OPINION & ORDER
In an Opinion & Order dated September 29, 2015 (the “Opinion”), the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions due to the spoliation of evidence by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 207.) Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Due to Spoliation of Evidence (“Motion”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. (Dkt. No. 213.) For the reasons explained herein, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
Assuming the Parties’ familiarity with the background of this case, as discussed in the Opinion, the Court will briefly summarize only those facts most relevant to resolving the instant Motion.
In this Action, Plaintiffs challenge as unlawful certain zoning and environmental ordinances enacted by Defendant Village of Pomona. (See Dkt. No. 27.) Following discovery, on April 27, 2015, the Court held a pre-motion conference on Plaintiffs’ putative motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence. (See Dkt. (minute entry for April, 27, 2015).) Pursuant to a Scheduling Order of the same date, (Dkt. No. 185), Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Sanctions and associated documents on June 3, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 195-97). Plaintiffs requested that the Court sanction Defendants for destroying a Facebook post (the “Face-book Post”) written by Defendant Rita Louie (“Louie”) and related text messages between Defendant Brett Yagel and Louie, and for failing to produce “the non-destroyed portion of those texts,” which Plaintiffs alleged contained relevant evidence. (See Pis.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pis.’ Mot. for Sanctions 2 (Dkt. No. 196).) Defendants filed their opposition papers on July 1, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 200-04), and Plaintiffs filed their reply on July 15, 2015, (Dkt. No. 205).
In the Opinion, the Court found that “this [was] the rare case where bad faith, and a clear intent to deprive Plaintiffs of the evidence at issue, is sufficiently clear from the face of the record.” (Opinion & Order (“Opinion”) 38 (Dkt. No. 207).) Ac
On October 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion and supporting papers, seeking an order for attorneys’ fees and costs due and payable to Savad Churgin, Stepanovich Law, PLC, and Storzer & Greene, P.L.L.C. (Dkt. Nos. 213-19.) Defendants filed their opposition on November 16, 2015. (Dkt. No. 227.)
II. Discussion
A. Applicable Law
A district court has “considerable discretion” in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee award. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany,
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Arbor Hill,
The party seeking attorney’s fees “bear[s] the burden of documenting the hours reasonably spent by counsel, and the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed.” Beastie Boys,
Plaintiffs seek $63,406.15 in attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with Defendants’ spoliation of evidence. (See Pis.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pis.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Pis.’ Mem.”) 1 (Dkt. No. 214).)
1. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate'
A reasonable hourly rate is based on “the [current] prevailing market rate for lawyers in the district in which the ruling court sits.” Anthony v. Franklin First Fin., Ltd.,
As co-counsel, all attorneys from the firms of Savad Churgin, Stepanovich Law, and Storzer & Greene have billed Plaintiffs at a blended rate of $375 per hour, regardless of seniority. (See Decl. of Paul Savad (“Savad Decl.”) ¶20 (Dkt; No. 215); Decl. of Roman Storzer (“Storzer Decl.”) ¶ 6 (Dkt. No. 217); Decl. of John G. Stepanovich ■ (“Stepanovich Decl.”) ¶ 12 (Dkt. No. 218); of. Savad Decl. Ex. A.)
As for credentials, Paul Savad (“Savad”) is a member of Savad Churgin and has been practicing law for 49 years in the areas of complex federal and state litigation, including matters of religious freedom, civil rights, and New York zoning and land use. (Savad Decl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 10.) A New-York based lawyer, (see id. ¶¶ 1, 6), he has represented Plaintiffs since 2004 when Plaintiff Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov purchased the property underlying the dispute in this case, (id. ¶ 11). Donna C. Sobel (“Sobel”) also is an attorney with Savad Churgin. (Decl. of Donna C. Sobel (“Sobel Decl.”) ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 216),) She has been practicing complex federal litigation for 14 years. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7.)
Roman P. Storzer (“Storzer”)-, an out-of-district attorney with Storzer & Greene, has significant experience with respect to religious rights litigation and specifically RLUIPA cases. (Storzer Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3-4.) After serving as Director of Litigation for the nonprofit organization The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, he subsequently has represented many religious organizations in such matters in private practice since 2004. (Id. ¶ 4.)
John G. Stepanovich (“Stepanovich”) is an out-of-district attorney with Stepano-vich Law who has been practicing complex
By way of comparison, the $375 hourly rate charged by Savad, Stepanovich, and Storzer falls below that found to be reasonable for attorneys of comparable experience in complex litigation in the Southern District of New York. See, e.g., Coakley v. Webb, No. 14-CV-8438,
Moreover, as set forth in the declaration of Russell M. Yankwitt, a local practitioner without interest in the present case, (see Decl. of Russell M. Yankwitt (‘Yankwitt Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 6-7), the requested rate is actually lower than the prevailing hourly rates charged for legal services rendered in' comparable cases by experienced federal court litigators, (id, ¶ 10).' In fact, the blended hourly rate of $375 is the same rate billed to Defendants by their litigation counsel, Robinson & Cole, in 2007 and 2008, (Savad Decl. ¶ 21; see also id. Ex. I), and well below the $700 per hour that Defendants’ RLUIPA counsel, Marci Hamilton, charges Defendants, (Savad Decl. ¶22; see also id. Ex. J).
Finding no reason to question the reasonableness of the requested rate in light of counsels’ extensive experience and the prevailing rates in the Southern District of New York, the Court will calculate the presumptively reasonable fee based off the hourly rate of $375. See Makinen v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-7535,
2. Reasonableness of Hours Requested
The fee applicant also bears the burden of demonstrating the number of hours expended and the type of work performed through contemporaneous time records that “specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
In support of the instant Motion, Plaintiffs have submitted records indicating that counsel expended approximately 173 hours in connection with their Motion for Sanctions. {See Savad Decl. Ex. A.) Defendants, in response, set forth a number of grounds on which they contend the requested fees should be reduced. (See Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 3-11 (Dkt. No. 227).)
a. Excessive Hours
First, Defendants argue that the “hours expended by Plaintiffs in connection with this narrow discovery issue are excessive.” (Id. at 4.) Although Plaintiffs contend that “[t]his is a complex case,” and “[t]he spoliation motion itself was a complex motion,” (Pis.’ Mem. 10), deletion of a Facebook post and a handful of related text messages was the sole factual issue relevant to the Motion for Sanctions, (see Dkt. No. 195). Nonetheless, the submitted time records indicate that Plaintiffs’ counsel spent over 80 hours drafting the motion and reply brief, over 20 hours on research and fact review relating to the spoliation issue, another 36 hours preparing for and attending a pre-motion conference, and approximately 16 hours conferring with one another. (See Savad Decl. Exs. B, C, D.)
Defendants further contend that the claimed hours include “considerable time spent reviewing irrelevant discovery.” (Defs. Opp’n 6.) According to Plaintiffs, it was “necessary for Plaintiffs’ counsel to cull through the discovery in order to present the Court with evidence of Defendants’ other failures to properly preserve evidence.” (Pis.’ Mem. 12.) However, in the Opinion, this Court deemed “consideration of the alleged ‘pattern’ of misconduct unnecessary in determining the appropriate sanction for the primary misconduct alleged in Plaintiffs’ Motion [for Sanctions].” (Opinion 42 n.28.)
While the costs of fruitless efforts should not be borne by Defendants, see Ruggiero v. Krzeminski,
b. Duplicative Entries
Further challenging Plaintiffs’ fee request, Defendants allege “a large amount of duplicative time and ■ effort.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 8.) Although Plaintiffs’ counsel made efforts to avoid duplicative work, (see, e.g., Savad Decl. ¶26 (averring that Savad did not bill for his participation in conferences regarding the Motion for Sanctions or for his final review of the
For example, the submitted records reveal that Savad, Sobel, Storzer, and Stepa-novich spent approximately 16 hours conferring with one another, (see Savad Decl. Exs. B, C, D), yet it is not clear that such staffing was objectively necessary, see Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. X & L Supermarket, Inc., No. 12-CV-1401,
Lastly, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ requested fees should be reduced due to “block billing” and overly vague billing descriptions. (See Defs.’ Opp’n 9-11.) While it is “unnecessary for [fee applicants] to identify with precision the amount of hours allocated to each individual task,” Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 06-CV-6198,
Here, the majority of the block-billed entries were for fewer than five hours. (See Savad Deck Ex. B.)
On the other hand, the vague nature of many of the entries throughout the records effectively prevents the Court, and Defendants, from independently assessing whether the time spent on each task was reasonable and necessary. The billing records submitted by Plaintiffs are replete with examples of work identified in mere generalities, such as “Team Meeting, etc.,” (Savad Decl. Ex. B-l, at 1), “Review spoliation facts,” (Savad Decl. Ex. B-2, at 8), and “Work on Spoliation Issue,” (Savad Deck Ex. D). Such vague descriptions are precisely the sort that courts have deemed impermissible in the context of fee awards. See, e.g., Abeyta v. City of N.Y., No. 12-CV-5623,
d. Aggregate Fee Reduction
Considéring all of the above factors, the Court will impose a 30% reduction of the total number of hours for which compensation is sought. As noted, the Court is not to compensate counsel for “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours, Hensley,
Such is the case here, where the factors most influential to the Court’s determination were the excessive hours and vague entries. After subtracting $2,062.50 from the requested $63,406.15 to eliminate unwarranted travel time by Stepanovich and Storzer, (see supra n.6), the 30% reduction leaves fees of $42,940.56 to be paid, by Defendants.
C. Costs
Plaintiffs also request $1,840.56 in costs, (see Pis.’ Mem. 1), which consist of travel-related expenses and a transcript of the pre-motion conference, (see id. at 15 (citing Savad Deck ¶ 30; id. Exs. A, B, C, D)). Fee awards include “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,
The vast majority of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’- costs were incurred in relation to travel for the pre-motion conference before this Court on April 27, 2015; indeed, of the $1,840.56 requested, $1,740.66 covered Storzer’s and Stepanovich’s trips to White Plains. (See Savad Deck Ex. C (listing $541.55 as Storzer’s travel-related expenses for the pre-motion conference); Sa-vad Deck Ex. D (listing $1,199.11 as Stepa-novich’s travel-related expenses for the pre-motion conference); cf. Savad Deck B-3 (listing $99.90 as the cost of the hearing transcript).) However, “the Second Circuit has instructed that defendants should1 not be penalized for a plaintiffs choice of out-of-district counsel, unless ‘the case required special expertise beyond the competence of forum district law firms.’ ” Dzugas-Smith v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-3760,
Accordingly, the Court denies reimbursement for these travel-related expenses. See Ryan v. Allied Interstate, Inc.,
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ counsel is hereby awarded attorneys’ fees of $42,940,56 and costs of $99.90, for a total of $43,040.45. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt, No. 213.)
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. For Savad Churgin, that rate has been in place since October 2007 and has not been raised over the past nine years. (See Savad Decl. ¶ 20.)
, Notably, Defendants do not object to the blended rate as a concept, and nor do they object to the particular rate charged by Plaintiffs’ counsel. (See generally Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pis,’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) (Dkt. No, 227).)
. Though Plaintiffs presume that "Robinson & Cole currently charges more because the retainer provided that after the end of 2008 ‘the blended rate will be adjusted consistent with rate changes,’ " (Pis,,’ Mem. 6-7 (quoting Savad Decl. Ex. I)), the Court does not consider such speculation in resolving the instant Motion, see Farbotko v. Clinton Cty.,
. These figures represent a rough approximate based on the Court’s review of the time records submitted by Plaintiffs. More exact calculations were impossible in light of cer
. Moreover, Plaintiffs have given no reason to believe that there were other instances of suppressed or destroyed evidence.
. Of these hours, 11 cover Storzer's and Step-anovich's travel time to and from the' pre-motion conference. (See Savad Decl. Exs. C, D.) As discussed in detail below, these travel expenses are not to be borne by Defendants. See Dzugas-Smith v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-3760,
. This is particularly true given Storzer’s self-proclaimed role as co-counsel ”focus[ed] on the federal and state constitutional and civil rights issues presented," (Storzer Decl. ¶ 5), and the pre-motion conference’s limited purpose of addressing Plaintiffs’ putative motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, (see Letter from Plaintiffs to Court (Mar. 26, 2015) (Dkt. No. 165)).
. The cited cases found a “modest” or “minor reduction” warranted as a result of duplica-tive efforts relating to oral argument. See Valley Hous. Ltd. P’ship,
. Among Plaintiffs' three law firms, only the billing records for Savad Churgin include block billing, (Compare Savad Deck Ex. B, with Savad Deck Ex. C, and Savad Deck Ex. D.)
. As discussed above, it was unnecessary and excessive for three attorneys, one from each of Plaintiffs' law firms, to attend the pre-motion conference regarding a discovery issue. This, alone, would merit a reduction in the compensable costs, See Clarke v. Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union, No. 14-CV-5291,
, Indeed, it was Sobel, an attorney with Sa-vad Churgin, who was "the person most familiar with the facts” and "performed a majority of the work on the spoliation motion." (Sobel Decl, ¶ 7.)