Plaintiff recovered judgment on a policy of fire insurance issued by defendant, insuring plaintiff against all loss by fire in the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars on a stock of merchandise while contained in a described building, in the city of Los Angeles, and five hundred dollars on furniture and fixtures while contained in said building. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for the aggregate of these sums, together with interеst and costs. From this judgment defendant appeals.
The court found that on July 21, 1913, the stock and fixtures covered by said policy were totally destroyed by fire; that the merchandise, the furniture, and оther equipment were worth much more than the respective amounts of insurance, and that defendant was fully liable. The court also found as follows: “That during said fire, but subsequent to the commеncement thereof, an explosion occurred in said building. That there was no explosion prior to said fire. That to the contrary said fire preceded and was the cause of said explosion.” The court also by the findings negatived defendant’s attempted showing of fraud in the presentation by plaintiff of his proofs of loss.
*598
Appellant denies that the testimony or any of it tends to establish the conclusion that the stock and store fixtures had been attacked by fire when the explosion took place.
Several witnesses testified that they saw “light” or “fire” or “flames” in the directiоn of plaintiff’s store some time, before the explosion. One witness, Eioloc, said he saw the fire “at” plaintiff’s store and that shortly after there was an explosion. Without reviewing the testimony in detail, we think it sufficient to say that the findings are supported. Many of the witnesses spoke through an interpreter, and their statements are not, perhaps, so clear and satisfying as would be those of witnesses familiar with the English language ; but there was sufficient testimony to justify the court in concluding that there was a fire within plaintiff’s store which by its size and extent must have been attacking the stock and fixtures at the time of its discovery and before any question relating to the injury worked by the explosion could arise.
Defendant bases its contention that the explosion and not the firе caused the damage upon testimony regarding fragments of the building found at some distance from the site of the store. But other witnesses said that they could find no part of the stock or fixtures thus dispersed. One of defendant’s own witnesses testified that there were of the grocery stock outside of the lines of the building the next morning only a few cans. The testimony on behalf of plaintiff, if beliеved, justified the court in concluding that there had been a substantial destruction of the stock and fixtures
*599
before the explosion dissipated any of the parts of the house.
Fountain
v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.,
It is contended that plaintiff had no insurаble interest in the automatic scale described! in the findings; that the policy is nonseverable, and that by reason thereof it never attached to the risk. There is no merit in the Insurance Company’s position in that behalf.
It is further contended that there was a gross irregularity demanding reversal of the judgment, due to the fact that plaintiff’s attorneys, after argument, tendеred to the judge and he read a report of an accountant regarding certain books and matters of account which had been introduced in evidence with the purposе of showing the amount and value of stock in plaintiff’s store at the time when the fire started. It is shown by affidavits that at the close of the taking of testimony in the case one of the counsel fоr plaintiff made an opening argument. During the reply of defendant’s counsel the judge" of the court stated that he would be pleased if the attorneys would furnish him with statements of the figures deemed of importance and brought out in the course of the trial. Plaintiff’s counsel made no closing argument, and there was, according to Ms affidavit, no formal or other order that the cause stand submitted. Subsequently, defendant’s counsel furnished the court with a document purporting to contain “memoranda of figures used on argument,” but which'also contained certain argumentativе matter and certain authorities. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel served on defendant’s counsel and delivered to the judge, as their reply to defendant’s written argument, a report оf one Rea, an accountant. This was adopted by counsel for plaintiff as their argument. It was a review of all the evidence in the record on the amount and value of plаintiff’s stock. Plaintiff’s counsel also sent,to the judge, without serving it upon opposing counsel, a summary of the testimony of Mr. Coniglio as to the value of the property destroyed. While this may have been an irregularity, it does not appear that the “summary” was in any respect improper. It consisted of a tabulated statement of figures indicating the value of property dеstroyed as Mr. Coniglio estimated its worth. It was accompanied by no comment. Nor can we see how defendant' was injured by the analysis of the testimony made by the accountant. It was *601 in the nature of an informal brief furnished by plaintiff’s representatives. It does not appear that appellant’s counsel regarded this document and its service as a serious invasion оf the rights of the Insurance Company, for he made no motion to reopen the case for the cross-examination of Mr. Rea. In other words, there is no showing that the informality in the manner of argument injured the defendant, or that it did or could prejudice that litigant with the learned judge of the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Wilbur, J., and Lennon, J., concurred.