Conchito v. City of Tulsa

urgеs that the defendant veracity Lastly, character, memory, curacy, that if the States, punishment was excessive United Leeper v. credibility. See affirmed, should the sentence judgment is denied cert. Cir., F.2d given to the punishment reduced. The (1971). be 30 L.Ed.2d 1021, 92 S.Ct. the limits set invited defendant was within question was Thus, that feel therefore, statutes, not excessive. aft that himself so counsel the defense direct, can he on door opening the thus reasons, er foregoing judgment For the comes about what complain be heard appealed from affirmed. and sentence Kennedy v. See such door. through We, BRETT, State, Okl.Cr., (1965). BLISS, J., J., 400 P.2d P. concur. be with therefore, proposition find this

out merit. proposition

Defendant’s second Ven Change for his Motion deals with 22 O.S. counsel to only cite would ue. We that a provided wherein by af supported change of venue must persons credible at least three fidavits of Chico CONCHITO, Appellant, failed to county. defendant of that statutory requirement comply TULSA, The CITY OF Appellee. judge affidavits, so the trial supporting No. M-73-391. scope of his discretion within the was well Appeals of Criminal Oklahoma. State, Sam deny said motion. See April 18, 1974. Okl.Cr., 510 P.2d 978 Further, de we obsеrve dire designate the voir failed to

fendant we can so that proceedings the record claim the defendant’s further discuss have ordered judge should after change his own motion of venue on he had an outburst of one venireman cases,” therefore enough “drug had case. could not on sit error, proposition of As his next trial court urges allowing discretion in State’s abused its during remain in the courtroom witness to expert of the defendant’s examination “the had invoked. witness since Rule” been upon the “discrediting” We find no effect urged by de defendant’s witness This discretion of fendant. was within judge thus, the absence trial abuse, not overturn the we will extreme trial See decision on matter. court’s State, Okl.Cr.,

Haggy P.2d 936 reason, Thus, foregoing proposi third we feel that the defendant’s tion is without merit.

13«5 Goodwin, Tulsa, appellant. for O. James Bales, Atty., Waldo F. Mor- Jack Prosecutor, gan, County, Chief Tulsa appellee.

OPINION

BRETT, Judge: Conchito, appellant, Chico hereinaft- defendant, charged, er referred to as Municipal Court, tried and convicted County, Tulsa in Case No. Using 153732for the crime of Profane and Language Obscene Insulted Which and Of- Pеrson, fended a in violation of Title Section of the Tulsa Revised Ordi- alone, punishes speech pay a fine of Section sentenced He was nances. therefore, standing Dollars Fifty ($150.00) Hundred One ordinance, attack the overbreadth of that days Ninety (90) a term serve might the words he used although said judge, trial before city jail, after constitutionally punishable timely appeal been under A suspended. being sentence because, narrow, precisely drawn this Court. perfected to has been society “the to all transcendent value the fa- into appeal draws This expression constitutionally protected is 122, the constitutionality of Section cial justify 'attacks on allowing deemed to provides: which Revised Ordinances Tulsa overly requirement broad no statutes with any person to for an offense “It shall be person making that the the attack demon lan- or obscene profane utter use or could not be strate that his own conduct any person proposal guage req the regulated a statute drawn with ” offended insulted or hearing such is specificity.’ Gooding v. uisite narrow such is di- thereby, to whom regаrdless Wilson, 521, 1103, 518, 405 92 U.S. S.Ct. rected.” 408, 1105, quoting L.Ed.2d 418 (1972) 31 Pfister, 479, 486, Dombrowski 380 v. U.S. thereunder conviction The defendant’s 1116, 22, (1965). 85 L.Ed.2d 31 S.Ct. 14 manag- addressing to from his resulted Orleans, also Lewis v. of New See words, “mother retail store er of a 972, - U.S. -, 970, 94 S.Ct. 39 following a fucker, my rights,” know 214, 219(1974). store whether ‍‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍argument over heated repair a properly kept promise had The overbreadth doctrine purchased had he pair of trousers upon principle founded of substantive given either to be entitled he was whether process due forbids governments which his or to have pair trousers a different prohibit guaranteed by certain frеedoms manager testi- store money The refunded. A penal the Constitution.2 vio out- defendant’s following fied at trial that when, con lates this doctrine as drafted or inspected burst, pants out “we took susceptible strued, application it is was still and he . . again them . offensive, although vulgar or so about it. very, very hostile protected by the First and Fourteenth time, very enraged, and I was at that Orleans, Amendments. Lewis of New police.” (Tr. 10) I did call that time U.S. -, 970, L.Ed.2d 94 39 S.Ct. - epithet used testified He further California, 214 403 (1974); Cohen v. U.S. and offended insulted had the defendant 15, 18-21, 91 L.Ed.2d 284 29 him.1 (1971); Gooding 405 U.S. ordi- challenges 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 408 The Button, violation its face in In N. 371 nance as overbroad on A. A. C. P. v. U.S. expression 433, freedom of L.Ed.2d 405 guarantee 9 (1963), Amendment. United First States complained of, perhaps de him 1. the word he It of some interest wouldn’t young com then man and the arrested. denied trial fendant a black Coriehito was prosecu offending plaining man. The that he had used the term. witness a white through emphasized ex direct tion at trial Amendment doctrine of over- the store The First amination that witness always separable complaining breadth, neighborhood. while from the The a black epithet void-for-vagueness doctrine, is nonetheless a he had heard witness testified concept separate he had distinct which flows from in the several weeks “m.f.” more times principle. Note, previously in he Constitutional See the First store than had worked at that time, Doctrine, ex Amendment Harv. that each Overbreadth 83 his He testified entire life. ; spoken (1970) Note, offending cept one, L.Rev. 871-75 word was Void-for-Aragueness person. complaining Doctrine in the witness testi black Court, arrived, police he told Con- 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 110-113 fied that when spoken police chito if he he had wоuld tell punishable makes the over- the language the rationale articulated “hapless who, in these words: stonemason after crushing doctrine breadth toe, his innocently utters relieving few freedoms are “These Amendment] [First expletives” as as the public speaker well su- as well as vulnerable, delicate punctuates political speech with a society. The in our precious premely vulgarity convey it helps chosen because their may deter exer- sanctions threat of inexpressable “otherwise emotions.” ap- actual рotently as the almost cise . . . Because sanctions. plication of carefully We have examined the need breath- Amendment freedoms First recent Supreme Court decisions in this survive, space government ing area and conclude that Section only with narrow in the area regulate drafted, is unconstitutionally broad. See specificity.” Cohen v. 1780, (1971); Gooding L.Ed.2d 284 Thus, no while freedom of 518, 1103, 405 U.S. 92 L. S.Ct. 31 absolute, providing necessity the of means Ed.2d 408 Lewis (1972); City v. of New space” First Amend- “breathing such - Orleans, -, 970, U.S. 94 S.Ct. 39 L. requires only that threats freedoms ment 214 Ed.2d cf. (1974); Rosenfield v. New proscribed.3 evil be оf a serious substantive 901, Jersey, 2479, 408 92 U.S. S.Ct. 33 L. Therefore, undertakes ordinance which an Oklahoma, Ed.2d 321 Brown (1972); v. only may upheld to punish 914, 2507, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 326 33 interest,4 compelling state showing of (1972). punishable words and the made specific doubt, in certain We have no must come with view of Cohen v. California, speech.” “narrowly supra, Gooding Wilson, classes of su- limited v. pra, each, 315 Hampshire, progency U.S. the of Chaplinsky v. New that 1031, 766, provisions 568, 1035 of the ordinance L.Ed. make 62 S.Ct. 86 before us punishable constitutionally (1942). protected speech, and that a conviction under it has never us been The ordinance before not sustainable unless the ordinance plain that in by this It is construed Court. fairly require to something construed may regulate government an area which more than profane the utterance of a or (N. A. “only specificity” narrow A. obscene word which or insulted offended 433, Button, at 83 371 U.S. S.Ct. C. P. v. someone who heard it. 338, is no nar- at L.Ed.2d this 418), 9 at whether, by The then becomes provision. language pro- rowly drawn The applying statutory the rules of construction boisterous, or not be or scribed need loud presumption that its drafters requirement is no public. There intended the to be ordinance consistent knowledge that it be uttered with the that Constitution, with the can ordinance might be hearing is within someone be narrowed construction that it is so only two ele- offended. The ordinance speech protected susceptible to first, language that uttered be ments: First and Fourteenth Amendments. second, that some- profane and, or obscene City brief, brings of its or of- be insulted hearing same one provisions attention of this Court the face, thereby. its the ordinance On fended public inconvenience, 1, 4, that far Chicago, evil rises abоve 09 3. In Terminiello annoyance 1131, (1949), or unrest.” 1134 L.Ed. 93 inconvenience, “public an the court held noying 516, Rock, Little 361 4. Bates v. of U.S. evil sufficient is not or unrest” 412, (1960). 4 L.Ed.2d 480 80 S.Ct. punishing speech. justify of “[F]reedom Columbia, 136 U.S. 5. v. District Williams absolute, though ... is never 638, (1969). App.D.C. 644 419 F.2d punish censorship against less likely produce 91 ment, a clear 403 U.S. shown unless Cohen 294 29 danger present substantive a serious 1388 whom, person to indi- O.S.1971, urges that the of violence vidually, pro the remark addressed. as construed city must be ordinance n n n n n n state interest compelling the same

tecting within the urges, the sion diate because the as that another “fighting physical Chaplinsky New statute, from ordinance purview of addressee a breach of 62 S.Ct. violence. words” so insulting or is, preventing abusive retaliates with designed the landmark deci and, hence, falls Thus, Hampshire, 315 L.Ed. 1031 offending prohibit results imme peace by the than plainly The statute peace. this characteristic en excite Derisive statute ^[******] as prohibit coming the addressee to likely . . . annoying within the addressee. .' the face-to-face words construed cause a breach of only plainly purview of the does breach . can tending . no . be tak- ” more 310-313, 320-321, Hampshire 18 A. New reaffirmed As 754,758,762 (1941). 2d Wilson, supra, Gooding v. is one categorized spite strong In interest speech” “narrowly limited classes preserve construing the Tulsa ordinance to Hampshire, 315 U.S. (Chaplinsky v. New ju validity, accept we are unable 1035) L.Ed. at suggested gloss dicial for two power punish to which have the the States First, plain precise lan reasons. the consistently the First Fourteenth impossible the makes it guage of supra, the Chaplinsky, In Amendments. overly its scope to narrow broad to the a conviction un- sustained Court prohibition “fighting of words” without 2, of Chapter Section the Public der judicial exceeding reshap the limits of the provided: Hampshire, which Laws óf New ing legislative enactments substan tially rewriting the ordinance. doWe offensive, any person “No shall address power the the confuse to construe with any to other annoying or word derisive power legislate. to any person lawfully in or is street who any him place, call of- public other nor Whatever “fighting else annoying word to or derisive or fensive be, they might it clear that are words lawfully any any person other hearer,” person the “directеd nor public place, call him street or other Connecticut, Cantwell v. derisive name. any offensive or (1940); 84 L.Ed. 1213 tendency

are words such as a direct “have person acts of cause violence the statute did not Court held that that whom, individually, is ad ‍‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍ the remark right the of free contravene constitutional dressed,” Chaplinsky Hampshire, New Hampshire court because the New supra, 315 U.S. at 62 S.Ct. at scope had the statute to limited the at and that one who hears such L.Ed. words,” stating: reasonably regard able must insult,” except personal such them as “a direct Cohen words were forbidden “[N]o tendency supra, acts cause 403 U.S. at 91 S. have a direct any pro- upon guilty and, any person peace, use of of a 7. “If shall make breach insulting thereof, punished by fane, violent, to- conviction shall be fine abusive or presence any person, $100.00, the sum not im- ward another to exceed or or about prisonment county jail language, hearing, in its common the to exceed or which anger thirty days, imprison- acceptation, fine to arouse to or both such is calculated jury spoken person ment, it or at discretion of court or about or to whom trying addressed, or same.” or to cause a breach every person assault, shall be deemed an such city legitimate has protecting at 291. The Tulsa interest in Ct. citizens an of- from lan- provides that it shall be offensive abusive ordinance may violence, guage provoke which prohibited other- use the fense to peace, or wise breach same is insulted or create a any person hearing the annoyance.8 is di- Nothing such “regardless to whom recent cases offended so far as of the justifies unable to strain rected.” are conclu- We prohibit words, sion that grossly offensive those words to construe personal purpose for the intentionally constitutes direct sole “in- language which anger flict[ing] injury” (Chaplinsky to arouse and is calculated v. New insult Hampshire, supra, such is directed. person to whom 1780) upon those who hear is constitution- reject second reason we must n ally expression. great But care city upon urged us construction must be taken protecting that in citizens statute, state note that the O.S. injury, from legislative enactment city has called to which “protect” does not also them from the ex- attention, penalty one month bears our pression, terms, although in offensive a fine of Hun- imprisonment One and/or ideas. ($100.00) Dollars. The ordinance dred times as penalty three question bears a reached, In of the result we do not the ordinance de- great. If the statute and occasion to decide the offense, as the proscribe the same fine and spoken by whether the words this defend- hold, punishment as- city urges us to ant constitute “fighting words” or come jurisdiction of beyond here is sessed within specific some other classification statute city so construe the court. To which punished with the Constitu- ordinance compel finding would tion of the United States. statute, the state conflict with For the above reasons we are that the rule previously held opinion that judgment ap- and sentence respect en- prohibits a from

which pealed be, is, from must and the same a state larging upon requirements of . hereby reversed and in- remanded with city may impose that the statute means structions to dismiss. penalty a for the same offense greater imposed by than the state statute. Johnson BUSSEY, J., specially conсurs. 258 P.2d 97 Okl.Cr. 702 special concur- joins in BLISS, J., P. Supreme decisions In of the BUSSEY, rence area, compelled

in to conclude we are J. susceptible in ordinance speech protected by the application : concurring) BUSSEY, Judge (specially is, First and Fourteenth Amendments and bound are Since therefore, unconstitutionally broad. Fur- the members opinions ther, above, for the reasons listed we do must, States, reluc- I the United Court of susceptible find the ordinance of nar- by my tantly, results reached concur in the preserve rowing would construction which howevеr, believe, colleague, Judge Brett. validity. Amend- the First the true construction of limitations, breadth, particular scope, right’s We are not unaware ment epithet by analyzed opinion vulgar dissenting used the defendant would are best Blackmun, great majority in grossly offensive to the concurred Chief Justice Burger Rehnquist of the citizens of the of Tulsa. Justice Justice guidance the later in this connection connection with decisions Some provided by Penal 250.2 in this area. the Model Code draft, 1962), (proposed when read official 1390 Orleans, building they by physical met supra. The were City of New

Lewis loud, personal entirety, as follows: resistance abuse: reads in its Dissent, bitch, you,’ son I’ll kill ‘You ‘White aptly Holmes observed: “Mr. Justice bitch, death,’ you son of I’ll choke themselves declare tend to rights ‘All bitch, you put and ‘You son of a if ever logical extreme.’ to their absolute your again, you hands on all me I’ll cut County v. Mc Co. Water Hudson pieces.’ The defendant was convicted Carter, Georgia provided under statute which 828 52 L.Ed. shall, any person prov- that ‘who without allow our ocation, another, to which we “The extremes use to or of and in his maniрulated theory ex presence opprobrious selves to be . . . words or exemplified logic end of tended to the language tending abusive to cause a opinion in this case and the Court’s breach of the . . . shall be years ago, of two guilty its blood brother of a misdemeanor.’ The Court Wilson, 405 92 S. U.S. Gooding upon dictionary seized definitions and (1972). The 31 L.Ed.2d Ct. of Georgia court decisions doctrines, ‘vagueness’ ‘overbreadth’ and century. from the turn of the It con- being applied are now swept beyond cluded that the statute Court, steadily have worked quietly ‘fighting bounds words’ limitatiоn par way into First Amendment their Hampshire, of Chaplinsky v. New process as substantive due lance much 82 L.Ed. 1031 of the 20’s and did for the ‘old Court’ (1942), despite the fact the lan- being are invoked 30’s. These doctrines guage of the virtually statute tracked the indiscriminately regard without used the Chaplinsky Court question, pos nature of to describe properly subject or ordinance has sible effect the statute regulation, some any and without demon- upon importance stration in reason how ‘the narrow lan- exposition speech in to the relation guage of Georgia stаtute has ideas, purported or asserted com or the significant potential appli- for sweeping munity preventing interest cation to suppress or important deter happenstance speech. And it is no U.S., speech.’ footnote each case the facts are status, conveniently relegated distant and senting) . ^[1103] (Burger, C. J., dis- cates, of our constitutional bly might apply ter supra, is that in a less in wholesale lots because our at 1112 “The stitutional compulsion of a doctrine context of Framers, and, indeed, other words.’ function ‍‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍to application but are (dissenting disturbing limitations, imaginary are not U.S., invalidating state to others who of this parsing opinion). merely applying Gooding focus. This is the events. The as was intended adjudication ^[1103] 92 S.Ct. elliptical as the ‘conceiva might statutes reduces history analy- result indi con ut produce don’t have to know where he did something to her son and she wanted ing and screaming that I had her son or us. The officer testified that while he came out of their was waiting husband spective versions of the incident are con- course, cer. “In the flicting, officer’s Appellant’s on this but the prеsent were his driver’s your testimony. stopped by son and I municipal record, case, appellant and her appellant’s truck ‘and started and the officer’s re- was. license, That is I said am not judge credited binding upon police husband to finding, appellant “lady, talking offi- yell- I sis Gooding to and to this case is in- you. to I talking am to this man and structive: In Gooding, officers were at- you can go sit in the truck.” She said tempting to public restore “you access to a god police damn m. going f. am —I 49-7,’ police superintendent] or indeed other term to Giarrusso [the again, thе you are Ante And or- “lady said 94 S.Ct. 972. this.” to see about I struck no discus- arrest.” dinance is down with jail you are under going to — significantly af- jail” might sion of whether it “you’re taking me to said She protected speech, reasons fect and no in the cab get back she started and why interest in her while State’s caught up to and I truck attempted of its and the harmonious administration the cab. getting she was lone, prevail laws should not over indi- fighting she started take her and fight that the statute is unconsti- A vidual claim App. arms.’ her swinging applied tutional as I cannot with to others. appellant was subdued ensued says with reconcile what the Court what Appellant help another officer. Supreme the Louisiana Court has said. resisting arrest charged with my police. I believe Brethren wantonly reviling the She here, merely as ap- just seek a result I was charges but on both was convicted wantonly they sought a result in convinced Good- conviction pealed only the ing. reviling police. “Mr. warned of the dan- this case to

“We remanded Justice Jackson this gers analy- kind of constitutional to construe of' Louisiana Court sis : of the ordinance. meaning [footnote 92 S.Ct. 408 U.S. omitted] suppose But I did not our function court, after That was that of a council of The revision. precedents, in applicable reviewing the issue before us whether what specifi Gooding, cluding Chaplinsky deprived appellant been done has this ‘not of

cally construed the ordinance right. of a constitutional It the law nar protected speech; it is fensive review, applied that we not the ab- rowed stract, questions academic which it time; it is persons specific at a specific might raise in some more doubtful not un and is thereforе not overbroad York, case.’ v. New 334 U.S. Saia Any reason .... constitutional 1148, 1155, 92 L.Ed. 68 S.Ct. wantonly it able man knows what (1948) (dissenting opinion). The or revile .... Section curse vagueness in the field “Overbreadth and sweep pro within its definitely does not present as the case and Good- de scriptions abusive and all forms indicate, ing have become result-oriented 826-827, La. speech.1 263 rogatory rubber-stamps easy attuned to the (emphasis origi 269 So.2d imagined man’s self-assurance ‘one nal). vulgarity lyric.’ is another’s Cohen v. side, setting facts to one “Again, selectively wording of dissects the 29 L.Ed.2d 284 The dan- opinion, ger apparent. Inherent in the

the Louisiana use eyes ‘opprobrious,’ refers us these doctrines and this is a ju- the word standard dicial-legislative ‘opprobrious’ confrontation. its treatment of Good- intervention, a plainly frequent more our which of that ‘49-7 ing, observes unrestrained, constitutional late has been the more we sweep than the broader usurp prerogative an- “fighting gov- of democratic definition of applying and ernment. Instead of constitu- Chaplinsky,’ ante nounced limitations, nothing in the tional do that ‘we find become ‘coun- concludes cil of revision.’ adheres to If opiniоn of the Louisiana meaningful attempt present course, no state statute or any that makes by acceptable limited ordinance will unless it properly or define—as limit parrots wording opinions. of our Chaplinsky Gooding “opprobrious” and — legitimate community in- it reflects a inter- surely is not what the Framers “This in the harmonious administration this is not our constitutional est and tended day what Mr. its laws. Police officers in this per- would adhere to function. champion haps prepared must be thick-skinned and Murphy, a known Justice abuse, wanton, freedoms, velocity, high wrote for a but Amendment First away supra, step verbal attack often is Chaplinsky, but unanimous bench U.S., 571-572, ^[766] at from violence or passioned reaction, no self-disciplined matter how the individu- 769: als involved. In the interest the ar- scope to the ‘Allowing the broadest person rested who could become the vic- purpose of the Four- police overbearance, tim of and in the Amendment, it is well under- teenth officer, interest of the who must antici- right speech of free stood that the pate who, violence and like the rest of and under all not absolute at all times us, fallibly human, legislatures certain There are circumstances. challenged enacted laws of the kind narrowly limited well-defined and legitimate this case to pur- serve a social prevention classes of pose and to restrict speech that is punishment been of which have never slight ‘of such social step value as a thought any raise Constitutional any may truth that benefit that be de- problem. These include lewd and rived from clearly by outweighed [it] obscene, libelous, profane, the social interest in morality.’ order and the insulting “fighting” or words— supra, Chaрlinsky, [315 U.S.] by very those which ‍‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍their in- utterance [766], at 769 [footnote omitted]. injury or tend an imme- flict to incite In such circumstances stay we should peace. It has diate breach been yield our hand and not to the absolutes well observed such utterances are of doctrine. part any exposition no essential ideas, slight and are social val- “I see no affirmance, alternative to our step as a ue truth benefit and I therefore dissent.” be derived from them In the instant case I have no hesitation clearly outweighed by the social inter- construing the words morаlity. est order and “Resort to to the store manager as words.” epithets personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of in- Perhaps impact of the decisions cited opinion safeguarded by formation or by Judge Brett, and the underlying facts Constitution, punishment and its upon which they based, were yet have as criminal act would raise no been obscured the scandals of Water- under instrument.” Cantwell v. gate, energy crisis, and the rising rate Connecticut, 296, 309-310, 60 of unemployment, but as these problems (Footnotes 84 L.Ed. 1213.’ are resolved, my it is hope fervent оmitted.) news media analyze will these decisions “The uttered Mrs. Lewis to and make known to the American the arresting ‘plainly’ pro- officer that the ultimate result of the conclusions fane, ‘plainly’ insulting, it was reached highest ‘plainly’ fighting. it was It therefore is Court in this land, subjects every citizen ordinance, within the reach of the family his to hearing the most vulgar, highest narrowed Louisiana’s obscene, court. and abusive language and leaving ordinance, moreover, poses sig- no them without recourse if the remarks are nificant threat to speech. And not specifically аddressed to them.1 It State, Okl.Cr., Brown 492 P.2d 1106— with the case) ; same crime as in the instant modified this Court because was. Brown Supreme and later the United States Court in indigent, (dealing an but otherwise affirmed Oklahoma, Brown 408 92 will, course, necessary City future, of be distant to address themselves to the specifically ordi- creation, discovery, rights Tulsa to enact a new of of for the nance, complying the decisions of the of perpetrated with thousands victims of crimes Court, to against States referred United them these same crim- opinion. Judge Brett’s inals. it do not believe that can be established BLISS, J.,P. with Judge concurs BUS- adopting First Amеndment that special concurrence. SEY’s contemplated was ever First it broadly right should be so Amendment which

construed sanction results must, necessity, of flow deci- from these sions. If the unbridled exercise of ^ right, only by

First limited Amendment lip empowers service which states to punishable only and

declare unlawful particular words” addressed to a Jerry CUDJO, Appellant, Lee individual, talk, gutter then and obscenities insulting all Oklahoma, Appellee. The STATE of places public of resort without the exclu- No. F-73-430. churches, schools, state-support- sion of the Appeals оf Criminal Court of Oklahoma. institutions, courts2, ed of the Halls April 24, 1974. Congress, grounds and the hallowed dedi- gallant cated honor those men republic

strove to establish and maintain a guaranteed which right freedom of right but life, pursuit liberty happiness, insuring pow- the states the enact, define,

er to and declare certain acts and omissions as criminal ‍‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍offenses and prescribe punishment therefor.

Surely, in weighing the First Amend- guarantees, ment some consideration should given provisions to the other Constitution to the end that standards public speech and conduct should not be re-

duced common lowest denominator. Perhaps the partici- the Court pating in opinions, ju- these who have also

dicially greater decreed ever and broader protections for the committing criminal vi- crimes, time,

olent may find some judgment (dealing Contempt, 33 L.Ed.2d vacated the 1973 open court, Direct and remanded the case to this for re- used the “chicken-shit”) ; consideration of Cohen v. Cali- and on March fornia, supra, Gooding supra. United Eaton v. States [Dissenting opinion Burger Tulsa,-- U.S.-, Chief Justice 39 L.Ed. with whom Justice Blackmun 2d reversed and Justice remanded for further Rehnquist opinion joined]. proceedings. [Dissenting Justice Burger Rehnquist, Justice with whom Chief A-18,10 joined]. 2. Eaton v. No. Blackmun Justice 7 —Af September 20, firmed Order of this Court

Case Details

Case Name: Conchito v. City of Tulsa

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Date Published: Apr 18, 1974

Citation: 521 P.2d 1384

Docket Number: M-73-391

Court Abbreviation: Okla. Crim. App.