Concord Columbus, L.P. v. TestaConcord Columbus, L.P. v. Testa
Lead Opinion
Concord Columbus, L.P. (“Concord Columbus”) is the owner of certain real property located at 35 West Spring Street, Columbus, Ohio. The property is the site of the Courtyard by Marriott Hotel, which was purchased by Concord Columbus in 1992 for $1,400,000. Following substantial renovations, the hotel ultimately opened for business in April 1994. The dispute before us conсerns the valuation, for tax purposes, of the property during the renovation period.
For tax year 1993, the auditor аssessed the value of the property at $2,600,000. To challenge this valuation, Concord Columbus filed a complaint before the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”), seeking a decrease in the assessed value. In turn, the Board of Education of the Columbus City School District (“Board of Education”) filed a counter-complaint seeking an increase. The BOR ultimately decreased the assessed value to $1,400,000, a determination which was not appealed.
For tax year 1994, the auditor assessed the property’s value at $3,472,600. Both Concord Columbus and the Board of Education again filed complaints challenging this assessment. While the 1994 complaints werе still pending, the auditor reassessed the property, pursuant to
On April 5, 1996, the BOR issued its decision regarding the 1994 tax year, again devaluing the assessed value of the property. The assessed value for 1994 was $2,580,000. On the same date, the BOR also rendered a determination revising the auditor’s appraised “finished value” to $5,510,000 for the 1995 tax year. Since no party had filed a separate complaint to challenge the auditor’s 1995 valuation, the BOR apparently based its jurisdiction to render the determination upon thе “carryover” provisions of
*208 Concord Columbus appealed the BOR’s 1995 valuation to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the BOR lacked statutory jurisdiction to determine the value of the property for tax year 1995 because no complaint had been filed to trigger review of the auditor’s valuation for that year.
The trial court ultimately agreed, finding that the 1994 complaints were not valid complaints upon which the BOR could render a determination for the 1995 tax year. The trial court held that a valid new appraisal rendered by the auditor pursuant to his statutory duties under
The Board of Education and the auditor (“appellants”) have jointly appealed, assigning a single error for our consideration:
“The common pleas court erred in holding that the complaints filed by the property owner and Board of Education with the Franklin County Board of Revision for tax year 1994 were not valid complaints for tax year 1995 underR.C. 5715.19(D) .”
In order to determine whether the “continuing” complaint or “carryover” provision of
Preliminarily, we note that there is scant authority upon which to rely in resolution of this issue. Concord Columbus, and ultimately the cоurt of common pleas, cited case law from the Supreme Court of Ohio that we do not find to be directly on point. See
Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision
(1996),
“***// a complaint filed under this section for the current year is not determined by the board within the time prescribed for such determination, the complaint and any proceedings in relation thereto shall be continued by the board as a valid complaint for any ensuing year until such complaint is finally determined by the board or upon any appеal from a decision of the board. In such case, the anginal complaint shall continue in effect without further filing *209 by the original taxpayer, his assignee, or any other person or entity authorized to file a complaint under this section.” (Emphasis added.)
“No person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuation or assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against the valuation or assessment of that parcеl for any prior tax year in the same interim period, unless * * *
“(a) The property was sold in dn arm’s length transaction * * *;
“(b) The property lost value due to some casualty;
“(c) Substantial improvement was added to the property;
“(d) An increase or decrease of at least fifteen percent in the property’s occupancy has had a substantial economic impact on the property.”
The “interim period” to whiсh the above provision refers is a three-year appraisal cycle or “triennium.” The court of common pleas held that a conflict existed between the continuing-complaint provision and the provisions of
Appellants make a distinction between the carryover or “continuing” complaint provisions set forth above and the carryover “value” provisions set forth in the first two sentences of
“The determination of any such complaint shall relate back to the date when the lien for taxes or recoupmеnt charges for the current year attached or the date as of which liability for such year was determined. Liability for taxes and recoupment charges for such year and each succeeding year until the complaint is finally determined and for any penalty and interest for nonpayment * * * shall be based upon thе * * * valuation * * * as finally determined.”
The carryover-value provisions essentially determine whether a prior valuation must be applied to an ensuing tax year. As noted by appellants, the carryover-“value” provisions were the focus of the Supreme Court of Ohio decisions cited above.
Appellants аrgue that there is no conflict between the continuing-complaint provision, one which is merely procedural, and
We construe the foregoing statutes to mean that although any party could have filed another complaint for tax year 1995, no party was required to do so in order for the BOR to have jurisdiction to address the 1995 valuation. In our view, the continuing-complaint provision is merely a procedural device which ought to be given the effect of its plain intention. While a prior complaint is still pending before the BOR, the parties are not required to keep filing additional complaints in order for the BOR to retain jurisdictiоn for the ensuing years within the same triennium.
The assignment of error is sustained.
Notwithstanding our holding that the BOR retained jurisdiction to address the 1995 valuation, the record before us indicates that the parties were given no notice of the BOR’s intention to address the issue; accordingly, the parties had no opportunity to present evidence regarding the valuation. Therefore, we remand the case to the court of common pleas with instructions to remand the case to the BOR to receive pertinent evidence and render a determination thereon.
Having sustained the assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to the court of common pleas for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed ' and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent. Appellee filed a complaint seeking a decrease in the property’s valuation and the Board of Education filed a counter-complaint with the board of revision (“BOR”) for the 1994 tax year. The 1994 complaints were not dеcided by the BOR within the ninety-day period required under
In order to determine whether the “continuing complaint” or “carryover” provision of
“ * * * If a complaint filed under this section for the current year is not determined by the board within the time prescribed for such determination, the complaint * * * shall be continued by the board as a valid complaint for any ensuing year until such complaint is finally determined by the board * * *. In such ease, the original complaint shall continue in effect without further filing by the original taxpayer * * * or any other person or entity authorized to file a complaint under this section.”
“No person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuatiоn or assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same interim period, unless * * *:
iji
“(c) Substantial improvement was added to the property[.]”
Reading these two sections together and attempting to harmonize them leaves us with an obvious understanding of whаt is intended. A “person, board, or officer” may challenge property valuations and assessments only once during an interim (triennium) period, unless one of the circumstances listed in
That is precisely why
Based on my reading of the above statutory provisions and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in
Wolf v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
(1984),
While ordinarily county auditors reappraise property only on a sexennial basis and update thоse appraisals on a triennial basis, county auditors are required under
The renovations and the changes in value resulting therefrom required the auditor to revalue the property each year, notwithstanding the fact thаt 1995 was part of the same triennium as 1994. Since the carryover provision in
Thus, where the BOR, for whatever reason, does not resolve a complaint or counter-complaint in a timely manner during a triennium, the BOR’s determination of value for the year in question cаnnot carry over to ensuing years within that triennium if the property’s value has changed during that ensuing year as evidenced by the auditor’s valuation. Tax year 1995 represented a new and changed value; consequently, there could be no carryover from the previous *213 year’s valuation even though both years were in thе same triennium. There simply was no carryover jurisdiction authorizing the BOR to impose its own, separate valuation.
When the auditor issued his 1995 valuation, either party had the right to file a complaint or counter-complaint challenging that valuation. Conversely, all parties had the right to accept the auditor’s valuation. Since all parties accepted the auditor’s valuation, the BOR had no authority “sua sponte ” to alter that valuation.
This holding is consistent with the constitutional requirement of uniform tax treatment. Taxpayers’ property taxes do not change during a triennium unless there is a substantial change in value. Further, the parties’ rights to notice of property tax increases and to present evidence regarding the property’s valuation is preserved by keeping the auditor’s duties and the subsequent appeal process intact.
I would overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.