In the Chesterfield Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, Blake Mitchell Congdon pled guilty to felony vandalism. His plea agreement expressly waived his statutory right of appeal to the circuit court. Congdon nonetheless filed an appeal which the Chesterfield Circuit Court dismissed. He now appeals to us claiming the circuit court erred as a matter of law. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Congdon, a juvenile, was charged with felony vandalism in August 2008. See Code § 18.2-137. Before the case went to trial in juvenile court, Congdon entered into a written plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, the felony vandalism charge would be dismissed if Congdon successfully completed a drug court program. The agreement, signed by Congdon and his attorney, also included a provision stating that Cong-don “WAIVES, or gives up” his statutory “right to appeal the final decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court to the Circuit Court where the matter may be tried by a jury.” Plea Agreement H 3, at 2 (emphasis in original). The juvenile court accepted and signed the agreement, confirmed the voluntariness of Congdon’s consent, deferred the disposition of the felony vandalism charge, and ordered Congdon into the juvenile drug court program.
More than a year later, in December 2009, the juvenile court found Congdon in violation of the rules of the drug court program and terminated his participation in it. The juvenile court thereafter revoked Congdon’s deferred disposition and entered a finding of delinquency on the felony vandalism charge as well as other unrelated charges. Congdon appealed to the circuit court seeking a de novo review. Holding that Congdon had made “an intelligent and effective” waiver of his statutory right of appeal, the circuit court dismissed the case.
II.
On appeal, Congdon asserts he has a statutory right under Code § 16.1-296(A) to an appeal from the juvenile court to the *695 circuit court. As a matter of law, Congdon argues, this right cannot be waived. We disagree.
With few exceptions, most legal rights — whether common law, statutory, or constitutional — can be waived if the requisite formalities are observed. In the “context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,” courts have “articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, ... and we have recognized that ‘the most basic rights of criminal defendants’ ” can be waived.
New York v. Hill,
Some waivers can be implied. For example,
Miranda
rights can be lost by an “implied waiver” just as effectively as by an express one.
Berghuis v. Thompkins,
— U.S.-,
A juvenile’s right to seek a
de novo
circuit court appeal from a juvenile court ruling is entirely statutory. Code
*696
§ 16.1-296(A) authorizes a
de novo
appeal from “any final order or judgment of the juvenile court affecting the rights or interests of any person coming within its jurisdiction” if the appeal is filed within ten days after the entry of the juvenile court’s final order. The statutory right of appeal, however, is implicitly waived (more precisely, forfeited) if the appellant misses the ten-day deadline — even if he does so entirely by mistake.
See, e.g., Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev. v. Donald,
The question we must answer is whether the right of appeal under Code § 16.1-296(A) can be expressly waived. It would seem anomalous that the most venerable constitutional rights can be implicitly waived but this particular statutory right cannot be expressly waived. To be sure, most courts “are persuaded that because other important constitutional rights of the defendant may be waived by plea agreement, the right to appeal, which is not even guaranteed by the Constitution, but by statute, should also be subject to waiver.” 7 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(c), at 75-76 (3d ed. 2007). Congdon, however, says there are several reasons why neither he nor any other litigant can expressly waive the right of appeal under Code § 16.1-296(A).
First, Congdon observes that the very act of appealing the juvenile order has the effect of voiding it.
See Commonwealth v. Diaz,
When Virginia courts speak of nullifying the district court order, “the annulment of the district court judgment in such a situation occurs because a trial
de novo
has commencéd on the merits of the case,”
Diaz,
Second, Congdon also points out the right of appeal cannot be implicitly waived simply by paying lower court fines and costs. Such acts “do not
of themselves
constitute a waiver of the right to an appeal” that has been properly perfected.
Gravely v. Deeds,
Moreover, to the extent an implied waiver case like
Gravely
sheds light on the issue before us, it is a light wholly unfavorable to Congdon. For if it were true that no appeal waiver of any nature (express or implied, formal or informal) could ever be legally enforced, it would have been unnecessary for
Gravely
to make the point that certain inadvertent acts “of themselves” did not constitute an implied waiver.
Gravely,
*698
Third, Congdon notes that a district court guilty plea (whether unconditional or pursuant to a plea agreement) is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s guilt when the case is tried
de novo
in the circuit court.
See Santen v. Tuthill,
In the end, we believe this case is answered by first principles. “Generally, a party may waive by contract any right conferred by law or contract. If the party being charged with relinquishment of a right had knowledge of the right and intended to waive it, the waiver will be enforced.”
Burke v. Burke,
*699 We have heretofore recognized that a defendant can, through a plea agreement, waive his appellate rights. See United States v. Poindexter,492 F.3d 263 , 267-68 (4th Cir.2007). And we will enforce such a waiver if it is valid and if the issue sought to be appealed is within its scope. See United States v. Blick,408 F.3d 162 , 168 (4th Cir.2005). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to it. See id. at 169.
United States v. Manigan,
Consistent with these views, Virginia has long held a criminal defendant can waive “his appeal of right” if the circumstances demonstrate “his decision to waive his appeal was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”
Davidson v. Commonwealth,
In this case, the circuit court found Congdon knowingly and intelligently waived his right of appeal under Code § 16.1-296(A). Congdon does not claim the prosecutor, the district court, or anyone else coerced him into making the agreement. Nor does he contend the agreement was in any way unconscionable. Instead, Congdon merely asserts the circuit court should have declared the agreement unenforceable as a matter of law. Because we know of no law saying as much, and we *700 are unwilling to declare it to be so ipse dixit, we cannot grant the unprecedented relief Congdon seeks.
Affirmed.
Notes
. We acknowledge Congdon's citation to
Harris v. Commonwealth,
. Along similar lines, Congdon notes Rule 3A: 19(b) addresses a criminal defendant's right to withdraw an appeal from a district court to a circuit court but does not mention any right to waive an appeal. We find appellant's point unpersuasive because Rule 3A: 19(b) addresses the right to withdraw an already perfected appeal while the issue before us is the ability of a litigant to waive an appeal before it is filed.
See generally United States v. Mezzanatto,
.
See also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco,