74 N.Y.S. 277 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
Lead Opinion
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
■ The action was brought to recover damages for the destruction by fire of a quantity of railroad ties, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The ties were piled upon the defendant’s right of way, near its tracks. There was a lot of rubbish about the ties and along the tracks. It was a dry time. Sparks or coals from a passing engine fell in the rubbish, kindled a fire and the ties were consumed. The defendant claims it was not liable to the respondent in damages, for two reasons: First. The plaintiff was a mere licensee as to the ties upon defendant’s right of way, and the defendant was not, therefore, liable for setting tlie fire resulting in their destruction. Second. The plaintiff was not free from contributory negligence. He assumed the risk.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff had been accustomed to pile ties at the place in question for many years while the New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company was operating the railroad. Some were sold to that company and some were sold and shipped to other companies. That company went into the hands of receivers July 25, 1893, and sometime thereafter the railroad passed into the custody of the defendant, by whom it was being operated at the time the fire occurred, October 6, 1897. No ties were sold to the receivers or to the defendant after the railroad came under their control respectively. The ties in question had been where they were for at least two years. They were not there at the time of the fire for shipment over defendant’s road. The defendant had no interest in their being upon its right of way, but permitted them to be there solely for the accommodation of the plaintiff. As to the ties at the time of the fire, the plaintiff was merely a licensee. The defendant as to him had, therefore, no duty imposed upon it of active vigilance to protect the ties from destruction by fire kindled by its passing locomotives. It would only be liable in case the fire was kindled willfully or wantonly. (Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Company, 101 N. Y. 391; Splittorf v. State of New York, 108 id. 205; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 145 id. 301; Cusick v. Adams, 115 id. 55.) The fire was neither willful noy wanton. It was at most merely negligent. The specific ground
We do not think any duty was imposed upon the defendant, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, to remove the grass any more than the other old dry rubbish, so as .to protect the plaintiff’s property from danger of fire, or that the failure to so remove the grass constituted negligence rendering the defendant liable for damages for the destruction of the ties. Plaintiff assumed the risk of using the right of way as it was, or was guilty of contributory negligence in not removing the dry rubbish and grass or his ties, ■and could not, having failed to perform his duty in this respect, call upon the defendant to pay him for his ties.
The court submitted this question to the jury as one of assumed risk, and in the course of the charge said: “ The plaintiff owed himself a duty with respect to his property, and if the plaintiff delivered his property and piled it up upon the lands of the railroad company, with a knowledge of the situation, or if knowledge came to him of the situation and perilous condition of his property, then he had no legal right to allow it to remain subject to the danger of destruction. * * * The evidence upon' the part of the plaintiff is that he knew that this land where his ties were piled was low and swampy ; that grass had grown there from year to year and that sometimes it had been cut. He knew that bark was peeled from ties or from posts and that chips had been made by the railroad company in the building or
We cannot assent to the proposition that any right, of action was •established by the evidence in the case. The defendant raised the question fairly in its motions for a nonsuit and its motion for a new trial upon the minutes.
The judgment and order must, therefore, be reversed and new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Adams, P. J., Speing and Hiscock, JJ., concurred ; McLennan, -J., dissented in an opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
The defendant is engaged in operating a line of railroad which extends from Jersey City westward to and through the village of Salamanca, N. Y. About four miles west of the village there is a siding called Page’s switch, which is used in connection with the railroad. The plaintiff was the owner of a sawmill located
On the 5th day of September, 1897, while the ties were piled as. aforesaid, they were destroyed by fire. ' The evidence was such as-to justify the jury in finding that the defendant’s employees cut the-grass and weeds upon its right of way, which was adjacent to and about the'ties, in' a period of drought; left the same until it became so dry that it caught fire from a- spark of a passing engine, and thus conveyed the fire to the ties, causing their total destruction. Considering the season, the excessive drought, the combustible-nature of the material about the ties, and- all the other circumstances, the jury was justified in finding that the defendant was negligent ini permitting the dry grass and weeds which it had cut, and the other combustible material, to remain in close proximity to. plaintiff’s-property, where it was liable at any time to be ignited from sparks-from passing engines, and that such negligence caused the destruction of the plaintiff’s ties. (Webb v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420; O'Neill v. N. Y., O. & W. R. Co., 115 id. 579; Hoffman v. King, 160 id. 618.)
In the case last cited the rule is stated in the head note as follows :- “ As even properly constructed locomotives, with the most:, approved spark arresters, will, of necessity, emit some sparks, it is.
There is no claim that the negligent acts complained of were wantonly or willfully done, which it is urged by appellant’s counsel was necessary in order to make the defendant liable therefor. That is entirely immaterial, as concededly the acts were done by employees of the defendant while engaged in the performance of duties directly within the scope of their employment. Neither is it of importance that the negligence was not gross, so called, but of some lesser degree. The question is, did the acts, under the circumstances, constitute negligence ? If it had been proven that defendant’s employees had emptied the fire box of an engine in close proximity to plaintiff’s ties and thus caused their destruction; concededly gross negligence would have béen established.' Precisely the same result happened because of the acts complained of, although less pronounced in their character, perhaps more difficult of proof, and from which, perchance, different inferences might be drawn by a jury; but if the acts constitute negligence, liability follows, unless the person chargeable therewith is relieved because of some other principle of law. ' As affecting the liability for a negligent act, we know of no distinction between gross, petty or some .other degree of negligence. The only question'to be determined in such case is, did ■ the person who is sought to be charged do or' omit to do something which a person óf ordinary care and prudence would not have done under the circumstances ? As we have seen, such acts as are here complained of have been repeatedly held by the Court of Appeals to constitute negligence on the part of railroad companies, and, therefore, a further discussion of the question cannot be useful.
For the first time in this case the question is raised upon this appeal that the plaintiff failed to prove that the ties in question were destroyed after the defendant became the owner of the railroad and while it was operating the same, and it is urged for that reason that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted. We think such defense is not now available to the defendant, because of the admissions in the pleadings, the course which was pursued by the defendant upon the trial, because the
• “Second. Por a second answer defendant, on information and belief, alleges that the brush, logs, shavings and other inflammable ■ matter and substances on its right of way, at or near' ‘ Page’s ■ switch,’ named in the complaint, at the times therein mentioned, were placed thereon by the plaintiff herein, and were thereon and in the same condition as when the ties named in the complaint "were _ burned, at the time plaintiff deposited his railroad ties thereon,” and that he so deposited them with full knowledge of the condition, and was, therefore, guilty of contributory negligence. The answer, when fairly construed in connection with the allegations of the complaint, in effect admits that the defendant was the owner of and was operating the railroad at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed.
. Upon the trial it was proven, apparently incidentally, that the receiver was operating the railroad in .January, 1894, but it was not shown when the defendant was incorporated or when it commenced the operation of the road. It seems to have been assumed throughout the entire trial, by all parties, that the ties were burned while the defendant was operating the railroad. This is apparent from the language, used by the learned trial court in charging the. jury, to which the defendant in no manner objected. He said: “Several witnesses have testified that grass grew there in considerable abundance, of a coarse, swampy character, and "was mowed sometime dur
“ Upon the part of the defendant it is contended in this respect that you -are not justified in drawing this inference of fact from the circumstances developed in the evidence; that the defendant, anting in the capacity of a prudent and careful person, would not have been impressed that it was dangerous; tnat fire was liable to be communicated to the refuse which had been permitted to accumulate at this point near the place where these ties were stored, and that, therefore, it was not guilty of negligence in not removing this refuse.”
That the defendant had no thought upon the trial of raising the question that the ties were not burned while it owned and operated the railroad is apparent by what its learned counsel said in moving for a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. . The record is- as. follows: “ The defendant moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that, the plaintiff had not shown any state of affairs which warrants a. recovery for any injury, unless it was willful; in other words, that, the railroad company was under no obligation to take care of the. plaintiff’s property, except that it could not injure it wantonly or-willfully, and there has been no evidence showing that the act of the. railroad company or of its employes was wanton or willful.”
Again, upon renewing the motion for a nonsuit at the close of the: entire evidence, counsel for the defendant said : “ And the further-ground that the place the plaintiff placed the ties was such that the defendant was charged with no care or responsibility for the same, ' and that it could only be charged with-willful injury of them and that there is n.o evidence of anything of that kind.”
During the trial it was nowhere suggested that the defendant was not operating the railroad at the time the plaintiff’s ties were burned, but, as we have seen, it was assumed throughout, and was understood by the learned trial justice and by counsel as well, that the
There is no proof or anything to indicate that the defendant was 'not the owner of and engaged in operating the railroad in question when the plaintiff’s ties were burned: ■ It was not claimed upon the ■ argument and is not suggested in appellant’s brief that such was not in fact the case. It is only urged that formal proof of the fact was not made. Under all the circumstances it is too late to effectively raise such question for the first time on appeal. (Jordan v. McGill, 43 App. Div. 264; Flandrow v. Hammond, 148 N. Y. 129; Sterrett v. Third Nat. Bank of Buffalo, 122 id. 659.)
Assuming that the plaintiff was himself free from ..-contributory negligence, is the defendant liable for the valué of the ties destroyed through its negligence % The plaintiff was not a-trespasser in permitting the ties to remain on defendant’s right of -Way. Originally they were placed there rightfully- under an agreement with defendant’s- predecessor, for the mutual benefit of -both parties. If the ties had been destroyed by the negligent act of that company, unquestionably it would have been liable to the plaintiff for their value. Undoubtedly, as between him and the defendant, the plaintiff was a licensee at will: He could have been compelled at -any time to remove the ties, and, after notice to remove them, if-the plaintiff failed to do so within a reasonable-time, the defendant would have been relieved of all liability in respect to the property, even for its negligent acts. No such-notice was given; no objec- ’ tian was in any manner made to plaintiff’s continuing to store his ties upon defendant’s premises after it became the owner of - the railroad, precisely as he had done before. The defendant was engaged in the same business as its predecessor. Plaintiff’s custom was transferred from the old company to it.; he continued to use the siding for shipping purposes as occasion required. The defendant knew, or is presumed to have known, the situation at the siding, and by what right the plaintiff permitted' his property to remain upon its right of way. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff had the right to assume that the ties were allowed to ' remain by the defendant by virtue of the agreement" with the :- old company, and that the defendant had, in fact, assented to, or
. It is urged that the evidence conclusively establishes contributory negligence on the. part of the plaintiff, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to recover, The evidence does show that the place where the plaintiff piled his ties some two or three years before they were burned was low and marshy ground; was grown up with swale' grass and weeds, and was covered with other combustible refuse to a considerable extent, and it appears without contradiction that at the time the ties were placed upon the right of way of the predecessor company the plaintiff was quite as conversant with, the situation as it was. He knew the character of the soil; about the rubbish that had accumulated, and all the conditions as they then existed, and if the fire. had resulted solely by reason of such conditions the plaintiff could not have recovered ; but there is evidence tending to show that the fire resulted because'of the dry grass’and weeds which the defendant’s employees had cut and left scattered upon its right of way- and about the ties of the .plaintiff,, and .there is no evidence that the plaintiff knew of that condition, or of such
It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should he . affirmed, with costs.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to-the appellant to abide the event,, upon questions of law, the facts, having -been examined and no error found therein.
