45 S.E. 566 | N.C. | 1903
This was a controversy submitted to the court without action upon an agreed state of facts. By an act of the General Assembly a stock law was established in Chatham County, through which the *194
(217) defendant's road passes. The Raleigh and Augusta Air Line Railroad Company owns a right of way with track and depots thereon from the Wake County line to the line of Moore County, through New Hope, Cape Fear, and Oakland townships, which was assessed by the North Carolina Corporation Commission for taxation in 1900, 1901, and 1902, at $74,390. The commissioners in November, 1902, levied a "stock-law" tax for 1900 on the said railroad company's right of way, etc., of 20 cents on each $100 of assessed value for taxation in said townships; for 1901, 15 cents, and for 1902, 10 cents, and adopted the following order: "That a tax levy of 10 cents is made on the $100 of value of real estate embraced within the present stock-law territory in said county, known as the Pittsboro and Pioneer stock-law territory." On 6 April, 1903, the following order was made by the commissioners: "Ordered, by the Board of Chatham County Commissioners, that the order of the board at its meeting in November, 1902, relative to railroad taxes be changed so as to require the railroads mentioned to pay the stock-law tax for the years 1900, 1901, and 1902." Pursuant to said orders, the register of deeds has computed taxes against the said railroad as set forth in the case agreed and the sheriff of said county threatens to collect the same. The Corporation Commission, in accordance with the statute, valued the right of way, including tracks and buildings thereon, of the defendant as an entirety, and apportioned to Chatham County such part of the whole amount as the length of the road in Chatham County bore to the entire length of the road, and it was upon this valuation that the "stock-law" assessment was computed. The defendants, the several railroads, parties to this controversy, insist that their right of way, roadbed, depots, etc., are not liable for the assessment levied upon them, because in the act prescribing the method of taxation of railroads, it is expressly provided that their right of way, etc., shall be assessed as personal (218) property; that they do not own the land, but simply a right of way or easement, and rely upon the language used by this Court in Shields v. R. R.,
It is undoubtedly true that as between the railroad and the owner of the land condemned, the former acquires by condemnation proceedings only an easement to be used for the purposes set out in its charter. It is equally clear that the Corporation Commission, the agency appointed for the assessment of railroad property, is directed to assess and value the right of way, etc., as personal property.
The liability of railroads for assessment for local improvements has been the subject of much discussion and conflict of decision. Elliott on Railroads, sec. 786, says: "There is a conflict in the adjudicated cases as to whether or not the right of way of a railroad company is subject to local assessment. The question has been discussed in a great number of *195
instances and different conclusions reached in apparently similar cases. The latest authorities on the subject, however, recognize what we believe to be the true rule, and that is, that where the right of way receives a benefit from the improvements for which the assessment is levied, and there is no statute exempting the railroad company from local assessments in clear and unequivocal terms, it is subject to assessment." In R. R.v. Connelly,
It having been settled by this Court that it is within the power of the Legislature to establish stock-law districts and provide for an assessment upon the land therein to pay for building and maintaining the common fence, upon the theory that the land within said territory receives a special benefit from the establishment of the stock law, we can see no reason why all of the land and all such interests as are capable of *196
(220) receiving the benefit and being assessed therefor do not come within the provisions of the law. Cain v. Commissioners,
We simply decide in this case two questions:
1. That the roadbed and right of way of the defendant is liable to an assessment for local improvements as other real estate.
2. That the assessment levied by the commissioners, based upon the valuation of the Corporation Commission, cannot be sustained.
(221) The judgment of his Honor is, therefore,
Affirmed.