The questions in this case relate to the admissibility of the testimony of two witnesses, called by the petitioner as experts to testify in regard to damages to real estate. One of them, so far as appears, had no knowledge of the prices at which land was bought and sold in the vicinity of the land taken by the respondent, and hardly any knowledge of the prices of land in other places. The other testified that he was “ perfectly familiar with values in Dorchester and other places around Boston for manufacturing purposes, but not for any other purposes, and had nothing to do with any other purposes.” Both of these witnesses were mechanical engineers who were familiar with the use of steam and water power and with mills of various kinds in many places. They werb competent to give an opinion on the question whether the petitioner’s property was adapted to use as a site for a mill, but their testimony tended to show that they had been occupied chiefly with mechanical subjects in connection with mills, rather than with prices or values. After they had testified that the petitioner’s property was well adapted for a mill site, one of the witnesses was allowed to answer the question, “ What is the fair market value of this combination of the land here with the water for the purposes of the rubber business ? ” and to say that it would be worth $50,000 for such a mill site. The other witness gave similar testimony. The respondent objected to the questions and answers, both in form and substance, and saved exceptions.
The subject thus presented was considered in Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 175 Mass. 299, and similar questions have arisen in previous cases. The sum to be awarded for real estate taken
In view of the fact that “ it was not claimed by the petitioner that it would be practicable to use the stream directly for water power on the petitioner’s land, but only that he could take water from the river for steam and other manufacturing uses other than power,” and the further fact that under the reservation in the taking, the owner of the part of the land which is left will have a right to take water from the river in any reasonable manner and to the same extent as heretofore for mercantile or manufacturing purposes, and to discharge the water into the river; and in view of the ignorance of these experts of the selling prices of land in the vicinity, and the introduction of many witnesses on both sides who were familiar with the prices at which property sold in that part of Dorchester, although they did not know the value of mill sites, we think it would have been a better exercise of judicial discretion if the testimony of these two witnesses as to values had been excluded. On the other hand, the questions which arose in passing upon the competency of the evidence at the trial were questions of fact, and we cannot sustain the exceptions if there was any evidence to warrant the view taken by the presiding judge. Amory v. Melrose, 162 Mass. 556, 557. Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 137. He might find that the land had elements of value as a mill site. There was no testimony before the court in regard to the selling price of mill sites as such. The evidence tended to show that the experience of these witnesses enabled them to judge of the value of a mill site somewhat better than persons generally. We cannot say that there was no evidence on which he could find the qualifications of these witnesses to be such as might enable them to aid the jury in fixing the market value of the property, under the findings which he might make, and which the jury subsequently might make as to its condition and qualities. Notwithstanding the objections to such testimony, there was evidence on which it could be admitted in the discretion of the presiding judge, and the entry will therefore be,
Exceptions overruled.