306 F.3d 1347 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110(cid:13) Stat. 1321-73, as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), provides(cid:13) that a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or correctional(cid:13) facility may not bring any action under any federal law --(cid:13) with respect to prison conditions -- "until such(cid:13) administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."(cid:13) The issue in this case is whether the PLRA’s exhaustion(cid:13) requirement applies to a grievance procedure described in(cid:13) an inmate handbook but not formally adopted by a state(cid:13) administrative agency. We hold that it does. Accordingly,(cid:13) we reverse the judgment of the District Court and we(cid:13) remand the case for further proceedings consistent with(cid:13) this opinion.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) Plaintiffs Victor Concepcion and Anthony Ways are(cid:13) inmates in the custody of the New Jersey Department of(cid:13) Corrections (NJDOC). They filed this S 1983 action against(cid:13) various corrections officers and officials on August 6, 1998,(cid:13) alleging that the defendants violated their civil rights(cid:13) through the use of excessive force during two separate(cid:13) incidents on August 18, 1997. We briefly describe each of(cid:13) these alleged incidents in turn.(cid:13) A. Concepcion Incident(cid:13) During the morning of August 18, 1997, Corrections(cid:13) Officer William Sellnow opened all of the cells in(cid:13) Concepcion’s tier at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP) so(cid:13) that the inmates could proceed to morning breakfast. After(cid:13) opening the cells, Sellnow walked down the hallway and(cid:13) crossed paths with Concepcion. Because the hall was(cid:13) narrow, Concepcion claims that he had to turn to the side(cid:13) so that Sellnow could pass. According to Concepcion, for no(cid:13) apparent reason, Sellnow rammed his shoulder into(cid:13) Concepcion’s left shoulder as he walked by, and(cid:13) 3(cid:13) Concepcion responded by asking, "What’s your problem?"(cid:13) App. at A112-13. Concepcion claims that the two men then(cid:13) started swinging at each other simultaneously.(cid:13) According to Concepcion, he and Sellnow exchanged(cid:13) punches for only a "couple [of] seconds." Id. at A114.(cid:13) Concepcion admits that he hit Sellnow, who later received(cid:13) at least four stitches in the forehead. Upon witnessing the(cid:13) fray from a nearby desk, Sargeant Larry Cole called a "Code(cid:13) 33," which, according to Concepcion, "means there’s a(cid:13) fight." Id. at A115. At this point, Concepcion claims that(cid:13) approximately thirty to forty officers began running towards(cid:13) him. In response, Concepcion ran in the opposite direction(cid:13) and jumped over the tier railing down to the first floor.(cid:13) Several officers caught and restrained Concepcion on the(cid:13) first floor. Corrections Officer George Phillips testified that(cid:13) it took four or five officers to place Concepcion in(cid:13) handcuffs. While restraining Concepcion, Phillips suffered a(cid:13) burn from a nearby boiler pipe. After he was restrained,(cid:13) Concepcion claims that Cole kicked him in the face and(cid:13) that Phillips stuck his nightstick in between Concepcion’s(cid:13) handcuffs, lifting him off his feet and into the air.(cid:13) Concepcion further claims that Phillips rammed his head(cid:13) into a cement wall, and that after Concepcion was taken to(cid:13) a detention cell, Phillips hit him in the forehead with a(cid:13) nightstick.(cid:13) As a result of the events described above, Concepcion(cid:13) was charged with committing a prohibited act ("assaulting(cid:13) any person") in violation of Title 10A of the New Jersey(cid:13) Administrative Code, which subjects inmates to disciplinary(cid:13) action and sanctions for committing certain enumerated(cid:13) acts. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, S 4-4.1(a)*.002 (2002).(cid:13) After a disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer found(cid:13) Concepcion guilty as charged and sanctioned him to 15(cid:13) days detention, a 360-day loss of commutation time, and(cid:13) 365 days administrative segregation.(cid:13) B. Ways Incident(cid:13) On August 18, 1997, the same day in which the above(cid:13) events took place, inmate Anthony Ways was involved in a(cid:13) separate incident. After having his lunch at the prison(cid:13) 4(cid:13) cafeteria, Ways proceeded towards a central rotunda, upon(cid:13) which various wings of the prison converge. He alleges that,(cid:13) as he approached the rotunda, there was a "commotion(cid:13) going on," with "people . . . running" and"officers swinging(cid:13) sticks." App. at A135. He also testified that he saw two(cid:13) officers on the ground in the center of the rotunda.(cid:13) After observing this commotion, Ways claims that he(cid:13) attempted to get back to his wing so that he could return(cid:13) to his cell. Id. at A137. According to Ways, while attempting(cid:13) to return, he was approached by Corrections Officer Robert(cid:13) Richter. Ways testified as follows:(cid:13) [H]e’s approaching me, so, out of instinct, my hands go(cid:13) up. He swings. As he swings, I’m trying to prevent his(cid:13) swing by pushing his shoulder away from me. . . . As(cid:13) he swings, he hits me in my jaw, and it didn’t knock(cid:13) me out, but it was enough for me. I laid on the ground(cid:13) and surrender[ed].(cid:13) Id. at A139. According to Ways, after he laid down on the(cid:13) ground, Richter and another officer placed his arms and(cid:13) legs in handcuffs. Ways claims that, after he was(cid:13) restrained, several officers stood him up and carried him(cid:13) towards another wing of the prison. As he was being(cid:13) carried, Ways alleges that he was dropped to the floor and(cid:13) that Richter kicked him. He testified that he sustained(cid:13) various injuries requiring medical treatment.(cid:13) In connection with the events of that day, Ways was(cid:13) charged with assaulting Richter and two other corrections(cid:13) officers in violation of Title 10A of the New Jersey(cid:13) Administrative Code. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, S 4-(cid:13) 4.1(a)*.002 (2002). After a disciplinary hearing, a hearing(cid:13) officer found Ways guilty on all charges and sanctioned him(cid:13) to 30 days detention, a 970-day loss of commutation time,(cid:13) 970 days administrative segregation, and a 30-day loss of(cid:13) recreation privileges. On February 19, 1999, also in(cid:13) connection with what transpired on August 18, 1997, Ways(cid:13) pled guilty to criminal aggravated assault in violation of(cid:13) N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:12-1(b)(5). The aggravated assault(cid:13) charge was based on the fact that Ways had punched(cid:13) Corrections Officer Kimberly Bleinstein in the face, breaking(cid:13) her jaw.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) C. Plaintiffs’ S 1983 Complaint(cid:13) On August 6, 1998, Concepcion and Ways filed their(cid:13) complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that they(cid:13) were the victims of excessive force in violation of their(cid:13) constitutional rights on August 18, 1997. They named(cid:13) seven NJSP corrections officers and officials as defendants.(cid:13) On August 22, 2000, the defendants moved for summary(cid:13) judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had failed(cid:13) to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant to(cid:13) 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), which mandates that"[n]o action(cid:13) shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under(cid:13) section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such(cid:13) administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."(cid:13) More specifically, the defendants argued that, before(cid:13) seeking redress in a federal court, the plaintiffs were(cid:13) required under S 1997e(a) to follow the administrative(cid:13) grievance procedure set forth in the Department of(cid:13) Corrections Inmate Handbook ("Handbook"). The District(cid:13) Court described that procedure as follows:(cid:13) The process begins by the inmate submitting an(cid:13) "Administrative Remedy Form" to the Administrator’s(cid:13) Office. Upon receipt, the Department Head writes a(cid:13) response on the form; this response is signed by the(cid:13) Primary Level Supervisor and the Department Head;(cid:13) and the response is finally reviewed and signed by the(cid:13) Intermediate Level Supervisor as the Administrator’s(cid:13) designee. The inmate complaint form with the(cid:13) administrative response is then placed in the inmate’s(cid:13) Classification folder and the prisoner is given a copy.(cid:13) No administrative appeal is permitted.(cid:13) Concepcion v. Morton, 125 F. Supp. 2d 111, 116 (D.N.J.(cid:13) 2000) (citations omitted). The Handbook states that the(cid:13) grievance procedure is "set up to give the inmate population(cid:13) a way to bring complaints, problems, suggestions, etc. to(cid:13) the attention of the Administration of New Jersey State(cid:13) Prison to solve or possibly put into use." App. at A5.(cid:13) Finding that the grievance procedure described in the(cid:13) Handbook does not constitute an "administrative remedy"(cid:13) for purposes of S 1997e(a), the District Court held that(cid:13) there were no available administrative remedies for the(cid:13) 6(cid:13) plaintiffs to exhaust and therefore denied defendants’(cid:13) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to address(cid:13) available administrative remedies on December 21, 2000.1(cid:13) Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 121. After conducting an(cid:13) analysis of the language, structure, and legislative history(cid:13) of S 1997e(a), the court concluded that, in using the phrase(cid:13) "administrative remedies," Congress meant"administrative(cid:13) schemes promulgated by an agency." Id. at 120. Because(cid:13) the prison warden and his staff, rather than the(cid:13) Department of Corrections, promulgated the grievance(cid:13) procedure in the Handbook, the District Court held that the(cid:13) remedy was not "administrative" in nature and thus outside(cid:13) the scope of S 1997e(a). See id.(cid:13) Subsequent to the District Court’s decision denying(cid:13) summary judgment, the United States Supreme Court(cid:13) decided Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), in which(cid:13) the Court held that S 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of an(cid:13) administrative remedy even if that remedy cannot grant the(cid:13) type of relief sought by an inmate. See id. at 734. Thus, the(cid:13) prisoner in that case, who sought only money damages(cid:13) under S 1983, was required to complete a prison(cid:13) administrative process, even though that process could not(cid:13) provide him with any monetary relief. See id. On June 11,(cid:13) 2001, in light of the Court’s holding in Booth , the(cid:13) defendants moved for reconsideration of the District Court’s(cid:13) decision. The District Court, however, denied defendants’(cid:13) motion for reconsideration, explaining:(cid:13) The clear implication of Booth is that courts should not(cid:13) read futility exceptions into [S 1997e(a)’s] exhaustion(cid:13) requirement where there is an existing administrative(cid:13) procedure. Here, this Court found that there was no(cid:13) existing administrative procedure; therefore; the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The District Court did, however, grant summary judgment on Count(cid:13) Seven of plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which alleged that "defendants(cid:13) Willis Morton and John Smith 1-13 failed to provide adequate training(cid:13) and supervision to their corrections officers in violation of plaintiffs’(cid:13) Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Concepcion, 125 F.(cid:13) Supp. 2d at 127. The court held that these claims for supervisory(cid:13) liability had to be dismissed because there was no"affirmative link"(cid:13) between the alleged constitutional violations and the officials sued. Id. at(cid:13) 128.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) teaching of Booth does not alter the Court’s original(cid:13) Opinion and Order.(cid:13) App. at A28.(cid:13) The defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration(cid:13) of the District Court’s order denying their previous motion(cid:13) for reconsideration, noting that several District Judges in(cid:13) the District of New Jersey had recently issued decisions at(cid:13) odds with the District Court’s holding in Concepcion. See,(cid:13) e.g. In re Bayside Prison Litigation, 190 F. Supp. 2d 755,(cid:13) 771 (D.N.J. 2002) ("I cannot accept Concepcion’s conclusion(cid:13) that an inmate handbook can never constitute an(cid:13) administrative remedy . . . ."). In the alternative, the(cid:13) defendants sought a stay of the proceedings and moved to(cid:13) certify the question of what constitutes an "administrative(cid:13) remedy" under S 1997e(a). On October 5, 2001, the District(cid:13) Court denied defendants’ second motion for reconsideration(cid:13) but granted their motion for certification and for a stay of(cid:13) the proceedings.(cid:13) The defendants then petitioned this Court, pursuant to(cid:13) Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for(cid:13) permission to appeal the question whether the exhaustion(cid:13) requirement of S 1997e(a) is applicable only in those(cid:13) instances in which an administrative remedy scheme is(cid:13) adopted through regulations rather than through(cid:13) publication and distribution of an inmate handbook. We(cid:13) granted the petition on November 8, 2001.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.(cid:13) SS 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction over this(cid:13) interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). Because we(cid:13) have been asked to consider the scope of S 1997e(a)’s(cid:13) applicability, which is a question of law, our review is(cid:13) plenary. See Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 507 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2001); Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1998).(cid:13) III.(cid:13) This appeal requires us to consider whether the term(cid:13) "administrative remedies" in 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a)(cid:13) 8(cid:13) encompasses remedies not promulgated by an(cid:13) administrative agency, such as the relatively informal(cid:13) grievance procedure at issue in this case, a procedure(cid:13) which was established by the prison administrators of the(cid:13) NJSP and published in the Department of Corrections(cid:13) Inmate Handbook.(cid:13) To assert an action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, plaintiffs(cid:13) ordinarily need not exhaust administrative remedies first.(cid:13) Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, ___, 122 S.Ct. 983, 987(cid:13) (2002) (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla. , 457 U.S.(cid:13) 496, 516 (1982)). However, in 1980, Congress enacted the(cid:13) Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 94(cid:13) Stat. 352, as amended 42 U.S.C. S 1997e (1994 ed.), which(cid:13) changed the rules for prisoner suits. CRIPA gave district(cid:13) courts discretion to stay a prisoner’s S 1983 action "for a(cid:13) period not to exceed 180 days," during which time the(cid:13) prisoner would exhaust available "plain, speedy, and(cid:13) effective administrative remedies." S 1997e(a)(1). The(cid:13) Supreme Court described this provision as a "limited(cid:13) exhaustion requirement," McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S.(cid:13) 140, 150 (1992), as it "could be ordered only if the State’s(cid:13) prison grievance system met specified federal standards,(cid:13) and even then, only if, in the particular case, the court(cid:13) believed the requirement ‘appropriate and in the interests of(cid:13) justice,’ " Porter, 534 U.S at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 987-88 (citing(cid:13) SS 1997e(a) and (b)).(cid:13) Fifteen years after CRIPA became law, Congress(cid:13) strengthened its exhaustion requirement by enacting the(cid:13) Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat.(cid:13) 1321-73, as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (1994 ed.,(cid:13) Supp. V), which made exhaustion mandatory. The revised(cid:13) provision states that "[n]o action shall be brought with(cid:13) respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,(cid:13) or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,(cid:13) prison, or other correctional facility until such(cid:13) administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42(cid:13) U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (emphasis added). At issue in this case is(cid:13) whether the Handbook’s grievance procedure constitutes an(cid:13) available "administrative remedy" within the scope of the(cid:13) revised S 1997e(a).(cid:13) 9(cid:13) In construing the intended meaning of a statute, we(cid:13) begin with an examination of its language. See Duncan v.(cid:13) Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). Because Congress did(cid:13) not define the term "administrative remedy" inS 1997e(a),(cid:13) we give those words their ordinary meaning. See Asgrow(cid:13) Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (citing(cid:13) FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)). In applying this(cid:13) interpretative principle, the District Court noted that(cid:13) Black’s Law Dictionary defines "administrative remedy" to(cid:13) be " ‘a nonjudicial remedy provided by an administrative(cid:13) agency.’ " Concepcion, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (quoting(cid:13) BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (7th ed. 1999)). Based largely(cid:13) upon this isolated definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, as(cid:13) well as a reference in S 1997e(b) to "[t]he failure of a State(cid:13) to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance(cid:13) procedure," the District Court found that the statute’s(cid:13) language indicates that "Congress intended ‘administrative(cid:13) remedy’ to refer to an administrative scheme adopted by the(cid:13) state department of corrections." Concepcion , 125 F. Supp.(cid:13) 2d at 118-19.(cid:13) While we recognize that the District Court properly(cid:13) attempted to ascertain the meaning of S 1997e(a) through(cid:13) examination of the statute’s own language, we have doubts(cid:13) as to whether that language sufficiently supports the leap(cid:13) the court took in interpreting the general term used by(cid:13) Congress--administrative remedies--as including only the(cid:13) relatively narrow category of remedies ultimately carved out(cid:13) by the District Court, i.e., those that have been"adopted by(cid:13) the state department of corrections." Nowhere inS 1997e(cid:13) does Congress indicate that the manner in which a remedy(cid:13) is implemented affects the applicability of the statute’s(cid:13) exhaustion requirement.(cid:13) Furthermore, we find that the isolated definition of(cid:13) "administrative remedy" cited by the District Court hardly(cid:13) lends conclusive support to its narrow interpretation, which(cid:13) rests mostly on the fact that Congress used the term(cid:13) "administrative remedies" rather than just the term(cid:13) "remedies." The degree to which the word "administrative"(cid:13) should be read to narrow the range of "remedies"(cid:13) contemplated in S 1997e(a), however, appears less certain(cid:13) in light of broader definitions not discussed by the District(cid:13) 10(cid:13) Court. For example, another reference defines(cid:13) "administrative" as "proceeding from . . . an(cid:13) administration," which, in turn, is defined as"a body of(cid:13) persons who are responsible for managing a business or an(cid:13) institution." WEBSTER’STHIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 28(cid:13) (1993). In this case, the remedy in the Handbook(cid:13) "proceeded from" the prison warden and his staff, who, as(cid:13) a group responsible for managing the prison, comfortably(cid:13) fit within the above-quoted definition of "administration."(cid:13) Just as the Supreme Court found that the single word(cid:13) "remedy" in S 1997e(a) can have different meanings(cid:13) "depending on where one looks," Booth, 532 U.S. at 738, we(cid:13) find that the ordinary meaning of the term "administrative(cid:13) remedy" is far less clear and instructive than has been(cid:13) suggested by the District Court. Accordingly, we look to the(cid:13) statutory history and motivating policies of S 1997e(a) for(cid:13) further guidance in determining whether the Handbook’s(cid:13) grievance procedure constitutes an "administrative remedy"(cid:13) for purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.(cid:13) Plaintiffs liken the grievance procedure described in the(cid:13) Handbook to a "suggestion box," contending that such a(cid:13) remedy is not of the type contemplated by Congress in(cid:13) S 1997e(a). However, as we noted in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204(cid:13) F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 2000), " ‘[t]he removal of the qualifiers(cid:13) "plain, speedy, and effective" from the PLRA’s mandatory(cid:13) exhaustion requirement indicates that Congress no longer(cid:13) wanted courts to examine the effectiveness of(cid:13) administrative remedies but rather to focus solely on(cid:13) whether an administrative remedy program is "available" in(cid:13) the prison involved.’ " Id. at 72 (quoting Alexander v. Hawk,(cid:13) 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998)). We further(cid:13) explained that it was a "justifiable assumption" that(cid:13) "Congress intended to save courts from spending countless(cid:13) hours, educating themselves in every case, as to the(cid:13) vagaries of prison administrative processes, state or(cid:13) federal." Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 74. Along these lines, we(cid:13) think it also justified to assume from the PLRA(cid:13) amendments that Congress did not intend for courts to(cid:13) expend scarce judicial resources examining how and by(cid:13) whom a prison’s grievance procedure was implemented.(cid:13) Rather, as noted above, the revisions to S 1997e(a) suggest(cid:13) 11(cid:13) that Congress wanted the focus to be on the availability of(cid:13) an administrative remedy program. See id. at 72; see also(cid:13) Porter, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 988 (explaining that,(cid:13) under S 1997e(a)’s revised exhaustion provision, "[a]ll(cid:13) ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies(cid:13) need not meet federal standards, nor must they be‘plain,(cid:13) speedy, and effective’ "). In this case, while the effectiveness(cid:13) of the Handbook’s grievance procedure may be unclear,(cid:13) there is no doubt that it is "available" to the plaintiffs.(cid:13) The District Court’s narrow interpretation of the term(cid:13) "administrative remedies" also seems inconsistent with(cid:13) several other motivating policies and goals of the PLRA. In(cid:13) Porter, a case in which the Supreme Court concluded that(cid:13) the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate(cid:13) suits about prison life, including those involving allegations(cid:13) of excessive force, the Court found that, "[b]eyond doubt,(cid:13) Congress enacted S 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and(cid:13) improve the quality of prisoner suits." Id. at 988; see also(cid:13) Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326 n.11 (stating that"Congress(cid:13) amended section 1997e(a) largely in response to concerns(cid:13) about the heavy volume of frivolous prison litigation in the(cid:13) federal courts") (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H14078-02, *H14105(cid:13) (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995)).(cid:13) In Booth, the Court noted some of the practical(cid:13) arguments for exhaustion, even when the administrative(cid:13) remedy cannot provide the type of relief sought by an(cid:13) inmate:(cid:13) [R]equiring exhaustion in these circumstances would(cid:13) produce administrative results that would satisfy at(cid:13) least some inmates who start out asking for nothing(cid:13) but money, since the very fact of being heard and(cid:13) prompting administrative change can mollify passions(cid:13) even when nothing ends up in the pocket. And one(cid:13) may suppose that the administrative process itself(cid:13) would filter out some frivolous claims and foster better-(cid:13) prepared litigation once a dispute did move to the(cid:13) courtroom, even absent formal factfinding.(cid:13) 532 U.S. at 737. The fact that the grievance procedure at(cid:13) issue in this case was not formally adopted by the(cid:13) Department of Corrections seems irrelevant to these(cid:13) 12(cid:13) rationales for exhaustion. Not only does the process(cid:13) outlined in the Handbook give inmates the opportunity to(cid:13) inform the prison administration about any complaints, but(cid:13) it also provides for a written response back to the inmates.(cid:13) Furthermore, the responses of the Department Head are(cid:13) subject to review by the Administrator’s Office and must be(cid:13) signed both by the Department Head and by the Primary(cid:13) Level Supervisor before the Intermediate Level Supervisor(cid:13) gives a final formal answer. (App. at A5.) In light of the(cid:13) forum and feedback provided by the Handbook’s remedy,(cid:13) even if the vast majority of prisoners still remain(cid:13) unsatisfied, "at least some" may be able to resolve their(cid:13) concerns without resorting to litigation. For cases(cid:13) ultimately brought to court, the remedy form submitted by(cid:13) the inmate and the written response provided by the prison(cid:13) administration could facilitate adjudication by clarifying the(cid:13) contours of the controversy. See Porter, 122 S.Ct. at 988;(cid:13) see also Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 74 (noting that an(cid:13) administrative remedy program " ‘often helps focus and(cid:13) clarify the issues for the court’ ") (quoting Alexander, 159(cid:13) F.3d at 1326 n.11).(cid:13) Another policy consideration in favor of the exhaustion(cid:13) requirements relates to the overall efficacy, as well as the(cid:13) improvement, of the administrative process. See Nyhuis,(cid:13) 204 at 76 (stating that "a comprehensive exhaustion(cid:13) requirement better serves the policy of granting an agency(cid:13) the ‘opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to(cid:13) the programs it administers before it is haled into federal(cid:13) court’ ") (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145). Furthermore,(cid:13) if an "inmate sees his meritorious claims handled with care(cid:13) by his jailers, he is more likely to respect their rules and(cid:13) serve his time in a manner that is as productive as(cid:13) possible." Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 76-77. We find these goals to(cid:13) be consistent with requiring the plaintiffs in this case to(cid:13) comply with the remedy described in the Handbook before(cid:13) allowing them to pursue their S 1983 claims in federal(cid:13) court. If the administrators of the NJSP at least have the(cid:13) opportunity to consider and address the grievances of(cid:13) Concepcion and Ways, the possibility exists that the prison(cid:13) and its administration may benefit or improve. With these(cid:13) policies in mind, the fact that the Handbook’s remedy has(cid:13) 13(cid:13) not been formally adopted by the NJDOC is without(cid:13) significance.(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) For the reasons stated above, we hold that a remedy need(cid:13) not be formally adopted through regulations by an agency(cid:13) in order for it to be considered an "administrative remedy"(cid:13) within the scope of S 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement.(cid:13) Thus, in this case, the plaintiffs must first attempt to(cid:13) address their grievances through the administrative remedy(cid:13) described in New Jersey’s Department of Corrections(cid:13) Inmate Handbook before they will be allowed to pursue(cid:13) their S 1983 claims. Accordingly, we will reverse the(cid:13) decision of the District Court and direct it to dismiss the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to exhaust administrative(cid:13) remedies pursuant to S 1997e(a).(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 14
