201 A.D. 170 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1922
Lead Opinion
This action was brought by a wife to obtain an absolute divorce on the ground of the adultery of her husband. After issue had been joined counsel for the plaintiff applied for an allowance of counsel fees and alimony. The court directed the payment of $200 per week for alimony, $7,500 “ on account of counsel fee,” and $1,500 on account of disbursements of counsel already or prospectively to be made. It then referred the issues of the action to a referee to hear and determine the same. It further referred to him the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to have any further sum allowed for counsel fees. This court, on an appeal to it, modified the order by striking therefrom the allowance of $1,500
The cause of action, upon which an attorney may have a lien, belongs to the client and not to the attorney; the right of the client in good faith to settle his cause of action and terminate a suit brought to enforce the same is absolute; the lien of the attorney does not stand in the way. (Peri v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 521; Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 173 id. 492.) The lien of the attorney will attach to the money or property accruing to the client from the settlement. (Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., supra.) It is clear, therefore, that the respondents cannot continue this action to judgment. Indeed, a decree divorcing husband and wife against their will at
The order should be reversed and the proceedings dismissed.
All concur, except Kiley, J., who reads memorandum for modification.
Concurrence Opinion
I agree with Mr. Justice Kellogg that the court at Special Term could not revive and perpetuate a cause of action that had been satisfied by the parties to the action resuming their domestic relations. I agree further that for services rendered and moneys expended after such reconciliation, plaintiff’s attorneys must look to the plaintiff if there is anything due for such services and moneys expended on her account. If Mr. Justice Kellogg’s holding is to the effect that these present proceedings, petition and order, be dismissed I agree with such holding. I do not agree, if such is intended, that all proceedings be dismissed. The order appealed from and upon which this court passed in 196 Appellate Division, 607, was entered in Broome county clerk’s office on the 12th day of January, 1921. It was granted at an Otsego Special Term and I assume it is the same order first appearing in the record on this appeal. The right of the attorneys for plaintiff to receive anything further as remuneration depends not upon the law as it has been applied under such circumstances. The order recites: “ The parties having consented in open court to the reference of this action, it is further ordered and adjudged * * * (5).
With this modification or explanation I concur in the result.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion denied, with ten dollars costs.