Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township

309 F.3d 120 | 3rd Cir. | 2002

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH and(cid:13) RENDELL, Circuit Judges.(cid:13) (Filed: October 16, 2002)(cid:13) MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQUIRE(cid:13) (ARGUED)(cid:13) 36 Timber Knoll Drive(cid:13) Washington’s Crossing, PA 18977(cid:13) HARRY G. MAHONEY, ESQUIRE(cid:13) CARLA P. MARESCA, ESQUIRE(cid:13) MICHAEL L. BARBIERO, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Deasey, Mahoney & Bender(cid:13) 1800 John F. Kennedy Blvd.(cid:13) Suite 1300(cid:13) Philadelphia, PA 19103(cid:13) Counsel for Appellants(cid:13) JEROME M. MARCUS, ESQUIRE(cid:13) JONATHAN AUERBACH, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Berger & Montague(cid:13) 1622 Locust Street(cid:13) Philadelphia, PA 19103(cid:13) ANTHONY R. PICARELLO, JR.,(cid:13) ESQUIRE (ARGUED)(cid:13) ROMAN P. STORZER, ESQUIRE(cid:13) The Becket Fund for Religious(cid:13) Liberty(cid:13) 1350 Connecticut Avenue, NW,(cid:13) Suite 605(cid:13) Washington, DC 20036(cid:13) Counsel for Appellees(cid:13) 2(cid:13) D. MICHAEL FISHER, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Attorney General(cid:13) HOWARD G. HOPKIRK, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Deputy Attorney General(cid:13) CALVIN R. KOONS, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Senior Deputy Attorney General(cid:13) JOHN G. KNORR, III, Esquire(cid:13) Chief Deputy Attorney General(cid:13) Chief, Appellate Litigation Section(cid:13) Office of Attorney General of(cid:13) Pennsylvania(cid:13) Strawberry Square, 15th Floor(cid:13) Harrisburg, PA 17120(cid:13) Counsel for Amicus-Curiae Appellant(cid:13) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania(cid:13) STEFAN PRESSER, ESQUIRE(cid:13) LARRY FRANKEL, ESQUIRE(cid:13) American Civil Liberties Union(cid:13) 125 South Ninth St., Suite 701(cid:13) Philadelphia, PA 19107(cid:13) Counsel for Amicus Curiae-Appellees(cid:13) The American Civil Liberties Union of(cid:13) Pennsylvania and The American(cid:13) Jewish Committee(cid:13) RONALD A. KRAUSS, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Campbell, Campbell, Edwards(cid:13) & Conroy(cid:13) 1265 Drummers Lane, Suite 200(cid:13) Wayne, PA 19087(cid:13) MARK D. STERN, ESQUIRE(cid:13) American Jewish Congress(cid:13) 15 East 84th Street(cid:13) New York, NY 10028(cid:13) Counsel for Amicus Curiae-Appellee(cid:13) The American Jewish Congress(cid:13) 3(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) BECKER, Chief Judge.(cid:13) Congregation Kol Ami (the "Congregation") is a Reform(cid:13) Jewish Synagogue that desires to relocate to a 10.9-acre(cid:13) parcel of land in the midst of a purely residential section of(cid:13) Abington Township ("Abington" or "the Township") in the(cid:13) Philadelphia suburbs, zoned R-1 residential under the(cid:13) Township Zoning Ordinance. After the Congregation entered(cid:13) into an agreement of sale with the Sisters of Nazareth, the(cid:13) current owners of the property, it sought zoning approval(cid:13) from the Township Zoning Hearing Board ("ZHB") seeking(cid:13) either a variance or a special exception, and alternatively,(cid:13) permission to use the property as an existing non-(cid:13) conforming use. When the Congregation’s application was(cid:13) denied by the ZHB, the Congregation, along with its Rabbi,(cid:13) Elliot Holin, filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern(cid:13) District of Pennsylvania against the ZHB, Abington(cid:13) Township, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of(cid:13) Code Enforcement in both his individual and official(cid:13) capacities, seeking injunctive, declaratory and(cid:13) compensatory relief for alleged civil rights violations(cid:13) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The complaint also alleged a(cid:13) violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized(cid:13) Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. S 2000 et seq.; the(cid:13) Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. S 11001A-11005A;(cid:13) Article I, sections 3, 7, 20 and 26 of the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Constitution; and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of(cid:13) the United States Constitution. [1a-20a].(cid:13) Central to the case are certain provisions of the Abington(cid:13) Township Zoning Ordinance whose purpose, under a 1996(cid:13) Amendment, is "to provide low density, single family,(cid:13) neighborhoods." Under the Ordinance, the R-1 Residential(cid:13) District only permits a handful of uses by right: agriculture,(cid:13) livestock, single family detached dwellings, and(cid:13) conservation and recreation preserve. Similarly, the(cid:13) Ordinance only permits a handful of uses by "special(cid:13) exception," including a kennel, riding academy, municipal(cid:13) complex, outdoor recreation, emergency services, and utility(cid:13) 4(cid:13) facilities. The Ordinance does not permit churches or other(cid:13) religious institutions in R-1, except those that are legal,(cid:13) nonconforming uses, even by special exception. Nor does it(cid:13) allow a myriad of other uses such as schools, hospitals,(cid:13) theaters, and daycare centers in R-1 Residential Districts.(cid:13) These uses are, however, permitted in other districts in the(cid:13) Township.(cid:13) The Congregation moved for partial summary judgment(cid:13) on its claim that the Ordinance is unreasonable on its face(cid:13) because it prohibits houses of worship from locating in(cid:13) residential neighborhoods. The District Court granted the(cid:13) Congregation’s motion, finding instead that the Ordinance,(cid:13) as applied, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the(cid:13) United States Constitution. The Court reasoned that a(cid:13) "house of worship inherently further[s] the public welfare,"(cid:13) and that the Township had no rational reason to allow(cid:13) some uses by special exception, such as a country club(cid:13) subsumed under "outdoor recreation," but not the(cid:13) Congregation. The Court granted injunctive relief, ordering(cid:13) the ZHB to conduct hearings on the Congregation’s(cid:13) application for a special exception. The Court denied the(cid:13) Township’s motion for reconsideration.(cid:13) The Township appealed, and asked for a stay of the(cid:13) injunction, both in the District Court and in this Court, but(cid:13) those applications were also denied. The ZHB held the(cid:13) special exception hearing and concluded that the proposed(cid:13) use would not "adversely affect the health, safety and(cid:13) welfare of the community," and that the use was(cid:13) "consistent with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the(cid:13) Ordinance." [3907a]. These are the requirements for a(cid:13) special exception, which must be awarded if they are met.(cid:13) The ZHB thus granted the Congregation a special exception(cid:13) with some limitations aimed at traffic, light pollution, and(cid:13) noise. [3907a-3909a]. Since then, the Township has also(cid:13) approved the Congregation’s land development plan. The(cid:13) Congregation, however, has not begun building on the(cid:13) property; it awaits the outcome of the appeal brought in(cid:13) this Court, and one brought in the Montgomery County(cid:13) Court of Common Pleas by neighbors who oppose the(cid:13) synagogue use. For reasons explained at length infra, given(cid:13) the tenor of the District Court’s holding, which functionally(cid:13) 5(cid:13) altered the Township’s zoning ordinance and poses a(cid:13) continuing burden on its enforcement, we conclude that the(cid:13) grant of the special exception did not moot the case, hence(cid:13) we reject the Congregation’s mootness argument.(cid:13) The District Court’s holding of unconstitutionality rested(cid:13) on its reading of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,(cid:13) 473 U.S. 432 (1985), where the Supreme Court concluded(cid:13) that similarly situated group homes were impermissibly(cid:13) treated differently because one home’s occupants were(cid:13) mentally handicapped. The District Court in effect read City(cid:13) of Cleburne as standing for the proposition that a(cid:13) municipality’s decision to distinguish between land uses is(cid:13) not rational if both uses, permitted and not-permitted, have(cid:13) the same impact on the municipality’s asserted goals. In so(cid:13) concluding, the District Court overlooked the threshold step(cid:13) that must be taken under the City of Cleburne analysis--(cid:13) the court must first conclude that the two land uses are(cid:13) "similarly situated."(cid:13) The Township submits that the Congregation’s use is(cid:13) different from the other uses permitted by special(cid:13) exception. It also contends that it had good reason to group(cid:13) churches and other religious institutions in the CS-(cid:13) Community Service District with other institutional uses,(cid:13) such as hospitals and schools, and that it was not(cid:13) irrational to allow outdoor recreation and certain other uses(cid:13) in the R-1 Residential District (by special exception). The(cid:13) Township invokes the well-established principle that, in the(cid:13) federal Constitutional universe, federal courts accord(cid:13) substantial deference to local government in setting land(cid:13) use policy, and that only where a local government’s(cid:13) distinction between similarly situated uses is not rationally(cid:13) related to a legitimate state goal, or where the goal itself is(cid:13) not legitimate, will a federal court upset a local(cid:13) government’s land use policy determination. It argues that(cid:13) the distinction between religious uses and other uses is not(cid:13) only rational, but that under the District Court’s analysis,(cid:13) any use, or at least any religious use with a similar impact,(cid:13) can automatically locate in the R-1 Residential District with(cid:13) special exception thereby giving a preference to religion, in(cid:13) contradiction of the principles of local land use law.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) The Township’s arguments are forceful, but we will not(cid:13) resolve them here, because the District Court did not(cid:13) address the similarity of uses question, and the Abington(cid:13) Ordinance is not so clearly drafted that we may definitively(cid:13) determine what uses are permitted by special exception on(cid:13) our own. Put differently, because the District Court failed to(cid:13) evaluate whether the Congregation was similarly situated,(cid:13) i.e., similar in "kind," to the uses that are currently(cid:13) permitted in the R-1 Residential District, we must vacate its(cid:13) order and remand so that the proper inquiry may be(cid:13) conducted. Since the special exception hearing was held(cid:13) pursuant to an improper order by the District Court, the(cid:13) resulting grant of special exception by the ZHB and the(cid:13) land use permit issued by the Township are null and void.(cid:13) I. Facts and Procedural History(cid:13) The Congregation is a Reform Jewish Synagogue,(cid:13) founded in 1994, which conducts religious services, Hebrew(cid:13) classes, and other related activities at various locations in(cid:13) eastern Montgomery County. The Township is a political(cid:13) subdivision located in eastern Montgomery County. It(cid:13) operates pursuant to the First Class Township Code of(cid:13) Pennsylvania, 53 P.S. S 55101 et seq., and with respect to(cid:13) zoning, subdivision and land use matters, in accordance(cid:13) with Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S.(cid:13) S 101 01 et seq. The ZHB has jurisdiction to hear and(cid:13) render final adjudication on, inter alia, applications by(cid:13) landowners for variances from and special exceptions under(cid:13) the Township’s Zoning Ordinance. The ZHB and the(cid:13) Township are separate entities. As we understand the(cid:13) practice, the Township does not customarily appear before(cid:13) the ZHB to state a position on an application, although it(cid:13) is not foreclosed from doing so.(cid:13) A. The History of the Relevant Zoning Ordinance(cid:13) In 1977, The Township developed a Comprehensive Plan(cid:13) for development within the Township. [337a]. As part of this(cid:13) Comprehensive Plan, The Township enacted Ordinance No.(cid:13) 1469, which established a "V-Residence" District. Article III,(cid:13) S 301. [477a, 512a]. In the V-Residence District, pursuant(cid:13) 7(cid:13) to S 301.2, certain uses were permitted as of right: single-(cid:13) family detached dwellings, tilling of the soil, township(cid:13) administrative buildings, public libraries, public parks, play(cid:13) or recreational areas, or any similar uses operated by the(cid:13) Township or other governmental agencies. [512a]. Other(cid:13) uses, such as churches, rectories, parish houses, convents,(cid:13) monasteries and other similar institutions, were permitted(cid:13) as "special exceptions"; the ZHB may grant a"special(cid:13) exception" to certain predetermined uses and in so doing it(cid:13) may attach conditions to the grant of the exception in order(cid:13) to preserve the purpose of the zoning ordinance.(cid:13) On March 8, 1990, The Township enacted Ordinance No.(cid:13) 1676, which amended S 301.2 of Ordinance No. 1469 (the(cid:13) "V-Residence District"). [806a]. The amendment, as it(cid:13) pertains to the issues in this case, eliminated all uses by(cid:13) right except single-family detached dwellings, and accessory(cid:13) uses on the same lot that are customarily incidental to(cid:13) single-family dwellings. [806a]. All of the uses previously(cid:13) permitted by special exception, including "religious" uses,(cid:13) were eliminated. The purpose of this amendment, as stated(cid:13) in the "Legislative Intent" of the Ordinance, was to create a(cid:13) "low density" area for single-family detached dwelling units.(cid:13) [806a].(cid:13) On May 9, 1996, The Township re-classified its zoning(cid:13) ordinances pursuant to Ordinance No. 1753 (the(cid:13) "Ordinance"). [977a]. This Ordinance changed the(cid:13) designation of The Township’s "low density residential(cid:13) district" from V-Residence to R-1 Residential.[999a].(cid:13) Section 301 of the Ordinance permitted the following uses(cid:13) in R-1 by right: agriculture, livestock, single family(cid:13) detached dwellings, conservation and recreation preserve.(cid:13) [1000a]. Uses permitted by special exception include:(cid:13) kennel (defined at 1074a), riding academy, municipal(cid:13) complex (defined [at 1094a] to include municipal(cid:13) administration buildings, libraries, police barracks, or road(cid:13) maintenance facilities), outdoor recreation (defined in(cid:13) Article IV, section 706(G)(6) of the 1996 Ordinance to(cid:13) include "public or private miniature golf courses, swimming(cid:13) pools, ball courts, tennis courts, ball fields, trails, and(cid:13) similar uses, . . . [o]utdoor recreation shall[also] include(cid:13) any accessory use, such as snack bar, pro shops, club(cid:13) 8(cid:13) houses, country clubs"), emergency services, and utility(cid:13) facilities (defined [at 1108a] to include, inter alia, train(cid:13) stations and bus shelters). The stated purpose of the R-1(cid:13) Residential District was "to provide low density, single(cid:13) family, neighborhoods." [1000a].(cid:13) Churches and other religious institutions, except those(cid:13) that are legal, nonconforming uses, are not permitted in(cid:13) R-1 Residential Districts.1 Although religious institutions(cid:13) are not explicitly excluded by the language of the(cid:13) Ordinance, they are de jure excluded from that particular(cid:13) zone because they are not specifically listed among the uses(cid:13) that may apply for special exceptions. Apparently, the only(cid:13) option for a religious institution wishing to locate in an R-1(cid:13) Residential District is to apply for a variance with the ZHB.(cid:13) According to the Ordinance, a variance is a "grant of(cid:13) relaxation by the [ZHB] from the dimensional and use(cid:13) regulations of th[e] Ordinance, when such action will not be(cid:13) considered contrary to the public interest, and where,(cid:13) owing to conditions unique to the property, and not(cid:13) resulting from the actions or situation of the applicant, a(cid:13) literal enforcement of this code would result in undue and(cid:13) unnecessary hardship." [997a].(cid:13) The variance standard is very different from the special(cid:13) exception standard because it requires the applicant to(cid:13) demonstrate "unnecessary hardship," which requires(cid:13) evidence that: "(1) the physical features of the property are(cid:13) such that it cannot be used for a permitted purpose; or (2)(cid:13) that the property can be conformed for a permitted use only(cid:13) at a prohibitive expense; or (3) that the property has no(cid:13) value for any purpose permitted by the zoning ordinance."(cid:13) Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 554 Pa. 249, 721(cid:13) A.2d 43, 47 (1998). In contrast, for an application to merit(cid:13) a special exception, it need only establish that the zoning(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. A non-conforming use is defined as: "A building, lot, structure, sign or(cid:13) use, which lawfully existed prior to the adoption, revision or amendment(cid:13) of this Ordinance, but does not comply with zoning use or district(cid:13) regulations by reasons of adoption, revision, or amendment of this(cid:13) Ordinance." [993a; see also 1191a]. Of the 36 churches and synagogues(cid:13) currently operating in the Township, 29 of them are legal, non-(cid:13) conforming uses outside of the CS, M, and A-O Districts. 25 of those(cid:13) places of worship are located in residential districts.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) ordinance allows the use and that the particular use(cid:13) applied for is consistent with the public interest. Ryan,(cid:13) Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, Vol. 2 SS 5.1.2,(cid:13) 6.1.5; Heck v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 39 Pa. Commw. 570, 397(cid:13) A.2d 15 (1979). If that showing is made, the special(cid:13) exception must be granted, though appropriate conditions(cid:13) may be attached.(cid:13) Religious institutions are permitted in the Township(cid:13) under the Ordinance in the CS-Community Service District.(cid:13) [1024a]. In fact, the CS-District was specifically designed to(cid:13) provide for, inter alia, the religious needs of the Township(cid:13) community. [1024a]. The Township has provided for other(cid:13) institutional uses that are excluded from the R-1(cid:13) Residential District in the CS-District, including hospitals,(cid:13) schools, and community service centers. Religious(cid:13) institutions are also permitted in the M-Mixed Use District(cid:13) [1028a], and, by special exception, in the A-O(cid:13) Apartment/Office District. [1019a].(cid:13) B. The History of the Property At Issue(cid:13) The real property in question is located at 1908 Robert(cid:13) Road and is zoned R-1 Residential. [298a]. It consists of a(cid:13) 10.9-acre parcel of land, on which there are several(cid:13) buildings. Prior to 1951, the property was a 38-acre piece(cid:13) of land used as a residence by a family. At that time, there(cid:13) were three buildings on the 10.9 acres which are the(cid:13) subject of this lawsuit: a three-story masonry residence, a(cid:13) detached garage, and a two-story auxiliary residence, all(cid:13) constructed in the mid-twenties. [292a].(cid:13) In 1951, the property was purchased by the Sisters of(cid:13) Nazareth, an Order of Roman Catholic Nuns. The Sisters(cid:13) constructed additions as well as other buildings, including(cid:13) a chapel and a 13,300 square foot main building.[292a].(cid:13) The property was used as a convent, [292a], and at its(cid:13) peak, it was home to over 80 Sisters. [292a]. The nuns used(cid:13) the convent to receive daily instruction on religious life,(cid:13) engaging in prayer for up to two and a half hours per day.(cid:13) [305a]. The Sisters had only limited contact with the(cid:13) outside world; visitors to the property were limited to(cid:13) visiting on special occasions, and visits would not occur(cid:13) 10(cid:13) more than twice per year. [305a]. Ceremonies and religious(cid:13) services were rarely attended by persons other than the(cid:13) Sisters and their relatives. [305a]. On a daily basis, the(cid:13) average number of vehicles parked at the property was five,(cid:13) and the primary use of the property was as a residence.(cid:13) [305a].(cid:13) Until 1988, the 38-acre parcel had direct access to Valley(cid:13) Road, a major road in The Township, by means of a long(cid:13) driveway. In 1988, however, the Sisters subdivided the(cid:13) parcel and sold off nearly 28 acres as residential property,(cid:13) leaving the 10.9-acre plot before us, but relinquishing(cid:13) direct access to Valley Road. Then, in 1995, due to a(cid:13) decline in the number of nuns on the property, the Sisters(cid:13) leased the property to a community of Greek Orthodox(cid:13) Monks for religious services, family retreats, religious(cid:13) study, and prayer. [293a, 307a]. Since the 1990(cid:13) amendments had removed religious uses from the list of(cid:13) uses permitted by special exception, the Monks filed an(cid:13) application with the ZHB seeking a variance from the(cid:13) Ordinance to use the property as a monastery. The ZHB(cid:13) granted this request, with certain conditions. [291a]. One of(cid:13) the conditions was that the property deed be restricted to(cid:13) prevent further subdivision, and that a driveway be(cid:13) constructed off of Robert Road (a 30-foot wide cul-de-sac(cid:13) road). A stone driveway off of Robert Road is currently the(cid:13) only access to the property. The surrounding area is(cid:13) completely residential, consisting of well-kept single-family(cid:13) homes on large plots abutting shady streets. The immediate(cid:13) block from which the driveway extends ends in a cul-de-(cid:13) sac.(cid:13) C. History of the Current Litigation(cid:13) In August 1999, the Congregation entered into an(cid:13) agreement with the Sisters to purchase the property, and to(cid:13) use it as a place for worship. [304a]. The Congregation filed(cid:13) an application with the ZHB, seeking to use the property as(cid:13) an existing non conforming use, or for a variance, or special(cid:13) exception. [2795a]. The Congregation proposed the(cid:13) following regularly scheduled uses: (1) Shabbat services on(cid:13) alternate Fridays and Saturdays for up to an hour and a(cid:13) half; (2) Hebrew classes on Wednesdays from 4pm to 8pm;(cid:13) 11(cid:13) and (3) religious classes for 2 hours on Sunday mornings.(cid:13) [1360a-1368a]. Other uses would include four High Holy(cid:13) Day services in the fall, religious meetings, Bar and Bat(cid:13) Mitzvah services, outdoor wedding ceremonies, and other(cid:13) similar celebrations and receptions to follow. [1369a-1379a,(cid:13) 1435a]. As part of its proposal, the Congregation sought(cid:13) permission to change the driveways, roadways, and parking(cid:13) lots on the property. [2798a].(cid:13) The ZHB rejected the Congregation’s application,(cid:13) concluding that the principal use of the property by the(cid:13) Sisters was residential, and that the chapel was an(cid:13) accessory use to the property. The ZHB further noted that(cid:13) the principal use by the Monks was also residential. The(cid:13) ZHB concluded that the use of the property by the Sisters(cid:13) was as a residential use in the V-Residential District, which(cid:13) was lawfully permitted there. The ZHB ruled that if the use(cid:13) by the Sisters was non-conforming, the Sisters had(cid:13) abandoned the non-conforming use by filing a preliminary(cid:13) subdivision plan (and by its subsequent approval) but that,(cid:13) at all events, the grant of a variance to the Monks(cid:13) extinguished any non-conforming use. Since the(cid:13) Congregation’s proposed use of the property was for(cid:13) religious not residential purposes, there was no continuing(cid:13) non-conforming use from the Sisters or the Monks. Since(cid:13) religious institutions are not permitted in the R-1(cid:13) Residential District, the ZHB denied the request for(cid:13) continuation as a non-conforming use.(cid:13) The ZHB also concluded that the Congregation had failed(cid:13) to show that it was entitled to a variance because there(cid:13) were no unique physical features of the property that would(cid:13) preclude it from being used as zoned, and that the(cid:13) Congregation had failed to demonstrate unnecessary(cid:13) hardship. In so concluding, the ZHB observed that the(cid:13) Ordinance does not impose a substantial burden on the(cid:13) religious exercise of any person because religious(cid:13) institutions are permitted in three other zoning districts(cid:13) within the Township. [297a-320a].(cid:13) The Congregation had the right to file an appeal to the(cid:13) Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County to challenge(cid:13) the ZHB’s decision. Instead, the Congregation filed the(cid:13) present lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District(cid:13) 12(cid:13) of Pennsylvania, seeking injunctive, declaratory and(cid:13) compensatory relief for: alleged civil rights violations(cid:13) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983; violation of the Religious(cid:13) Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42(cid:13) U.S.C. S 2000 et seq.; the Municipalities Planning Code, 53(cid:13) P.S. S 11001A-11005A; Article I, sections 3, 7, 20 and 26 of(cid:13) the Pennsylvania Constitution; and the First and(cid:13) Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.(cid:13) [1a-29a].(cid:13) The Congregation moved for partial summary judgment(cid:13) on its claim that the Ordinance is unreasonable on its face(cid:13) because it prohibits houses of worship from locating in(cid:13) residential neighborhoods. Essentially, this was a challenge(cid:13) to the facial validity of the Ordinance based on both state(cid:13) and federal constitutional law; the Congregation did not(cid:13) argue or present evidence that the Ordinance was(cid:13) unconstitutional as applied. The District Court granted the(cid:13) Congregation’s motion for partial summary judgment. In so(cid:13) doing, the Court declined to rule on the facial validity of the(cid:13) Ordinance. Instead, based on the argument presented in(cid:13) the Township’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the(cid:13) Court concluded that the Ordinance, as applied, violated(cid:13) the Equal Protection Clause of the United States(cid:13) Constitution. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township,(cid:13) 161 F. Supp.2d 432, 435-37 (E.D.Pa. 2001).(cid:13) The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in City(cid:13) of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985),(cid:13) which applied rational basis review to a zoning ordinance(cid:13) that required special-use permits to operate group homes(cid:13) for the mentally handicapped but not similar homes for(cid:13) other occupants, such as senior citizens and fraternities.(cid:13) The critical portions of the District Court’s ruling were(cid:13) terse. First, it explained the relevance of Cleburne:(cid:13) In that case, just as in the instant case, the defendant(cid:13) city argued that the ordinance was aimed at avoiding(cid:13) concentration of population and at lessening(cid:13) congestion of the streets. However, the Court(cid:13) concluded that "these concerns obviously fail to explain(cid:13) why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses,(cid:13) hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area(cid:13) without a permit."(cid:13) 13(cid:13) Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 436 (quoting(cid:13) Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450). In so doing, (here and later), the(cid:13) Court looked to only part of the analysis in Cleburne for the(cid:13) proposition that a zoning ordinance is not rational when(cid:13) the impact of permitted and non-permitted uses is similar.(cid:13) The Court then went on to state:(cid:13) Not only does a house of worship inherently further the(cid:13) public welfare, but defendants’ traffic, noise and light(cid:13) concerns also exist for the uses currently allowed to(cid:13) request a special exception. Indeed, there can be no(cid:13) rational reason to allow a train station, bus shelter,(cid:13) municipal administration building, police barrack,(cid:13) library, snack bar, pro shop, club house, country club(cid:13) or other similar use to request a special exception(cid:13) under the 1996 Ordinance, but not Kol Ami. Because(cid:13) the ZHB failed to consider whether traffic, noise, light(cid:13) or other disruptions warrant the denial of a special(cid:13) exception, and failed to apply the 1996 Ordinance in a(cid:13) way that accounts for that Ordinance’s differing(cid:13) treatment of Kol Ami from the other permitted uses by(cid:13) special exception, the Court finds that defendants(cid:13) denied plaintiffs rights secured by the Constitution.(cid:13) Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 437. These(cid:13) statements were made without elaboration or citation.(cid:13) However, in their wake the Court granted injunctive relief to(cid:13) the Congregation, ordering the ZHB to conduct hearings on(cid:13) the Congregation’s application for a special exception. The(cid:13) Township moved for reconsideration, which was denied.(cid:13) The Township appealed and asked for a stay of the(cid:13) injunction, both in the District Court and in this Court, but(cid:13) these applications were denied. The ZHB held the special(cid:13) exception hearing between August 6 and August 9, 2001.(cid:13) On August 15, 2001, it concluded that the use would not(cid:13) "adversely affect the health, safety and welfare of the(cid:13) community," and that it was "consistent with the spirit,(cid:13) purpose, and intent of the Ordinance." [3907a]. Thus, the(cid:13) ZHB allowed the use by the Congregation, albeit with some(cid:13) limitations aimed at traffic, light pollution, and noise.(cid:13) [3907a-3909a]. Since then, The Township has also(cid:13) approved the Congregation’s land development plan.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) However, the Congregation has not begun construction as(cid:13) it awaits the result of the appeals in this Court, and by(cid:13) neighbors in the Court of Common Pleas. See(cid:13) http://www.rluipa.com/cases/KolAmi.html.(cid:13) We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1).(cid:13) We review the grant of summary judgment de novo . See(cid:13) Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1996). We apply the same standard as the District(cid:13) Court in determining whether summary judgment was(cid:13) appropriate. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1321 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1995). Summary judgment should be granted when(cid:13) there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.(cid:13) 56(c). An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could(cid:13) possibly hold in the nonmovant’s favor on that issue. Boyle(cid:13) v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 387, 393 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1998).(cid:13) II. Mootness(cid:13) As a preliminary matter, we must address the(cid:13) Congregation’s argument that in view of the fact that the(cid:13) ZHB has granted a special exception, there is no(cid:13) meaningful relief that this court can give, and that the case(cid:13) is therefore moot. "A case is moot when issues presented(cid:13) are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable(cid:13) interest in the outcome." Erie v. Pap’s A.M. , 529 U.S. 277,(cid:13) 287 (2000) (internal citations omitted); see also Harris v.(cid:13) City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1326 (3d Cir. 1995) ("As(cid:13) a general principle, once a party has complied with a court(cid:13) order or injunction, and has not been penalized or suffered(cid:13) any prejudice that could be remedied on appeal, the appeal(cid:13) is moot," but also stating that a case is not moot where(cid:13) there exists a " ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of(cid:13) the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination(cid:13) on the merits.") (internal citation omitted).(cid:13) The Congregation argues that the Township’s appeal of(cid:13) the District Court’s July 20, 2001 Order granting injunctive(cid:13) relief became moot on August 15, 2001, the day on which(cid:13) the Township fully complied with that Order by holding a(cid:13) hearing and issuing a written decision on the(cid:13) Congregation’s special exception application. In its(cid:13) 15(cid:13) submission, once the special exception hearing was held,(cid:13) the injunctive relief ordered by the District Court was fully(cid:13) executed and could not be undone. To properly address(cid:13) this contention we must assess the character of the District(cid:13) Court’s ruling and its effect on the parties.(cid:13) Under the Ordinance, places of worship are not among(cid:13) the uses that are permitted to apply for a special exception.(cid:13) Such an omission is a de jure exclusion of that use from(cid:13) the R-1 Residential District. In its opinion, the District(cid:13) Court took note of the ZHB’s failure to specifically address(cid:13) plaintiffs’ request for a special exception, the ZHB’s(cid:13) conclusion that the Abington Ordinance does not permit(cid:13) places of worship to locate in an R-1 district, and its(cid:13) conclusion that the Ordinance does not specifically allow a(cid:13) special exception for places of worship. The Court then(cid:13) reasoned that a "house of worship inherently further[s] the(cid:13) public welfare," and that the Township had no rational(cid:13) reason to allow some uses by special exception, such as a(cid:13) country club [subsumed under "outdoor recreation]," but(cid:13) not the Congregation. Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F.(cid:13) Supp.2d at 437.(cid:13) The District Court’s conclusion appears to be a blanket(cid:13) determination that, as a category, places of worship cannot(cid:13) be excluded from residential districts. In combination with(cid:13) the Court’s Order requiring the ZHB to hold a special(cid:13) exception hearing, the Court functionally altered The(cid:13) Township’s Ordinance in two ways. First, it gave the ZHB(cid:13) authority it did not otherwise possess--the authority to(cid:13) entertain a request for a special exception by a place of(cid:13) worship in an R-1 Residential District. Prior to the District(cid:13) Court’s Order, the only means for a place of worship to(cid:13) obtain permission to locate in the R-1 Residential District(cid:13) was by way of a variance. By permitting places of worship(cid:13) to apply for a special exception, the District Court altered(cid:13) the standard of proof that the Congregation must meet in(cid:13) order to obtain approval from the ZHB by removing the(cid:13) much more onerous requirement that the Congregation(cid:13) prove "unnecessary hardship."(cid:13) As previously mentioned, in order to prove "unnecessary(cid:13) hardship" an applicant must demonstrate that the land(cid:13) cannot be used for a permitted purpose, that converting the(cid:13) 16(cid:13) land so that it may be used for a permitted purpose is(cid:13) prohibitively expensive, or that the property has no value(cid:13) for any of the permitted purposes. In contrast, in order for(cid:13) an application to get a special exception, it need only(cid:13) establish that the zoning ordinance allows the use and that(cid:13) the particular use applied for is consistent with the public(cid:13) interest. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, Vol.(cid:13) 2 SS 5.1.2, 6.1.5; Heck v. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra.(cid:13) Moreover, if a party meets the requirements of a special(cid:13) exception, the ZHB does not have discretion to deny the(cid:13) special exception -- it must be granted. Thus, the District(cid:13) Court’s determination allows religious institutions to get(cid:13) permission to locate in the R-1 Residential District under a(cid:13) burden of proof significantly lower than that required under(cid:13) the Ordinance.(cid:13) Second, the Court’s categorical determination that(cid:13) houses of worship further the public interest opened the(cid:13) door for other places of worship to request the same(cid:13) treatment -- a special exception hearing in residential(cid:13) zones where they are currently excluded. Supreme Court(cid:13) precedent is clear that the First Amendment prohibits(cid:13) municipalities from applying their laws differently among(cid:13) various religious groups. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456(cid:13) U.S. 228 (1982) (finding state statute that regulated(cid:13) charitable solicitations preferred one denomination over(cid:13) another and therefore violated the Establishment Clause);(cid:13) Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1957) (holding(cid:13) application of ordinance that prohibited preaching in public(cid:13) parks only against Jehovah’s Witnesses but not other(cid:13) ministers violated First and Fourteenth Amendments).(cid:13) Further, discrimination against a future similarly situated(cid:13) religious landowner would be a clear violation of the Equal(cid:13) Protection Clause. See, e.g., Cleburne, supra; Cornerstone(cid:13) Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991). As(cid:13) a result, the District Court’s determination altered(cid:13) Abington’s zoning plan by giving the ZHB authority to grant(cid:13) a special exception to places of worship in an R-1(cid:13) Residential District not only in this case, but also in future(cid:13) situations where a place of worship seeks to locate in such(cid:13) a district.(cid:13) These effects, which operate by virtue of the precedential(cid:13) 17(cid:13) effect of the District Court’s opinion (unless reversed on(cid:13) appeal), impose a burden on the Township. As long as a(cid:13) government is saddled with an "ongoing injury" caused by(cid:13) a judgment that its law is unconstitutional, the case is not(cid:13) moot. Erie, 529 U.S. at 288. In Erie, the owner of a nude(cid:13) dancing establishment prevailed in the Pennsylvania(cid:13) Supreme Court, which found the aspect of a city ordinance(cid:13) banning nude dancing unconstitutional under the First(cid:13) Amendment. Before the U.S. Supreme Court heard the(cid:13) city’s appeal, however, the owner ceased to offer nude(cid:13) dancing at his establishment and therefore argued that the(cid:13) case was moot. Id. at 286-87. The Court disagreed and(cid:13) concluded that the city suffered an "ongoing injury because(cid:13) it is barred from enforcing the public nudity provisions of(cid:13) its ordinance." Id. at 288. Such is the case here, where(cid:13) Abington is barred from enforcing its zoning ordinance as(cid:13) written. Thus, we conclude that Abington has "suffered . . .(cid:13) prejudice" as a result of complying with the District Court’s(cid:13) Order, and that there is an ongoing injury that can be(cid:13) remedied on appeal. Harris, 47 F.3d at 1326; see also 13A(cid:13) Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure(cid:13) S 3533.10 (1984).2(cid:13) The Congregation makes much of the fact that the(cid:13) District Court did not order the ZHB to grant the special(cid:13) exception, but only required it to hold a hearing. That is,(cid:13) because the ZHB’s determination to grant the special(cid:13) exception is said to have been "voluntary," the Congregation(cid:13) submits that we do not have any power to undo what has(cid:13) been "voluntarily" done. We disagree. This argument(cid:13) overlooks the fact that the ZHB was completely without(cid:13) authority to consider the request for a special exception(cid:13) absent the District Court’s Order, which compelled it to do(cid:13) so. We conclude that the District Court’s Order requiring(cid:13) the hearing, but not a particular outcome, is not a(cid:13) jurisdictional obstacle, and that this appeal is not moot.(cid:13) Hence, we turn to the merits.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. Additionally, the neighbors residing near the proposed site are also(cid:13) aggrieved by the District Court’s decision, which places an intense use(cid:13) of property squarely within what has heretofore been a quiet residential(cid:13) neighborhood. They are currently challenging the ZHB’s approval of a(cid:13) special exception in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.(cid:13) 18(cid:13) III. Equal Protection Analysis(cid:13) A.(cid:13) The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment commands that no State shall "deny to any(cid:13) person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the(cid:13) laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. This is "essentially a(cid:13) direction that all persons similarly situated should be(cid:13) treated alike." City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (citing(cid:13) Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). However, courts(cid:13) are reluctant to overturn governmental action on the(cid:13) ground that it denies equal protection of the laws:(cid:13) The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason(cid:13) to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will(cid:13) eventually be rectified by the democratic process and(cid:13) that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no(cid:13) matter how unwisely we may think a political branch(cid:13) has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute(cid:13) unless the varying treatment of different groups or(cid:13) persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any(cid:13) combination of legitimate purposes that we can only(cid:13) conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.(cid:13) Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).(cid:13) Like other economic and social legislation, land use(cid:13) ordinances that do not classify by race, alienage, or(cid:13) national origin, will survive an attack based on the Equal(cid:13) Protection Clause if the law is " ‘reasonable, not arbitrary’(cid:13) and bears ‘a rational relationship to a (permissible) state(cid:13) objective.’ " Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8(cid:13) (1974). However, land use regulations must possess a(cid:13) legitimate interest in promoting the public health, safety,(cid:13) morals, and the general welfare of its citizens in order to(cid:13) pass scrutiny. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,(cid:13) 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (citation omitted). Land use(cid:13) ordinances will be deemed "irrational" when a plaintiff(cid:13) demonstrates either that the state interest is illegitimate (an(cid:13) ends-focus) or that the chosen classification is not(cid:13) rationally related to the interest (a means-focus).(cid:13) While the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed(cid:13) 19(cid:13) the constitutional incidents of municipal restrictions on use(cid:13) of land by religious institutions,3 its application of the(cid:13) rational basis test in cases involving other alleged liberty(cid:13) restrictions by municipalities exercising land use authority(cid:13) suggests that the same highly deferential standard of(cid:13) review is applicable here. In Village of Euclid , a zoning(cid:13) ordinance classified different portions of land into six(cid:13) categories. The owners of a vacant plot of land that fell(cid:13) partially within a zone restricted to two-family dwellings(cid:13) filed suit claiming that they were being deprived of liberty(cid:13) and property without due process within the meaning of(cid:13) the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the land had(cid:13) been held for industrial development, and that under the(cid:13) ordinance the land would be greatly reduced in value since(cid:13) it could not be put to that use.(cid:13) The Court noted that the case involved the "validity of(cid:13) what is really the crux of the more recent zoning legislation,(cid:13) namely, the creation and maintenance of residential(cid:13) districts, from which business and trade of every sort,(cid:13) including hotels and apartment houses, are excluded." 272(cid:13) U.S. at 390. The Court proceeded by observing the logic of(cid:13) such a design in land use -- that "the segregation of(cid:13) residential, business, and industrial buildings" would(cid:13) "increase the safety and security of home life; greatly tend(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. See, e.g., Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 896(cid:13) F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1991) (holding(cid:13) that denying a permit to establish a church in a residential area did not(cid:13) violate the Free Exercise Clause because the zoning system protected(cid:13) government interests, nor did it violate the Equal Protection Clause(cid:13) because there was no discrimination against appellant); Messiah Baptist(cid:13) Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.(cid:13) denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989) (holding that denial of a permit to build a(cid:13) church was not a violation of the Due Process of Free Exercise Clause);(cid:13) Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.(cid:13) denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984) (holding that a zoning law affecting(cid:13) appellee’s ability to conduct religious services in his home was not a(cid:13) violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Due Process Clause);(cid:13) Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. City of(cid:13) Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 72 (1983)(cid:13) (holding that denial of a variance to build a church in a residential area(cid:13) was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Due Process(cid:13) Clause because it was a legitimate exercise of the city’s police power).(cid:13) 20(cid:13) to prevent street accidents, especially to children; by(cid:13) reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential(cid:13) sections; decrease noise and other conditions which(cid:13) produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more(cid:13) favorable environment in which to rear children, etc." Id. at(cid:13) 394. Thus, the Court sustained the ordinance as"having [a](cid:13) substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or(cid:13) general welfare." Id. The Court further noted that zoning(cid:13) ordinances should be treated deferentially like other(cid:13) "practice-forbidding laws," and be upheld even if uses that(cid:13) "are neither offensive or dangerous will share the same(cid:13) fate." Id. at 388.(cid:13) Similarly, the Court upheld against attack the zoning(cid:13) ordinance in Village of Belle Terre. In that case, the Court(cid:13) addressed the validity of a zoning ordinance that restricted(cid:13) a portion of the village to one-family dwellings. The term(cid:13) "family" was defined to mean individuals related by blood,(cid:13) adoption, marriage, or living and cooking together as a(cid:13) single housekeeping unit, but it excluded the latter category(cid:13) if the household consisted of more than two individuals(cid:13) who were not related by blood, adoption, or marriage. Six(cid:13) students attending college at the State University at Stony(cid:13) Brook, none of whom was related by blood, adoption, or(cid:13) marriage, brought suit challenging the validity of the(cid:13) ordinance. The Court observed that the "regimes of(cid:13) boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present(cid:13) urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more(cid:13) cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are parked;(cid:13) noise travels with crowds." 416 U.S. at 9. Thus, the Court(cid:13) concluded that the ordinance was rationally related to a(cid:13) legitimate state objective, holding that a "quiet place where(cid:13) yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted(cid:13) are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to(cid:13) family needs. . . . It is ample to lay out zones where family(cid:13) values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion(cid:13) and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id.(cid:13) As the foregoing cases make clear, local zoning(cid:13) ordinances are subject to a very forgiving standard of(cid:13) review. That zoning ordinances are subject to such(cid:13) deferential review, however, does not mean that they are(cid:13) subject to no meaningful review. For example, in City of(cid:13) 21(cid:13) Cleburne, which we will discuss extensively in Section IV(cid:13) infra, the Court struck down an ordinance requiring group(cid:13) homes for the "feebleminded" to apply for special use(cid:13) permits in the same zone where other groups homes, such(cid:13) as fraternities and homes for the aged, were permitted by(cid:13) right. Applying rational basis review, the Court concluded(cid:13) that the "State may not rely on a classification whose(cid:13) relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to(cid:13) render the distinction arbitrary and irrational. Furthermore,(cid:13) some objectives -- such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a(cid:13) politically unpopular group’ -- are not legitimate state(cid:13) interests." City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 (internal(cid:13) citations omitted); see also Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of(cid:13) Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 685 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding(cid:13) "negative attitudes or biases, unfounded fears or(cid:13) speculation, prejudice, self-interest, or ignorance[are](cid:13) arbitrary and irrational" ends).4(cid:13) Although a finding of bare animus towards a group or(cid:13) "fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly(cid:13) cognizable in a zoning proceeding," is not necessary for a(cid:13) zoning ordinance to fail under an equal protection(cid:13) challenge, such evidence is likely sufficient. City of(cid:13) Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. However, absent such animus or(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Likewise, in Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), the(cid:13) Court struck down a zoning ordinance that permitted a "philanthropic(cid:13) home for children or for old people" in a particular district "when the(cid:13) written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of(cid:13) the property within four hundred feet of the proposed building." Id. at(cid:13) 118. The Court noted that owners could "withhold consent for selfish(cid:13) reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee[owner] to their will or(cid:13) caprice." Id. at 122. Thus, the Court struck down the ordinance because(cid:13) a zoning " ‘restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial(cid:13) relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.’ " Id. at(cid:13) 121 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)). In that(cid:13) case, Seattle had failed to show how the maintenance and construction(cid:13) of the homes for the aged would "work any injury, inconvenience or(cid:13) annoyance to the community, the district or any person." Id. at 122; see(cid:13) also Hooper v. Barnalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1985)(cid:13) (finding legislation not rationally related to purpose of encouraging(cid:13) Vietnam veterans to settle in New Mexico where legislation might have(cid:13) discouraged some veterans from settling there).(cid:13) 22(cid:13) other improper motive, a land use ordinance will typically(cid:13) be upheld.(cid:13) B.(cid:13) As the preceding more general discussion suggests, the(cid:13) federal courts have given states and local communities(cid:13) broad latitude to determine their zoning plans. Indeed, land(cid:13) use law is one of the bastions of local control, largely free(cid:13) of federal intervention. As the Supreme Court stated in(cid:13) Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68(cid:13) (1981), "[t]he power of local governments to zone and(cid:13) control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper(cid:13) exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory(cid:13) quality of life in both urban and rural communities.. . .(cid:13) [T]he courts generally have emphasized the breadth of(cid:13) municipal power to control land use . . . ." See also FERC(cid:13) v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) ("[R]egulation(cid:13) of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.");(cid:13) Izzo v. River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Land(cid:13) use policy customarily has been considered a feature of(cid:13) local government and an area in which the tenets of(cid:13) federalism are particularly strong.").(cid:13) The breadth of this power, as noted by the Court in(cid:13) Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9, "is not confined to(cid:13) elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is(cid:13) ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values,(cid:13) and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the(cid:13) area a sanctuary for people." A necessary corollary of the(cid:13) extensive zoning authority bestowed upon local(cid:13) municipalities, including the authority to create exclusively(cid:13) residential districts, is the authority to make distinctions(cid:13) between different uses and to exclude some uses within(cid:13) certain zones. Indeed, zoning is by its very design(cid:13) discriminatory, and that, alone, does not render it invalid.(cid:13) Concomitantly, in Lakewood, Oh. Congregation of(cid:13) Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d(cid:13) 303 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit upheld a zoning(cid:13) ordinance that prohibited the construction of church(cid:13) buildings in virtually all residential districts of the city(cid:13) using rational basis review. When the Congregation of(cid:13) 23(cid:13) Jehovah’s Witnesses was denied a permit to build a church(cid:13) on a plot of land that the Congregation purchased in an(cid:13) area zoned for single-family dwellings, the Congregation(cid:13) filed suit alleging that Lakewood’s ordinance, which created(cid:13) areas exclusively for residential use, violated the Free(cid:13) Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Noting that, under(cid:13) cases such as Village of Euclid and Village of Belle Terre,(cid:13) the city "may, within constitutional limits, zone to preserve(cid:13) a peaceful sanctuary for its citizens," the Sixth Circuit(cid:13) observed that the "broad lines" drawn by the city "to protect(cid:13) its tranquil neighborhoods" were a " ‘reasonable margin to(cid:13) insure effective enforcement’ of quiet residential zones." Id.(cid:13) at 308-09. Thus, the Court held that the "ordinance is(cid:13) constitutional although it creates exclusive residential(cid:13) districts and thereby prohibits the construction of church(cid:13) buildings in the districts." Id.(cid:13) Cases such as Lakewood, as well as Village of Euclid and(cid:13) Village of Belle Terre, demonstrate the breadth of a(cid:13) municipality’s power to discriminate in the land use(cid:13) context. Indeed, because the purpose of zoning ordinances(cid:13) is to distinguish among uses in order to draft(cid:13) comprehensive municipal plans, a degree of arbitrariness is(cid:13) inevitable. The question presented in these cases is when(cid:13) does a distinction cross the constitutional line. As long as(cid:13) a municipality has a rational basis for distinguishing(cid:13) between uses, and that distinction is related to the(cid:13) municipality’s legitimate goals, then federal courts will be(cid:13) reluctant to conclude that the ordinance is improper.(cid:13) IV. City of Cleburne and "Similarly Situated" Uses(cid:13) While City of Cleburne ultimately turned on the fact that(cid:13) the city held an irrational animus toward the mentally(cid:13) retarded, the Court provided a useful roadmap for(cid:13) analyzing equal protection challenges of zoning ordinances.(cid:13) City of Cleburne made two determinations crucial to the(cid:13) outcome in the case: 1) the proposed use, a group home for(cid:13) the mentally retarded, was similarly situated to the allowed(cid:13) uses, other group homes, pursuant to the zoning(cid:13) ordinance, City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50; and 2)(cid:13) there was no rational reason behind the differential(cid:13) treatment of the similarly situated uses, id. at 450, 461,(cid:13) 24(cid:13) which appears to have been a function of animus against(cid:13) the retarded. Notably, the Court’s holding that there was no(cid:13) rational basis for the city’s distinction between the CLC and(cid:13) the other permitted uses followed only after the Court(cid:13) determined that CLC and the other permitted uses were(cid:13) "similarly situated." This two-step inquiry properly places(cid:13) the initial burden on the complaining party first to(cid:13) demonstrate that it is "similarly situated" to an entity that(cid:13) it is being treated differently before the local municipality(cid:13) must offer a justification for its ordinance.(cid:13) Of course, the nature of the issue in City of Cleburne(cid:13) rendered quite easy the determination that CLC was(cid:13) similarly situated to the other permitted uses. The Court(cid:13) was comparing uses that were obviously similarly situated,(cid:13) so that the inquiry into whether the rationale offered by the(cid:13) city -- that the uses would have a different impact --(cid:13) became the crux of the decision. The Court thus framed the(cid:13) question before it as follows: "May the city require the(cid:13) permit for this facility when other care and multiple-(cid:13) dwelling facilities are freely permitted?" id. at 448; it(cid:13) presumed that it was comparing similar uses. Yet, in(cid:13) answering the question presented, the Court relied on the(cid:13) fact that the impact on CLC would have to be different from(cid:13) the other similar uses, and not just compared with other,(cid:13) dissimilar uses permitted in the district. The Court noted(cid:13) that the mentally retarded are "different," but that this(cid:13) difference was "largely irrelevant unless the . .. home and(cid:13) those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate(cid:13) interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such(cid:13) as boarding houses and hospitals would not." Id. (emphasis(cid:13) added). The focus, then, was first and foremost on whether(cid:13) similarly situated uses were being treated differently.(cid:13) Other courts have tracked the two-step analysis laid out(cid:13) in City of Cleburne, determining first if the uses are(cid:13) "similarly situated" and, if they are, asking if there is a(cid:13) rational basis for distinguishing between them. In(cid:13) Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings, supra , the Eighth(cid:13) Circuit relied on City of Cleburne and required the city to(cid:13) provide a rational basis for the "apparent unequal(cid:13) treatment of similarly situated entities" only after first(cid:13) concluding that the church was similarly situated to(cid:13) 25(cid:13) permitted uses in a commercial zoning district. 948 F.2d at(cid:13) 472. Similarly, in Christian Gospel Church v. San Francisco,(cid:13) 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990), a church sought a permit to(cid:13) build a church in an area zoned for single-family(cid:13) residences. The Court stated that "[i]n order to prevail, the(cid:13) Church must make a showing that a class that is similarly(cid:13) situated has been treated disparately." Id. at 1225. In(cid:13) concluding that there was no equal protection violation, the(cid:13) Court observed that the church "was treated no differently(cid:13) than a school or community center would have been," and,(cid:13) thus, that the church had failed to establish that other(cid:13) similarly situated uses had been treated differently. Id.(cid:13) In sum, the first inquiry a court must make in an equal(cid:13) protection challenge to a zoning ordinance is to examine(cid:13) whether the complaining party is similarly situated to other(cid:13) uses that are either permitted as of right, or by special(cid:13) permit, in a certain zone. If, and only if, the entities are(cid:13) similarly situated, then the city must justify its different(cid:13) treatment of the two, perhaps by citing to the different(cid:13) impact that such entities may have on the asserted goal of(cid:13) the zoning plan.(cid:13) V. Application to the Abington Ordinance(cid:13) A. The District Court’s Approach(cid:13) As noted above, the Congregation moved for partial(cid:13) summary judgment on the ground that the Ordinance was(cid:13) facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause(cid:13) and the Due Process Clause. The District Court, however,(cid:13) proceeded to evaluate whether the Ordinance violated the(cid:13) Equal Protection Clause as applied, and did so in order to(cid:13) "avoid making [an] unnecessarily broad constitutional(cid:13) judgment." Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 436.(cid:13) Relying on City of Cleburne, the District Court concluded(cid:13) that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the(cid:13) Congregation because it did not permit the Congregation to(cid:13) apply for a special exception in an R-1 Residential District.(cid:13) As the District Court viewed it, the issue was whether the(cid:13) Township’s scheme was rationally related to its proffered(cid:13) reason for excluding the Congregation -- a concern over(cid:13) 26(cid:13) traffic, light, and noise pollution. That is, the question was(cid:13) whether it was permissible for the Township to allow uses(cid:13) other than residences in the R-1 Residential District, while(cid:13) simultaneously excluding the Congregation. The District(cid:13) Court observed that Abington’s "traffic, noise and light(cid:13) concerns also exist for the uses currently allowed to request(cid:13) a special exception." Id. at 437. Thus, the court concluded(cid:13) that the means employed by the Ordinance, i.e.,(cid:13) distinguishing between country clubs and the(cid:13) Congregation, was not rationally related to the goal of(cid:13) preventing traffic, noise, and light pollution in the(cid:13) neighborhood. Accordingly, the court ordered the ZHB to(cid:13) hold a hearing on whether the Congregation was entitled to(cid:13) a special exception.(cid:13) The Township submits that the District Court erred in its(cid:13) equal protection analysis, for which it relied primarily on(cid:13) City of Cleburne. We agree. First, the District Court failed to(cid:13) make the preliminary determination in the equal protection(cid:13) analysis, as we identified above. See supra Section IV. That(cid:13) is, the District Court failed to inquire whether the uses(cid:13) permitted by special exception, such as country clubs, were(cid:13) "similarly situated" to religious institutions or to the(cid:13) Congregation in particular. Rather, the District Court(cid:13) concluded that because the impact of the uses, either(cid:13) similar or not, was the same, there could be no rational(cid:13) basis for distinguishing between them, and that the(cid:13) Congregation must therefore be able to apply for a special(cid:13) exception.(cid:13) At oral argument the Congregation claimed that the(cid:13) District Court had focused, and that this Court should(cid:13) focus, on the impact of the different uses because that was(cid:13) the proffered reason offered by Abington for distinguishing(cid:13) between country clubs and religious uses. However, based(cid:13) on our review of City of Cleburne and other caselaw,(cid:13) discussed supra Section III, we conclude that this argument(cid:13) overlooks the fact that Abington need not justify its(cid:13) exclusion of religious uses if such a use is not similarly(cid:13) situated to, for example, a country club. As the Ninth(cid:13) Circuit noted in Christian Gospel Church,"[i]n order to(cid:13) prevail, the Church must make a showing that a class that(cid:13) is similarly situated has been treated disparately." 896 F.2d(cid:13) 27(cid:13) at 1225. It is not until this showing is made that it becomes(cid:13) "incumbent on the City to provide a rational basis for [the](cid:13) apparent unequal treatment of similarly situated entities."(cid:13) Cornerstone, 948 F.2d at 472. That Abington offered a(cid:13) rationale based on the Congregation’s impact does not(cid:13) relieve the Congregation of its burden to demonstrate, at(cid:13) the outset, that it is similarly situated to the uses permitted(cid:13) by special exception in the R-1 District.(cid:13) So then, the Congregation must demonstrate that it is(cid:13) similarly situated to other permitted entities by(cid:13) demonstrating that it is similarly situated in relation to the(cid:13) Township’s purpose in creating the R-1 Residential District.(cid:13) See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365,(cid:13) 388 (1926) ("[T]he question whether the power exists to(cid:13) forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for(cid:13) a particular use . . . is to be determined, not by an abstract(cid:13) consideration of the building or of the thing considered(cid:13) apart, but by considering it in connection with the(cid:13) circumstances and the locality.").(cid:13) The Township’s purpose in creating R-1, as stated in the(cid:13) Ordinance, is to provide "low density single-family,(cid:13) neighborhoods." [1000a]. The burden on the Congregation(cid:13) is to demonstrate that it is just as compatible with this goal(cid:13) as is, for example, a country club. To be sure, it may be(cid:13) that an inquiry into whether something is "similarly(cid:13) situated" will involve an inquiry into whether the two(cid:13) entities have the same impact. But the analysis for equal(cid:13) protection purposes is more nuanced. In City of Cleburne,(cid:13) for example, the nature of the uses was dwellings for large(cid:13) numbers of people. In this case, a court must evaluate not(cid:13) only the impact of the Congregation as compared with a(cid:13) country club, the example raised by the Congregation at(cid:13) oral argument, but also what requirements or needs it may(cid:13) have in order to operate within the neighborhood. Should(cid:13) the Congregation prevail, the burden then shifts to the(cid:13) Township to offer any evidence of a rational reason for(cid:13) distinguishing between the uses.(cid:13) We will turn presently to the similarity of uses issue. But(cid:13) first we are constrained to note that if we were to conclude,(cid:13) as the District Court did, that all uses with a similar impact(cid:13) must be treated alike, regardless of the fact that such uses(cid:13) 28(cid:13) may be fundamentally distinct, we would turn zoning law(cid:13) on its head. That is, such a conclusion would mean not(cid:13) only that churches must be allowed in a zone where(cid:13) country clubs are allowed (based on the conclusion that(cid:13) country clubs impact light, traffic and noise as well), but(cid:13) also, by necessity, that a host of other uses that impact(cid:13) light, traffic and noise must also be permitted in such(cid:13) zones. But this would strip of any real meaning the(cid:13) authority bestowed upon municipalities to zone since the(cid:13) broad power to zone carries with it the corollary authority(cid:13) to discriminate against a host of uses that a municipality(cid:13) determines are not particularly suited for a certain district.(cid:13) Placing the burden on the complaining party first to(cid:13) establish that it is similarly situated with other, permitted(cid:13) uses preserves the clearly established local authority in the(cid:13) land use context. The District Court did not do this and(cid:13) hence its judgment must be set aside. To the extent that(cid:13) the District Court’s conclusion rests on the notion that a(cid:13) "house of worship inherently further[s] the public welfare,"(cid:13) Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 437, it is seriously(cid:13) problematic for the reasons set forth in the margin. 5(cid:13) (Text continued on page 31)(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. The Congregation concedes that "a municipality may indeed decree(cid:13) that some [uses] are suitable in a particular district and some are not.(cid:13) For example, it could decide that it wishes to permit golf clubs in a(cid:13) residential neighborhood, but exclude tennis clubs." The Congregation(cid:13) also acknowledges that "a local government may generally exclude a use(cid:13) from a residential zone because the use ‘lacks residential character,’(cid:13) even if the excluded use would be similarly intense as those permitted."(cid:13) However, the Congregation contends that a local government "may not(cid:13) permit any of those things and prohibit houses of worship and rely on(cid:13) ‘compatibility with residential life’ as its reason for distinguishing the(cid:13) uses." In its submission, "The Constitution privileges the activity of(cid:13) religious worship at least to this extent: that it bars government from(cid:13) finding nonreligious uses, other than ‘residences’ themselves, permissible(cid:13) within a residential district, while excluding religious uses for reasons(cid:13) related solely to the ‘character’ of the activity."(cid:13) This argument, which is essentially a challenge to the facial validity of(cid:13) the Ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause, is not necessary to(cid:13) our disposition of the case, nor do we think it prudent to pass upon it(cid:13) now; as the District Court noted in ruling on the Ordinance as applied(cid:13) to the Congregation, and as the Supreme Court observed in City of(cid:13) Cleburne, it is preferable, when possible, to"avoid making unnecessarily(cid:13) 29(cid:13) broad constitutional judgments." City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447; see(cid:13) also Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 436. However, we do note(cid:13) that this argument seems to boil down to a contention that religious(cid:13) institutions get a preference in the land use context, and we think that(cid:13) such a preference would pose a significant problem.(cid:13) First, under Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v.(cid:13) Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a local government must even-handedly(cid:13) apply its laws and cannot single out religion for either discriminatory or(cid:13) preferential treatment. Id. at 879 ("the right of free exercise does not(cid:13) relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral(cid:13) law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or(cid:13) prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ "). As the(cid:13) Court observed, "We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs(cid:13) excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting(cid:13) conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79. Second, a(cid:13) conclusion that religious uses may not be excluded from residential(cid:13) districts takes away the deference that has been granted to local(cid:13) municipalities to make a determination whether or not such a use is(cid:13) suited for a residential district. As stated at oral argument, it creates a(cid:13) "cookie-cutter" approach to zoning that seems contrary to, at the very(cid:13) least, the Supreme Court’s observation that "regulation of land use is(cid:13) perhaps the quintessential state activity." FERC v. Missippi, 456 U.S.(cid:13) 742, 768 n.30 (1982).(cid:13) Second, we are unpersuaded by the Congregation’s citation to several(cid:13) decisions in state courts holding that houses of worship are inherently(cid:13) compatible with residential zoning. See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 617 P.2d(cid:13) 816 (Haw. 1980); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39 (Ind.(cid:13) 1961); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827(cid:13) (N.Y. 1956); Congregation Committee v. City Council of Haltom City, 287(cid:13) S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1956); O’Brien v. Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1952).(cid:13) Although some jurisdictions have so held, not all states espouse this(cid:13) ruling, see, e.g., Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293(cid:13) (Alaska 1982); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore.(cid:13) 281 (1958); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,(cid:13) 143 Conn. 263 (1956); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the(cid:13) Epiphany v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955); Corporation of the(cid:13) Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Porterville, 203(cid:13) P.2d 823 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949), nor does the Congregation cite a(cid:13) federal case explicitly upholding this extremely broad principle. Most(cid:13) importantly, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken(cid:13) directly on this subject, lower court decisions demonstrate that it is not(cid:13) good law in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ v.(cid:13) 30(cid:13) B. Similarity of Uses(cid:13) Since we review the grant of (partial) summary judgment(cid:13) de novo, see Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d(cid:13) 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996), we apply the same standard as the(cid:13) District Court in determining whether summary judgment(cid:13) was appropriate, Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1321(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, we may analyze whether the(cid:13) Congregation is similarly situated to uses permitted by(cid:13) special exception in the R-1 Residential District, i.e.,(cid:13) whether, as submitted by the Congregation at oral(cid:13) argument, Congregation Kol Ami is similarly situated to a(cid:13) country club. We are tempted to do this because the(cid:13) District Court, albeit in summary fashion, did so, and(cid:13) because delay in disposition of this matter impedes the(cid:13) Congregation’s relocation efforts.(cid:13) In response to questioning at oral argument, the(cid:13) Congregation contends that it is similarly situated to a(cid:13) country club, a use that is permitted by special exception(cid:13) in the R-1 Residential District. In its submission, a country(cid:13) club conducts activities at the same time and with the(cid:13) same number of people as the Congregation would, yet the(cid:13) country club is permitted by special exception but the(cid:13) Congregation is not. The Congregation submits that it(cid:13) should make no difference that "Congregation" Kol Ami,(cid:13) and not "Country Club" Kol Ami, applied for a special(cid:13) exception.(cid:13) If Abington permitted full-scale country clubs, this(cid:13) argument might have some force. It is unclear however,(cid:13) based on a review of the Abington Ordinance, whether(cid:13) country clubs, as described by the Congregation, are(cid:13) permitted in the R-1 Residential District in Abington.(cid:13) Leaving aside the religious events conducted at the(cid:13) synagogues, which have no analogue to any of the uses(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) Lower Merion Township, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (Mont. Co. Ct. of Comm.(cid:13) Pleas 1964) (upholding generally applicable zoning regulation that denied(cid:13) church a special exception to locate in a residential area). At all events,(cid:13) the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Smith renders questionable the(cid:13) continuing vitality of this line of state cases for the reasons discussed(cid:13) above.(cid:13) 31(cid:13) permitted in R-1 by special exception, the country club(cid:13) described at oral argument was one that would be on a par(cid:13) with a 450-family synagogue regularly hosting weddings(cid:13) and Bar and Bat Mitzvah services.[OA Trans. At 62, 68,(cid:13) 93]. But we cannot tell whether the Ordinance would(cid:13) permit such a club. The R-1 Residential District permits(cid:13) "Outdoor Recreation" by special exception.[1001a]. Outdoor(cid:13) recreation is then defined as follows:(cid:13) Public or private miniature golf courses, swimming(cid:13) pools, ball courts, tennis courts, ball fields, trails, and(cid:13) similar uses which are not enclosed in buildings and(cid:13) are operated on a commercial or membership basis,(cid:13) primarily for the use of patrons who do not reside on(cid:13) the same lot on premises. Outdoor recreation shall(cid:13) include any accessory use, such as snack bars, pro(cid:13) shops, club houses, country clubs, or similar uses(cid:13) which are designed and intended primarily for the use(cid:13) of patrons of the principal recreational use. Outdoor(cid:13) recreation shall not include amusement parks, open(cid:13) space recreational uses, overnight camping parks, or(cid:13) other uses specifically provided herein.(cid:13) (Emphasis added). [1098a].(cid:13) This ordinance is not a model of clarity, but its text does(cid:13) not appear to permit full-scale country clubs. While(cid:13) "country clubs" are permitted within the meaning of(cid:13) "outdoor recreation," when read in connection with the(cid:13) permitted "outdoor recreation" it seems that country clubs(cid:13) like those envisioned by the Congregation are not(cid:13) permitted. For example, the use permits miniature golf(cid:13) courses, not full-scale golf courses, which is a limitation(cid:13) that seems to restrict the possibility that any grand country(cid:13) club could or would locate in the R-1 Residential District.(cid:13) Rather, under the text of the Ordinance the type of country(cid:13) club permitted in the R-1 Residential District appears(cid:13) specifically designed to be an accessory use and, as such,(cid:13) to serve those uses listed in the sentence preceding the list(cid:13) of accessory uses, such as miniature golf courses,(cid:13) swimming pools, and tennis courts. Under this reading, the(cid:13) Congregation’s argument that such clubs could be used for(cid:13) 32(cid:13) weddings and other celebrations would be inconsistent with(cid:13) the precise language of the Ordinance.6 (cid:13) But this argument, which depends on a rather crabbed(cid:13) characterization of "country club," is less than fully(cid:13) convincing. At all events, because the ordinance is so(cid:13) poorly written that we cannot be sure what it means, we(cid:13) will remand so that the District Court can consider the(cid:13) similarity issue in the first instance. In consideration of this(cid:13) remand, we make a number of observations for the(cid:13) guidance of the District Court.(cid:13) First, we note that of the uses permitted by special(cid:13) exception in the R-1 Residential District, the country club(cid:13) comparison seems to be the only possible similarity. 7 We(cid:13) are mindful that in City of Cleburne, the different housing(cid:13) arrangements used for comparison were, essentially,(cid:13) multiple housing arrangements. It is hard to describe how(cid:13) one of the arrangements differed from the other insofar as(cid:13) its use was concerned. Clearly, as the similarity of use(cid:13) wanes, so too the inequality in treatment will be(cid:13) increasingly tolerated under the law. On the basis of the(cid:13) present record, it seems doubtful that the Congregation is(cid:13) similarly situated to the other uses permitted by special(cid:13) exception in R-1. Kennels, riding academies, and outdoor(cid:13) recreation facilities are very low-intense uses of land that(cid:13) preserve residential character. [1074a-75a, 1098a]. Train(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. We note, in this regard, that restaurants and clubs in general are not(cid:13) permitted either by right or by special exception in the R-1 Residential(cid:13) District. Rather, restaurants are permitted only in commercial districts,(cid:13) such as in the Town Commercial District [1007a], Special Commercial(cid:13) District [1010a], Planned Business Districts[1014a], Mixed Use Districts(cid:13) [1028a], and as an accessory use to a golf course [1097a]. "Clubs" are(cid:13) permitted in the Apartment-Office Districts [1018a], Mixed Use Districts(cid:13) [1028a], and Recreation/Conservation Districts[1036a]. Country clubs of(cid:13) the type conceived of by the Congregation, with full-scale golf courses,(cid:13) are permitted in the Community Service Districts by conditional use(cid:13) permit (where houses of worship are permitted by right), Apartment-(cid:13) Office Districts, and Recreational/Conservation Districts by special(cid:13) exception. [1019a, 1036a].(cid:13) 7. Although the notion that a country club and a synagogue are similarly(cid:13) situated at first seems counterintuitive, perhaps an explanation (beyond(cid:13) similarity of impacts) can be found.(cid:13) 33(cid:13) stations and bus shelters are located adjacent to (usually(cid:13) long established) public rights of way which transport(cid:13) suburban commuters into Philadelphia and support(cid:13) regional transportation. [1108a]. Municipal complexes,(cid:13) emergency services, and utility facilities for sewers and(cid:13) electricity are indispensable to the health, safety, and(cid:13) administration of a residential community [1094a, 1108a].(cid:13) All of these uses would appear to have functionally different(cid:13) purposes than the Congregation, and would seem(cid:13) compatible with a low-density residential neighborhood so(cid:13) as to represent a lower likelihood of generating negative(cid:13) secondary effects.(cid:13) In addition to the fact that the uses permitted by right or(cid:13) by special exception differ in scale and purpose from the(cid:13) Congregation, we note that the Congregation’s proposed use(cid:13) presents an intense use of the land, which the Township(cid:13) might determine was incompatible with its residential(cid:13) designation. Services and educational classes typically(cid:13) require a large number of people to arrive and leave by car(cid:13) at roughly the same time. As we previously observed, a(cid:13) municipality may chart out a "quiet place where yards are(cid:13) wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are(cid:13) legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to(cid:13) family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to(cid:13) elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is(cid:13) ample to lay out zones where . . . the blessings of quiet(cid:13) seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for(cid:13) people." Village of Belle Terre, 446 U.S. at 9.(cid:13) As represented at oral argument by the Township, the(cid:13) Congregation stated at the initial proceeding before the ZHB(cid:13) that it had a membership of 207 families and predicted a(cid:13) growth to about 350 families. By the time the special(cid:13) exception hearing was held, the Congregation was willing to(cid:13) put a cap at 450 families. There is no doubt that the(cid:13) Congregation is growing, probably due to a popular rabbi.(cid:13) The Congregation may well grow larger. With a large and(cid:13) growing congregation comes increased traffic and noise.(cid:13) Indeed, at the special exception hearing, the Congregation(cid:13) reported that it would need to expand the existing parking(cid:13) lot to 137 spaces, but might need to make available an(cid:13) additional 54 spaces for reserve parking for heavy-use(cid:13) 34(cid:13) occasions. [3904a]. This matter might well be considered by(cid:13) the District Court on remand.(cid:13) C. Rationality(cid:13) Since we remand for resolution of the similarity of uses(cid:13) issue, we need not reach the ultimate rationality question,(cid:13) even though the District Court did so. We do however, offer(cid:13) some observations on that issue should the District Court(cid:13) need to revisit it.(cid:13) First, we note that there is no evidence of anti-Jewish or(cid:13) anti-religious animus in the record. Although such evidence(cid:13) is not necessary to sustain an equal protection violation,(cid:13) this court has stated that "negative attitudes or biases,(cid:13) unfounded fears or speculation, prejudice, self-interest, or(cid:13) ignorance [are] arbitrary and irrational" ends that warrant(cid:13) finding a statute unconstitutional. Midnight Sessions, 945(cid:13) F.2d at 685.(cid:13) Second, the facts of this case illustrate why religious uses(cid:13) may be, in some cases, incompatible with a place of"quiet(cid:13) seclusion." When conducting its Comprehensive Plan in(cid:13) 1992, the Township determined that institutional uses,(cid:13) such as schools, churches, and hospitals, have distinctive(cid:13) requirements that would best be addressed by placing them(cid:13) in particular districts. Specifically, the Township concluded(cid:13) that although these entities "provide many benefits to the(cid:13) community," they also "have specific use, space and(cid:13) locational requirements which are inherently different from(cid:13) other land categories . . . [and] necessitate[ ] a separate(cid:13) land use classification." [889a]. To that end, the CS-(cid:13) Community Service District was established to meet the(cid:13) particular needs of churches and other institutions.(cid:13) [1024a].(cid:13) In view of the enormously broad leeway afforded(cid:13) municipalities in making land use classifications, see(cid:13) discussion supra, it is strongly arguable that the(cid:13) Township’s decision to group churches together with(cid:13) schools, hospitals, and other institutions is rationally(cid:13) related to the needs of these entities, their impact on(cid:13) neighboring properties, and their inherent compatibility or(cid:13) incompatibility with adjoining uses. If so, the foregoing(cid:13) 35(cid:13) standard of review in land use cases will be met. Such(cid:13) planning is the raison d’etre of zoning ordinances, and(cid:13) broad latitude is given to authorities that rationally conduct(cid:13) this municipal function. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89(cid:13) ("The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective(cid:13) enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the(cid:13) stamp of invalidity.").(cid:13) Finally, we do not believe land use planners can assume(cid:13) anymore that religious uses are inherently compatible with(cid:13) family and residential uses. See, e.g., Megachurches as(cid:13) Minitowns, NYT F1, F6 (May 9, 2002). Churches may be(cid:13) incompatible with residential zones, as they "bring(cid:13) congestion; they generate traffic and create parking(cid:13) problems; they can cause a deterioration of property values(cid:13) in a residential zone . . . ." Jewish Reconstructionist(cid:13) Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 293(cid:13) (1975). Thus, the District Court must refrain from making(cid:13) a blanket determination that religious institutions are(cid:13) inherently compatible, and, as argued by the Congregation,(cid:13) "essential to residential zoning." See supra n.5. These(cid:13) matters need to be considered on remand as well.(cid:13) D. Conclusion(cid:13) For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of the(cid:13) District Court will be vacated and the case remanded for(cid:13) further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The(cid:13) special exception granted by the ZHB and the land use(cid:13) permit issued by the Township are declared to be null and(cid:13) void. Parties to bear their own costs.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 36(cid:13)