See
Further, the record is rife with reasons that the Fippennies Ledge HMA may warrant a higher level of protection than the rest of the seabed in the groundfish closure. The key difference between the two closures, readers will remember, is that the groundfish closure's protection may be re-evaluated earlier than that for Fippennies Ledge - i.e. , if cod populations bounce back before the Council reviews HMA designations. A varying level of habitat vulnerability between the two areas would explain this disparate treatment. The record so provides. While the management areas in the region consist of "higher vulnerability" substrate, the rest of the Cashes Ledge Groundfish Closure Area is an exception. See EFH 6222. It is characterized by a "mix of shallow coarse sediment ... around a central mud basin," which results in lower habitat vulnerability.
ii. Platts Bank
Cruising northwest from Cashes Ledge, the Court next arrives at the dispute concerning Platts Bank. This one is reminiscent of earlier challenges discussed. The Council rejected a habitat closure in Platts Bank based largely on economic impacts on fishing communities, and the Service approved this move. Because Plaintiff offers no contention that it considered an improper factor - or, more accurately, no contention unresolved by the Court's conclusion about what the MSA requires - the nature of judicial review largely limits CLF, once again, to contending that the record cannot support the conclusion. On this count, it again falls short. The Court will run through the Agency's reasoning before addressing any lingering rejoinders.
In approving the Council's decision not to implement a closure in Platts Bank, the Service relied on its "concern regarding the displacement of current fishing and the economic impact to a sub-set of the fleet." See
The analysis unique to Platts Bank, conversely, directly supports the Service's conclusion. In 2013, one of the Council's teams reported that scallop fishing was occurring on Platts Bank. See EFH 6360. After further investigation, it discovered that a small number of individuals were responsible for a large portion of the scallop dredging in the area. Specifically, five individuals accounted for 90% of the revenue and 65% of the trips to the region.
Not yet content, CLF in its Reply brief returns to some of the same arguments the Court found unpersuasive in the earlier discussion of management measures taken in the Eastern Gulf of Maine. It reiterates its position that because the Council determined that the full Alternative - which, again, includes eliminating the groundfish closure and a number of other changes - would not result in significant economic hardship, the Council was bound to determine that the option was practicable and then bound to implement it. Again, this misses the distinction between the impact of the full Alternative 3 and the impact of Platts Bank alone. Even setting this point to one side, CLF still comes up empty. As the Court has already explained, CLF's line of reasoning both confuses the MSA's mandate and usurps the Agency's role in balancing complex factors. Finally, CLF also points to the draft document in which the Council tentatively concluded that the full Alternative "appears to be moderately practicable." EFH 4178; see also Pl. Opp. & Reply at 10. For the reasons the Court rejected a similar argument earlier, it finds it no more persuasive this time around. It also notes that even if the Agency concluded that it would be practicable to implement the full suite of options embodied by that Alternative, it does not necessarily follow that the same conclusion applies to closing Platts Bank alone - i.e. , without also opening up other areas to fishing simultaneously.
In sum, the Agency's line of reasoning is apparent. It is reasoning with which Plaintiff may not agree, but that disagreement does not render it irrational. See State Farm,
c. Western Gulf of Maine
This expedition through the waters of the Gulf of Maine is nearly complete. The final leg of the Court's trip takes it to the Western Gulf of Maine, an area that lies in the broad swath of water south of Portland and east of Boston and is represented in Figure 3. The Service's approval of two specific changes serves as the entrée for the Court's discussion of this region. First up are two overlapping management areas called, uninventively, the Western Gulf of Maine Habitat Closure Area and the Western Gulf of Maine Groundfish Closure Area. Prior to this Amendment, the northern, western, and southern boundaries of these two areas overlapped, but the eastern boundary of the groundfish closure extended some miles beyond that of the habitat closure. See EFH 7814. The Habitat Amendment modified the former to align with the latter - i.e. , moved westward the groundfish closure's eastward boundary, thus reducing by roughly 25% the area covered and opening up those waters to fishing. See
Figure 3: Western Gulf of Maine Alternatives
Start with the change to the Western Gulf of Maine Groundfish Closure Area. The Service approved this decision because the "bottom habitats just outside the eastern boundary of the current groundfish closure are primarily deeper, low vulnerability mud habitats."
In determining that the changes to the groundfish closure complied with the MSA's directive, the Service weighed both the habitat value of protecting the seabed and economic objectives. Compared with the seabed that remained protected, the five-nautical-mile-wide stretch opened in the Amendment consists of "primarily deeper, low vulnerability mud habitats." Id.; see also
CLF's contention is that the record shows that the larger area has superior habitat benefits, while resulting in similar economic consequences. See Pl. Mot. at 36. From this premise, it concludes that the only rational decision was for the Service to retain the full groundfish closure. Id. at 36-37. The Court has already rejected Plaintiff's weighing of the factors considered. This deficiency aside, the record is again CLF's foe on this front.
The Court's perusal of this tome finds fertile ground for the Service's determination. The Council, too, determined that the "eastern sliver" of the Western Gulf of Maine Closure Area consisted of less vulnerable habitat. See EFH 6254. Unlike the adjacent ledge and bank features to the west, this sliver is "relatively deep and muddy" and "likely less vulnerable to impact than nearby structured habitats," which remain protected. See EFH 6256. The trawl vulnerability and substrate maps generated by SASI's analysis of the substrate corroborate these determinations. See EFH 6246. As CLF points out, it does appear that this sliver contained one "shallow feature," an oceanic area with the seemingly incongruous name of Wildcat Knoll. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 17 (citing EFH 6254); see also EFH 6257 (noting that Wildcat Knoll consists of gravel habitat). Even so, the Court does not think that the existence of one relatively small feature within the broader area so disturbs the Council's finding that the full area consists of less vulnerable habitat so as to render its decision irrational.
The same is true of the economic side of this equation. The preferred alternative, which would "[s]hift[ ] the boundary west by approximately five nautical miles[,] could reduce steam times by an hour or so per day" for the area's fishers. See EFH 6385. For reasons related to the cod-catch rate in the area, the Council also found that "there is some benefit to opening [these] areas ... to fishermen." EFH 6385. Although present, the Council - as the Service recognized - did not find the magnitude of these economic benefits overwhelming. Rather, they would "likely" fall
With the decisions supported in the record, CLF next attacks the Service's calculus. It contends that keeping the full groundfish closure off limits was "practicable"; because that option would "produce[ ] superior beneficial EFH results," the Service was thus required to conclude that the Council's decision ran afoul of the MSA. See Pl. Opp. & Reply at 11. Once again, this mode of argument comes up empty, for reasons that have now been rehearsed seemingly ad infinitum in this Opinion. It is precisely the weighing of relevant factors that falls to the expertise of the Agency. This Court will not accept CLF's invitation to substitute its judgment. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n,
To the degree CLF contends that the Service did conclude this option to be practicable based on the 2014 draft document, see Pl. Opp. & Reply at 11, the Court does not ascribe to it the weight Plaintiff urges for the reasons already mentioned.
That being said, the Court is not blind to the oddity of this situation. The Council undertook this Amendment process with the stated goal of minimizing to the extent practicable the adverse effects of fishing on habitat and then, in the Western Gulf of Maine, opted for an edit to existing management measures that reduced square mileage of waters closed to fishing. But, consistent with the Court's earlier analysis, it would have little difficulty upholding this suite of management closures had there been fewer or no pre-existing restrictions. And CLF has not provided, nor has the Court been able to independently draw up, any good reason why a different initial condition should change the discretion afforded to the Secretary in balancing the factors associated with a particular measure.
ii. Bigelow Bight
With that, the Court turns to the final challenge under the MSA: Bigelow Bight. This one need not be long. The Service approved the Council's recommendation to forgo this closure because of the economic impacts that would ensue. See
The Service offered the following rationale in approving the Council's determination: "NFMS agrees with the Council's determination that they would incur unacceptable costs to the industry, particularly the inshore groundfish fishery and are, therefore, impracticable."
But wait, says CLF: there may be long-term benefits to fishers if the groundfish stock improves, even if they take a short-term
By now, readers can likely anticipate the Court's response. For one, nothing in the MSA requires the Service to prioritize long-term over short-term consequences in weighing the importance of adverse economic impacts. Second, CLF's view as to the significance that should be placed on the magnitude of the economic harm bears little fruit in such a review. The fact that the Service plainly has a rational basis for its determination supported by facts found and explained in the record, even if its conclusion is not the one CLF prefers, is sufficient to uphold its action. See State Farm,
* * *
This lengthy exposition of Plaintiff's MSA challenges ultimately results in a simple conclusion. The Government prevails. In arriving at this outcome, the Court offers no comment on the policy wisdom of the Service's Amendment. Its role does not extend so far. Indeed, it merely finds that the Agency has articulated a satisfactory line of reasoning based on facts in the record. That is sufficient.
B. NEPA Claim
Next up is CLF's challenge under the National Environmental Policy Act, better known by the acronym NEPA. As best the Court can tell, Plaintiff's attack is launched on two fronts. First, it believes that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) fails to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, as NEPA directs. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 113-22. Second, CLF takes issue with the Agency's decision to delay consideration of coral-protection measures. Id., ¶¶ 123-29. After outlining the legal framework that governs these challenges, the Court takes on each separately.
1. Legal Framework
NEPA has two aims: first, it "places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action," and second, "it ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process." Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc.,
Under NEPA, an agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for any proposed major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
2. Range of Alternatives
With CLF's first cast into NEPA's waters, it contends that the FEIS came up short on one of these latter requirements: the statutory command to consider "alternatives to the proposed action."
a. Set Up
Both NMFS regulations and case law in this circuit expand on NEPA's demand that an agency consider alternatives to its proposed action. This alternatives analysis is the "heart of the environmental impact statement."
The upshot of this guidance is a two-step inquiry. For reasons that will be clear in a minute, the first step is to
If the objectives pass muster, they serve as the needed reference for the court's evaluation of the range of alternatives, which serves as the second step of the inquiry. The court evaluates the "agency's choice of 'reasonable alternatives' ... in light of the objectives of the federal action." City of Alexandria,
It is surely no surprise to learn that judicial review at both steps is deferential. Reasonableness serves as the cornerstone of a reviewing court's concern. See Nevada v. Dep't of Energy,
The Court begins, as it must, with determining whether the Service "reasonably defined its objectives for this action." Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship,
The Council adopted ten goals followed by fourteen objectives. See EFH 7851-52. These two categories are related; each objective "map[s] to 1 or more of the Amendment's goals and provide[s] more specific guidance on how to achieve that goal."
The alternatives come next. In developing this suite of options, the Council employed the same approach everywhere. Across each sub-region, Alternative 1 was a "No Action" alternative, meaning that the Council evaluated the effects of maintaining the existing habitat and groundfish measures in place, whatever they were. See EFH 7160. Alternative 2 removed all year-round closures. See EFH 7161. Alternatives 3 and up then consisted of various combinations of new or modified habitat-management areas. Id. In the Western Gulf of Maine, for example, the Council considered eight total alternatives. See EFH 6254-69.
CLF takes no issue with the depth of analysis for each named alternative performed by the Council and approved by the Service. Rather, it thinks that the Council's consideration of alternatives was incomplete for twо reasons. First, it challenges the Council's decision to reject various alternatives without comprehensive analysis. Second, Plaintiff contends that the range of alternatives in the Western Gulf of Maine is unreasonable because it skews in one direction - namely, toward limited habitat protection. See Pl. Mot. at 39; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 113-22.
b. Rejected Alternatives
The Court first addresses Plaintiff's unhappiness with the rejected alternatives. For the sake of clarity, a quick note about this process may be worthwhile. Agencies abandon alternatives at two different stages. First, the agency must decide which alternatives it will subject to in-depth review. At this step, it may choose not to go forward with some alternatives proposed by its members or other stakeholders. Practicality demands this step; an agency cannot be expected to conduct a comprehensive analysis of every conceivable variation to its proposed action. The governing regulations thus permit summary rejections, provided the agency "briefly discuss[es] the reasons for their having been eliminated."
To evaluate this claim, the Court starts with the facts. In the Western Gulf of Maine, the Council opted against comprehensively analyzing the impacts of several potential habitat-management areas proposed by one of its teаms. See EFH 4424; Pl. Mot. at 21-22, 41; Pl. Opp. & Reply at 20-21. It provided several reasons for this decision. First, considerations about adverse economic impacts on fishing communities drove its rationale, including "extreme[ ] concern[ ] about the potential economic impacts" of a particular proposed closure. See EFH 7265. More generally,
There can be little doubt that these are valid reasons for rejecting alternatives. CLF, it should be noted, does not contend that anything about the nature of the Council's rationale is inherently inadequate. It concedes, in fact, that "any one of these reasons might have supported the elimination of some of [the] alternatives," Pl. Mot. at 41, and may "ultimately have been meritorious." Pl. Opp. & Reply at 21. Its primary point, rather, is that NEPA bound the Council to provide an in-depth comparative analysis of each one, rather than rejecting these particular alternatives prior to that process.
The Court disagrees. As a general matter, it would be untenable for the Council to have to consider every alternative in the broad Gulf that could have some possible positive impact on habitat. The number of permutations is colossal. As the Supreme Court put it, agency's choices "cannot be found wanting simply because [it] failed to include every device and thought conceivable." Vermont Yankee,
Moving to the grounds offered by the Council, the Court similarly finds them to be valid reasons to reject an alternative prior to conducting a comprehensive review. The Agency's goals and objectives, mimicking the statutory command, limit conservation measures to those "practicable" and "appropriate." EFH 7851. It is thus "reasonable for the agency to conclude" that alternatives with certain economic impacts would not "bring about the ends of the federal action." City of Alexandria,
The same is true for the Council's preference "to work with refinements to areas already managed." EFH 7264. Had it only considered refinements, rather than evaluating any new protection, the Court might view such a limited universe of alternatives with considerable skepticism. But again, that is not what the Council did. In all sub-regions, it performed a detailed alternatives analysis for areas that included new habitat-management areas. In this situation, the Court finds it perfectly reasonable to consider a preference for refining current areas. The myriad "line-drawing decisions" and "endless series of judgment calls" inherent these actions are left to the agency. See Coal. on Sensible Transp., Inc.,
c. Reasonableness of Range
Even if it was reasonable to reject particular alternatives, CLF still has a bone to pick with the ones that remain. In the Western Gulf of Maine, it says, the surviving alternatives are unreasonably skewed in one directiоn: no alternative analyzed increases the amount of habitat protected from fishing relative to the status quo. See Pl. Mot. at 41-42; Pl. Opp. & Reply at 21-23. As the Court will explain,
First is CLF's assertion that the Service did not consider increases in EFH protection relative to the status quo. A factual nuance appears critical. As a careful reader will remember, the alternatives considered - with the exception of the "no action" and no-closure alternatives - are combinations of various new and modified habitat-management measures. Consistent with Plaintiff's position, the alternative that covers the maximum square mileage in the Western Gulf of Maine is the "no action" alternative. See EFH 6244. That is not to say, however, that the Council considered no new habitat measures. It plainly did. In the Western Gulf, it considered a new management area in Bigelow Bight, an area that, had it been adopted with no other changes to the status quo, would have increased the square mileage of habitat protection by over 50%. See EFH 6244. When organized into formal alternatives, however, the Council combined this new addition with modifications to other existing management areas that, on net, decreased the square mileage protected. See EFH 6241, 6244. This factual distinction gives rise to the first premise underlying CLF's argument. Its assertion that the Service failed to analyze options that increase the geographic scope of habitat protection thus rests on the premise that this formal organization of options into alternatives is meaningful. For if it is not, then the Service clearly considered the impact of significantly expanding habitat protection.
Ultimately, the Court doubts that the formal organization of hаbitat measures into alternatives is all that significant under the particular facts of this case when compared to the substance of the management areas within each alternative. For one, the Council's analysis of each alternative was not necessarily holistic with respect to the full suite of measures. Rather, it analyzed the pros and cons of each individual management area included separately. And when the Council considered a management area in an alternative that had already been analyzed earlier, it merely directed readers to that earlier section. See, e.g., EFH 6260 ("The Large Bigelow Bight area is discussed above."). Only in the very end of each discussion did it qualitatively sum these impacts to develop a recommendation on the alternative as a whole. Further, if the Agency's options were limited to choosing or rejecting an alternative in toto , perhaps the formal permutation would have some significance. But this clearly was not the case. In no sub-region of the Gulf of Maine did the Council recommend adopting any particular formal alternative in full; in each area, it recommended combining options from each. Combining the "no action" alternative (Alternative 1) with the Large Bigelow Bight option in Alternative 3 was thus an available choice, which would have increased the geographic scope of habitat protection by over 50%. For this reason, the Court does not think it wholly accurate to say that the Agency's EIS does not consider options that increase the square mileage of EFH protection relative to the status quo in the Western Gulf of Maine.
In that last sentence lies CLF's second premise: that the appropriate baseline of comparison is the status quo. Said another way, Plaintiff's worry that the Service has confined itself to "one end of the spectrum of possibilities," see Oceana,
Third and finally, CLF asserts that the reasonable range of alternatives should be defined in terms of geographic size of protected habitat. The Court believes this to be unduly constraining. As the record indicates, the geographic extent of an area, although an important factor, is not the sole driver in the level of habitat protection. While the "size of a particular management area is [a] contributing factor in terms of the positive benefits it may provide," larger areas may also "contribute to more displacement of fishing effort," thus negatively affecting other habitat outside of the protected region. See EFH 6201. The magnitude of protection also depends heavily on the underlying vulnerability of the area to impact from fishing gears.
In the end, the decisions that CLF challenges entail the type of line-drawing exercises properly entrusted to the Agency's discretion. The Court sees nothing unreasonable in the Council's analyses of alternatives. That dooms Plaintiff's claim here.
d. "Rubber Stamp" Argument
Before moving on, one other issue merits a brief discussion. Peppered through Plaintiff's brief are suggestions that the Court should fault the Service for not having performed its own NEPA analysis apart from that conducted by the Council. It criticizes the Agency for having "rubber stamped" the Council's analysis and for not having offered any rationale "beyond that proffered by the committee itself." Pl. Opp. & Reply at 20; Pl. Mot. at 39. To the degree CLF intends these assaults as a stand-alone challenge to the Service's action, they fail thrice over. First, the Complaint makes no mention of any such claim and, in fact, seems to present a diametrically opposed position to CLF's view as expressed in its brief. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 107-29. The former document states that "the fishery management council undertakes and prepares the NEPA decisional documents for NMFS," while "NMFS is solely responsible for ensuring that the NEPA analysis satisfies all legal requirements." Id., ¶ 111.
Second, this contention is factually dubious. CLF's assertion that the Service bought the Council's recommendations hook, line, and sinker without analysis is contradicted by the record. As the Government points out, the Service was involved in much of the Council's process and aided in preparing the EIS, which includes thе detailed NEPA alternatives analysis. See, e.g., EFH 6158; Def. Reply at 17-18.
Finally, these positions come up short on the merits. The Service's duty is to ensure that the Council's action complies
3. Corals Amendment
The Court's last port of call requires it to evaluate the Agency's decision to consider in a separate amendment protective measures designed to protect corals, a decision to which Plaintiff now takes exception.
Backing up to first principles, the primary goal of the Habitat Amendment was to minimize the adverse effect of fishing on habitat essential to the various species of fish managed by the Council, consistent with § 1853(a)(7)'s command in the MSA. See
CLF now objects. In short, it complains that the Service did not conduct an analysis of various proposed alternatives to protect deep-sea corals in the Habitat Amendment.
Before jumping into these claims, the Court clarifies a few factual issues that pervade the parties' briefs in the hope that doing so will streamline the subsequent discussion. As of 2012, the Habitat Amendment consisted of, among other things, two separate categories of measures. The first was to develop "alternatives to minimize, to the extent practicable, the adverse effects of Council-managed fisheries on EFH."
CLF's challenge comes in two flavors. First, it contends that NEPA requires that the Council present in the current Habitat Amendment FEIS a comparative analysis of measures to protect deep-sea corals. See Pl. Mot. at 23, 44; Pl. Opp. & Reply at 24. NEPA does not so require. That statute only "requires an agency to evaluate the environmental effects of its action at the point of commitment." Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler,
Two arguments related to this first contention and arguably advanced by Plaintiff here gain no ground. To begin, while the Agency may not be able to defer the consideration of a specific alternative to the proposed action, see Flaherty v. Bryson,
CLF also hints that the deep-sea-corals measures and EFH measures are connected actions for which NEPA requires joint consideration. See Pl. Mot. at 43. It is true that, under the anti-segmentation rule, certain "connected" actions require a comprehensive environmental analysis. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Plaintiff's argument on this count is only a hint, however, because it never meaningfully engages with these prongs or otherwise explains why the two categories of actions are connected. The explanation perhaps is that they are not. The Service's analysis identified minimal overlap between them. See
* * *
NEPA, as it turns out, proves no more fruitful a ground for Plaintiff than the MSA. The record reveals that the Agency's path to its ultimate decision meets the procedural requirements imposed by this statute. With that, this voyage comes to an end.
IV. Conclusion
The Court will, accordingly, deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
