317 Mass. 628 | Mass. | 1945
This is an action under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 239, § 1, as amended by St. 1941, c. 242, § 1, to recover possession of certain premises which the defendant occupied as a tenant at will of the plaintiff. There was evidence that the rent, which was paid monthly, had been paid for August, 1943; and that a notice dated August 31, 1943, to quit and deliver up the premises, which were adequately described, “at the expiration of that month (September) of your tenancy which shall begin next after this date,” was served upon the defendant on September 1, 1943. At the trial, the defendant, subject to the plaintiff’s exception, was permitted to show that the plaintiff was not the record holder of the title to the premises but that the title was in the name of one Tracy, a straw for the plaintiff. Thereupon the judge stated that the plaintiff could not maintain the action. He denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, and over the plaintiff’s exception granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
The evidence was sufficient, if believed, to show that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. It was immaterial to the creation or existence of .this relationship whether the owner held the title in her own name or in the name of a straw. The reciprocal obli
It does not follow that, even if the judge was wrong in directing a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not the record owner of the premises, the ruling is to be reversed if it was right upon another ground, Rathgeber v. Kelley, 299 Mass. 444; Old Colony Railroad v. Assessors of Quincy, 305 Mass. 509, which is open upon these exceptions, even though the point was not raised at the trial, as the judge did not require the party moving for a directed verdict to specify the reasons upon which the motion was based. Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538, 540. Krasnow v. Krasnow, 253 Mass. 528. Beebe v. Randall, 304 Mass. 207.
The plaintiff sought to terminate the defendant’s tenancy by giving him a noticé to quit in compliance with G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 186, § 12, which in so far as material provides for the termination of a tenancy at will by either party “by three months’ notice in writing for that purpose given to the other party; and if the rent reserved is payable at periods of less than three months, the time .of such notice shall be sufficient if it is equal to the interval between the days of payment.” This statute has been construed as requiring that the notice must be given at least a rent period prior to the time stated therein for the termination of the tenancy and that the time specified in the
Exceptions overruled.