5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 265 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1968
This is a summary process action in which the plaintiff claimed possession of the premises described in the complaint as 520 Prospect Avenue (first floor), Hartford, Connecticut, because of nonpayment of the rent for the months of December, 1967, and January, 1968. General Statutes § 52-532. The defendants filed an answer in which they admitted certain paragraphs of the complaint and denied others; and, by way of counterclaim, they alleged that “the plaintiff was, and still is, indebted
“Jurisdiction over summary process actions is given to the Circuit Court by §§ 52-2a and 52-532 of the General Statutes. Section 52-2a does not purport to give this jurisdiction to the Circuit Court exclusively, but that is implicit in § 52-532 and in the other statutes [§§ 52-534, 52-536, 52-545] concerning summary process.” Bubinow, “Circuit Court Civil
Turning now to the instant case, in measuring time in which the appeal must be taken, we exclude from the count the day that judgment was rendered (February 27); see Rivera v. Hankard, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 324, 325; and we are also required by statute to exclude from the computation March 3 (Sunday) ; thus March 4, 1968, must be fixed as the final day
Our ruling sustaining the first ground of the motion to dismiss the appeal makes it unnecessary for us to consider the second ground.
The motion to dismiss the defendants’ appeal must be, and the same is hereby, granted.
In this opinion Kosicki and Wise, Js., concurred.
We fail to see how the defendants could obtain a money judgment upon their counterclaim in this summary process action. In Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 551, our Supreme Court said: “In view of the restricted nature of the issues open in a summary process action the counterclaim for money damages for partial eviction had no place in the case.” We do not mean to suggest, however, that where a complaint does set up a forfeiture of the lease for nonpayment of the rent as a basis of recovery, it may not be germane to the issues to show, if indeed the facts were so, that no rent was due and owing. And had the plaintiff brought an independent action for the recovery of the rent due under the lease, the defendants might, under appropriate pleadings, recoup such damages as they could show they had sustained owing to the plaintiff’s breach. See Barnum v. Keeler, 33 Conn. 209, 210.
It is to be noted that February 29, 1968 (this being leap year) must be counted as one day since the appeal period is measured in days. See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 98. “ ‘Each of the 28th and 29th days of February, in the leap-year, is a day of twenty-four hours’ duration; and, where these two days occur in any period of days less than one year, we are clearly of the opinion, that, under the law of this State, they ought to be and must be regarded and computed as two days, and not as one day, for any purpose.’ ” Walker v. Hazen, 90 F.2d 502, 503; see 86 C.J.S., Time, § 15.