This is аn action against the publisher of a newspaper for two alleged libels published on January 11, 1936. Earlier, during the year 1935, the defendant in a number of articles had attacked the plaintiff in strong language, principally because of his conduct as State senator. These were published in a column entitled “Political Grab Bag,” written by a political writer for the defendant, named Brindley. On the evening of January 8, 1936, the plaintiff delivered a public speеch, reported in the defendant’s newspaper, in which he indulged in vulgar abuse of Brindley. But he said, “I don’t hate the Fall River Herald News,” and “Its owner doesn’t know the way the paper is being conducted”; also “I have respect fоr the Herald News staff but one rotten apple will spoil a barrel of good apples.”
The alleged libels evidently were published in answer to that speech. It is unnecessary to quote them in full, for undoubtedly they could be found defamatory. The plaintiff in an editorial was called “a low-grade creature,” of “crass ignorance and stupid egotism,” who has tried to clothe himself in a “thin veneer of respectability.” He was called “a meаn, vicious and contemptible liar,” whose habit of mind has been a “gutter type of politics,” and who “takes refuge in the thought that self-respecting men will hesitate to answer him, by going to the necessary low level to meet and answer his abuse and scurrility.” A cartoon entitled “The Boomerang” depicted the plaintiff as standing in a “Political Dump,” where a waste barrel marked “Gutter Methods,” apparently thrown by him, has returned to cast its contents of vermin and rubbish over him.
A libel may be privileged on the ground of self defence. “One attacked by a slander or libel has a right to defend himself, but he has no right to turn his defence into a slanderous or libellous attack, unless it clearly appеars that such attack was necessary for his justification.” Borley v. Allison,
Even where no privilege can be found, a defamatory attack by the plaintiff upon the defendant can sometimes be shown in mitigation of damages. This cannot be rested on the broad ground that one who has defamed the defendant at any time in the past does not suffer the same wound to his feelings as one whose conduct has been without reproach. Wigmore, Evidence (Rev. ed. 1940) § 209. Neither can it rest on the ground that libels may be set off against each other. Child v. Homer,
On the matter of provocatiоn, the judge instructed the jury in substance that if the attack made by the plaintiff in his speech of January 8, 1936, “was made upon the defendant paper, or upon a servant or agent of the defendant paper in his capаcity as such servant or agent,” and if the alleged libels were published so soon after the attack that it can be said that they were provoked by it, and not after “there was sufficient time for the anger or passion of thе defendant, or its agents . . . , to cool off,” then the provocation might be considered on the question of damages. The defendant excepted to the part of the charge that declared that the provоcation could not be considered if there had been time to cool off. But it is plain from the foregoing discussion that the instruction was correct.
One Delaney, the managing editor of the defendant’s newspaper, was permitted to testify that his reason for entitling the cartoon “The Boomerang” was that the filth that the plaintiff threw at the newspaper rebounded and hit the plaintiff. The judge struck out the reference to the newspaper, saying that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s attack was upon the newspaper. To this the defendant excepted. Whether the plaintiff had attacked
The fourth, ninth, fourteenth and eighteenth requests for instructions did not relate directly to any issue in the case, but asked instructions relating at best only to a single consideration bearing upon an issue. Barnes v. Berkshire Street Railway,
The last point argued by the defendant relates to the admissibility and effect of three earlier attacks upon the .plaintiff, written by Brindley and publishеd in the defendant’s newspaper, which were admitted, subject to the defendant’s exception, as evidence of malice on its part. Malice could be proved by the plaintiff to take away the defence of truth (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 231, § 92) and also to enhance damages. Faxon v. Jones,
From the standpoint of relevancy, defamation at other times has a logical tendency to prove malice at the time of the libel or slander in question. A defamatory utterance, and especially a series of such utterances, may show malice at the time when made. One of the commonest of inferences is that a state of affairs, including a state of mind, once proved to exist, continues to exist. Galdston v. McCarthy,
In a number of reported cases in this Commonwealth the rule has been stated that defamatory statements at other times are not admissible to show malice at thе time of the libel or slander in issue, unless they are substantially similar to it. If the action is for saying that the plaintiff stole a cow, statements at other times that he committed murder or stole a horse are said not to be admissible. See Conant v. Leslie, 85 Maine, 257. That rule was derived from early English decisions at nisi prius that apparently are not now followed in England. Bodwell v. Swan,
The reasons given in our early cases for the exclusion of defamatory statements that differ from the libel or slander in issue, do not impress us. We are unable to see why defamation of a different sort mаy not equally well show malice. The danger of excessive damages is not materially greater where the defamation is of a different sort, and may equally well be guarded against by instructions. Notwithstanding the statements in our early сases, we are of opinion that no sound distinction can be drawn between defamation of the same sort at other times and defamation of a different sort.
Although some of the earlier attacks upon the plaintiff, admitted in evidence in the present case, might be found defamatory and were based on somewhat different grounds, we think that they were all properly admitted to show malice at the time of the libel in issue, and that the jury could not rightly have been instructed, in accordance with the defendant’s second, seventh and twelfth requests, that they were not evidence of malice. This accords with the law as laid down in a number of other jurisdictions. Barrett v. Long, 3 H. L. Cas. 395, 413, 414, which did not take the distinctions discussed below in Barrett v. Long, 8 Ir. L. 331, and Long v. Barrett, 7 Ir. L. 439. King v. Londerville, 8 Sask. L. R. 376. Hazaree v. Kamaludin, South African L. R. [1934] App. Div. 108, 121, 122. Scott v. Times-
Exceptions overruled.