*1 v. ANISKOFF CONROY et al. 11, 1993 March January Argued
No. 91-1353. Decided Court, in which Rehnquist, J., opinion of the delivered Stevens, *2 JJ., SouteR, and O’Connor, Kennedy, White, Blackmun, J.,C. J., Thomas, J., joined. filed Scalia, which joined, in all but n. 12 of post, p. 518. judgment, concurring in the opinion argued briefs for cause and filed H. Robert Klonoff petitioner. Manning argued for the United States the cause F.
John urging him on the brief reversal. With amicus curiae as Attorney Acting Assistant Starr, General were Solicitor Deputy Wallace, Richard Bruton, General Solicitor General Bridget M. Rowan. Farber, and argued Cuddy a brief for cause and filed Kevin M. respondents.* opinion † of the Court. delivered Stevens
Justice 1940, Act of 54 Stat. Relief and Sailors’ Civil Soldiers’ (1988 §501 App. seq. et ed. amended, as 50 U. S. C. Ill) persons (Act), suspends Supp. civil liabilities of various provision military in in this case is in service. At issue military § “period not be included service shall that the by any any period provided computing law for the . . in . any property redemption forfeited to enforce sold or of real question presented obligation, is tax, or assessment.”1 Foreign Wars of the a brief for Veterans of *Lawrence M. Maher filed States as amicus curiae. United opinion. joins all but footnote
† Justice Thomas as follows: presently The full text of 525 reads computing any in shall not be included period “The service law, by any regulation, or order period to be limited now or hereafter court, board, bureau, any bringing any proceeding or for the action by any commission, department, agency government against or or other heirs, executors, person military against or his administra- service or tors, right privilege action or the or assigns, or whether such cause of prior during proceeding institute such action or shall have accrued service, any period which period part of such nor shall of such occurs any computing period after October included in now or here- 1942 be provided by any redemption property of real sold or after law for the whether a of the Armed member Services must show that prejudiced ability his his service to redeem title to qualify statutory property suspension can for the before he of time.
I Army. Petitioner an officer the United States He duty continuously was on active from 1966until the time of purchased parcel In 1973, trial. he of vacant land in the paid property town of Danforth, Maine. He taxes on the years, pay 1984,1985, but failed to and 1986local real following statutory proce- estate taxes.2 In the Maine acquire tax-delinquent dures it to that authorize real estate, *3 property.3 the town sold the petitioner brought
In 1987, suit in the Maine District against purchasers. the town and the Court two He claimed § redemption period that 525 of the Act tolled while he military prevented was in service, and federal law therefore acquiring good property the town from title to the even though statutory procedures the State’s had been followed. rejected unreported opin- The trial court claim. an § literally, ion, noted that some courts had construed 525 but it elected follow a line of decisions that refused to toll redemption period taxpayer unless the could show any obligation, tax, forfeited to enforce or assessment.” App. 50 U. S. C. (1988 III). §525 ed., Supp. 2He years testified that he did not tax receive bills for those and that his asking letters by tax bills were not answered the town. 3Under taxing authority Maine law a against has a lien real estate until properly paid. assessed taxes are If unpaid taxes remain days for 30 after a payment notice of lien owner, and demand for has been sent to the may tax collector record a tax lien certificate to create tax lien mortgage. The taxpayer then has an period 18-month of redemption may which he by recover his property paying plus the overdue taxes inter est and Ann., (1990). §§ costs. See 552, 942, Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. It stipulated is required that the procedures were followed in this case and that the town’s perfected, petitioner’s title was objection unless based on § requires a different result. timely legal excusing hardship
“military resulted in service agreed be it would those courts that It with action.”4 periods illogical” for career toll limitations and “absurd “handicapped by their personnel been who had not service Supreme of af- military Judicial Court Maine status.”5 granted equally certiorari court.6 We divided firmed §525. interpretation of in the the conflict to resolve U. S.
II
unequivo-
unambiguous,
§
statutory
in 525
command
period
that the
It states
unlimited.
cal,
“any
computation of
in the
not be included”
“shall
service
redemp-
by any
provided
law for the
period
hereafter
now or
Respondents
dispute the
property
do not
real
....”
tion of
they argue
meaning
when
plain
Rather,
this text.
implicitly
statute, it
of the entire
in the context
525 is read
hardship
protection
on a demonstration
its
conditions
They
prejudice resulting
make three
service.
from
argument:
points
support
that the
this
only
protection
provide
to those
intent to
Act reveals an
by military
disrupted
temporarily
have been
whose lives
expressly
provisions
Act are
condi-
other
service; interpre-
prejudice;
showing
that a literal
tioned on
sepa-
illogical
produces
absurd results. Neither
tation
*4
departure
points justify a
rately
do these
nor in combination
statutory
unambiguous
text.
from the
correctly
Respondents
cause for
describe the immediate
year
entry
before our
1940,
enactment in
the statute’s
purpose
“expe-
Congress stated its
II.
into World War
emergent conditions
under the
the national defense
dite
security
threatening
peace
United
which are
4
v. Conti
Parnell
on
particularly
relied
33. The court
Pet. for Cert.
Barranca,
1977); Bailey
Co.,
(CA5
N. M.
nental Can
v.
83
F.
216
554
2d
1968).
Zagorski,
Respondents correctly also remind us to “followthe cardi rule nal that a statute is to be read as a whole, see Massa (1989), Morash, 107, 115 chusetts v. 490 U. S. since the mean ing statutory language, plain depends on not, context.” King Hospital, v. St. Vincent’s But 215, 221 U. S. King, actually supports inas the context of this statute §525 says. conclusion that meant what Several provisions protection they of the statute condition the offer showing adversely on a service affected the ability protect legal right. to assert or To choose one of 532(2) § many examples, stay authorizes a of enforcement of obligations ability secured “the unless of the defendant to comply obligation materially with the terms of the is not
7Respondents emphasize purposes the statement of refers to the ‘“temporary suspension legal proceedings and transactions.’” Brief Respondents quoting App. 50 U. S. C. length suspen of a long period sion that lasts as “temporary,” as the of active service is how ever, applies whether to a short long enlistment or a career. 8Section 14 of the Selective Service Act of provided Stat. that the 1940 Act applicable persons “shall be to all in the armed forces of repealed United States” until the 1940 Act “is or otherwise terminated by subsequent Congress.” Act of the *5 compre- reason service.”9 The
affected of his statute indicates that hensive character of the entire Con- gress requirement prejudice whenever it included consid- any appropriate that of ered it its omission such so, do and § requirement in 525 was deliberate.
Finally, history carefully both the this reticulated stat of any argument interpreting ute, it, and our of refute §525 illogical that a literal construction of is so absurd many Congress respects that could not intended have it. legislation the 1940Act was a of I reenactment World War legislation turn, after had, in been modeled several adopted during Light States War. the Civil See Boone v. (1943). empha ner, S. had U. 565-569 The Court comprehensive carefully segregated sized and character arrangement provisions of the various of the World War I (1925), Poston, statute Ebert v. 266 U. S. and it showing consequences requiring had considered the of prejudice when it statute in construed World War II supra. presume Congress Boone, Since was famil we iar with cases,10 those we assume that also consid interpret apply provi ered the decision in Ebert to each separately temporarily sion of the Act when reestablished the law as a whole in then 1940,and Boone’s considered anal ysis prejudice requirement permanently of a when it ex Act in tended the
Legislative history assumption. confirms that Since the expressed enactment 1918 Act, has its un- derstanding exemptions might that absolute save time or §520(4) qualifications Similar appear in (applying to reopening judgments against member); §§521 an absent service (providing and 523 stays attachments, legal proceedings, garnishments); § 526 (reg ulating obligations interest rates on prior incurred seryiee); §530(3) (covering §531(3) eviction proceedings); and distress (involving contracts); §535(1) termination installment (involving assign 535(2) ment of coverage); insurance right (limiting the to enforce liens storage personal for the property). 10See v. University Chicago, Cannon 441 U. S. 696-697 *6 money service members at the cost of only their injuring own their credit, credit, family’s domestic economy;11 presumably required when it showing prejudice only seemed to confer on the service necessary member a genuine benefit. By between distinguishing the two sharply types of protections, Congress unquestionably contemplated that either ways type would affect protection both mili- debtors and tary their civilian creditors. and consistent long and the structure of this
legislation therefore lead us to conclude as just that — §of 525 language made a suggests Congress deliberate pol- — icy judgment value on placing higher firmly protecting service member’s redemption than on rights occasionally the tax collection burdening process. Given the limited number of in situations which this precisely structured stat- ute offers such absolute protection, we cannot say Con- Report The House suspension on the of suits in the 1918 for exam ple, provided in part: stay
“The lesson of the laws of the Civil War teaches arbitrary that an rigid protection against suits is as much a mistaken kindness to the unnecessary. soldier as it is A suspension total period for the of the war rights against of all a soldier purpose. defeats its own In time of war importance credit is of even more than in peace, time of and if there were prohibition upon a total enforcing obligations against military one in serv- ice, the credit of a soldier family and his would utterly be cut off. No one could be found who would extend them credit.” H. R. No. 65th (1917). Cong., Sess., 1st 2-3 Congressman Webb,
And Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, House stated:
“Manifestly, if this pass should undertake to arbitrary stay providing law that no creditor should ever bring sue or proceedings against any soldier while in the country, service of his that would upset very largely many parts business of the country. In the next place, it would be unfair to the creditor as well as to the soldier. It would disturb probably the soldier’s many credit deny cases and would right of the just creditor to his person debts from a amply who was able pay and whose service impair did not the least ability his obligation.” (1917). meet Cong. Rec. 7787 Lightner, See Boone v. 561, 566, 567, 319 U. S. straightforward our interpretation have found
gress would If either absurd or illogical.12 of its words and application had been —or of that interpretation prove the consequences arewe confident contend, as respondents be—as unjust do injustice corrected will would have —or so in future. Judicial Court Maine of the Supreme judgment
reversed.
It is so ordered. in the Scalia, judgment. Justice concurring “The with the observation: analysis its begins Court is and unequivocal, command 525 unambiguous, statutory Ante, view, at discussion of that my unlimited.” the should have analysis is where remainder point Instead, however, compelled the Court feels to dem- ended. with legislative onstrate that its is consonant history, holding to 1917 —a quarter century some back including dating full opinion concurring judgment, 11-page In his Scalia Justice legislative response respondents’ reliance on suggests that our to ink,” also merely a waste of time and but “a false and “is not research Post, post, clerk,” law disruptive “hapless in the at 519. His lesson law.” legislative history good a of evidence in the that at has found deal many provisions intended to confer discretion on of this statute were trial That, course, point: our It is reasonable judges. precisely to conclude is expressly pro to such when it Congress intended authorize discretion deny A jurisprudence vided for it and to when it did not. such discretion passed,” wholly court’s the “law it is is inquiry confines a to as and post, legislators,” about “the intentions of at would en unconcerned statutory produces manifestly force unambiguous an text even when it consequences. profoundly Respondents unintended unwise have ar however, gued disagree. a that this is such case. We Scalia, Justice case, apparently willing is to that this is but assume such would never duty theless conclude that we to enforce the statute have as written if fully every enacting Congress, even convinced Member of the as well as signed the President intended a different result. who Mortier, Public Intervenor v. Again, Wisconsin disagree. we See 597, 610, U. S. n. 4 provision before the at was enacted. That is not issue merely a waste research is a false and ink; time disruptive says in the It to the bar that lesson law. even “unambiguous unequivocal” [and] statute can never dis- be positive; presumably penalty malpractice that, under lia- bility, legislative history, dimmy oracles far into the past, always must be consulted. This undermines clar- (who, ity litigants pay law, and condemns unlike us, must pockets) subsidizing for it out of own their historical re- by lawyers. search greatest legislative history illegitimacy. defect of is its governed by legislators.
We laws, are not the intentions of passed As the Court said law 1844:“The as it is will majority only of both houses, mode in which spoken Aldridge that will is is in the act . .” . v. itself. added). (emphasis Williams, How. But not least legislative history indeterminacy. of the defects of If its interpretive technique one were to search for an that, on the likely clarify, whole, was more than confuse one could hardly promising find a more candidate than his- *8 tory. nicely present proves point. And the case
Judge legisla- Harold Leventhal to the used describe use of history equivalent entering tive as the a crowded cocktail party looking guests over the heads of the for one’s pursue may metaphor: legislative friends. If I The his- §205 tory of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act1 variety personages, contains diverse a selected few of sup- whom—its “friends”—the has to Court introduced us in port many of its But there are result. other faces in the against today’s crowd, which, most of I are set think, result. my exposition legislative history I will limit of the to the enactment of four statutes: “§525,”
1 The Court refers to this section corresponds as which to the Code, unofficial codification of the the section in United S. States 50 U. C. §App. 525. I find more to use statutory convenient the actual section “§ discussing history 205”—in provision. number — 520 1918 Relief Act of Civil and Sailors’
1. The Soldiers’ (1918Act), 440; 40 Stat. Act of 1940 Relief and Sailors’ Civil The
2. Soldiers’ (1940 Act), 1178; Act or Stat. Act Amend- Relief and Sailors’ Civil
3. The Soldiers’ (1942Amendments), 769; 56 Stat. ments of 1942 Stat. Act 4. The Selective Service “complete legislative be said to be That, of cannot course, provision. history” ante, Cf. at 515. One to this relevant history problems legislative is inher- is that it with example, go ently open could for one case, In this ended. relief War-era time to examine Civil back further in appendix many in an forth Acts, are fact set which App. Report Act, A, see H. R. the House on (1917)(hereinafter Cong., 1st Sess., 65th 18-32 No. Report). search abroad House one could extend Or foreign that were mentioned consider the various statutes (discussing Report. id., at 13-14 same House See enactments). English statutes Those additional and French might questionable but then so too are relevance, be of pro- which contained a 1918Act the 1940 neither of redemption governing periods. I will Nevertheless, vision my legislative inquiry limit to those four statutes scope simple that that is the chosen the Court. reason appears comprehensive the first 1918Act have been Cong. national relief Act. Rec. 7787 soldiers’ See legislative history intended2 that reveals that I say “Congress intended,” When and hereafter excursus here this legislative history, speaking speak, into I am at as historians (or tributing to a all Members of both Houses of at least *9 majority House), (or, of Members of each the if the the to President question, President sign did not the bill in then to at least of the two-thirds Congress) Members of expressed by particular both Houses of views personage, being or of personages, committee whose are de statements sentence, scribed —in the case of the citation in this at issue a committee Representatives. House of by It is to be a sort of sus- assumed — “protection purpose providing vital it serve same — against state various service”—as suit to men during 1917 House Re- the Civil War. had served statutes A) (setting (App. text of forth port id., at see also 18-32 3; era). the Civil War Acts from state soldiers’ relief numerous Act differ Congress that the 1918 should intended, however, respects.” “in two material statutes from the Civil War (statement Webb). (1917) Rep. Cong. of first Rec. disposi- produce being statute, a national would that, was Report throughout 1917 House the Nation.” tion “uniform (1917) (statement Rep. Cong. 3; see also 55 Rec. Webb). particular which has the second difference But it is today: ruling to the Court’s relevance this law and the between “The next material difference you I think will this, and in this laws is various State propose: which we of the bill find the chief excellence being considering now arbi- the bill are Instead of we dealing trary, as to out inflexible,the discretion inelastic, justice creditor and the sol- between the even-handed taking the soldier the fact that dier, into consideration country’s largely, cause, rests to his has been called judge entirely, who in the breast in some cases Webb).3 (statement Id., at 7787 tries case.” passing be remark of cannot dismissed as This -comment insignificant speaker was Member, since the the Chairman Judiciary the committee that re- Committee, House Houses of pension of two-thirds of the Members both disbelief —that (or President) majority plus of those state- were aware them;; agreed it is be assumed— perhaps and must have with or ments delegated by suspension a sort of of the Constitution —that authority say its laws mean. personage personages the- what statement, I quoting this floor follow the convention conclusively recorded history, which is to assume that statements assumption were in made. of course does Congressional Record fact That (1971) (supposed reality. Cong. See not accord with Rec. 36506-36507 delivered). to have been floor statement shown internal evidence never *10 522 Moreover, floor. his remarks the bill to the House
ported which into barely page echoed the House merely Report, soon, too or too emphat- cannot out point its text stated: “We inflexible of all claims the bill not an stay ically, service.” 1917 House Report in against military persons from the and “arbitrary rigid intended to depart under the Civil War-era that had been protection” provided ibid., men can could “who laws, protection which stay give full,” id., clear, in at 3. It is and should their pay obligations in the 1918 Act intended create therefore, denial of to mem- flexible rules that would permit protection bers of the who could show no military hardship.
The 1918 Act its own terms six months after expired by §Act, 603,40 the end of the First World War. See 1918 Stat. as the 449. The 1940 Act was Nation prepared adopted World War. Both the its the Second coming participation it as “in sub- being, House Senate described Reports identical with the H. R. No. stance, Rep. [1918 Act].” 2109, 76 3d Sess., (1940); 76th 3d S. No. Cong., Cong., in Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. Sess., Moreover, S. (1943), we the 1940 Act was “a acknowledged substantial to the reenactment” of the looked of the 1918 Act for indications of legislative history congres- sional intent with to the 1940 Act. on that Relying respect we found that “the heart of the legislative history, very pol- of the Act” icy was to discretion instead “judicial ... provide of civil rigid undiscriminating suspension proceed- Ibid. ings.” fact, Court never mentions this it is clear
Although that under the 1918 and 1940 Acts a period redemption would not be tolled during period service. § both enactments, governed only statutes limitations and did not mention Moreover, redemption periods.4
4Section 205 of
provided:
the 1918 Act
period
“That
computing
service shall not
be included
any period now or
by any
hereafter
to be limited
bringing
law for the
(1925),
Poston,
Ebert
scribed, can be considered authority suspend discretionary toll- The existence of Respond- ing suggested floor debates. the House is also (who Sparkman ing questions, Representative submitted Military Report Committee on of the House on behalf Affairs) “pertains persons agreed bill all that, while the “serving in armed forces for forces,” in the armed a man any money got not entitled to life ... more than he civil Cong. provisions this bill.” Rec. benefits response another comment, to that last 6364,6366 “[t]his inquired Representative whether is to take further handicapped because their mili- of the men who are care Sparkman Representative tary Id., an- service.” at 6366. affirmatively. He confirmed that Ibid. swered *12 discretionary of to the nature the did not intend abandon matters we have tried to all these scheme: “With reference by lodging discretion within the to make the law flexible justice equity may require.” and to not do as courts do or to finally, Repre- point debates, in the a later Ibid. And at the was intended clear that Act to sentative Brooks made compelled military remedy prejudice resulting from the obligations con- feel normal the man service: “We that the suspended prior as should be far tracted to service Induction duty, practicable during that this and the soldier as tour obligations protected his to be default in due his should from inability pay in income due to serv- caused reduction to Id., ice.” at history component legislative I of the shall final Act in
treat is the of the 1940 the Selective Service extension misconstrues Act of 604. The Court Con Stat. respects. gress’s First, intent in enactment two it this life extended the of the Act asserts that “because indefinitely II, after the end of World the 1948,well War congressional complete legislative history intent confirms duty, protect military just personnel on as all active the (footnote statutory language provides.” Ante, at omit- ted). enough draft over; War but the that the was It is true was the Act contained was not. The extension required military 1948, which Act Service Selective appear have been And it would from citizens. service contemplated would extended the “life of Act” be says, “indefinitely,” ibid., but for the dura as the not Court Cong., Rep. 1881, 80th 2d R. No. tion of the draft. See H. (1948) (extension “contihu[e] was intended to Sess., applica Relief Act of 1940 in its Civil Soldiers’ Sailors’ entering personnel inducted or armed forces tion to the act”). history during states the life of this provisions to extend the of the 1940 intended pursuant serving persons in the to this armed forces Act “to (em (1948) Cong., Sess., 1268,80th 2d No. act" S. added). peti phasis such as Career members serving “pursuant have to” the Selec tioner would not been excepted they expressly from since were tive Service requirement. Act of 1948 its See Selective Service service §6(a), legisla upon draftees, this focus 62 Stat. 609. merely replicates that of 1948 extension tive was Act the 1942 Amendments. The former the 1940 Training and Service enacted on the heels Selective was introduced on the Senate Act of 64 Stat. provide explanation “relief . with that would . . floor be those who are to inducted into the service *13 training Training [the Act under Selective Service (statement (1940) Cohg. 1940].” of of Rec. 10292 Overton) added). (emphasis In the debate on the Sparkman Representative Amendments, that “hun noted thousands, dreds of millions, even have been called” into Act, service since the the enactment of colleagues “keep uppermost your admonished his to mind legisla primary purpose at all times the fact that the of this give boy to to tion is relief the that is called into service.” Cong. words, In other Rec. the history of extension, the 1948 like that of the Act itself and protect suggests intent to those Amendments, the 1942 of many by military service, as who were prejudiced, were who would be. drafted probable mistaking of the effect errs
The Court also opinions presumed Congress’s earlier of our awareness Boone, we stated ante, In at 516. and Boone. Ebert See protect liberally always construed to to be that the Act “is drop obliged own to take their affairs who have been to those (emphasis Up S., at 575 the 319 U. nation,” the burdens of added), in the courts to ensure vested but that discretion was “unworthy put use,” to the Act not immunities of are that the very policy of Act” was to heart ibid., since “the of rigid “judicial provide of and undis discretion . instead . . criminating suspension proceedings,” id., at 565. of civil Congress likely of have caused Boone would Awareness very “the heart that the courts would vindicate assume by showing prejudice. policy requiring a Act” Congress argues, have however, would also The Court “carefully segregated recognized the aware that Ebert been arrangement provisions” ante, of the at the various already normal It is an extension of the convention (as precise reasoning Congress was aware of the assume judicial holding) opinions; opposed but to the earlier Congress only goes knew, assume that not much further to expected to follow, courts would continue the reason but (Ebert) repudiated ing holding a case whose had years supra, any event, six earlier. See at 523. only Court seeks to use Ebert to establish that was “carefully segregated aware that this Court was aware of the arrangement” anything, little, of the Act. That adds if upon plain language direct reliance statute. reading legislative history, the above After described one might well conclude the result reached the Court today, though betrays congressional law, faithful to in- Many Indeed, aware, tent. have done so. as far Ias am every interpret light court that has chosen to 205 in of its *14 legislative history plain than on the of its text rather basis' apply has did not intend 205 to to ca found that prejudice who cannot reer members of the show hardship. See, below, in addition to the court Pannell v. (CA5 1977); Co., 216, 224-225 554 F. 2d Continental Can Bai ley Barranca, 90, 94-95, 725, v. 83 N. M. 488 P. 2d 729-730 (Fla. (1971); King Zagorski, App. 61, v. 207 So. 2d 66-67 1968). only scholarly commentary I am aware of ad dressing legisla this issue “An examination of the concludes: prevailing interpreta tive of the Act shows that interpretation] [i. e., tion of section 205 the Court’s is not congressional Tolling Folk, consistent with intent.” of Stat utes of Limitations under Section 205 of the Soldiers’ Fi 157, 168 Sailors’ Civil Relief Mil. L. Rev. nally, successfully urged itself, even the which Government position adopted, recently in this case the we have until be legislative contrary. history, lieved, on the basis of See Secretary Force, Townsend Air 90-1168, v. No. 1991U. S. (CA4, 1991); App. 12, LEXIS *5-*7 Brief for Nov. (filed 2,1992) United States as Amicus Curiae n. 19 June §205 (noting position Government’s in Townsend that re quires showing prejudice); see also v. United Bickford (Ct. 1981) (“The States, F. 2d Cl. Government argues says that the statute does not mean what because legislative history Congress’ evinces intent to limit the applicability [§205] engaged to those servicemen in battle handicapped asserting or who are otherwise from their claims”). legal personally investigated
I confess that I have not the entire legislative history portion even that of it which relates —or excerpts to the four statutes listed above. The I have exam- quoted hapless ined and were unearthed law clerk to assigned I whom have, task. other Justices in the aggregate, many quite possi- more law clerks than I, and it is they upon they enterprise ble that if all were unleashed this dating discover, would in the materials back to *15 holding. friendly many Court’s faces earlier, 1917 or they to me—and no difference not makes would or Whether gives lip- evidently Court, which makes no difference legislative not trouble to set forth but does service to per- foregoing that others found so material and discuss except my be, it should that is as view, suasive. entirely language clear, lipservice. the statute Congress then has made meant is not what if that should correct it. We have to will a mistake (as opposed pretend intent about not to care law), impose upon practicing meaning lest we obligations that we do not ourselves and their clients bar seriously. take