CONFEDERATED BANDS AND TRIBES OF THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION, Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Appellees.
No. 74-1225.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 21, 1977.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 1, 1977.
552 F.2d 1332 | 443-456
Malachy R. Murphy, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Olympia, Wash., for appellees.
Before CHAMBERS, BROWNING, DUNIWAY, ELY, HUFSTEDLER, WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN, WALLACE, SNEED and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.
The Yakimas argue before this court en banc that PL-280 did not authorize Washington to assume partial jurisdiction and that
We must first decide whether the Supreme Court‘s summary dismissals in Tonasket v. Washington, 420 U.S. 915, 95 S.Ct. 1108, 43 L.Ed.2d 387 (1975) and Makah Indian Tribe v. Washington, 397 U.S. 316, 90 S.Ct. 1115, 25 L.Ed.2d 335 (1970) foreclose the issue. We can dispose of Tonasket quickly because the Supreme Court of Washington did not address the partial assumption question (as it did the disclaimer issue) after the United States Supreme Court vacated its prior decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm‘n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); accordingly, the partial assumption issue was not before the Supreme Court when it dismissed the second appeal. Makah is somewhat more troublesome because Makah clearly involved a partial assumption of jurisdiction under
Washington‘s primary reliance is placed on the following language from Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 1966) (hereinafter Quinault II):
“The third claim which plaintiffs purport to state in their complaint is that chapter 36, Laws of 1963, amending chapter 240, Laws of 1957, is void because it represents only a partial assumption of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations, whereas Public Law 280 does not authorize partial assumption of jurisdiction.
“. . . We do not read that act as constituting only a partial assumption of jurisdiction. The state therein indicates its willingness to extend criminal and civil jurisdiction over all Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country and lands within the state, it being provided, however, that as to some matters concerning some Indians, there must first be a tribal resolution and a gubernatorial proclamation. In chapter 240, Laws of 1957, this Indian resolution and governor‘s proclamation procedure applied to all exertions of state jurisdiction.
“In our opinion, the indicated condition precedent to the exertion of state jurisdiction as to some matters concerning some Indians involves no violation of Public Law 280. If the Quinault Tribe of Indians feels aggrieved because state jurisdiction is not presently being exerted to the full extent possible under chapter 36, all it has to do is provide the governor with a tribal resolution of the kind called for in section 5 of that act (RCW 37.12.021). A governor‘s proclamation would necessarily follow, and a full exertion of state jurisdiction would be achieved.” 368 F.2d at 657-58.
The ultimate holding of Quinault II supports the State‘s argument, and we choose to affirm it. While Quinault II, strictly speaking, avoided the assumption-of-partial-jurisdiction issue by treating Washington‘s assumption as total, it is reflective of a long-standing opinion that PL-280 authorizes the assumption of partial subject matter, and partial geographic, jurisdiction.1 Examination of the relevant legislative history does not disprove this interpretation of PL-280 and, in fact, provides some degree of support. More critically,
I
To hold, as the dissent would have us do, that any partial assumption of criminal jurisdiction by the states is violative of PL-280 would overturn the jurisdictional systems under which live approximately 16,000 Indians in the State of Washington and 5,000 Indians in Idaho. The jurisdictional systems under which 115,000 Indians in Arizona and 22,000 Indians in Montana live would also be jeopardized.2 The effects of such an immediate jurisdictional upheaval would be far-reaching and quite unpredictable for the approximately 158,000 Indians potentially affected by this decision.
For example, Washington has performed certain services since 1963. Doubts about whether tribal or federal authorities would be ready to step in immediately are quite reasonable. Consider highway traffic law enforcement and juvenile delinquency, two specific areas where state jurisdiction would be invalidated under the view of the dissenters. Both are complicated fields. Patrol cars and officers are necessary if the highways are to be efficiently patrolled. Skilled personnel, as well as specialized detention facilities, are needed to handle the problems presented by the delinquency of juveniles. It is very doubtful that the tribe or the federal government immediately could provide these resources. Even if the states are providing only minimal services, it is unlikely that tribal or federal authorities could equal or surpass that level in the near future.
Other “option states” within the circuit would confront similar uncertainties and confusion. “Option states” not within the circuit, moreover, could not view such action with indifference. Until the dissent‘s position was acted upon by their circuit, and possibly ruled upon by the Supreme Court, any partial assumption of jurisdiction, not arranged pursuant to procedures of the 1968 legislation, would be under a cloud.3
Despite these consequences we would not hesitate to overrule Quinault II if it were plainly and unequivocally inconsistent with the applicable legislative history of PL-280. But it is not. At worst, this history simply does not directly address the partial assumption issue.4 There are, however, aspects of PL-280 and its legislative history that suggest assumption of partial jurisdiction is valid and that Quinault II, as here interpreted, is sound.
First of all, partial geographic jurisdiction was specifically provided by the Act with respect to certain mandatory states, by excluding specific reservations from coverage.5 There is no reason to suppose that option states were not to have the power to be similarly flexible. Exclusion of an entire reservation is different, of course, from “checker-boarding.” There is, however, nothing to indicate that a state given the option to assume jurisdiction was required either to exclude entire reservations or to assume jurisdiction with respect to all Indian country within its territorial limits. Congress, by vesting states with an option, evidenced that at that time it did not know how jurisdiction in such states should be arranged. Experimentation undoubtedly was expected and that is what has occurred.
It is also reasonable to conclude that experimentation with respect to subject matter jurisdiction was intended. This is indicated by the fact that the Department of Interior conferred extensively with the representatives of mandatory states and the Indian tribes before presenting a bill to Congress in 1953.6 Both the mandatory states and the tribes therein had agreed to an assumption of complete civil and criminal jurisdiction prior to submission. However, very few of the option states and tribes therein were consulted. By failing to consult extensively and by vesting option states with the power to assume jurisdiction, it is reasonable to assume that Congress was prepared to permit various jurisdictional arrangements to be developed at the state level. No restraints on these arrangements were imposed by PL-280.
To assume no such restraints with respect to geography or subject matter were intended is consistent with the assimilative thrust of the 1953 legislation. Congress in PL-280 intended to relinquish federal jurisdiction over Indian people residing on reservations as quickly as possible. Relinquishment in option states simply had not been worked out in 1953.7 So far as Congress then knew it might never be worked out; but it is clear that Congress had hopes. Nothing could be more reasonable than to assume that Congress anticipated that various jurisdictional arrangements would be developed in option states. And this is what happened. We suggest that Congress anticipated, in a broad sense, this general direction of events that occurred in the option states.
Nor do we believe that the danger of states assuming only the beneficial aspects of jurisdiction while rejecting those more burdensome was so clear and present that Congress in 1953 reasonably could not have considered vesting in option states the power to experiment. Indeed, the failure of Congress in 1953 to repeal earlier grants of partial subject matter jurisdiction clearly suggests the contrary.8 Of particular im-
This fiscal imbalance, undoubtedly present under Washington‘s scheme, illumines an aspect which strongly suggests recognition by Congress of the necessity to permit experimentation with partial assumptions. This aspect is that the propensity of a state to assume jurisdiction is a function of its fiscal strength and the magnitude of the burden assumption imposes. It follows that the propensity of each state is different. Only by permitting the option states to experiment with assumptions of partial jurisdiction could Congress allow each state to fit its burdens to its capacities.
Another indication that partial assumption is valid appears in the meaning given the statute by the Department of Interior, the department closely involved in drafting PL-280 and having the primary responsibil-
III
We recognize that Washington‘s checker-boarding of criminal jurisdiction might appear particularly inefficient and that its elimination may be desirable. However, it would be difficult to limit an opinion overruling Quinault II merely to such a scheme. An overruling of Quinault II inevitably would cast grave doubt on Montana‘s 1963 assumption of criminal jurisdiction over only the Flathead Indian Reservation.11 There is nothing in the relevant legislative history to indicate that it was the intent of Congress to proscribe assumptions of jurisdiction geographically partial within reservations but to approve assumptions of jurisdiction geographically partial between reservations.
Nor would it be easy to limit such a holding to the proscription merely of partial assumptions of criminal jurisdiction. To validate assumptions of partial civil jurisdiction in the face of such a holding would sink to the level of clumsy and heavyhanded legislation by adjudication. Moreover, there exists nothing in the legislative history to suggest that partial assumption in the civil area is proper while improper in the criminal area. In addition, the administration of such a distinction would prove to be quite complex. The distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction is not easy to draw.12 Thus, assumptions of partial civil jurisdiction would be challenged and, after time and expense, very likely would fall.13 With this result would arise retroactivity problems more complex than we can now imagine.
Finally, a general and all encompassing proscription of assumptions with respect to portions of the Indian country within a state would invalidate state statutory schemes in which such assumptions are conditioned upon consent of the Indians. As already indicated, Washington, Idaho, and Montana have such legislation. To invalidate only those partial assumptions where consent has not been given would be either to apply improperly the 1968 amendments retroactively or to engraft on PL-280 a requirement of consent which all concede was not intended by Congress. Invalidation where consent has been given, however, borders on perversity when it is recalled that the 1968 amendments permit such assumptions. Finally, to invalidate all geographically partial assumptions for the sole purpose of requiring renegotiation of
The power of the United States, acting executively or congressionally, to rescue any and all Indians from the states imposing their jurisdiction improperly cannot be doubted. These branches of our Government are not insensitive to Indians.14 Our intervention in this case would be both redundant and unwise.
We adhere to Quinault II and the dictum of United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.1971) and remand this case to the panel before which it initially was heard to consider the other issues involved in this case.
REMANDED.
HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Circuit Judges BROWNING, DUNIWAY, ELY and WALLACE concur.
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation (“Yakimas“), invoking federal jurisdiction under
On appeal the Yakimas contend: The State‘s assumption of jurisdiction is invalid because the State did not comply with a statutory condition precedent to assumption imposed by Congress in PL-2801 because the State did not amend her constitutional disclaimer of jurisdiction over the Yakimas, and she did not obtain tribal consent to her assumption of jurisdiction. If the State could have assumed complete jurisdiction over the Yakimas,
The court sua sponte ordered this case en banc for the purpose of deciding whether to overrule that part of Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.1966) (”Quinault II“), stating that PL-280 authorized Washington‘s partial assumption of jurisdiction over Indian reservations. The majority of the court refuses to overrule this part of Quinault II and holds that PL-280, authorized the multiple partial assumptions at issue. In my view, the reasoning and the result of Quinault II are wrong and should be overturned. The majority‘s decision to the contrary is based on a misreading of the statutory scheme, a misinterpretation of the legislative history, and some strongly worded, but factually unsupported fears about the impact of correcting our past mistakes in Quinault II. The end product is the perpetuation of some bad law, and the enforced and otherwise unnecessary confrontation with some difficult constitutional issues.2
The Quinault II issue that we took en banc was wrongly decided. Quinault II de-
Quinault II failed to recognize that Washington‘s assumption scheme involves multiple partial assumptions: (1) assumption of jurisdiction of less than all Indians, tribes, and reservations; (2) partial territorial assumption within reservations; and (3) partial assumption of subject matter jurisdiction within reservations.
I have no difficulty in upholding the validity of reservation-by-reservation or tribe-by-tribe assumptions under PL-280, and to the extent that the majority opinion rests on that conclusion, I agree with it.3 That issue was never addressed in Quinault II. However, the second and third types of partial assumption are not valid under PL-280.
I
I start with a brief statutory sketch of Washington‘s assumption schemes. In 1957, the legislature enacted chapter 240, Laws of 1957 (
The majority opinion decides that Congress authorized Washington to assume
I realize that defining congressional policy is not an easy task because Congress has never formulated a coherent policy toward Indians. It has wavered between and among federal dependence, assimilation, and autonomy. In pursuit of one policy, rather than another, and sometimes adopting antithetical policies at the same time, Congress has kept, given, and shared jurisdiction with the states over Indian affairs. The end product has been and still is confusion. However, no confusion exists on the point that history supplies no support for the majority‘s conclusion that Congress intended the states to experiment with partial jurisdiction. The failure of the Department of Interior to consult with option states or with nonconsenting Indians had nothing to do with some kind of experimental proclivities in departmental or congressional minds. On the contrary, it was further evidence of departmental and congressional insensitivity toward Indians. As far as the legislative history reveals, assimilation as a means to “resolve” Indian problems was relatively strong in 1953 when PL-280 was enacted. But of greater moment were the pressures and counterpressures from states who wanted the benefits of total jurisdiction, from those states who were unwilling or unable to assume the
Six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin), known as the “mandatory” states, were willing to assume complete civil and criminal jurisdiction, and none of them had internal impediments to assumption. PL-280 gave consent to transfer immediately full jurisdiction to those states, with a few stated exceptions for specifically designated well-governed reservations.5 The remaining states, known as “option states,” were given the limited choice “as provided in the Act” to assume jurisdiction of “criminal offenses or civil causes, or with respect to both.”6
The majority opinion‘s conclusion that Congress authorized the option states to assume patchwork jurisdiction within a single reservation is flatly contrary to its clearly evinced intent to cure the break-
“[W]here . . . the existence or nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government. Such an impractical pattern or checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of § 1151 and we see no justification for adopting an unwarranted construction of that language where the result would be merely to recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to avoid.” (Seymour v. Superintendent (1962) 368 U.S. 351, 358, 82 S.Ct. 424, 428, 7 L.Ed.2d 346.)
In striking down South Dakota‘s 1961 statute assuming jurisdiction over highways on the reservations, the South Dakota Supreme Court cited the law enforcement
Congress did not need to run experiments to decide that checkerboarding was antithetical to effective law enforcement. Moreover, when it wanted to permit some partial assumption in circumstances that did not affect criminal law enforcement, it left no doubt about its intentions. Section 2(a) of PL-280, as amended by Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545,
The Yakimas’ reservation is a checkerboard of fee owned and non-fee owned land. The effect of Washington‘s partial territorial assumption is to combine on the
The Yakimas have requested retrocession of state jurisdiction to enable them to return fully to federal jurisdiction with the hope of federal assistance in securing outside help and in aiding them to work out their problems within the tribal structure.9
The State of Washington either does not have, or declines to use resources to improve the situation, but has so far been unwilling or unable to relinquish jurisdiction. This lawsuit is a by-product of the stalemate.
The Yakimas have no effective law enforcement on their reservation. Washington acknowledges that reality.10 So does the majority of this court. The majority justifies its conclusion that the Yakimas must be made to bear those ills they have because this court refuses to fly to others that we know not of. “More critically,” it says, “reversal of Quinault II at this late stage [10 years], along with a new interpretation of PL-280, could lead to unfortunate law enforcement problems for thousands of native Americans.”11 The majority opinion‘s statement that reversal of Quinault II would adversely affect 158,000 Indians is factually incorrect. In the first place, Quinault II itself has adversely affected the Yakimas, and overturning the decision will alleviate their distress. In the second, invalidating Washington‘s truly unique checkerboarding would affect no more than about
Invalidating the Washington assumption statute under PL-280 for impermissible geographical checkerboarding would break the stalemate. Washington would be relieved of a law enforcement burden she is unwilling or unable to carry. The Yakimas would be free to negotiate with the federal government and with the State of Washington under
II
The majority opinion also errs in upholding the Washington statute against attack based upon partial subject matter assumption. Because I would strike the statute down for impermissible partial territorial assumption, I would not need to reach the partial subject matter issue. I reach the question only because the majority does so.
Congress required the mandatory states to assume complete subject matter jurisdiction. It had very little reason to require less of the option states, when and if they accepted the invitation to assume jurisdiction. But Congress had a very good reason for not permitting any state to choose the subject matter jurisdiction that it would assume. Congress knew that the states wanted the sweet but not the bitter jurisdiction over Indians.18 Authorization to
It is unnecessary, however, to decide whether, before 1968, Congress gave any leeway to option states to assume jurisdiction selectively. It would be enough to decide a much narrower question: Did Congress authorize Washington to assume some but not all of the jurisdiction relating to criminal offenses, adult and juvenile? The simple answer to that question is “no.”
Although there is arguable textual support in section 7 for dividing civil and criminal subject matter jurisdiction (“criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both“), the same language and that of section 6 (“civil and criminal jurisdiction“) supplies strong textual support for the inference that Congress had no intention of permitting a state to assume pieces of the whole criminal or civil packages.
The 1968 amendments, in contrast, unmistakably permit piecemeal assumption of jurisdiction. (See, e.g.,
Idaho‘s assumption is similar to Washington‘s in the subjects covered, but contains one crucial difference.23 The Idaho jurisdiction is shared with tribal courts as it is concurrent with them.24 It is unclear that invalidation would have any adverse impact because tribal court structures are performing the task now. Finally, the legality of New Mexico‘s assumption will remain unaffected as it has attempted to assert jurisdiction on statutory bases other than PL-280.25 Invalidation does not prevent the states and tribes from negotiating a structure which will operate to the benefit of both. Although I do not know whether Indians in Idaho are experiencing similar problems to those of the Yakimas, invalidation of partial subject matter assumptions would not throw the administration of justice to reservation residents into chaos.
The majority opinion rests on unsound law, and on fears, not facts. The result is a perpetuation of ills forced upon the Yakimas that benefits no one.
I would reverse, invalidating the Washington statute, and set the Yakimas and Washington free from statutory bonds that chafe them both.
Notes
The responses of these nineteen states have not been uniform. Six states assumed some kind of partial jurisdiction (Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, and Washington). Ten of the remaining states have not assumed any effective jurisdiction (Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming). Two other states acted after the 1968 amendments to PL-280 and so are covered by a different statutory scheme (Nevada and Utah). One state assumed complete jurisdiction (Florida). Even among the states assuming partial jurisdiction, there have been a variety of approaches. Washington‘s plan is adequately described in the dissent, infra at p. 447. Idaho, in 1963, assumed partial subject matter jurisdiction in both the civil and criminal areas. Nevada originally adopted a county option approach but, following the 1968 legislation by Congress, returned all previously assumed jurisdiction if the tribe refused to consent to its continuation. Montana, in 1963, assumed only criminal jurisdiction over the Flathead Indian Reservation. Arizona, in 1967, despite its constitutional disclaimer clause, assumed jurisdiction only with respect to air and water pollution control. The exception of well-governed reservations from total assumption of jurisdiction in mandatory states is entirely consistent with the overriding concern of Congress to cure the breakdown in criminal law enforcement on the reservations. (The excepted reservations were Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, and Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin.) Congress’ attention was focused for this purpose reservation by reservation, rather than state by state. The genesis of PL-280 was in individual state by state bills, which at first did not include any exceptions. See Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, and H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 (1952).
“(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.”
“Tribal police officers were outspoken about the quality of law enforcement. Their greatest complaints concerned juvenile problems. One officer reported, ‘The juvenile situation is sad. There is one juvenile officer who covers three or four counties. He seldom comes to the reservation and when he does he just scolds the kids and lets them off. The kids laugh in his face and then they laugh in my face because they know we cannot do a thing with them. . . .’ Others made the same complaint and lamented that there was no action taken by the local authorities on juvenile problems. ‘Sheriff‘s Officers release kids without holding them or doing anything. When we call them they come too late if they even bother to show up. We are getting a real hard time from kids who know we have no jurisdiction over them. Half of the time we don‘t let on that we have no authority over them because they would run wild.’
“Other officers reported, ‘State and County authorities do not enforce the laws. The problem has become worse since the state took over. The kids know we have no authority and make it hard for us. State officials will not even go onto deeded property where Indian families live, even though they have authority to do so. The tribal police have to go there when the situation seems desperate . . .‘” (“The Impact of Public Law 280 upon the Administration of Criminal Justice on Indian Reservations,” in 1 National American Indian Court Judges Ass‘n., Justice and the American Indian 9 (1974) (survey of Washington Indians) [hereinafter cited as “Indian Court Judges Survey“].)
Be that as it may, his statement is not supported by the letter of Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher cited by the dissent, infra at p. 455, n.20. This letter expressed doubt about the wisdom of recognition by the 1968 amendments of assumptions of partial criminal jurisdiction. Its relevant portion merely observed that the Department of Justice “has in the past emphasized the desirability from a law enforcement point of view of not adding to the complexity of the existing jurisdictional structure. For this reason, states and consenting tribes should be encouraged to shift jurisdictional responsibility en bloc whenever possible.” Hearings on H.R. 15419, supra at 28.
The best that the dissent properly can make of these bits of history is that Representative Aspinall thought the 1968 legislation changed PL-280 despite the contrary authority of Quinault II and that perhaps there was a difference between Justice and Interior with respect to the policy of partial assumptions of criminal jurisdiction. Deputy Attorney General Christopher‘s letter cannot be construed as an official interpretation by the Department of Justice of the legality of partial assumptions of criminal jurisdiction under the 1953 legislation. “Although the State assumed jurisdiction over major crimes and juvenile delinquency on reservations, counties have not been provided with resources to effectively assume the responsibilities of patrol, apprehension and investigation of offenses committed on reservations . . . .” (Id. at 7, quoting State of Washington, Comprehensive Plan for Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, January 1-December 31, 1973, at 109.)
Washington Indian Reservations
Total Population: 19,362
Number subject to partial geographic and partial subject matter jurisdiction under ‘63 act (checkerboarding): 9,697
Number subject only to partial subject matter jurisdiction under ‘63 act: 985
Number consenting to full jurisdiction under ‘63 act: 5,758
Number consenting to full jurisdiction under ‘57 act: 2,647
[495 subject to criminal jurisdiction only]
Number over which jurisdiction retroceded in accordance with PL 90-284: 275
Source: Indian Court Judges Survey, supra note 9, at App.C.
The reservations subject to checkerboard jurisdiction include Hoh (60), Kalispel (167), Lower Elwha (250), Lummi (1,225), Nooksack (370), Puyallup (450), Quinault (1,200), and Yakima (5,975) reservations.
This article has meticulously collected and analyzed the legislative history of PL-280. The majority, supra, at note 4, cites this article for the proposition that the legislative history does not definitely indicate whether partial subject matter jurisdiction was within the intent of PL-280. However, the majority then goes on to ignore the subsequent analysis in the article which concluded that such jurisdiction is invalid.
Evaluating legislative history to determine congressional intent can sometimes be an exercise in nuance. Although the Court has indicated what material is relevant to the determination, little guidance concerning weighting has been attempted. E.g., Galvan v. Press (1954) 347 U.S. 522, 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (memorandum inserted in Congressional Record by sponsor); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp. (1951) 341 U.S. 384, 394-95, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (statement by sponsor during presentation on floor of Senate for vote); United States v. C.I.O. (1948) 335 U.S. 106, 113-21 (congressional discussion); Helvering v. Griffiths (1943) 318 U.S. 371, 371, 63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843 (legal opinions relied on by committee and sponsors); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co. (1943) 317 U.S. 476, 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407 (reports of congressional committees). Here the inquiry is even more obscured because we must look to the history of subsequent legislation to divine the intent of the earlier enactment. Mattz v. Arnett (1973) 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.25, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 2258, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (“Although subsequent legislation usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes, . . . it is not always without significance. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S., at 356-57, 82 S.Ct. 424.“).
Nevertheless, the intent of the 1968 amendments is relevant and reasonably certain enough to add support to the view that partial subject matter jurisdiction is inconsistent with the intent of PL-280. Representative Aspinall was Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee which reported out the bill. His remarks were the only representation as to what the bill was intended to accomplish. The sponsors (Reps. Cunningham & Denney and Sen. Ervin) made no remarks. When weighed against a conflicting view expressed in the opinion of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, an opinion contradicted by counsel representing some tribes and implicitly contradicted by the Deputy Attorney General, the pronouncement on the floor of the House should control. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., supra, 341 U.S. at 394-95, 71 S.Ct. 745 (expression of fear in minority report of Senate Committee not authoritative guide to construction of legislation).