218 Conn. 335 | Conn. | 1991
In this appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly dismissed their action for a declaratory judgment under General Statutes §§ 4-175, 4-176 and 52-29 (a)
The plaintiffs are the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Inc. (CBIA), which represents employers who provide health insurance to their employees, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. (BCBS), an insurer that provides health insurance to those insured under the policies it has issued, and
In August and September, 1988, CHHC issued orders establishing the rates to be charged by the hospitals during the 1989 fiscal year.
On September 30, and October 3, 1988, BCBS filed petitions pursuant to § 19a-165q-45 (b) (4)
The plaintiffs then pursued two courses of action. First, they filed thirty-two administrative appeals in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a)
Thereafter, in accordance with their stated intentions, the plaintiffs challenged CHHC’s decisions revising the original rate orders by filing this action for a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court pursuant to §§ 4-175, 4-176, 52-29 (a), and pursuant to Practice Book §§ 388 through 394. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, among other things, that CHHC’s “failure to follow proper rate reconsideration procedures, its negotiation and entry of Agreed Settlements, and its adverse ruling or refusal to rule on the Petition for Declaratory Rulings, as amended, all constitute the application of regulations and implementation of certain orders which interfere with or impair, or which threaten to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiffs.” Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action on the ground that they had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies because they had circumvented the scheduled declaratory ruling proceeding.
Although several issues have been raised for our consideration, both parties have briefed the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action in the first instance. Our conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing and our affirmance of the judgment of dismissal on this ground obviates the necessity to consider the other issues raised.
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the declaratory judgment action for the reasons set forth in our recent decision in CBIA I. That case, as noted above, involved an administrative appeal under § 4-183 (a)
In response to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiffs argue that the principles set forth in CBIA I are limited in application to administrative appeals filed pursuant to § 4-183 (a). They maintain, further, that by virtue of our decision in Connecticut Assn. of Health
While Worrell involved a declaratory judgment action brought under §§ 4-175 and 52-29 (a) by two associations that had suffered adverse administrative rulings on petitions for declaratory rulings filed pursuant to § 4-176, that procedural happenstance played little or no role in the decision reached in Worrell. It was not stated or intimated in Worrell that the decision was intended to liberalize the doctrine of standing for purposes of declaratory judgment actions under § 4-175 as opposed to administrative appeals under § 4-183 (a). Subsequent cases applying the principles set forth in Worrell in a variety of procedural settings lend additional support to the proposition that Worrell was not designed for, nor confined to, cases involving similar procedural underpinnings. See Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 650, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989) (administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes [Rev. to 1985] §§ 1-21i [d], 4-183); State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 304-305, 524 A.2d 636 (1987) (administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-176 and 4-183); University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 389, 512 A.2d 152 (1986) (action for injunction); see also Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Indians v. Indian Affairs
Furthermore, Worrell did not abandon the traditional standing requirement that a party bringing suit must “demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of [a controversy] that can be distinguished from the interest of the general public . . . .” CBIAI, supra. Worrell broke new ground only to the extent that it overruled an earlier precedent holding that an association was without standing to bring suit on behalf of its members “unless it has a right, in itself, in the subject matter of the controversy which a decree will affect”; Connecticut Society of Architects, Inc. v. Bank Building & Equipment Corporation, 151 Conn. 68, 74, 193 A.2d 493 (1963); and “adopted the federal standard for representational standing as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).” State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 304, 524 A.2d 636 (1987); see Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 615-17. Although Worrell disavowed the prior requirement that an association must demonstrate a personal interest in a controversy; Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 614-16; the assurance of a justiciable controversy inherent in that requirement was preserved by adjusting the focus of the typical standing inquiry to scrutinize the nature of the interests of the association’s members. The association accordingly was required to establish, as one of three prerequisites to representational standing, that its “ ‘members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right ....’” Id., 616. The association involved in Worrell satisfied this prerequisite since its
Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot disentangle themselves from the standing criteria applied in CBIA I on the basis of an illusory distinction in Worrell between standing for purposes of § 4-175 as opposed to § 4-183 (a). In the event of their failure to prevail on this claim, however, the plaintiffs raise the alternative, though analogous, contention that the declaratory judgment provisions of § 52-29 (a)
“ ‘It is a basic principle of our law . . . that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.’ Connecticut Assn. of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd, 197 Conn. 554, 558, 499 A.2d 797 (1985).” Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 613. Our rules of practice, mirroring the fed
“An action for a declaratory judgment, valuable as it has become in modern practice, is not a procedural panacea for use on all occasions.” Liebeskind v. Waterbury, 142 Conn. 155, 158, 112 A.2d 208 (1955). In providing statutory authority for courts to grant declaratory relief, the legislature did not intend “ ‘to broaden their function so as to include issues which would not be such as could be determined by the courts in ordinary actions.’ ” McGee v. Dunnigan, 138 Conn. 263, 267, 83 A.2d 491 (1951), quoting Board of Education v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 347, 16 A.2d 601 (1940). The declaratory judgment procedure consequently may be employed only to resolve “a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal
We recently held that a party who was “simply a member of the general public who has not demonstrated how she was harmed in a unique fashion” by the conduct she had challenged in a declaratory judgment action had failed to establish “a colorable claim of direct injury,” and accordingly lacked standing to maintain the action. (Emphasis in original.) Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469, 473, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990). For the reasons set forth in CBIA I, neither the plaintiffs in this case nor their members have an interest in CHHC’s decisions revising the original rate orders that is distinguishable from that of the general public. Consequently, the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the decisions in a declaratory judgment action, and the action was properly dismissed.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] Sec. 4-175. declaratory judgment ACTION TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OR APPLICABILITY OF A REGULATION OR order. The validity or applicability of a regulation or order of an agency
This statute was amended, effective July 1, 1989, by Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317, §§ 9, 107.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] Sec. 4-176. DECLARATORY RULINGS. Each agency may, in its discretion, issue declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any regulation or order of the agency, and each agency shall provide by regulation for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions seeking such rulings. If the agency issues an adverse ruling, the remedy for an aggrieved person shall be an action for declaratory judgment under section 4-175 unless the agency conducted a hearing pursuant to sections 4-177 and 4-178 for the purpose of finding facts as a basis for such ruling, in which case the remedy for an aggrieved person shall be an appeal pursuant to section 4-183. If the agency fails to exercise its discretion to issue such a ruling, such failure shall be deemed a sufficient request by the plaintiff for the purposes of section 4-175. Rulings disposing of petitions have the same status as agency decisions or orders in contested cases.”
This statute was amended, effective July 1, 1989, by Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317, M 10, 107.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 52-29. superior court may declare rights and LEGAL RELATIONS, (a) The superior court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.”
The 1989 fiscal year covered October 1, 1988, through September 30, 1989.
Section 19a-165q-45 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “A hospital may request, within 10 calendar days of issuance of a rate order or within 10 calendar days of modification or denial for items (3) and (4), below, that the commission hold a hearing concerning those items in the rate order as follows:
“(1) Items which were modified or denied by the commission and which were determined pursuant to a provision in the regulations which provides for the hospital to request that an item be considered in determination of the rate order and for the commission to approve, modify or deny such request; or,
“(2) Items which were determined pursuant to a provision in the regulations which specifically provides for the commission to approve, modify or deny an amount provided to the commission by the hospital, except items specified in (3), below, or
“(3) Items modified or denied pursuant to section 19a-165q-32 (b) (4) of these regulations.
“(4) Modifications to a hospital’s rate order by the commission, pursuant to section 19a-165q-28 (b) (6) and (7), of these regulations.
*339 “The hospital’s request shall specify in detail the reasons for such request. The commission shall hold such hearing and make a decision as to whether the request will result in a revision of the commission’s rate order issued pursuant to section 19a-165q-44 of these regulations no later than 45 days from the date of receipt of the request and additional information that the commission deems is required. At any hearing thereon, payers and other interested parties may participate in accordance with the Commission’s rules of practice. If the rate order is revised the hospital will implement such revision no later than 30 days from the date of such commission decision.”
See footnote 3, supra.
The temporary stay orders were periodically extended either by CHHC or at the hospitals’ request until the settlements were finally approved.
See footnote 1, supra.
The plaintiffs amended their petition on November 15,1988, to include two additional issues.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] Sec. 4-183. appeal to superior court, (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this chapter, provided, in case of conflict between this chapter and federal statutes or regulations relating to limitations of periods of time, procedures for filing appeals or jurisdiction or venue of any court or tribunal, such federal provisions shall prevail. A preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.”
This statute was amended, effective July 1, 1989, by Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317, §§ 23, 107.
In light of its determination that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, the court declined to consider whether they lacked standing to maintain the action as claimed by the defendants as an alternate ground for dismissal.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs that we decline to address are: (1) whether the court properly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (2) whether the judgment can be affirmed on the ground that the relief sought by the plaintiffs should have been pursued in an administrative appeal rather than in an action for a declaratory judgment. We also do not consider whether our decision in Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 573 A.2d 736 (1990), renders this appeal moot as claimed by the defendants.
See footnote 8, supra.
Furthermore, we rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they had a unique legal interest in the rate order decisions by virtue of § 19a-165q-45 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. That regulation placed “payers” such as the plaintiffs on an equal par with “other interested parties” such as members of the general public and could not, therefore, be construed to elevate the status of payers for aggrievement purposes above that of members of the general public. Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 732-733, 573 A.2d 736 (1990).
See footnote 1, supra.
See footnote 1, supra.
“[Practice Book] Sec. 390. —conditions
“The court will not render declaratory judgments upon the complaint of any person:
“(a) unless he has an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to his rights or other jural relations; or
“(b) unless there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties; or
“(c) where the court shall be of the opinion that the parties should be left to seek redress by some other form of procedure; or
“(d) unless all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof.”