92 P. 573 | Idaho | 1907
This is an original application to this court for a writ of mandate to the Honorable W. W. Woods, judge of the first judicial district, commanding him to set
In support of the second ground of said motion, it is contended that the orders of the court complained of were the judicial acts of said judge acting in a judicial capacity, and hence could not be controlled by a writ of mandate. The act complained of is the striking out of certain paragraphs of the answer, thereby depriving the defendants of their alleg'ed defense. That defense in substance is that said railway corporation has been created and organized fraudulently for the sole purpose of enabling the B. R. Lewis Lumber Company, a private corporation, to evade the laws of the state, in order that it may indirectly be enabled to exercise the right or power of eminent domain for its own private use and benefit, and not for the use and benefit of the general public as a common carrier of passengers and freight. While there were specific allegations or averments in the answer of other matters affecting the organization and incorporation of said railway company, the most of them go to the question of the fraudulent organization of said company, and that it was not organized for the benefit of the public or for public use, but was organized for a private purpose, and therefore was not entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain in the condemnation of land for a right of way. One of the prominent questions in this case is whether the Idaho and Northwestern Railway Company is building or extending its lines of railway for public or only for private purposes. In other words, whether, under the provisions of our constitution and law, that railway company is, in fact, a public service corporation,
The first judicial district court had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion to strike out portions of said pleading and has exercised that jurisdiction. It therefore did not exceed its jurisdiction in performing said duty. If it erred in the decision of said motion, such error cannot be corrected by mandamus. Had it refused to pass upon or decide said motion, it could have been compelled by mandate to decide it, but it could not have been compelled to decide it in any particular way, and the authorities hold that it is not the function of mandamus to reverse the orders of inferior courts or tribunals of which they had jurisdiction, but if they had jurisdiction and refused to act, then they may be compelled to act by mandate.
The case of Hill v. Morgan, Judge, 9 Idaho, 718, 76 Pac. 323, is not in point. In that case the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction to proceed and try said cause, and for that reason declined to proceed with the trial. This court held that it acquired jurisdiction and directed the trial to proceed. In that case, in limine, the judge held that he had no jurisdiction, while in the case at bar, the court had jurisdiction, and proceeded within it.
Recurring again to the right of eminent domain, it will be observed that very few states have constitutional provisions as broad as our own on that subject. The contour and formation of the state and its industries of mining and irrigation made it absolutely necessary for the complete development of the resources of the state to have very liberal laws on
We also conclude that the action of the court in striking said defens.e from the answer was a judicial act within the sound legal discretion of the court, and in that matter the court acted within its jurisdiction, and in its judicial capacity.