The single issue presented in the instant case is whether the civil courts of this Commonwealth have subject-matter jurisdiction over a tort suit alleging defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of a parochial school’s expulsion of a student for allegedly bringing a weapon to school, and the school’s communication of the expulsion to the school community. Citing the long-standing common-law precept known as the deference rule, according to which civil courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases that would require them to decide ecclesiastical questions, the lower courts held that they lacked jurisdiction over the instant case. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the lower courts erred in finding that the deference rule applies here, and we therefore reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Because this Court sits in review of the trial court’s grant of preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the salient facts are derived solely from the
In March 2004, Eric Connor was a twelve-year-old seventh-grade student at St. Eleanor’s School (“St. Eleanor’s” or “the School”), a Roman Catholic elementary school located in Collegeville, Montgomery County, and operated by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia (“Archdiocese”). After being assigned to read The Outsiders, a novel that “glorifies gang fights,” the seventh-grade boys developed “a significant interest in knives and weapons.” Complaint ¶¶ 14, 19 (filed Apr. 7, 2005). Several boys began bringing their Boy Scout knives to school and showing them off to their classmates.
In the week of March 8, 2004, the sixth and seventh grade boys were engaged in a running feud between the two grades- — which historically did not get along — carried out in the schoolyard at recess. On Tuesday, March 9th, after Eric Connor got into a shoving match with a sixth grader, the sixth and seventh grade boys planned a “rumble” for the next day at recess. Id. ¶ 21. On the way home from school on Wednesday, March 10th, 2 Eric told a classmate that he planned to bring to school the next day “a miniature ‘thing’ that could [do] no damage but would be a good bluff.” Id. ¶ 24.
On Thursday, March 11th, after a classmate of Eric’s spoke to St. Eleanor’s Principal Sister Mary Marie Heenan (“Sister Marie”) in her office, Sister Marie called Eric to her office and asked him to turn over a penknife that she believed he possessed. Eric denied that he had a knife but produced a manicure set containing “a two-inch nail file along with scissors and letter opener.” Id. ¶ 83. Soon thereafter, Sister Marie telephoned Eric’s mother, Kimberly Connor, and informed her that Eric had brought a “weapon” to school and was being expelled. Id. ¶ 29. The next day, the Reverend Patrick Sweeney (“Father Sweeney”), the pastor of St. Eleanor Parish, sent a letter to Eric’s parents, informing them that, pursuant to the Parent/Student Handbook of the School, Eric had been expelled for bringing a penknife to school. Exhibit A to Complaint (“Expulsion Letter”); Reproduced Record (“R.R.”) at 32a. The Expulsion Letter was shown to “the person who typed it and to various individuals in the school community.” Complaint ¶ 70.
On Wednesday, March 17th, all parents and guardians of St. Eleanor’s students were sent a letter signed by,
inter alia,
Father Sweeney and Sister Marie. Exhibit C to Complaint (“Information Letter”); R.R. at 34a-35a. The Information Letter related that, on March 11th, Sister Marie received several tips from concerned parents that knives were being brought to school that day. Thereafter, according to the letter, a “specific student ... was found to have a penknife in his possession”; Father Sweeney confirmed the existence of the penknife; and “[t]his student” was expelled from the School. R.R. at
After you have read this, do you have any further suggestions or ideas for us that will help improve the relationships among all of us[:] parents, teachers, staff, and students?
We suggest to you the following:
- Do not fall prey to idle gossip and rumors. If you need more information, call the school. If your call is not returned, call again.
- Speak to your child/ren individually[.] [A]s you well know when children are with others their behavior may not reflect what you have taught them. Name-calling and disrespect are learned and imitated behaviors. Remind your child/ren how you expect them to act and how to treat others with respect.
- Am I speaking in front of my children about topics which should only be spoken about in front of adults?
- Have you taught them to be tolerant of others who are different and that a person who may seem different is also a creature of God?
- Have you reviewed the golden rule recently?
We all need to step back during this time and examine our own consciences first[.] We know that we have a plank in our own eyes[,] so I can barely see in order to remove the speck from yours. This is first and foremost a Catholic School and we are Catholics who are called at all times to love God and to respect our neighbor. If each one of us were to arise tomorrow before God what would he say of us, whether parent or teacher or principal[?] We pray that God would be merciful with all of us.
God bless you and keep you[.] May God’s light shine upon you and may God grant all of us His peace.
17s]
Rev. Patrick Sweeney
Pastor
17s]
Rev. Andrew Brownholtz
Parochial Vicar
17s]
Sister Marie Heenan, RSM Principal
17s]
Mrs. Katherine Schmitt
Vice Principal
R.R. at 35a. Although the above Information Letter did not identify Eric by name, “everyone who saw the letter knew that it referred to Eric as having the pen knife.” Complaint ¶ 41.
In addition to sending the above letters, Father Sweeney and Sister Marie made an unspecified number of statements (“Oral Statements”)
4
between March 11th and March 20th to various St. Eleanor’s parents and students “indicating that Eric had been expelled for having a pen knife and implying that he presented a danger to the school and to the individuals in the school and to the community at large.” Complaint ¶ 64. The following week, on March
On April 7, 2005, Eric’s parents, Kimberly and Larry Con-nor (collectively, “appellants”) filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“trial court”) in their own right and on behalf of Eric against the Archdiocese, St. Eleanor’s, Father Sweeney and Sister Marie (collectively, “appellees”) seeking in excess of $50,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. In their complaint, appellants set forth a total of nine counts, four of which are based solely on Eric’s expulsion. In particular, Counts I and II allege, respectively, breach of contract and violation of due process grounded in appellants’ allegation that Father Sweeney and Sister Marie expelled Eric without sufficient investigation and without providing him with an opportunity to respond; and Counts VI and VII allege, respectively, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“IED”) as to Kimberly Connor and intentional IED as to Eric grounded in similar allegations directly related to the decision to expel Eric.
Appellants’ complaint also set forth two counts that are based on the Information Letter, the Expulsion Letter, and the Oral Statements (collectively, “Post-expulsion Communica tions” or “Communications”). Specifically, Count III alleges defamation, grounded primarily in the Oral Statements; and Count IV alleges defamation, grounded primarily in the Information Letter and the Expulsion Letter. 5
The remaining three counts of appellants’ complaint are based on both Eric’s expulsion and the Post-expulsion Communications: Count V alleges negligent IED as to Eric; Count VIII alleges respondeat superior liability on the part of the Archdiocese; and Count IX alleges respondeat superior liability on the part of St. Eleanor’s.
On April 26, 2005, appellees filed preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028 on the following grounds: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or lack of specificity; and (3) failure to state a claim against the Archdiocese, Father Sweeney, or Sister Marie.
6
In alleging lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, appellees invoked the deference rule, according to which civil courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases that would require them to decide ecclesiastical questions. In particular, appellees cited
Gaston v. Diocese of Allentown,
After hearing oral argument, on September 6, 2005, the trial court, per the Honorable Jacqueline F. Allen, sustained appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed appellants’ complaint with prejudice. In one paragraph of analysis, the trial court reasoned in its Rule 1925(a) 7 opinion as follows:
The court finds that it is without subject matter jurisdiction. As drafted, plaintiffs’ allegations require the court to determine whether the defendants acted “fairly and according to Catholic principles” with regard to the disciplinary measures employed. Such an endeavor would necessarily require an examination of Catholic principles. The Doctrinal Deference Rule prohibits Pennsylvania courts from such exploration.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/06, at 5 (citing Gaston, supra).
Appellants appealed to the Superior Court, abandoning the four counts based solely on Eric’s expulsion — namely, Counts I (breach of contract), II (due process violation), VI (negligent IED as to Kimberly Connor), and VII (intentional IED). In a published opinion authored by then-Judge, now Justice McCaffery, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court unanimously affirmed, citing the deference rule.
Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila.,
Acknowledging appellants’ contention that Counts III, IV, and V (alleging defamation and negligent IED) were not grounded in their wrongful expulsion allegations, the panel held that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider any of appellants’ claims. In this regard, the panel found that appellants’ negligent IED claim as to Eric “is based directly upon Appellees’ decision to expel Eric without cause.” Id. at 98-99 (internal quotation marks omitted). The panel further observed that all three of appellants’ non-abandoned claims “allege injury as a result of information disseminated wholly within the parish community.” Id. at 99. Such a decision, the panel held:
by a religious organization to discuss the fact and import of an ecclesiastical disciplinary decision is, for purposes of the deference rule, no different than the imposition of the discipline itself. This Court would indeed be straying into “the sacred precincts”[Presbyter of Beaver-Butler of United Presbyterian Church in U.S.A. v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 507 Pa. 255 ,489 A.2d 1317 , 1321 (1985)] if it determined that a religious organization would be subject to civil liability for communicating to its community the existence of a disciplinary decision made and imposed by the organization.
Connor,
Although noting that review of decisions from other jurisdictions was unnecessary since
Gaston
and prior decisions of this Court provided sufficient guidance, the panel included in its opinion a discussion of several non-binding decisions cited by appellants as well as a brief explanation of the distinction of each case from the instant matter.
See Connor,
933 A.2d at
100-01 & n. 9 (discussing
Bowie v. Murphy,
In conclusion, the panel explained, appellants’ defamation and negligent IED claims “essentially hinge upon judicial review of whether officials at a parochial school, in the course of their ecclesiastical disciplinary duties, correctly concluded that the object in Eric’s possession, which admittedly contained two or more solid, pointed blade-like implements of at least two inches in length, was a penknife.” Id. at 102. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ complaint.
Appellants sought allocatur in this Court, which we granted on September 24, 2008, rephrasing the issue as follows: “Did the Superior Court err in applying the deference rule to [appellants]’ negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims?” Because the issue is one of law, our review is plenary.
Mullin v. Commomvealth,
The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated what has come to be known as the deference rule in
Watson v. Jones,
Early on in his opinion for the Court, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, an appointee of President Abraham Lincoln, emphasized that this was “a case of a division or schism in [a] church” and that the question raised was, essentially, which of two competing factions should be recognized as having lawful control over the management of the church’s property.
Watson,
The other two categories of cases both concern implied trusts — but whereas the second category includes cases in which the local church is not governed by a national denomination, the third category is comprised of cases in which there is such a hierarchy of church governance. As for the second category, the Watson Court noted that the dispute must be resolved by application of “the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.” Id. at 725.
It is the third, most common category, to which the Watson case belonged. In such cases, the Court noted, the local church is bound by the orders and judgments of the ecclesiastical bodies that are superior to it. With respect to “this class of cases” of disputes over church property, the Court set forth its original articulation of the deference rule, as follows:
[Wjhenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 727.
After noting that the English courts did not observe this rule of deference to ecclesiastical bodies in such cases, the Watson Court proceeded to explain the underpinnings of this new American rule. In language that would later be repeated time and again in explanation of the more general doctrine of separation of church and state, 9 Justice Miller wrote for the Court:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of po dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large and influential bodies (to mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches), has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.
Id. at 728-29. As emphatic as the Watson Court was in refusing to decide questions of “ecclesiastical law and religious faith,” however, the Court was careful to note that not all decisions made by church authorities related to such doctrinal questions. Thus, the Court conceded that, for example:
if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church should undertake to try one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or imprisonment, its sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or anywhere else. Or if it should at the instance of one of its members entertain jurisdiction as between him and another member as to their individual right to property, real or personal, the right in no sense depending on ecclesiastical questions, its decision would be utterly disregarded by any civil court where it might be set up.
Id. at 733. “But it is a very different thing,” the Court reasoned, where the dispute concerns “a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 733.
Applying the rule as set forth above, the
Watson
Court declined the invitation of the pro-slavery members of the local church to examine the General Assembly’s
Notwithstanding the sweeping language in which the High Court indulged when justifying the deference rule,
Watson
did not explicitly rest on constitutional grounds.
10
Indeed, it was not until eighty years later that the deference rule was
constitutionalized in
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America,
Watson v. Jones ... radiates[ ] [ ] a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.
Kedroff,
The third decision in the U.S. Supreme Court’s line of church property disputes that gave rise to the deference rule is
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
Nevertheless, echoing
Watson,
the
Mary Elizabeth
Court repeated that “not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First
Seven years later, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the reach of
Watson
and
Mary Elizabeth
beyond the property dispute context. In
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich,
Jones v. Wolf,
The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general — flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.
Jones,
Because church property disputes — like most real property cases — usually are first heard in state court, it should come as no surprise that Pennsylvania judges have long been familiar with the special problems inherent in intra-church controversies. When the U.S. Supreme Court first set forth the deference rule in
Watson
in 1872, this Court had already been expounding the principle in similar terms for decades. In fact, the Commonwealth’s jurisprudence was so notable in this area that the High Court in
Watson
professed itself unable to “better close [its] review of the authorities than in the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of
German Reformed Church v. [Commonwealth ex rel] Sei
berl,”
The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offence against the word of God and the discipline of the church. Any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline, and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but improve either religion or good morals.
Watson,
Nevertheless, it was not until 1985 that this Court had occasion to explicitly recognize the deference rule as set forth
in
Watson.
In
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice James T. McDermott, this Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court erred in applying the deference rule. Justice McDermott began his discussion by eloquently describing the continuing vitality of both the deference rule and the neutral principles of law approach:
The wisdom of the Watson Court is as clear now as it ever was: the right to practice one’s belief and worship as one chooses is so deep a root of our constitutional culture that a court, even one with the best intentions, can be no more than a clumsy intruder into the most delicate and sensitive areas of human life. When Caesar enters the Temple to decide what the Temple believes, he can leave behind only his own views. The view of a court as to who are heretics among warring sects is worth nothing, and must count as nothing if our cherished diversity of religious views is to prevail.
* * * *
All disputes among members of a congregation, however, are not doctrinal disputes. Some are simply disputes as to meaning of agreements on wills, trusts, contracts, and property ownership. These disputes are questions of civil law and are not predicated on any religious doctrine. While it is true that parties may agree to settle their disputes according to their own agreed fashion, the question of what they agreed to, or whether they agreed at all, are not doctrinal and can be solved without intruding into the sacred precincts. From this consideration has evolved what is called the “neutral principles approach” delineated in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. [Mary Elizabeth] Blue Hull Memorial [Presbyterian] Church,393 U.S. 440 ,89 S.Ct. 601 ,21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), where the rule was carefully announced.
Beaver-Butler,
accepting] that the question was one of deference and yielding] the issue to the judicature of UPCUSA. We believe, under the circumstances, they went further than required. Indeed they seemed to have mandated deference simply because there existed a judicature in the national church body. They would have been correct if the issue was doctrinal[;] it however is, whether there ever existed an agreement at all: an issue that requires no doctrinal exegesis.
Beaver-Butler,
Following
Beaver-Butler,
the Commonwealth Court has repeatedly employed the “neutral principles” approach to resolve subsequent church property disputes.
See Presbytery of Donegal v. Calhoun,
We further note at the outset that the courts of this Commonwealth previously have applied secular principles of law to certain suits brought against Roman Catholic schools.
See, e.g., Vojtasek v. Diocese of Allentown,
Instantly, appellants argue that resolving their two defamation claims and their non-abandoned negligent IED claim “does not require the interpretation of any religious principle or dogma of the Roman Catholic Church.” Appellants’ Brief at 21. Conceding that review of Eric’s expulsion would “require[ ] an intrusion into [ ] religious principles”
(id.
at 28), appellants emphasize that they no longer challenge Eric’s expulsion and do not seek his readmission to the School. Accordingly, appellants contend, the success of their claims depends not on whether Eric’s expulsion was justified but on whether Father Sweeney and Sister Marie falsely stated that Eric brought a weapon to school and that he posed a danger to the School and to the community. Similarly, while appellants concede that the deference rule would apply if appellees “had publically described Eric as a liar or a bad [C]atholie”
(id.
at 29), appellants note that the Roman Catholic Church holds no official position on the purely secular question of what constitutes a weapon or a penknife. Indeed, appellants assert, each element of the three claims can be met by applying neutral principles of law — that is, without addressing any issue of Catholic doctrine. Therefore, appellants argue, the Superior Court erred in relying on
Gaston v. Diocese of Allentown,
Proceeding beyond the facts of the case sub judice, appellants complain that, by applying the deference rule to the instant case, the Superior Court has provided clergypersons with absolute immunity against defamation claims. Appellants maintain that holding clergy liable for defamatory statements that do not relate to religious doctrine would result in no impairment of the free exercise of religion. Instead of protecting this First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion, according to appellants, declining to impose liability on clergy and religious institutions for such statements would actually lead to the establishment of religion, in contravention of the other protective guarantee of the First Amendment. Turning to extra-jurisdictional decisions, appellants first discuss the four cases addressed by the Superior Court, then mention several others that they contend support their position.
Appellees counter that the neutral principles approach, “by definition, does not extend to tort causes of actions [sic]” because a tort is an unforeseen wrong, as opposed to an anticipated contractual event that can be “designfed] ... through secular documents.” Appellees’ Brief at 6 (citing nonbinding extra-jurisdictional decisions). Indeed, appellees assert that no Pennsylvania court has ever applied neutral principles outside the context of real property disputes.
Id.
at 7 (quoting
Beaver-Butler,
Turning to the facts of the instant case, appellees contend that the decision to expel Eric — as well as the Post-expulsion Communications of that decision — “cannot be surgically excised” from doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.
Id.
at 13. Noting that all three of appellants’ remaining claims arise out of the expulsion decision, appellees argue that “[i]f the expulsion was
proper
— i.e., in accordance with Catholic principles and discipline — then none of the comments allegedly made during the expulsion process are subject to a defamatory meaning.”
Id.
at 15. In support of the religious roots of both the expulsion and the Communications, appellees quote liberally from the St. Eleanor’s Student/Parent Handbook, which directs that students “act in ways ‘that convey respect to God, self, teachers, adults and other students’ that St. Eleanor’s teachers “teach by word and example”; that School officials should discipline students with an eye toward “applying ‘Christ’s teachings and moral values to life in contemporary society’ ”; and that discipline itself is to be regarded as a “ ‘necessary reflection of the philosophy of a Catholic School.’ ”
Id.
at 15-16 (quoting R.R. at 40a-41a). In addition, appellees note that the Information Letter asked St. Eleanor’s parents and guardians “to teach tolerance of all ‘creature[s] of God’ ” and “emphasized that ‘we are Catholics who are called at all times to love God and to respect our neighbor.’ ”
Id.
at 14 (quoting
In response to the extra-jurisdictional decisions cited by appellants, appellees assert that “the overwhelming weight” of jurisdictions apply the deference rule in tort cases. Appellees’ Brief at 18. Appellees provide two lists of cases from other jurisdictions that have applied the deference rule in cases involving defamation claims. The first list is comprised of defamation actions brought by members of religious institutions against leaders of those institutions. The allegedly defamatory statements in these cases ranged from accusations of bigamy in two of these cases to determinations, in three other cases, of moral unfitness for church membership. The other series of decisions cited by appellees involves, in their own words, “statements about the fitness of a church leader.” Id. at 20. As for appellants’ authorities, appellees dismiss them as “nearly exclusively [] non-binding, mostly unpublished, and ultimately unpersuasive.” Id. at 21.
Finally, like appellants, appellees bring their own policy arguments to bear in support of their position. Most notably, appellees warn that allowing claims like appellants’ to proceed would signal to disgruntled members of the Commonwealth’s religious institutions that they can use creatively pleaded tort claims to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions. 15
In a Reply Brief, citing two Superior Court cases, appellants refute appellees’ assertion that the neutral principles approach is absent in Pennsylvania jurisprudence outside the context of property disputes.
See
Reply Brief at 8 (citing
Cooper v. Church of St. Benedict,
In a brief submitted in support of appellees, the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference argues as
amicus curiae
that appellants’
Because both appellees and the panel’s decision below rely to a significant extent on the Superior Court’s decision in
Gaston, supra,
we begin our analysis with a review of that case. Like the case
sub judice, Gaston
arose out of an expulsion decision made by a Roman Catholic elementary school. After their son and daughter were expelled by the school, the Gastons filed a complaint on behalf of their children and in their own right seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the children’s expulsion “without cause.” The Gastons’ complaint alleged negligent and intentional IED on the part of the school’s principal, the diocese that operated the school, and the diocese’s department of education. More specifically, the Gastons alleged that their children had been expelled in retaliation for the Gastons’ criticism of a course that their son, Joseph, was then taking that the course’s students were instructed not to discuss outside the classroom or even remove the course textbook therefrom. According to
the complaint, within a month after the Gastons sent a letter criticizing the course to the school principal, the principal reported to the police that Joseph had made threats against her and that both Gaston children had become “discipline problems.”
Gaston,
In the trial court, the defendants filed preliminary objections seeking dismissal for, inter alia, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Applying the deference rule, the court sustained the objections and dismissed the complaint, citing Beaver-Butler, supra. The Gastons appealed to the Superior Court, raising as their sole issue whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Gastons’ “suit sounding in negligence even though one of the parties was a religious institution,” i.e., the diocese. Id.
In an opinion authored by Judge Vincent A. Cirillo, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed. The panel first set forth the origins of both the deference rule and the neutral principles approach, reviewing this Court’s Beaver-Butler decision and the High Court’s decisions in Watson, Kedroff, and Mary Elizabeth. After noting that this Court adopted the neutral principles approach in Beaver-Butler, the panel proceeded to the following two-paragraph analysis of the matter before it:
The question here, however, is not a property or contractual dispute. It is a claim that hints at tort law, but is based on an expulsion decision ratified by a bishop; it is, in our opinion, not receptive to application of neutral principles of law. The Catholic school’s disciplinary code and review of expulsion involve matters of church doctrine. Absent allegations of acts against the public welfare or acts of immorality, or allegationsof “excessive interference within areas of paramount state concern, i.e. the maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation of affection, and the tortious interference with a business relationship, which the courts of this Commonwealth may have authority to regulate, even in light of the ‘Establishment’ and ‘Free Exercise’ clauses of the First Amendment[,]” this court is loath to interfere with a bishop’s decision on student expulsion. Bear [v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 380 ,341 A.2d 105 (1975) ].
The parochial school, synonymous with the installation of dogma and discipline in its students, is an integral part of the Roman Catholic Church. The school is a repository for Catholic tradition and scripture; it is so intertwined with the church doctrine that separation is neither pragmatic nor possible. Intrusion into the bishop’s decision on matters concerning parochial school discipline and expulsion places this court perilously close to trespassing on sacred ground.
Gaston,
Based on the above rationale of Gaston, the instant Superior Court panel — which, of course, was bound by Gaston — concluded as follows:
It is clear from Gaston that it is not within the purview of the courts of this Commonwealth, under the guise of a tort action, to review a decision to expel a student from a parochial school. Appellants’ arguments that their defamation and negligent [IED] claims are somehow separate and apart from the decision to expel Eric are wholly unpersuasive. First, the negligent [IED] claim is based directly upon Appellees’ decision to expel Eric “without cause.” (Complaint at ¶ 85). Clearly, under the deference rule, we may not review the question of whether a student was appropriately expelled from or otherwise disciplined by a school operated solely by a religious organization. Moreover, Gaston determined that an action in intentional [IED] made against a religious organization, based directly upon the expulsion of children from a parochial school, may not be reviewed by the courts pursuant to the deference rule. There is no discernable reason why the same disposition should not apply to an action made against a religious organization based upon the expulsion of a parochial school student grounded in negligent [IED].
Connor,
As appellants emphasize before this Court, they, unlike the Gastons, no longer challenge the decision to expel their child from school. Instead, appellants now seek damages only for communications that appellees allegedly made subsequent to the decision to expel appellants’ son. Instantly, the Superior Court panel essentially concluded that this was a distinction without a difference, opining that appellants’ claims were “based directly upon” the expulsion decision. For the reasons set forth throughout our discussion, we conclude that appellants’ complaint treads much further into secular territory than the mere “hint[ ] at tort law” that was deemed to be before the Gaston court.
The instant panel held that merely subjecting a religious institution to civil liability for communicating to its community the occurrence of a disciplinary decision would require the court to “stray[ ] into ‘the sacred precincts,’ ”
Connor,
In contrast to the panel below, appellees do make reference to the substance of appellants’ claims in arguing that their resolution would require consideration of religious authority, although appellees confine their argument to appellants’ defamation claims. Focusing on their own prospective showing concerning the defamatory character of the statements, appellees argue that “[i]n order to determine the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements” that appellees made in the Post-expulsion Communications, the trial court would “be led into an examination of the [School’s disciplinary decision and, by necessity, into an examination of Catholic doctrine.” Appellees’ Brief at 15. Although appellees’ argument is more focused than that of the Superior Court, we do not find it persuasive for the reasons set forth below.
Thanks in part to the diligent research efforts of the parties
sub judice,
we have conducted an exhaustive survey of the deference rule jurisprudence that has developed in the various federal circuits and in our sister jurisdictions. Our research has convinced us that the most thorough and persuasive analyses are yielded by a claim-by-claim, element-by-element approach to the question of whether to apply the deference rule.
17
See, e.g., Petrusha v. Gannon Univ.,
Instantly, appellants have preserved for appeal Counts III, IV, and V of their complaint. 19 In particular, the complaint sets forth the following pertinent allegations:
• Count III alleges that Father Sweeney and Sister Marie knowingly made numerous false statements to St. Eleanor’s students and parents to the effect that Eric was expelled for bringing a penknife to school and that he posed a danger to the School and community;
• Count IV alleges that Father Sweeney and Sister Marie distributed the Information Letter to all St. Eleanor’s parents, guardians, and students, constructively identifying Eric as having been expelled for bringing a penknife to the School; and that Father Sweeney showed the Expulsion Letter actually identifying Eric to the person who typed it and “to various individuals in the school community”; and
• Count Y alleges that Father Sweeney and Sister Marie negligently inflicted emotional distress upon Eric by making the above statements.
Appellants further allege in all three counts that each of the above Post-expulsion Communications resulted in reputational, psychological, and physical damages to appellants and their son.
Taking Count V first, appellees do not discuss whether the trial court could consider appellants’ proof and any defenses offered by appellees as to the above elements of a negligent IED claim without intruding into the “sacred precincts.”
20
It is appellees, as the party seeking dismissal on the pleadings, who must make such a showing, and we will not make appellees’ arguments for them.
See Cianfrani v. Commonwealth,
We next proceed to consider appellants’ proof and any defenses offered by appellees with respect to the elements of appellants’ defamation claims. Section 8348 of the Judicial Code provides as follows:
(a) Burden of plaintiff. — In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised:
(1) The defamatory character of the communication.
(2) Its publication by the defendant.
(3) Its application to the plaintiff.
(4) The understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning.
(5) The understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff.
(6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication.
(7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
(b) Burden of defendant. — In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised:
(1) The truth of the defamatory communication.
(2) The privileged character of the occasion on which it was published.
(3) The character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as of public concern.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8343.
Appellees did not file an answer to appellants’ complaint, and their preliminary objections only alleged generally that the deference rule applied simply because appellants’ claims “ar[ose] out of disciplinary matters at” St. Eleanor’s, a parochial school. R.R. at 53a. 21 That position no doubt was premised upon a hope that Gaston would be given broad interpretation, and indeed the lower courts gave it such a reading. The absolutist nature of the objection is reason enough to hold that it should fail under the more discreet approach to the deference rule that we approve today. We recognize, however, that appellees did not seek to satisfy the elements-based approach we have approved, and they should be free to renew a preliminary objection, upon remand, if they believe they can succeed in satisfying that test.
We further recognize that appellees have forwarded a more sophisticated argument on this appeal that they did below, an argument that touches more particularly
The proper focus starts by isolating the elements of appellants’ defamation claims that would actually be in dispute at trial. It appears that, if the defamation claims proceeded to trial, appellees would assert the affirmative defense that the Post-expulsion Communications were true. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(b)(1); Appellees’ Brief at 1 (alleging that Eric was carrying “a weapon or, at minimum, an item intended to imitate a weapon”); id. at 2 n. 1 (suggesting that Eric’s alleged weapon could be “fairly described [as] a Swiss Army-style penknife”); see also id. at 15 (arguing that truth is absolute defense to defamation claims and that, to determine truth of Post-expulsion Communications, trial court would have to examine School’s disciplinary decision and, in turn, Catholic doctrine). Appellees’ showing in this regard would be relevant only to the defamatory nature of the Communications, the first element of appellants’ defamation claims, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(a)(1). In contrast to this first element, appellees have not denied that: (2) they published the Communications (in fact, they admit that they distributed the Information Letter to St. Eleanor’s parents, see Appellees’ Brief at 3); 23 (3) the Communications applied to appellants and their son; (4) the recipients of the Communications understood their defamatory meaning; (5) the recipients of the Communications understood them as intended to be applied to appellants and their son; 24 (6) appellants and their son suffered substantial harm as a result of the Communications; or (7) appellees abused any potentially applicable conditional privilege. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(a).
Instead, in arguing that their Post-expulsion Communications were rooted in religious authority, appellees rely on the fact that the Communications were motivated by appellees’ adherence to religious authority. For purposes of preliminary objections, appellees’ tactic is unavailing for two reasons. First, appellees’ reasons for making the Communications are irrelevant to the only element of appellants’ defamation claims that appellees have so far contested — namely, the defamatory nature of the Communications. Second, even if appellees contested the second element of the defamation claims — that they published the Communications — the inquiry concerning that element is not why appellees published the Communications but whether appellees published them. Thus, although appellees lift quotations from the School’s Student/Parent Handbook in an attempt to cast the Information Letter in a
more doctrinal light, the fact that, for instance, the School’s teachers are to lead “by example” — or that the letter itself contains religious language — is relevant neither to the defamatory nature of the Communications nor to the allegation that appellees made them. Appellants are challenging the truth of the statement that Eric brought a weapon to school, not the
In this regard, it is worth recalling the crucial distinction noted by the U.S. Supreme Court between two concepts embraced by the First Amendment: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. While the first is “absolute,” the High Court noted, “in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
Consistently with the High Court’s admonition in
Cantwell,
many courts in our sister jurisdictions have declined to apply the deference rule after emphasizing the distinction between actions taken by a religious institution or leader and the reasons such actions were taken.
See, e.g., Lipscombe v. Crudup,
Regarding the Post-expulsion Communications themselves, as opposed to appellees’ professed motivation for making them, appellees cite no relevant religious authority. Indeed, whether the item that Eric was expelled for bringing to school constitutes a weapon is a secular factual matter well within the ken of a fact-finding civil court. Section 1317.2 of the School Code requires the expulsion of “any student who is determined to have brought onto or is in possession of a weapon on any school property.” 24 P.S. § 13-1317.2(a). The statute defines weapon as “includ[ing], but not be[ing] limited to, any knife, cutting instrument, cutting tool, nunchaku, firearm,
shotgun, rifle and any other tool, instrument or implement capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.” 24 P.S. § 13-1317.2(g). In at least one published decision, this definition has been interpreted and applied by a civil court.
See Picone v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist.,
The extra-jurisdictional cases cited by appellees in which the deference rule was applied are not persuasive in this instance, as resolution of the disputes at issue in those cases would obviously intrude into the sacred precincts.
Compare, e.g., Schoenhals,
Many of the decisions applying the deference rule that appellees cite concern the unique context of a religious institu
tion’s freedom to choose its clerical leader. This is a special class of cases that involves the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees
When the conduct complained of occurs in the context of, or is germane to, a dispute over the plaintiffs fitness or suitability to enter into or remain a part of the clergyf ][ ] it is difficult to see how the forbidden inquiry could be avoided. Questions of truth, falsity, malice, and the various privileges that exist often take on a different hue when examined in the light of religious precepts and procedures that generally permeate controversies over who is fit to represent and speak for the church. As the Court observed in McClure v. Salvation Army,460 F.2d 553 , 558-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,409 U.S. 896 ,93 S.Ct. 132 ,34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972): “The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”
Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt.,
It is in this class of ministerial exception cases that the Commonwealth Court decisions cited by appellees largely belong. Thus, it is of no moment for present purposes that the Commonwealth Court previously applied the deference rule in disputes involving, respectively, a religious fraternity’s “ritual rules governing [its] position of Supreme Grand Master,”
Poesnecker v. Ricchio,
As for appellees’ reliance on the extra-jurisdictional decisions that fall into the ministerial exception category, we find these decisions unpersuasive for purposes of the matter
sub judice
for the reasons explained above.
See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo.,
Notably, in many of the ministerial exception cases involving defamation claims, the courts explicitly note that jurisdiction cannot be exercised even though the allegedly defamatory statements themselves may have been of a secular nature.
See, e.g., Yaggie v. Ind.-Ky. Synod Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am.,
A few remaining decisions cited by appellees concern the religious practice of shunning former members who have been excommunicated from a church. In
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.,
Paul
and its state court progeny are readily distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. As the Superior Court noted in addressing appellants’ reliance on
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,
In any event, we have already determined, after reviewing the elements of appellants’ defamation claims and appellees’ apparent truth defense, that it is reasonably likely that the trial court will ultimately be able to consider whether the parties carried their respective burdens as to each element of appellants’ defamation claims without intruding into the “sacred precincts.” At this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that neutral principles can be applied to determine whether the Post-expulsion Communications were defamatory. We therefore conclude that the Superior Court erred in determining that the trial court would be unable to resolve appellants’ claims without “trespassing on sacred ground,”
Gaston,
Simply put, it does not appear that this case will require “Caesar [to] enter[ ] the Temple [and] decide what the Temple believes,”
Beaver-Butler,
Notes
. Of course, we need not accept any conclusions of law or argumentative allegations made in the complaint.
Krentz,
. The complaint does not explain why the rumble did not take place on Wednesday as planned.
. Although the letter did not directly state that the item Eric brought constituted a weapon, it did note that School administrators ensured the safety of the students by confirming that "no other weapons were in their personal belongings or their school things." R.R. at 34a.
. Although the complaint does not explicitly state whether these statements were written or spoken, the context strongly suggests the latter and appellants' reply brief specifies that the statements were oral, see Reply Brief at 6 n. 2.
. Relevant to Counts III and IV, the complaint also alleges two additional post-expulsion communications that we do not explicitly discuss because appellants do not do so in their Brief to this Court: (1) an address given by a John McGranaghan to the School’s sixth and seventh graders about the friction between them in which McGranaghan told the students that Eric had “brought in a knife and had been expelled for it” (Complaint ¶ 39); and (2) a note sent to Kimberly Connor from Karen Thomas, a St. Eleanor's cafeteria worker, that contained “a defamatory statement as to Eric relating to his having acted inappropriately” (Complaint ¶ 72).
. Rule 1028(a) provides, in pertinent, part, that ”[p]reliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:”
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or the person of the defendant ...;
‡ 'I*
(3) insufficient specificity in a pleading;
(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer);
¥ ‡ ‘1* *1*
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a).
. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
. The panel also distinguished the case
sub judice
from
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,
Because appellants have abandoned the "shunning” argument that they raised before the Superior Court, we do not address this aspect of the Superior Court's decision.
.
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas,
. Nor did the Court consult state court decisions, as the question was treated as one of federal common law pursuant to the then-governing rule of
Swift v. Tyson,
. The dispute was actually two-fold: (1) the validity of the removal of an anti-communist bishop in Illinois by the Serbian Eastern Orthodox "Mother Church” in then-communist Yugoslavia; and (2) whether the Mother Church had the authority to divide the American-Canadian Diocese into three new dioceses.
. Another early decision of this Court similarly observed:
Differences of opinion are the natural result of moral, spiritual, and social growth, and are unavoidable in every religious denomination. In the development of the human race changes in spiritual matters must necessarily follow if the race is to continue to progress. The questions of doctrine and principles arising in religious denominations from time to time are for the determination of the members, through their duly appointed representatives, in the manner provided by church law, and the civil courts will not undertake to determine between one theory and another, so long as there appears no serious departure from the generally accepted teachings of the organization, coupled with an attempt to divert church property to a purpose radically different from that for which it was acquired.
Commonwealth ex rel. Heil v. Stauffer,
.
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of United Presbyterian Church U.S.A. v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,
. The “neutral principles” approach actually had already been applied by this Court in two lesser known cases.
See W. Pa. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical Church of N. Am.,
. As alternative grounds for affirming the decision of the Superior Court, appellees offer that Counts III, IV, and V (the non-abandoned claims set forth in appellants' complaint) do not properly plead either a defamation claim or a negligent IED claim.
See
Appellees’ Brief at 25-28. In their Reply Brief, appellants respond that the lower courts declined to address tírese arguments and that this Court similarly declined to broaden our review by granting allowance of appeal solely to consider the applicability of the deference rule. As appellants note, appellees' alternative grounds for affirmance are distinct issues beyond the scope of our grant of allowance of appeal. Given these circumstances, we will decline to address the alternative grounds in this Opinion, without prejudice to appellees’ ability to raise them upon remand in the trial court.
See, e.g., Siekierda v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing,
. We mention many of these decisions, as well as many of those cited by appellees, in our analysis below.
. We mention decisions from other jurisdictions here and throughout our discussion not in an attempt to analogize their factual scenarios to the facts sub judice but, rather, in order to identify a deference rule approach that yields analyses that are both persuasive and consistent with Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
.
Accord Rweyemamu v. Cote,
. Appellants do not address whether they also seek to preserve Counts VIII and IX, alleging respondeat superior liability, to the extent those counts rely on the Post-expulsion Communications. Resolution of this question is not necessary for purposes of today’s decision.
. Instead, appellees focus on appellants’ defamation claims as inevitably dragging the trial court into the ecclesiastical thicket. See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 14-18.
. While appellees’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections did offer certain grounds for their objection that appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, appellees’ challenges to the merits of appellants' claims were generally secular in nature.
See
R.R. at 67a (arguing that appellants failed to plead defamatory statements with sufficient specificity);
id.
at 70a-71a (arguing that appellants' negligent IED claims could not co-exist with their breach-of-contract claim);
id.
at 70a-71a (arguing that appellants failed to plead physical harm or injury in support of negligent IED
claims);
id.
at 71a-72a (arguing that appellants failed to plead emotional distress with sufficient specificity). Although appellees did argue that their publication of the Expulsion Letter “was limited to that audience appropriate and necessary to hear it for purposes of school discipline,” the decisions they cited were solely for propositions of secular defamation law.
See id.
at 68a-70a (citing
Baker v. Lafayette College,
. Again, we note that appellees do not develop such an argument with respect to appellants' non-abandoned negligent IED claim.
. According to appellees, the Information Letter was sent to St. Eleanor's faculty as well.
. Although appellees note that the Information Letter referred to an "unnamed” student, they did not deny appellants’ allegation that "everyone who saw the letter knew that it referred to Eric” (Complaint ¶ 41).
.
See also Jones v. Trane,
.
See also Higgins v. Maher,
In other decisions cited by appellees, courts, albeit using different words, convey a similar sense of the unique class of cases in which the "ministerial exception” applies.
See, e.g., Hutchison v. Thomas,
.
See also Yaggie,
.
See also Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, Billings,
.
See also Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, Inc.,
. In remanding the matter for further proceedings, we, of course, express no opinion as to the merits of any pre-trial challenge that appellees may still present to appellants' action, or of appellants' claims should they ultimately proceed to trial.