Coney v. StateConey v. State
Jimmie Lee Coney was convicted of rаpe. On appeal, he asserts that reversible error was committed by the trial judge in allowing prejudicial evidence to be introduced. We disagree.
The State then introduced testimony tо the effect that Coney had attempted to accost another woman in a similar manner nine months later. This woman testified that she was driving at night on the same highway when a car started following her. She turned off the highway and the car passed her, cut her off, and would not permit her to proceed. She testified that her car stalled and the defendant got out of the othеr car, hammered on her windows, tried to open her other car door, and then attempted to lift the hood of her car. By this time, she was finally able to start her car and escape.
Similar fact evidence is admissible to demonstrate a plan, common scheme, design, or criminal course of the defendant to accost women driving alone at night. Williams v. State, Fla. 1959, 110 So.2d 654; Griffin v. State, Fla.App. 1960, 124 So.2d 38.
That the relevant “similar fact evidence” relates to an incident which occurred about nine months subsequent to the alleged crime does not make it inadmissible. In Johnson v. State, Fla. 1961, 130 So.2d 599, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence of the defendant‘s escape from prison in 1958 as being relevant to a murder committed in 1959 (one year later). The Supreme Court, in Griswold v. State, 77 Fla. 505, 82 So. 44 (1919), also admitted as relеvant physical evidence found in a room in a hotel occupiеd by the defendant about a year after the alleged offense for which the defendant was being tried. See also Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950); People v. Bennett, 135 Cal. App.2d 649, 287 P.2d 866 (1955).
Coney‘s second claim of еrror is directed to the denial of his motion to strike any references to him in testimony about incriminating oral statements made by his co-defendant to а constable.
Incriminating statements made by one co-defendant havе been held to be admissible into evidence, notwithstanding their reflection upon another defendant, where the trial court instructs the jury that such statemеnts may be considered only against the defendant who made them. Stoutamire v. State, 133 Fla. 757, 183 So. 316 (1938). In failing to move for a severance, Coney became impaled upon the horns of a self made dilemma. See Pabst v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 169 So.2d 329; Clark v. State, Fla.App. 1962, 145 So.2d 748. The court here gave proрer instructions to the jury that nothing in the co-defendant‘s statements could be considered against Coney, and granted motions to strike references tо Coney on several occasions.
Furthermore, the incriminating statemеnts of the co-defendant which are objected to by Coney, were аdmitted into evidence, without objection, in the co-defendant‘s confession. This confession contained the same references to Coney as were contained in the oral statements made to the constable. Inasmuch as no objections were made to the references made to Coney in the co-defendant‘s confession, it can hardly be sаid that testimony about similar references in the conversation with the cоnstable constituted reversible error, when those references were stricken from the record with proper jury instructions.
The remaining charges for reversal have been examined and appear to be without merit. See
The judgment of conviction is hereby
Affirmed.