85 N.Y.S. 93 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1903
Lead Opinion
In varying phases the substantial facts appearing in the present record have been before this court On two former appeals (Connor v. Koch, 63 App. Div. 257 ; Connor v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 73 id. 624; affd. on appeal, 174 N. Y. 515). It is not necessary, therefore, that we state the facts of the case in any great detail. Upon the present record it' appears .that the elevator man Baumann, in the management of the elevator and its load, was acting as the servant and agent of the present defendants and not of the fire extinguisher company, and for his acts and omissions, therefore, the present defendants are responsible. It appears without substantial dispute upon the present record that the elevator was in part loaded with long pijies, which projected above its top, one end resting upon the fl.opr of the elevator on its easterly side, and the upper part resting in the angle formed by the crosspieces on the top of the elevator. After being loaded the elevator was run to a point about three feet below the sixth floor, where it was stopped for the reason that its farther ascent .might bring the projecting ends of the long pipes in contact with the hood of the elevator, which had been suspended in the elevator shaft. Baumann and one Hamm, the latter a servant of the fire extinguisher company, were upbn the elevator at the time when it came to rest. As the men upon that floor were not present, Hamm drew himself up through the door on the sixth floor for the purpose of notifying them to. come and unload the elevator. At this time the pipes upon the elevator were in the same position that they occupied when; the elevator
It is evident that these pipes could not get from their position on the easterly side of the elevator to the southerly side and crash through the window without the intervention of some active agency, and the only active agent then upon the elevator was Baumann, its operator. He might have taken hold of the pipes to assist in their unloading and swung them around so as to be opposite, the window, and, losing control, permitted their descent to the ground, or they might have been displaced and thrown to the south by attempting to run the elevator farther up, bringing the upper ends in contact with the hood and so displacing them. It is not necessary, however, that we speculate upon such subject. We have the fact clearly established that the long pipes fell from the elevator, passed through the window and came in contact with the deceased, causing his death. Hnder these circumstances the deceased is to be regarded as occupying the same relation to the defendants as would any other person lawfully upon the street in the place where the pipes fell. He was engaged in making use of the walk for a lawful purpose, and was, therefore, entitled to the protection which the law affords to persons so situated. As the pipes fell from the defendant’s structure while in charge of their servant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, a presumption that defendants were guilty of negligence which caused the fall arose, and the defendants were called upon to explain the cause of the fall and to show that they were not guilty of any negligence in permitting the pipes to fall. (Hogan v. Manhattan R. Co., 149 N. Y. 23 ; Volkmar v. M. R. Co., 134 id. 418; Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 162 id. 380.) This court, upon the former appeal in this case, held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not necessarily apply, for the reason that there was present some evi
The judgment and order should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs. .
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson and Laughlin, JJ., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur upon the ground that the plaintiff’s intestate, being in a public street and injured by an object falling from the premises in. possession of the defendant while under the exclusive control of an employee of the defendant, justifies the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur, and there was, therefore, presented a question as to defendant’s negligence for the jury.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.